{"document":{"slug":"clarification-er26-3380-amp","title":"Request for Clarification and Alternative Request for Rehearing of American Municipal Power, Inc.","issued":"2026-10-13","accession":"20261013-5514","docket":"ER26-3380-001","group":"Rehearing of FERC's PJM Reliability Backstop Procurement order","filer":"American Municipal Power","kind":"request for clarification or rehearing","file":"sources/originals/20261013-5514_AMP_Clarification_ER26-3380.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_number=20261013-5514","sha256":"35d7abe57fa7077b76596d1c2122d41757c02457f86732daf7c3f71a79a57cc7","pages":17,"tokens":4643,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":273,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n \n) \n) \nDocket Nos. ER26-3380-000 \n                            EL26-108-000 \nREQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION AND ALTERNATIVE  \nREQUEST FOR REHEARING OF \nAMERICAN MUNICIPAL POWER, INC. \n \nAmerican Municipal Power, Inc. (“AMP”) hereby requests clarification of certain \naspects of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“Commission” or “FERC”) \nSeptember 29, 2026 order in the above-captioned docket,1 which addressed the proposal \nby PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) to establish a Reliability Backstop Procurement \n(“RBP”) for the PJM region.2 Clarification of the September 29 Order is warranted to help \nensure that any method for allocating RBP costs (whether developed in this proceeding \nor proposed by PJM in a future filing) comports with the Commission’s goal of allocating \nRBP costs to regions experiencing load growth driven by new large loads, consistent with \ncost causation principles.  \nFirst, the Commission should clarify its suggestion in the September 29 Order that \nit may be just and reasonable for PJM to “base the RBP allocation on the difference \nbetween the actual load for 2026/2027 delivery year in each Electric Distributor zone/area \nwith the most recent 2028/2029 delivery year load forecast for each Electric Distributor \nzone/area.”3 The Commission should make clear that it would not be just and reasonable \nto implement this cost allocation method if (as is likely) it would result in RBP costs being \n \n1  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245 (2026) (“September 29 Order”). \n2  PJM, Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from Large \nLoads, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026) (“PJM Filing”). \n3  September 29 Order at P 159."},{"page":2,"startToken":273,"endToken":590,"text":"2 \nallocated to Electric Distributor zone/areas that are not experiencing load growth \nattributable to data centers or other large loads, as such an allocation would be \ninconsistent with the cost causation principle.  \nSecond, the Commission should clarify that it did not make a final determination in \nthe September 29 Order that PJM’s proposed cost allocation method is not just and \nreasonable.4 The Commission should also clarify that parties will have the opportunity in \nthe paper hearing to argue that PJM’s as-filed proposal to allocate RBP cost responsibility \nis just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or unduly preferential.5 In the \nalternative, AMP requests rehearing. \nI. \nBACKGROUND \nPJM proposed the RBP as “a one-time time procurement of new capacity to \naddress resource adequacy challenges in the PJM Region.”6 The mechanism was \ndesigned to procure a targeted quantity of capacity under fixed agreements with terms up \nto fifteen years beginning with the 2028/2029 Delivery Year and ending with the \n2042/2043 Delivery Year.7 PJM set the Initial RBP Target at 6,831.3 MW.8  \nPJM proposed to allocate the Initial RBP Target “to each Electric Distributor’s \nzone/area using that zone/area’s pro-rata share of the difference between the forecasted \n \n4  See id. at PP 153-57. \n5  See id. at P 158. \n6  PJM Filing, Transmittal Letter at 1. \n7  Id. at 8. \n8  Id. at 31. This quantity (in megawatts (“MW”) of Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”)) is the amount that PJM’s \nBase Residual Auction for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year cleared short of PJM’s RTO-wide reliability \nrequirement at the price cap of $325/MW-day. Id. at 7. PJM proposed that the Initial RBP Target could \nbe decremented to account for certain new offsetting capacity (Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW), as \nwell as for any qualifying Electric Distributor zone/areas that opt out of procuring capacity through the \nRBP. See id. at 8-9."},{"page":3,"startToken":590,"endToken":969,"text":"3 \nLoad Adjustments for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year and the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.”9 \nThus, the Initial RBP Target of 6,831.3 MW would be allocated to those Electric Distributor \nzone/areas that provided PJM projections of large load growth between 2026 and 2028.10 \nAlthough there would be several more steps in determining ultimate liability for RBP \nCharges under PJM’s proposal, zone/areas that did not receive any allocation at this first \nstep would be effectively excluded from responsibility for RBP Charges. PJM asserted \nthat this allocation framework would be consistent with cost causation principles and the \nRatepayer Protection Pledge.11 \nIn the September 29 Order, the Commission preliminarily found that aspects of \nPJM’s RBP proposal – including cost allocation – may be unjust, unreasonable, unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential.12 The Commission established paper hearing procedures \nto address three aspects of the PJM Filing – cost allocation, Transmission Owner exit \nrules, and collateral requirements for Load Serving Entities (“LSEs”).13 The paper hearing, \nthe Commission explained, “should address the Commission’s potential modifications \n \n9  PJM Filing, Attach. A, proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, section 18.3(a). \n10  See, e.g., id., Attach. C, Croop Aff. at ¶¶ 41-43; Transmittal Letter at 96-97. \n11  See id., Transmittal Letter at 100-108. PJM effectively confirmed that neither AMP, nor any AMP \nmember, would be allocated any of the costs of procuring the Initial RBP Target (i.e., RBP Charges) \nunder PJM’s as-filed proposal, as all AMP members were within zone/areas that would not receive any \nallocation of the Initial RBP Target. See AMP, Comments, Docket No. ER26-3380-000, at 2 (Aug. 21, \n2026) (“AMP Comments”). \n12  See September 29 Order at P 23. FERC also concluded that the existing PJM Open Access \nTransmission Tariff (“Tariff”) “may be unjust and unreasonable because the existing reliability backstop \nprovisions appear to be insufficient to prevent the grave resource adequacy concerns that led PJM to \nfile the instant proposal in the first place.” Id. at P 29. \n13  See id. at PP 23-24. The Commission also established a new proceeding in Docket No. EL26-108-000 \npursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) “in anticipation of the Commission directing \nsignificant modifications to certain aspects of PJM’s RBP proposal following the paper hearing.” Id. at P \n27."},{"page":4,"startToken":969,"endToken":1301,"text":"4 \nwith respect to the portions of PJM’s existing RBP proposal” that FERC found may be \nunjust and unreasonable.14  \nWhile establishing a paper hearing, the Commission “strongly encourage[d] PJM \nto address the issues discussed in this order by submitting an alternative proposal \npursuant to its FPA section 205 filing rights without delay.”15 The Commission observed \nthat such a filing could “obviate the need for the paper hearing procedures,”16 and the \nCommission indicated that it would likely hold the paper hearing in abeyance if PJM files \na new FPA section 205 filing within thirty days of the September 29 Order.17 \nII. \nREQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION \nA. \nThe Commission should clarify that it would not be just and \nreasonable to implement its potential modification to PJM’s proposed \nRBP cost allocation if that approach would result in the allocation of \nRBP costs to zone/areas that are not experiencing load growth \nattributable to large loads. \nIn finding that PJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation may be unjust and \nunreasonable, the Commission’s principal concern was that PJM’s reliance on Load \nAdjustments could “potentially leav[e] out some new large loads,”18 because Load \nAdjustments “account[] for net load growth associated with any size or type of load, while \nexcluding any new large loads that PJM knew of and accounted for when calculating the \ninitial load forecast.”19 Excluding new large loads from the Load Adjustments used to \n \n14  Id. at P 23.  \n15  Id. at P 28; see also id. at PP 3, 158, 160. \n16  Id. at P 3. \n17  Id. at P 24. \n18  Id. at P 155. The Commission also found that “PJM’s proposed opt-out for qualifying cooperatives and \nmunicipal utilities may be unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory.” Id. at P 152. \n19  Id. at P 155; see also id. at P 154 (agreeing “with concerns in the record that relying on Load Adjustments \nto measure load growth may be inconsistent or not reasonably capture forecasted load growth or actual"},{"page":5,"startToken":1301,"endToken":1625,"text":"5 \nallocate the Initial RBP Target, the Commission reasoned, “could lead to the costs \nimposed on certain entities not being at least roughly commensurate with the benefits \nthey will receive from the procurement.”20 In other words, the Commission was not \npersuaded that the load growth data upon which PJM proposed to rely would accurately \nidentify, and allocate costs to, zone/areas with the new large loads that drove the region’s \ncurrent capacity shortfall, as required by the cost causation principle.21  \nIn response to this perceived deficiency in PJM’s proposal, the Commission \nremarked that it may be just and reasonable for PJM to “base the RBP allocation on the \ndifference between the actual load for 2026/2027 delivery year in each Electric Distributor \nzone/area with the most recent 2028/2029 delivery year load forecast for each Electric \nDistributor zone/area.”22 This approach, the Commission suggested, “may be consistent \nwith the cost causation principle because it would appropriately assign RBP costs to the \nElectric Distributor zone/areas with the reported new load that is driving the need for the \nprocurement.”23 The Commission indicated that parties should address this potential \nmodification to PJM’s cost allocation proposal in the paper hearing procedures.24 \nThe cost causation principle dictates that “all Commission-jurisdictional rates and \ncharges must reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who must \n \nlarge load growth.”). As explained, infra, in section III.B.1, the Commission appears to have \nmisunderstood how PJM calculated the Load Adjustment data on which PJM relied to set the Initial RBP \nTarget. \n20  Id. at P 155. \n21  See, e.g., id., Comm’r See, concurring, at P 3 (observing that “PJM missed the mark on an important \nelement of its proposal: it did not adequately ensure that the procurement’s costs will be allocated to the \ncustomers who drive its need.”). \n22  Id. at P 159. \n23  Id. \n24  Id. at PP 158, 160."},{"page":6,"startToken":1625,"endToken":1956,"text":"6 \npay for them, and costs must be allocated in a manner that is at least roughly \ncommensurate with benefits.”25 Adherence to this principle in allocating RBP costs, as \nthe Commission properly recognized, requires that RBP costs are borne by the \nzone/areas experiencing growth in large loads.26 The United States Department of Energy \n(“DOE”) underscored this point in its recent Statement of Position, “emphasiz[ing] the \nneed to protect ratepayers from the costs associated with rising demand caused by other \nlarge load customers.”27 \nTo help ensure that the method for allocating RBP costs (whether developed \nthrough the paper hearing or proposed by PJM in an FPA section 205 filing) comports \nwith the Commission’s goal of allocating RBP costs to zone/areas experiencing load \ngrowth driven by new large loads, the Commission should clarify that it would not be just \nand reasonable to apply the Commission’s potential modification to PJM’s cost allocation \nmethod if it would result in RBP costs being allocated to Electric Distributor zone/areas \nthat are not experiencing load growth attributable to data centers or other large loads, as \nsuch an allocation would be inconsistent with the cost causation principle.  \nThe requested clarification would avoid any potential misinterpretation of the \nCommission’s statement that its potential modification to the PJM proposal “would \nappropriately assign RBP costs to the Electric Distributor zone/areas with the reported \nnew load that is driving the need for the procurement.”28 Specifically, clarification would \n \n25  Id. at P 150 (citation modified). \n26  Id. at PP 154-55; see also id., Comm’r Rosner, concurring, at P 2 (opining that the Commission’s \nguidance “will enable PJM to assign costs to those responsible (i.e. to the zones with data center growth) \nfor the resource adequacy shortfall, consistent with cost causation principles”). \n27  DOE, Notice of Intervention and Statement of Position of the United States Department of Energy, \nDocket Nos. ER26-3380-000, et al., at 6 (Oct. 7, 2026). \n28  September 29 Order at P 159."},{"page":7,"startToken":1956,"endToken":2234,"text":"7 \nindicate that the Commission’s reference to “new load that is driving the need for the \nprocurement” means new data center and other large load. \nClarification is also appropriate to resolve the incongruity between, on the one \nhand, the Commission’s aim of ensuring that RBP costs are allocated to zone/areas with \nlarge load growth driving resource adequacy deficiencies, and, on the other hand, the \nlikelihood that its proposed cost allocation method would allocate RBP costs to \nzone/areas without new large loads. Contrary to the Commission’s goals in suggesting \nits revised cost allocation approach, implementing its potential modification to RBP cost \nallocation would likely violate cost causation principles, as it could result in the allocation \nof RBP costs to zone/areas that have not experienced load growth attributable to data \ncenters or other large loads. The Commission’s proposed modification apparently calls \nfor PJM to allocate RBP costs to each Electric Distributor zone/area based on its load \nratio share of forecasted load growth between the 2026/2027 and 2028/2029 delivery \nyears. Such a load ratio share approach to allocating costs would not comport with cost \ncausation. As the Commission recognized, “[t]he RBP is a one-time procurement of \ncapacity resources to address a shortfall attributable to load growth in certain Electric \nDistributor zone/areas.”29 Simply assigning RBP costs based on each zone/area’s share \nof the difference between the actual load for the 2026/2027 delivery year and the load \nforecast for 2028/2029 would not ensure that costs are appropriately allocated to those \n“certain Electric Distributor zone/areas”30 driving the capacity shortfall. The Commission’s \n \n29  Id. at P 156 (emphasis added).  \n30  Id."},{"page":8,"startToken":2234,"endToken":2534,"text":"8 \nmodified approach is instead likely also to capture zone/areas where load growth is \nattributable to ordinary, organic load growth, not new large loads.  \nB. \nThe Commission should clarify that it has not made a final decision \nregarding the justness and reasonableness of PJM’s proposed cost \nallocation method. \nAMP generally supported the RBP cost allocation method proposed in the PJM \nFiling, observing that it would appropriately allocate the Initial RBP Target to zone/areas \nwith large load growth documented in forecast Load Adjustments.31 As noted above, \nhowever, the Commission concluded “that PJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation method \nmay be unjust and unreasonable,”32 finding that, “based on the current record, PJM has \nnot adequately demonstrated that its proposal is just and reasonable and consistent with \nthe cost causation principle.”33 \nThe September 29 Order, however, is ambiguous as to whether the Commission \nintended to make a final decision as to the justness and reasonableness of PJM’s as-filed \ncost allocation method that would be subject to a request for rehearing. While certain \nstatements in the September 29 Order indicate that the Commission made no final \ndetermination on the merits of PJM’s proposal,34 other statements in the Order suggest \n \n31  See AMP Comments at 2. \n32  September 29 Order at P 153. \n33  Id. \n34  See, e.g., id. at P 23 (“[o]ur preliminary analysis indicates that . . . aspects of PJM’s proposal have not \nbeen shown to be just and reasonable and may be unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or \npreferential, or otherwise unlawful.”); id. (“PJM’s filing raises issues of material fact that cannot be \nresolved based on the record before us and that are more appropriately addressed in the paper hearing \nprocedures established below.”); id at P 153 (“PJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation method may be \nunjust and unreasonable”)."},{"page":9,"startToken":2534,"endToken":2883,"text":"9 \nthat the Commission conclusively found that PJM’s proposed cost allocation method is \nnot just and reasonable.35 \nThe Commission should clarify that it has not made a final decision regarding the \njustness and reasonableness of PJM’s as-filed RBP cost allocation approach, and that \nthe September 29 Order is not a final order as to that issue. Granting the requested \nclarification would be consistent with the general proposition that, when the Commission \nmakes preliminary findings on an issue and establishes further procedures, it has not \nmade a final determination that is subject to rehearing requests.36 \nThe Commission should also clarify that parties may address PJM’s as-filed cost \nallocation proposal in the paper hearing procedures. Those procedures would provide an \nappropriate forum for parties to clarify aspects of PJM’s proposal that are subject to \nmisinterpretation, and address other details related to the merits of PJM’s as-filed cost \nallocation method. The hearing process would allow the Commission to make a final \ndetermination on the proposal’s justness and reasonableness based on a more complete \nrecord.37 The opportunity to further evaluate PJM’s original proposal could be particularly \nvaluable given the concerns discussed above regarding the Commission’s proposed \nmodification to PJM’s cost allocation approach. \n \n35  See, e.g., id. at P 156 (“PJM has not demonstrated that reliance on the Load Adjustment process is just \nand reasonable.”); id. at P 158 (“we now conclude that additional record evidence is needed to determine \nwhether PJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation method could be just and reasonable if modified.”); id., \nComm’r See, concurring, at P 3 (“PJM missed the mark on an important element of its proposal: it did \nnot adequately ensure that the procurement’s costs will be allocated to the customers who drive its \nneed.”). \n36  See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 19 (2026); DCR Transmission, L.L.C., \n195 FERC ¶ 61,181, at P 19 (2026). \n37  See September 29 Order at P 153 (concluding “based on the current record” that PJM did not adequately \ndemonstrate that its cost allocation proposal is just and reasonable)."},{"page":10,"startToken":2883,"endToken":3146,"text":"10 \nIII. \nALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR REHEARING \nIf the Commission denies the clarification requested in section II.B above, AMP \nseeks rehearing of the September 29 Order pursuant to FPA section 31338 and \nCommission Rule 713.39 The Commission should grant rehearing of its determination that \nPJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation method – particularly its reliance on Load \nAdjustments – is not just and reasonable. The Commission’s rejection of PJM’s proposal \nwas arbitrary and capricious, as it was based on an apparent misunderstanding of PJM’s \napproach. \nA. \nStatement of Issues \nIn accordance with Rule 713(c)(2),40 AMP provides the following enumerated \nstatement of issues, including citations to representative Commission and court \nprecedent on which it relies: \n1. \nThe Commission’s conclusion that PJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation \nmethod was not just and reasonable was arbitrary and capricious.41 \n2. \nThe Commission’s conclusion that PJM’s proposed RBP cost allocation \nmethod was not just and reasonable was arbitrary and capricious, as it was based upon \nan apparent misunderstanding of the record evidence.42 \n \n38  16 U.S.C. § 825l. \n39  18 C.F.R. § 385.713. \n40  18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c)(2).  \n41  5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., \n463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); New England Power Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 881 F.3d 202 (D.C. Cir. 2018); \nKeySpan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 348 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003). \n42  5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n., 463 U.S. at 43."},{"page":11,"startToken":3146,"endToken":3457,"text":"11 \nB. \nRequest for Rehearing \n1. \nThe Commission’s rejection of PJM’s RBP cost allocation \nmethod was based on an apparent misunderstanding of that \nmethod. \nAs discussed above, the Commission’s principal rationale for rejecting PJM’s \nproposed cost allocation method was that PJM’s reliance “on Load Adjustments to \nmeasure load growth may be inconsistent or not reasonably capture forecasted load \ngrowth or actual large load growth.”43 While the Commission reasonably determined that \nthe cost causation principle requires RBP costs to be allocated based on “large load \ngrowth,” the Commission erred in concluding that PJM’s as-filed proposal would not \naccomplish this aim. The Commission’s conclusion appears to have been based, in \nsignificant part, on a misunderstanding of the PJM methodology. As a consequence, the \nCommission’s decision is not the product of reasoned decision making.44 \nThe Commission expressed concern that, based on PJM’s discussion of its load \nforecasting process in a prior proceeding, “it appears some large loads may never have \nbeen accounted for as Load Adjustments because PJM accounted for them when \ncalculating the initial load forecast.”45 This observation misapprehends the PJM Load \nAdjustment methodology used in allocating the Initial RBP Target. PJM’s proposed RBP \ncost allocation method was based on the Load Adjustments in Table B9b in the 2026 PJM \n \n43  September 29 Order at P 154. \n44  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n., 463 U.S. at 43 (an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious where the \nagency offers “an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency”). \n45  September 29 Order at P 155 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 188 FERC ¶ 61,200, at P 21 (2024)); \nsee also id. (“the delta accounts for net load growth associated with any size or type of load, while \nexcluding any new large loads that PJM knew of and accounted for when calculating the initial load \nforecast.”)."},{"page":12,"startToken":3457,"endToken":3812,"text":"12 \nLoad Forecast,46 and those adjustments incorporate large loads that might otherwise be \ncaptured in the initial load forecast, thus avoiding the concern identified by the \nCommission.  \nAs the Commission notes, PJM stated in Docket No. ER24-2447 that, to avoid \ndouble counting of forecast load, PJM will not generally make a Load Adjustment if, based \non its review process, it concludes that a potential Load Adjustment is already captured \nin the underlying load forecast model.47 The actual process is more complex. Relevant \nhere, PJM’s review of Load Adjustments includes a sensitivity analysis, reflected in Table \nB9 of the PJM Load Forecast,48 that seeks to identify the extent to which a proposed Load \nAdjustment includes large load already embedded in PJM’s initial econometric forecast.49 \nTable B9 presents the results of this sensitivity analysis, quantifying the Load Adjustment \namounts included in the final forecast that are over and above what is already embedded \nin PJM’s initial forecast.50 Reliance on Load Adjustment quantities in Table B9 to allocate \nRBP costs would indeed present a concern of undercounting new large loads. \nPJM, however, did not rely on the Load Adjustments shown in Table B9 to allocate \nRBP costs, it proposed to use the Load Adjustments in Table B9b of the Load Forecast. \n \n46  PJM Filing, Attach. C, Croop Aff. at ¶ 43 (citing 2026 PJM Load Forecast Report Data Tables, PJM \nInterconnection, \nL.L.C., \nTab \nTable \nB9b \n(Feb. \n2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/planning/res-adeq/load-forecast/2026-load-report-tables.xlsx [https://perma.cc/SST2-\nEGUZ]; 2026 PJM Load Forecast Report, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 5-6 (Jan. 14, 2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2026-load-report.pdf \n[https://perma.cc/J24E-7CV7] (describing Table B9b results)). \n47  See September 29 Order at P 155; see also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 188 FERC ¶ 61,200 at P 21. \n48  See footnote 46, supra. \n49  See, e.g., PJM, 2026 PJM Long-Term Load Forecast, Load Analysis Subcommittee presentation, at p. \n28 \n(Jan. \n23, \n2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-\ngroups/subcommittees/las/2026/20260123/20260123-item-03---pjm-2026-long-term-load-forecast---\npresentation.pdf. \n50  See id."},{"page":13,"startToken":3812,"endToken":4055,"text":"13 \nThe Load Adjustments reflected in Table B9b, which was developed after PJM’s filing in \nDocket ER24-2447, are intended to include new large loads that might otherwise have \nbeen reflected in the underlying econometric forecast. PJM has described51 the basic \nmethodology for Table B9b Load Adjustments to be as follows: First, PJM identifies zones \nwith existing data center loads. Second, PJM removes monthly data center load from the \ncommercial Energy Information Administration data underlying the load forecast. Third, \nPJM removes hourly data center load from historical loads used in PJM’s model \nestimation. Finally, total accepted load is added to the load forecast. Thus, PJM removes \nlarge loads from the underlying forecast data and adds large loads back into the forecast \nthrough the Load Adjustments.52 Table B9b is intended to capture the difference between \nthe final forecast and what the final forecast would be without any large load, not just \nwithout Load Adjustment requests above the embedded value.  \nThe difference between the B9 and B9b analyses can be seen in a comparison of \nthe respective results, with Table B9b generally reflecting larger Load Adjustments, as \nwould be expected given the nature of that analysis: \n \n \n \n51  PJM, 2026 PJM Long-Term Load Forecast, Load Analysis Subcommittee presentation, at p. 28, \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-\ngroups/subcommittees/las/2026/20260123/20260123-item-03---pjm-2026-long-term-load-forecast---\npresentation.pdf. \n52  For zones without existing data center loads, total accepted large load gets added into the forecast. See \nid."},{"page":14,"startToken":4055,"endToken":4066,"text":"14 \n2026 Load Forecast – Table B9 \n \n2026 Load Forecast – Table B9b"},{"page":15,"startToken":4066,"endToken":4382,"text":"15 \nBecause the Load Adjustments in Table B9b are intended to count new large load \nquantities, including those that might have otherwise been embedded in the initial PJM \nload forecast data, use of Table B9b addresses the Commission’s principal concern with \nPJM’s use of Load Adjustments in the cost allocation methodology. Accordingly, the \nCommission erred in finding that PJM’s approach was not just and reasonable based on \nthat concern.  \n2. \nThe objections raised by the NJBPU did not warrant rejection of \nPJM’s cost allocation methodology. \nIn rejecting PJM’s cost allocation methodology, the Commission also pointed to an \nanswer filed by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (“NJPBU”).53 Although generally \nsupporting reliance on Load Adjustments to allocate RBP costs, the NJBPU Answer \nraised concerns about utilities’ potential use of inconsistent criteria in submitting the Load \nAdjustment requests that formed the basis for PJM’s proposed cost allocation.54 While a \nspecific MW threshold for Load Adjustments might have been preferable (and has now \nbeen adopted55), the absence of such a bright line does not undermine a conclusion that \nthe Load Adjustments submitted by utilities in connection with the 2026 Load Forecast \nreasonably captured the large loads driving the region’s current capacity shortfall. \nMoreover, once the proposed Load Adjustments were submitted, PJM engaged in a \nrobust independent analysis to ensure that the proposals were evaluated based on \nconsistent standards, regardless of the criteria used by the respective utilities that \n \n53  September 29 Order at P 155 (citing NJBPU, Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer, at 3-6 (Sept. 24, \n2026) (“NJBPU Answer”)). As noted, the NJBPU filed its answer just five days before the date by which \nPJM asked the Commission to act on its Filing). \n54  See NJBPU Answer at 3-6. \n55  See id. at 4 n.13 (noting that PJM Manual 19 has been updated to specify a 50 MW threshold for future \nLoad Adjustments)."},{"page":16,"startToken":4382,"endToken":4579,"text":"16 \nsubmitted the Load Adjustments.56 Accordingly, the NJBPU’s concerns did not warrant \nrejection of PJM’s cost allocation approach. \nBecause the Commission’s rationales for rejecting PJM’s proposed RBP cost \nallocation method were based on a mistaken or incomplete understanding of PJM’s \napproach, the Commission should grant rehearing of its rejection of PJM’s approach. \nIV. \nCONCLUSION \nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, American Municipal Power, Inc. \nrequests the Commission to clarify its September 29 Order as explained herein. In the \nalternative, AMP requests rehearing of the Commission’s rejection of PJM’s RBP cost \nallocation methodology.  \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n/s/ John McCaffrey            \nJohn McCaffrey \nStinson LLP  \n1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  \nSuite 800  \nWashington, DC 20006  \n(202) 728-3026  \njohn.mccaffrey@stinson.com \n \n \n \nDated: October 13, 2026\n/s/ Gerit F. Hull                \nLisa G. McAlister                               \nSenior Vice President & General Counsel  \nGerit F. Hull                                   \nDeputy General Counsel for Regulatory Affairs   \nAmerican Municipal Power, Inc.                 \n1111 Schrock Road, Suite 100  \nColumbus, OH 43229                   \n(614) 540-1111 \nlmcalister@amppartners.org \nghull@amppartners.org \n \n56  See, e.g., PJM, Load Adjustment Requests Summary for 2026 Load Forecast - Preliminary, Load \nAnalysis \nSubcommittee \npresentation \n(Nov. \n24, \n2025), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/committees-groups/subcommittees/las/2025/20251124/20251124-item-03---large-\nload-adjustment-requests-summary.pdf."},{"page":17,"startToken":4579,"endToken":4643,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n \nI hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each \nperson designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \nDated at Washington, D.C., this 13th day of October, 2026. \n/s/ John McCaffrey                       \nJohn McCaffrey \nStinson LLP  \n1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  \nSuite 800  \nWashington, DC 20006  \n(202) 728-3026  \njohn.mccaffrey@stinson.com"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":2,"endAt":696,"startToken":0,"endToken":380},{"p":2,"at":696,"title":"I. BACKGROUND","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":700,"startToken":380,"endToken":381},{"p":2,"at":700,"title":"BACKGROUND","method":"printed heading","endPage":4,"endAt":628,"startToken":381,"endToken":1073},{"p":4,"at":628,"title":"II. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION","method":"printed heading","endPage":4,"endAt":660,"startToken":1073,"endToken":1077},{"p":4,"at":660,"title":"A. The Commission should clarify that it would not be just and","method":"printed heading","endPage":8,"endAt":158,"startToken":1077,"endToken":2259},{"p":8,"at":158,"title":"B. The Commission should clarify that it has not made a final decision","method":"printed heading","endPage":10,"endAt":4,"startToken":2259,"endToken":2884},{"p":10,"at":4,"title":"III. ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR REHEARING","method":"printed heading","endPage":10,"endAt":557,"startToken":2884,"endToken":2966},{"p":10,"at":557,"title":"A. Statement of Issues","method":"printed heading","endPage":11,"endAt":4,"startToken":2966,"endToken":3147},{"p":11,"at":4,"title":"B. Request for Rehearing","method":"printed heading","endPage":16,"endAt":376,"startToken":3147,"endToken":4435},{"p":16,"at":376,"title":"IV. CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":16,"endAt":381,"startToken":4435,"endToken":4436},{"p":16,"at":381,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":17,"endAt":0,"startToken":4436,"endToken":4579},{"p":17,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":17,"endAt":439,"startToken":4579,"endToken":4643}]}