{"document":{"slug":"e-9-spp-el26-68-000","title":"SPP show cause order","issued":"2026-06-18","docket":"EL26-68-000","filer":"FERC","group":"June 18 orders","kind":"order","file":"docs/orders/e-9-spp-el26-68-000.pdf","url":"https://www.ferc.gov/media/e-9-el26-68-000","sha256":"28c88f38e615d84bfc93c6a0b89995b40f86520d08d0e277afed8038ef884d3d","pages":92,"tokens":33815,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":147,"text":"195 FERC ¶ 61,213 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nBefore Commissioners: Laura V. Swett, Chairman; \n David Rosner, Lindsay S. See, \n Judy W. Chang, and David LaCerte. \n \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc. \nAEP Oklahoma Transmission Company, Inc. \nAEP Southwestern Transmission Company, Inc. \nDeseret Generation & Transmission Co-operative, Inc. \nEmpire District Electric Company \nEvergy Kansas Central, Inc. \nEvergy Kansas South, Inc. \nEvergy Metro, Inc. \nEvergy Missouri West, Inc. \nGridLiance High Plains LLC \nITC Great Plains, LLC \nMountrail-Williams Electric Cooperative \nNextEra Energy Transmission Southwest, LLC \nNorthWestern Energy Public Service Corporation \nOklahoma Gas and Electric Company \nPrairie Wind Transmission, LLC \nPublic Service Company of Oklahoma \nSouthwestern Electric Power Company \nSouthwestern Public Service Company \nTransource Missouri, LLC \nTransource Oklahoma, LLC \nTri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. \nUpper Missouri G. & T. Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nDocket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n \nORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDING \n \nUNDER SECTION 206 OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT \n \n(Issued June 18, 2026)"},{"page":2,"startToken":147,"endToken":411,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 2 - \nParagraph Numbers \nI. Background ..................................................................................................................... 6. \nA. Growth of Large and Co-Located Loads and ANOPR ............................................. 6. \nB. Recent Proceedings Addressing Large and Co-Located Loads .............................. 11. \n1. PJM Co-Location Proceedings ............................................................................ 12. \n2. SPP High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load Generation \nAssessment Processes .............................................................................................. 15. \n3. SPP Conditional High Impact Large Load Service ............................................. 17. \nII. SPP’s Existing Processes ............................................................................................. 19. \nA. Existing Tariff Processes ......................................................................................... 19. \nB. Recent Stakeholder Proceedings in SPP ................................................................. 27. \nIII. Discussion ................................................................................................................... 29. \nA. Transmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large Loads ................ 35. \n1. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................... 37. \n2. Tariff Provisions .................................................................................................. 43. \nB. Cost Shifting Risk Among Transmission Customers .............................................. 47. \n1. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................... 49. \n2. Additional Cost Transparency ............................................................................. 52. \n3. Cost Recovery Agreements ................................................................................. 59. \nC. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter Generation ............. 67. \n1. Definition ............................................................................................................. 69. \n2. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................... 73. \n3. Tariff Provisions .................................................................................................. 75. \nD. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on \nBehalf of Flexible Large Loads ................................................................................... 85. \nE. Informational Report ............................................................................................... 89. \nIV. Briefing Questions ...................................................................................................... 92. \n \n \nOver the past year, the Commission has taken action in numerous dockets1 to \naddress issues related to (a) unprecedented increases in requests for transmission service \n \n1 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 (2025) \n(PJM Show Cause Order); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2025) \n(PJM Co-Location Order); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026) (SPP HILL \nOrder); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2026) (SPP CHILLS Order); see also, \ne.g., Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025); Commonwealth Edison \nCo., 194 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2026)."},{"page":3,"startToken":411,"endToken":888,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 3 - \nto serve large loads2 and (b) growing interest in the co-location of loads with generating \nfacilities (co-location arrangements3). Separately, the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) \nreleased an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) in October 2025. The \nANOPR, issued pursuant to section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act,4 \ndirected the Commission to consider taking additional actions to address the addition of \nlarge and co-located loads to the transmission system.5 The records in these proceedings \nillustrate a host of urgent challenges associated with providing the transmission service \nneeded to serve the ongoing influx of large loads while maintaining reliability and \naffordability. In particular, stakeholders have expressed concerns that large loads are not \nefficiently and appropriately integrated onto the transmission system; have identified a \nnumber of unique challenges that large load integration poses for the reliable operation of \nthat system; and have debated how best to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of \ntransmission service remain just and reasonable as more and more large loads are \nonboarded onto that system.6 The records in these proceedings likewise present serious \n \n2 For the purposes of this order, we adopt SPP’s definition of high impact large \nload (HILL) for large load. See infra note 54. \n3 As explained below, it appears that it would be reasonable to define co-located \nload as a configuration that refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected \nto the facilities of an existing or planned generating facility on the interconnection \ncustomer’s side of the point of interconnection to the RTO/ISO’s transmission system. \nIn this order, we will use the term co-location arrangement when referring to both the \nco-located load and the associated generating facility. See infra P 69. \n4 42 U.S.C. § 7173. \n5 See Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, \nAdvance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 23, 2025) \n(ANOPR); see also Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Docket \nNo. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 23, 2025). The ANOPR uses the term “hybrid facilities,” \nwhich it explains are large loads that “share a point of interconnection with new or \nexisting generation facilities.” ANOPR at P 12. In this order, as explained below, \nwe use the term co-located load. \n6 Throughout this order we rely on comments and answers filed in response to the \nANOPR in Docket No. RM26-4-000 and all referenced comments in this order were filed \nin that docket, unless otherwise noted. A full list of commenter names and abbreviations \nis attached to this order as an Appendix. Additionally, we have relied on the discussions \nheld in the Federal and State Current Issues Collaborative in Docket No. AD24-7-000 \n(NARUC Collaborative). All entities who wish to participate in this docket, regardless \nof participation in the ANOPR proceeding or NARUC Collaborative, should file to \nintervene in Docket No. EL26-68-000."},{"page":4,"startToken":888,"endToken":1275,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 4 - \nconcerns about the lack of clarity and consistency in Regional Transmission Organization \nor Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) tariffs—including with respect to the rates, \nterms, and conditions of service that apply to flexible large loads, co-location \narrangements, load with behind the meter generation, and generating facilities with \nelectrically proximate large load7 or co-located load.8 \n \nThe findings in several recent Commission proceedings establish the foundations \nof a just and reasonable framework for addressing these concerns and ensuring the \ntimely, efficient, and reliable integration of large and co-located loads onto the \ntransmission system. For example, we directed PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) to \ntake steps to address the challenges of integrating co-located loads onto the transmission \nsystem while ensuring that its tariff remains just and reasonable.9 We recognize and \napplaud Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) for taking critical steps to address the addition \nof large and co-located loads to its transmission system.10 SPP has already enhanced its \nstudy process for requests from Eligible Customers11 for transmission service to serve \n \n7 As discussed below, under HILLGA, the generating facility and the HILL to be \nserved must be located no more than two substations apart. See infra P 15. \n8 We note that SPP’s Tariff does not have a formal definition of “co-located load” \nor “co-location arrangement.” As discussed below, for the purposes of HILLGA, the \ngenerating facility only must be in close electrical proximity. However, HILLs and the \ngenerating facility could be co-located. SPP TOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5. \n9 PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115; PJM Co-Location Order, \n193 FERC ¶ 61,217. \n10 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ \n61,196. \n11 SPP defines Eligible Customer, in relevant part, as \nAny electric utility (including the Transmission Owner(s) and \nany power marketer), Federal Power Marketing Agency, or \nany person generating electric energy for sale for resale… \n(ii) Any retail customer or eligible person taking unbundled \ntransmission service pursuant to a state requirement that a \nTransmission Owner offer the transmission service, or \npursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by a \nTransmission Owner, is an Eligible Customer under the \nTariff.” \nSPP Open Access Transmission Tariff, Sixth Revised Vol. No. 1, pt. I, § 1 (Definitions E) \n(6.1.0) (SPP Tariff)."},{"page":5,"startToken":1275,"endToken":1744,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 5 - \nlarge loads. So too has SPP provided a new transmission service that recognizes that \nlarge loads, including co-located large loads, are flexible and willing to limit withdrawals \nfrom the transmission system. We commend SPP’s leadership on these issues and \nappreciate the bold and proactive steps that SPP has taken to address the influx of large \nloads, including co-located large loads. Given SPP’s enhanced study processes and new \ntransmission service for Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large \nloads, we expect that SPP will be able to demonstrate that it has resolved several of the \nconcerns that the Commission has about a lack of clarity and consistency in other \nregions’ tariffs. That said, SPP has not yet proposed tariff revisions to address all of the \nchallenges associated with the integration of large and co-located loads. \n \nAs discussed below, we find that SPP’s existing Open Access Transmission Tariff \n(Tariff) appears to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or preferential. We \nthus institute a show cause proceeding pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act \n(FPA),12 and we direct SPP and the Transmission Owners,13 within 60 days of the date of \nthis order, to either: \n \n12 16 U.S.C. § 824e. \n13 Transmission Owners refers to the entities listed in the caption of this order. \nWe recognize that SPP’s transmission owners include entities that are not subject to the \nCommission’s jurisdiction because they are not public utilities pursuant to section 201(f) of \nthe FPA. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(f); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 180 FERC ¶ 61,022, at PP 44-45 \n(2022). Accordingly, the Commission has not included Arkansas Electric Cooperative \nCorporation; Basin Electric Power Cooperative; Central Nebraska Public Power and \nIrrigation District; Central Power Electric Cooperative, Inc.; City of Coffeyville, Kansas; \nCity of Independence, Missouri; City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri; Colorado Springs \nUtilities; Corn Belt Power Cooperative; East River Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.; \nEast Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Farmington Electric Utility System; Grand River \nDam Authority; Harlan Municipal Utilities; Heartland Consumers Power District; \nKansas City Board of Public Utilities; Kansas Power Pool; L and O Power Cooperative; \nLea County Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Lincoln Electric System; Midwest Energy, Inc.; \nMissouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission; Missouri River Energy Services; \nMor-Gran-Sou Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Nebraska Public Power District; and Northwest \nIowa Power Cooperative; Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority; Omaha Public Power \nDistrict; People’s Electric Cooperative; Platte River Power Authority; Roughrider Electric \nCooperative, Inc.; Southwestern Power Administration; Sunflower Electric Power \nCorporation; Western Area Power Administration-Upper Great Plains Region; Western \nArea Power Administration-Colorado River Storage Project Management Center; Western \nArea Power Administration-Rocky Mountain Region; and Western Farmers Electric \nCooperative here as Transmission Owners that must respond to this order to show cause. \nNonetheless, the Commission retains the authority to review each entity’s formula rates as"},{"page":6,"startToken":1744,"endToken":2087,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 6 - \n(1) show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential without provisions that: \n(a) require the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies,14 and \nmemorialize ongoing operational requirements in a transmission service \nagreement between SPP and the transmission customer taking transmission \nservice on behalf of a large load; \n(b) address additional transparency concerning the Network Upgrade15 \ncosts to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of \nlarge loads, establish a pro forma cost recovery agreement between SPP, \nthe relevant transmission owner, and Eligible Customer taking transmission \nservice on behalf of the large load to mitigate the risk of cost shifting \namong transmission customers, and establish a mechanism to ensure \nsuch payments are appropriately credited toward transmission owners’ \ntransmission revenue requirements consistent with the Commission’s \ncost-of-service regulations; \n(c) address the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to \nco-location arrangements; and \n(d) address transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of co-located loads, load with behind the \nmeter generation, and flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit \ntheir use of the transmission system under certain conditions;16 or \n \na component of SPP’s Tariff in an order to show cause directed towards SPP, and SPP \nmust respond to this order regarding the non-public utilities’ SPP Tariff provisions on file \nwith the Commission. See Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 180 FERC ¶ 61,022 at P 40. \n14 For purposes of this order, alternative transmission technologies include static \nsynchronous compensators, static VAR compensators, advanced power flow control \ndevices, transmission switching, synchronous condensers, voltage source converters, \nadvanced conductors, tower lifting, and dynamic line ratings. We note that the \nCommission has also referred to these types of technologies as Grid Enhancing \nTechnologies (GETs). \n15 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to \nthem in the Tariff. \n16 As explained below, for purpose of this order, “flexible” large loads are a subset \nof HILLs that are not co-located with generation, but are willing and able to limit their"},{"page":7,"startToken":2087,"endToken":2473,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 7 - \n(2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if the \nCommission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and \nunreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to \nestablish a replacement Tariff. \n \nWe are also concerned with SPP’s need to ensure adequate generation to serve \nnew large loads.17 We therefore direct SPP to submit, within 30 days of the date of \nissuance of this order, an informational report on how SPP intends to ensure that \nadequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads, as detailed \nlater in this order. \n \nWe recognize that large loads, including data centers, are actively working \nwith transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take \nservice from, the transmission system. We appreciate that different large loads are \ncurrently at different stages of that process. We also understand that large loads and \nEligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads are negotiating, \nentering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the \ntransmission system and/or the provision of transmission service. This proceeding is not \nintended to disrupt existing commercial arrangements, but rather to establish prospective \nreforms. Accordingly, any Tariff revisions offered by SPP and/or the Transmission \nOwners in response to this proceeding should (a) propose a reasonable implementation \nperiod to ensure minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements, and \n(b) allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are nearing \ncompletion as of the date such Tariff provisions are filed with the Commission. Such \nproposed Tariff revisions should include a reasonable effective date that accommodates \nsuch considerations regarding these existing commercial arrangements. \nI. \nBackground \nA. \nGrowth of Large and Co-Located Loads and ANOPR \n \nAs the Secretary explained in the ANOPR, electricity demand in the United States \nis expected to grow at an extraordinary pace in the near term, largely due to the rapid \n \nenergy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. See infra \nnote 163. \n17 Cf. PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 237-239 (highlighting \nPJM’s ongoing Critical Issue Fast Path stakeholder process to consider proposals to help \nintegrate large load additions without causing resource inadequacy and directing an \ninformational report on the status of those proposals)."},{"page":8,"startToken":2473,"endToken":2913,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 8 - \ngrowth of large loads.18 The Secretary highlighted findings from the North American \nElectric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that show that demand growth is now higher \nthan at any point in the past two decades, driven in part by increasing quantities of large \ncommercial and industrial load, most notably data centers, connecting rapidly to the \ntransmission system.19 The Secretary also highlighted NERC’s conclusion that the size \nand speed with which data centers can be connected to the grid present unique challenges \nfor demand forecasting and system planning. The ANOPR proposed that, in light of the \nunprecedented current and expected growth of large loads seeking to interconnect to the \ntransmission system, the Commission should standardize interconnection procedures and \nagreements for large loads, including those that seek to share a point of interconnection \nwith new or existing generation facilities.20 \n \nOn April 16, 2026, the Commission issued an order regarding its intent to act with \nrespect to the ANOPR docket.21 In that order, the Commission explained that it agreed \nwith the Secretary “that, ‘[i]n light of the unprecedented current and expected growth of \nlarge loads’ such as data centers, there is an urgent need for thoughtful reforms to ensure \nthat large loads are ‘able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and \nnon-discriminatory manner.’”22 After recognizing the Commission’s recent actions in \nproceedings involving issues associated with large loads,23 the Commission concluded \n \n18 ANOPR at 2 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Resource Adequacy Report: \nEvaluating the Reliability & Security of the United States Electric Grid (July 2025), \nwww.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report% \n20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf). \n19 Id. (citing NERC, 2024 Long- Term Reliability Assessment 8 (Dec. 2024, \nupdated July 2025), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments% \n20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf). \n20 Id. P 12. For example, the ANOPR proposed that load and hybrid facilities \nshould be studied together with generating facilities, observing that “siting a large load \nnear or at the same point of interconnection as a new generating facility could reduce the \nnetwork upgrades needed to interconnect only the load or only the generating facility.” \nANOPR at P 20. \n21 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission Sys., 195 FERC ¶ \n61,045 (2026) (Order Regarding Intent to Act). \n22 Id. P 2. \n23 Id. (citing PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217; SPP HILL Order, \n194 FERC ¶ 61,031; Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,181; Tri-State \nGeneration & Transmission Ass’n, 193 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2025); Duke Energy Carolinas, \nLLC, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025))."},{"page":9,"startToken":2913,"endToken":3238,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 9 - \nthat it was clear that additional “action is warranted to support further progress where it is \nneeded.”24 \n \nIn response to the ANOPR, SPP states that it is facing significant operational, \nplanning, and market challenges in response to unprecedented growth in large and non-\ntraditional load interconnection requests.25 SPP has elsewhere explained that large loads \ninterconnected to the transmission system can stress both real-time operational reliability \nand resource adequacy planning, particularly in areas with constrained transmission \ncapacity.26 SPP also acknowledges that the scale and speed with which large loads seek \nto interconnect to the transmission system, and the operational inflexibility of these loads, \nstrain existing transmission planning processes, real-time operational tools, and market \nmechanisms originally designed for gradual and geographically distributed load growth.27 \nA number of large load projects are underway in the SPP footprint.28 SPP has previously \nnoted that large load interconnection request submissions peaked in SPP in 2022 at nearly \n11 GW, but have since dropped to approximately 6 GW in 2024; according to SPP, this \ntrend could be due in part to SPP’s inability to study and interconnect large loads quickly \nenough to meet their commercial needs.29 As explained in detail below, SPP has taken \nsteps to address these challenges in a number of recent proceedings.30 \n \nWhile some commenters in the ANOPR proceeding assert that SPP’s existing \nprocesses and recent efforts are sufficient to address the challenges presented by large \n \n24 Id. PP 3-4. \n25 SPP November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2. \n26 See, e.g., Sw. Power Pool, Inc., Docket No. ER26-1323-000, Transmittal at 2 \n(filed Feb. 10, 2026) (SPP CHILLS Transmittal). \n27 Id. \n28 EEI March 12 ANOPR Comments, attach. 1, at 1-8 (listing publicly announced \nlarge load projects, including in the SPP footprint). \n29 Sw. Power Pool, Inc., Docket No. ER26-247-000, Transmittal at 8-9, figs. 2, 3 \n(filed Oct. 24, 2025) (SPP HILL Transmittal). \n30 See infra PP 15-18."},{"page":10,"startToken":3238,"endToken":3653,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 10 - \nand co-located loads,31 other entities in the SPP footprint support additional reforms.32 In \nparticular, many entities seek additional transparency from SPP and believe that further \naction is needed to protect ratepayers from cost shifts caused by large and co-located \nloads.33 Others stakeholders argue the Commission should provide mechanisms for \nadditional load flexibility.34 The Missouri Commission also supports efficient and \ncomprehensive study procedures for co-location arrangements.35 Antora asserts that SPP \nshould offer a permanent non-firm transmission service option.36 \n \nMoreover, many commenters in the ANOPR proceeding filed persuasive \ncomments documenting, generally, the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions to \nensure regulatory and process certainty, fairness and consistency, and efficiency as large \nand co-located loads are added to the transmission system in increasing numbers.37 \n \n31 See, e.g., Arkansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-3; \nNorth Dakota Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Louisiana and \nMississippi Commissions November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Nebraska Board \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; South Dakota Commission November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 5; SPP TOs April 6 ANOPR Comments at 2. \n32 Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12; Missouri \nCommission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14; Oklahoma State Entities November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 3, 9; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8. \n33 Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; Missouri \nCommission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14; Oklahoma State Entities November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 3; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8. \n34 Oklahoma State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; State Entities \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. \n35 Missouri Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14. \n36 Antora May 18 ANOPR Comments at 6-7. \n37 See, e.g., AI Supply Chain Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; \nCalibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-3; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 9-11; Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; DCC November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 3-4; ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-11; EPSA November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 4-6; Infrastructure Masons December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4-7; \nMicrosoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-10; National Grid November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 7; ODEC December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; R Street November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 3; Switch December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; Tract November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 5; Vantage November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Vistra \nDecember 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2."},{"page":11,"startToken":3653,"endToken":4090,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 11 - \nThere is also broad support for rules that help to ensure that other transmission customers \nare not unfairly burdened with additional costs or reliability impacts as large and co-\nlocated loads interconnect to the transmission system.38 In addition, many ANOPR \ncommenters highlighted the need to efficiently integrate large loads, particularly data \ncenters, to support national security priorities and economic development.39 \nB. \nRecent Proceedings Addressing Large and Co-Located Loads \n \nOver the past year, the Commission has begun to address, both sua sponte and in \nresponse to complaints and FPA section 20540 filings, the growing use of co-location \narrangements.41 The Commission’s orders in those proceedings have addressed the need \nfor clear and consistent tariff provisions regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of \nservice that apply to co-location arrangements and for transmission services that reflect \nEligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads and load \nwith behind the meter generation that are willing and able to limit their energy \nwithdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. Several other \nCommission proceedings have addressed the challenges of integrating large loads onto \nthe transmission system, including the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions \nregarding the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large \nloads and for interconnection customers serving electrically proximate large load. As \nexplained below, these proceedings provide examples that will help to ensure that \n \n38 See, e.g., APPA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Buckeye November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 17; Exelon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; Kansas \nCommission November 21 ANOPR at 12; NCSL November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; \nNRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9; NY UIU November 21 ANOPR at 3; \nOCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Oklo December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; \nSoutheast PIOs December 5 ANOPR Comments 11-15; State Entities November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 7-8; Tri-State November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; UCS \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-11; U.S. Representatives November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 1. \n39 See, e.g., AI Supply Chain Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; \nDCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 6; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Google November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 2-3; Verrus December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2. \n40 16 U.S.C. § 824d. \n41 See PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115; PJM Co-Location Order, \n193 FERC ¶ 61,217, order on reh’g, PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ \n61,209 (2026); SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ \n61,196."},{"page":12,"startToken":4090,"endToken":4491,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 12 - \njurisdictional transmission service is provided in a manner that is just and reasonable and \nmaintains reliability as large loads are integrated onto the transmission system \nand co-location arrangements become more common. It is in this context, and in \nrecognition of SPP’s recent reforms to implement a new process for studying requests \nfor Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads and a new \nconditional, non-firm transmission service for Eligible Customers taking transmission \nservice on behalf of large loads, that the Commission now considers whether SPP’s Tariff \nremains just and reasonable. \n1. \nPJM Co-Location Proceedings \n \nOn February 20, 2025, the Commission initiated a show cause proceeding \nagainst PJM and the PJM transmission owners regarding the lack of tariff provisions \naddressing with sufficient clarity or consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service \nthat apply to co-location arrangements.42 The Commission explained when initiating \nthat proceeding that the absence of such provisions may leave entities unable to \ndetermine what steps they can or must take to effectuate co-location arrangements of \nvarious configurations and how to do so in a manner that is just and reasonable.43 On \nDecember 18, 2025, the Commission found that PJM’s tariff was indeed unjust and \nunreasonable because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity \nor consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection \ncustomers serving co-located load and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on \nbehalf of co-located load.44 \n \nSpecifically, the Commission found that the PJM tariff was unjust and unreasonable \nbecause there is a lack of sufficient clarity or consistency as to the rates, terms, and \nconditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load.45 \nThe Commission also found that PJM’s tariff was unjust and unreasonable because it does \nnot include transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission \nservice on behalf of co-located loads that are willing and able to limit their energy \n \n42 See PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115. \n43 Id. P 74. The PJM Show Cause Order defined co-located load as a \n“configuration [that] refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected to the \nfacilities of an existing or planned Customer Facility on the Interconnection Customer’s \nside of the Point of Interconnection (‘POI’) to the PJM Transmission System.” Id. P 3 \nn.4. \n44 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217. \n45 Id. P 176."},{"page":13,"startToken":4491,"endToken":4863,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 13 - \nwithdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.46 Additionally, \nthe Commission found that PJM’s behind the meter generation rules were no longer just \nand reasonable.47 The Commission directed PJM to file a compliance filing to revise its \ntariff: (1) to set forth specific terms and conditions that an interconnection customer in \nPJM seeking to serve co-located load must follow in order to effectuate a co-location \narrangement;48 (2) to require that the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on \nbehalf of co-located load takes one of three transmission services: (a) network integration \ntransmission service (NITS) or a new interim, non-firm transmission service while \nNetwork Upgrades to provide full NITS service are constructed (interim NITS); (b) a new \nfirm contract demand transmission service; or (c) a new non-firm contract demand \ntransmission service;49 (3) to revise the behind the meter generation rules and implement a \ntransition process for existing behind the meter generation participants;50 and (4) to make \nseveral clarifications on how certain aspects of PJM’s generator interconnection process \napply to interconnection customers seeking to serve co-located load.51 \n \nOn June 18, 2026, concurrently with the instant order, the Commission issued an \norder modifying the discussion in the PJM Co-Location Order and setting aside the order \nin part; accepting in part and rejecting in part PJM’s compliance filing, and directing a \nfurther compliance filing; and establishing as just and reasonable certain rates, terms, and \nconditions for the new transmission services (i.e., interim NITS, firm contract demand \ntransmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission service).52 \n \n46 Id. P 177. \n47 Id. P 179. \n48 Id. PP 187-192, 225-230. \n49 Id. PP 193-218. The Commission also established a paper hearing to determine \nthe just and reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for the new transmission services. Id. \nPP 219-20. \n50 Id. PP 221-224. \n51 Id. PP 161, 231-236. \n52 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 7-9. PJM’s \ncompliance filing proposing revisions in response to the Commission’s directives \nregarding clarification that certain aspects of PJM’s generator interconnection process \napply to interconnection customers seeking to serve co-located load was accepted in \npart on April 16, 2026. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2026)."},{"page":14,"startToken":4863,"endToken":5270,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 14 - \n2. \nSPP High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load \nGeneration Assessment Processes \n \nOn January 14, 2026, the Commission accepted revisions to SPP’s Tariff to add a \nhigh impact large load (HILL) study process and High Impact Large Load Generation \nAssessment (HILLGA) process.53 SPP’s Tariff revisions established HILLs as a new \ncategory of load;54 imposed enhanced study requirements to enable SPP to assess the \nHILL’s reliability impacts on the transmission system;55 and created additional, ongoing \noperational requirements for transmission customers serving HILLs to ensure continued \nreliability of the transmission system.56 The Tariff revisions also established the \n \n53 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 61, 64. \n54 SPP defines a HILL as: \nA new commercial or industrial load, or increase in \ncommercial or industrial load, at a single site connected \nthrough one or more shared Points of Interconnection (POIs) \nor delivery points, where such load is either (1) 10 MW or \nmore if connected to the Transmission System at a voltage \nlevel less than or equal to 69 [kilovolts (kV)]; or (2) 50 MW \nor more if connected to the Transmission System at a voltage \nlevel greater than 69 kV. An Electric Storage Resource is not \nconsidered a HILL. \nSPP Tariff, pt. I, § 1 (Definitions H) (1.0.0). \n55 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 13-17 (explaining that the HILL \nprocess requires up to three additional studies beyond those required of all transmission \nservice requests for transmission customers requesting to add or modify a delivery point \nassociated with a HILL, including a HILL delivery point study, HILL supplemental load \nconnection study, and potential supplemental Electromagnetic Transient study). \n56 Id. P 18 (explaining that market participants registering a HILL must (1) follow \nall nonconforming load requirements (e.g., additional load forecast requirements); (2) \nprovide load data via telemetry in real time; (3) have remote capability to disconnect the \nload from the transmission system made available to the transmission operator; (4) have \nan up/down ramp rate not exceeding 20 MW per minute unless otherwise directed; (5) \ninclude additional information with registration; and (6) not have withdrawals from the \ntransmission system without appropriate transmission service); id. P 19 (explaining that \nthe transmission owner, at the transmission customer’s expense, must install a phasor \nmeasurement unit or similar equipment); id. PP 20-21 (explaining that the transmission \ncustomer will be required to comply with ride-through requirement guidelines)."},{"page":15,"startToken":5270,"endToken":5662,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 15 - \nHILLGA process, a new generator interconnection service and related interconnection \nprocess to facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are \nspecifically identified for, and limited to, serving a HILL and are located no more \nthan two substations away from the HILL.57 \n \nThe Commission stated that SPP demonstrated that the “unprecedented growth in \nlarge loads in the SPP region presents significant and unique operational and planning \nchallenges.”58 The Commission found that SPP demonstrated that its proposed HILL \nprocess was a just and reasonable approach for integrating transmission customers’ new \nlarge loads onto SPP’s transmission system in a reliable manner.59 The Commission \nfound that it was reasonable to impose additional study requirements and other proposed \nrequirements given the unique operating characteristics of HILLs. The Commission \nfurther found that the proposed study requirements would ensure the reliable integration \nof the transmission customer’s HILLs onto SPP’s transmission system and would provide \nSPP with information about their impact on SPP’s transmission system, including the \ntransmission system’s ability to withstand and control disturbances by the HILL at the \npoint of interconnection.60 In addition, the Commission found that the proposed study \ndeposits would discourage speculative HILL study requests.61 Finally, the Commission \nconcluded that the proposed ongoing reliability requirements would allow SPP to \nmaintain reliable operation of its transmission system by increasing SPP’s visibility, \nproviding necessary data, and imposing real-time operational safeguards for HILLs.62 In \naccepting HILLGA, the Commission found that “SPP’s HILLGA process reasonably \n \n57 Id. P 27 (explaining that, under the HILLGA process, SPP proposes to \nstudy HILLGA requests to determine whether any network upgrades are needed to \naccommodate the generating facility’s injection to the local area); id. P 32 (explaining \nthat SPP will grant HILLGA customers a new type of interconnection service, load \nlimited resource interconnection service, which grants limited interconnection service \nsolely to serve the associated HILL). \n58 Id. P 60. \n59 Id. P 61. \n60 Id. P 62. \n61 For the HILL delivery point study, SPP required a $10,000 non-refundable \napplication fee and a $100,000 study deposit, with an additional $200,000 study deposit \nif an Electromagnetic Transient study was also required. Id. P 15. For the HILL \nsupplemental load connection study, SPP allows the host transmission owner to require a \n$25,000 study deposit. Id. P 16. \n62 Id. P 63."},{"page":16,"startToken":5662,"endToken":5957,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 16 - \nprovides a flexible, expedited, and separate serial interconnection process that will \nfacilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are limited to serving a \nHILL in the same local area.”63 \n3. \nSPP Conditional High Impact Large Load Service \n \nOn June 5, 2026, the Commission accepted revisions to SPP’s Tariff to add a \nnew type of non-firm transmission service, conditional high impact large load service \n(CHILLS).64 CHILLS allows transmission customers serving HILLs to reliably receive \ntransfers of energy until sufficient designated resources and/or network upgrades are \nin place to support long-term, firm transmission service.65 CHILLS is an as-available \ntransmission service that will transfer energy to designated points of delivery to serve the \nportion of a HILL eligible to receive CHILLS, subject to curtailment and interruption.66 \nCHILLS has a maximum term of seven years, which is intended to incentivize \ntransmission customers seeking CHILLS to obtain the designated resources and/or \ncomplete the network upgrades needed to procure long-term firm transmission service \nthrough existing Tariff processes.67 \n \nThe Commission found that SPP had shown that unprecedented growth in \nlarge loads presents significant and unique operational and planning challenges.68 The \nCommission also found that SPP’s ability to add HILLs to its transmission system in a \ntimely manner may be limited due to delays in obtaining sufficient designated resources \nand completing network upgrades needed to provide long-term firm transmission service \nto such load.69 The Commission concluded that CHILLS is a just and reasonable and not \nunduly discriminatory or preferential approach to addressing the need to expeditiously \n \n63 Id. P 64. \n64 SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at P 1. \n65 Id. P 7. \n66 Id. PP 9-10. \n67 Id. P 9. \n68 Id. P 84. \n69 Id."},{"page":17,"startToken":5957,"endToken":6350,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 17 - \ninterconnect and provide transmission service to new HILLs, while maintaining the \nreliable operation of SPP’s transmission system.70 \nII. \nSPP’s Existing Processes \nA. \nExisting Tariff Processes \n \nSPP evaluates new Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and new \nNITS requests by Eligible Customers through Attachment Z1 (Aggregate Transmission \nService Study Procedures and Cost Allocation and Recovery for Service Upgrades),71 \nand existing transmission customers’ requests to add or modify delivery point facilities \nassociated with load additions under Attachments AQ (Delivery Point Assessment \nProcess) and AX (Provisional Load Process) of SPP’s Tariff.72 SPP studies the impacts \nof requested delivery point additions or modifications on the transmission system and \ndetermines what, if any, Network Upgrades are required to accommodate the requests.73 \nNetwork Upgrades identified in the Attachment AQ process are Base Plan Funded, \nmeaning that the costs of these Network Upgrades are allocated through rolled-in rates \namong all SPP transmission customers pursuant to the criteria in Attachment J of the \nTariff.74 \n \n70 Id. \n71 SPP Tariff, attach. Z1 (Aggregate Transmission Service Study) (0.0.0). \n72 Id. attach. AQ (Delivery Point Assessment Process) (1.0.0); id. attach. AX \n(Provisional Load Process) (0.0.0). \n73 A transmission customer can use a combination of the Attachment AQ and \nAttachment AX processes if it has neither sufficient designated resources nor planned \ngeneration to serve both its existing load and a new HILL. Id. attach. BA (High Impact \nLarge Load (0.0.0), § 2.1.2 (0.1.0). \n74 SPP Tariff, attach. J (Recovery of Costs Associated with New Facilities), § III.A \n(21.0.0); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 193 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2025). Specifically, using SPP’s \nHighway/Byway cost allocation method, SPP allocates the costs of Base Plan Upgrades \nto transmission customers in individual SPP pricing zones, subregions, the entire SPP \nregion, or a combination thereof, based on the voltage level and location of the specific \nfacility. Specifically, SPP allocates costs for transmission facilities as follows: (1) for \nfacilities at 300 kV or above (Highway facilities), 100% of the costs are allocated on a \nregional, postage stamp basis based on load ratio share; (2) for facilities above 100 kV \nand below 300 kV (Byway facilities), SPP allocates 33% of the costs on a regional, \npostage stamp basis and 67% of the costs to the subregion in which the facilities are"},{"page":18,"startToken":6350,"endToken":6774,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 18 - \n \nAttachment AX of SPP’s Tariff includes a Provisional Load Process to allow \ntransmission customers to request studies of new load interconnection requests when \ntransmission customers do not have sufficient Designated Resources to serve their load, \nprovided that the transmission customer has planned generation to serve the load additions.75 \nNetwork Upgrades identified in the Provisional Load Process will be directly assigned to \nthe transmission customer until the transmission customer’s transmission service agreement \nincludes a generating facility designated to serve the load, at which point the remaining cost \nof the Network Upgrades will be Base Plan Funded.76 \n \nAs described above, SPP’s Tariff has been amended to address the integration of \nlarge loads through the HILL study process, which includes enhanced study requirements \nbeyond what is required under the Attachments AQ and AX processes.77 SPP also \nestablished a HILLGA process that allows for expedited review of generating facilities \nthat are designated to serve a HILL and interconnected in the same local area as the HILL \n(i.e., within a certain number of substations and transmission line segments from the \nHILL).78 As SPP TOs explain, the HILL and HILLGA processes will treat large loads \nand any co-located generation79 as distinct for tariff and metering purposes, assess \ntransmission service based on the large load’s gross withdrawals, and ensure that the \ntransmission system is planned and paid for to meet a large load’s full reliability needs.80 \n \nNeither the HILL nor HILLGA process will result in transmission service for a \nnew generating facility to the HILL. Eligible Customers (including Eligible Customers \n \nlocated; and (3) for facilities at 100 kV or below, SPP allocates all costs to the zone \nwhere the facilities are located. \n75 See Sw. Power Pool Inc., 193 FERC ¶ 61,018 (2025); see also SPP Tariff, \nattach. AX. \n76 SPP Tariff, attach. J, § V(F) (6.0.0). \n77 See supra PP 15-16. SPP TOs explain that under the HILL proposal, the load \nand generating facility may be located at the same point of interconnection. SPP TOs \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 5. \n78 See SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 26, 64-66; see also SPP Tariff, \nattach. BB (High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment) (0.0.0), § 3.1.3(5)(a). \n79 We reiterate that SPP’s Tariff does not have a formal definition of “co-located \nload” or “co-location arrangement.” As noted, for the purposes of HILLGA, the \ngenerating facility only must be in close electrical proximity. \n80 SPP TOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7."},{"page":19,"startToken":6774,"endToken":7156,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 19 - \nthat are also HILLGA interconnection customers) must request transmission service, \nwhich may be short-term or long-term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, \nNon-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, or NITS.81 Additionally, as discussed \nabove, the Commission recently accepted SPP’s CHILLS, a new conditional, non-firm \ntransmission service option for Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf \nof large loads, including co-located large loads, that may be taken for up to seven years \nuntil the Eligible Customer obtains sufficient Designated Resources to support NITS or \nFirm Point-to-Point Transmission Service or the required Network Upgrades for NITS or \nPoint-to-Point Transmission Service are completed.82 \n \nFor long-term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service requests or requests for \nnew NITS, SPP conducts an Aggregate Transmission Service Study under Attachment Z1 \nof the Tariff to determine any necessary transmission facility additions, expansions, or \nupgrades the relevant transmission customer seeking transmission service is responsible \nfor funding to ensure that the transmission system and transmission service to existing \ncustomers is not degraded or impaired.83 \n \nNetwork Upgrades identified through the Attachment AQ, AX,84 and Z1 processes \nare evaluated in SPP’s transmission planning process and included in SPP’s Transmission \nExpansion Plan.85 SPP explains that as it relates to the cost responsibility of Network \nUpgrades, section 7.2 of the SPP Bylaws delegate primary responsibility for determining \nregional proposals for cost allocation to the SPP Regional State Committee.86 \n \n81 See SPP Tariff, pt. II, §§ 17.1 (Application) (1.0.0), 18.1 (Application) (0.0.0); \nid. pt. III, § 29.1 (Condition Precedent for Receiving Service) (0.0.0). \n82 SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at PP 7, 9; see SPP Tariff, pt. VII \n(Conditional High Impact Large Load Transmission Service) (0.0.0); id. schedule 15 \n(Conditional High Impact Large Load Service) (0.0.0). \n83 SPP Tariff, attach. Z1, § 1 (Introduction) (1.0.0). \n84 Specifically, Network Upgrades are included in SPP’s Transmission Expansion \nPlan once the loads seeking Provisional Load Services in Attachment AX have a \ngenerating facility designated to serve the load. \n85 See SPP Tariff, attach. O, §§ III (The Integrated Transmission Planning \nAssessment) (14.0.0), II.5.b (Roles and Responsibilities), V (The SPP Transmission \nExpansion Plan Report) (10.0.0), V.3.c. \n86 SPP November 21 ANOPR Comments at 15."},{"page":20,"startToken":7156,"endToken":7543,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 20 - \n \nSPP processes generator interconnection requests under Attachment V (Generator \nInterconnection Procedures (GIP)) of its Tariff.87 SPP’s generator interconnection study \nprocess, the Definitive Interconnection System Impact Study (DISIS), is divided into a \ntwo-phased system impact study in DISIS Phase One and DISIS Phase Two, which is \nfollowed by an interconnection facilities study.88 The system impact study is a cluster \nstudy that evaluates the impact of each proposed interconnection request on the reliability \nof SPP’s transmission system. DISIS Phase One involves a cluster study consisting of a \nsteady-state powerflow analysis and calculation of the short-circuit ratio. DISIS Phase \nTwo involves a cluster study consisting of a short circuit analysis, stability analysis, short \ncircuit ratio critical clearing time screening, and steady state powerflow analysis. \n \nPursuant to the Tariff, an interconnection customer may request, and SPP \nmay provide, interim interconnection service prior to the completion of requisite \nInterconnection Facilities, Network Upgrades, Distribution Upgrades, or System \nProtection Facilities.89 The scope of the interim availability interconnection system \nimpact study maintains the scope and procedures of the DISIS with the exception that \ncertain previous queued interconnection requests may not be included in the interim \navailability interconnection system impact study.90 Under the Tariff, an interconnection \ncustomer may also request surplus interconnection service for an unneeded portion \nof interconnection service capacity at an existing point of interconnection substation.91 \nThe surplus interconnection service impact study consists of reactive power, short \ncircuit/fault duty, stability analyses, and any other appropriate studies, and steady-state \n(thermal/voltage) analyses may be performed by SPP as necessary to ensure that all \nrequired reliability conditions are studied. \nB. \nRecent Stakeholder Proceedings in SPP \n \nSPP is also developing another transmission service, known as Price Adaptive \nLoad Service (PALS), to provide transmission service that will enable the connection of \n \n87 SPP Tariff, attach. V (Generator Interconnection Procedures (GIP)) (12.0.0). \n88 Id. § 8 (28.0.0), §§ 8.4 (Scope of Definitive Interconnection System Impact \nStudy and Priority System Impact Stud, 8.10 (Scope of Interconnection Facilities Study), \n8.11 (Interconnection Facilities Study Procedures). \n89 Id. § 11 (Generator Interconnection Agreement) (9.0.0), § 11.A (Interim \nGenerator Interconnection Agreement (Interim GIA)). \n90 Id. § 11 (Generator Interconnection Agreement) (9.0.0), § 11A.2.4.1. \n91 Id. § 3.3 (Utilization of Surplus Interconnection Service) (30.0.0)."},{"page":21,"startToken":7543,"endToken":7882,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 21 - \nnew loads.92 SPP states that PALS is a flexible, non-firm transmission service option that \nwill allow loads that are price sensitive and flexible (i.e., do not need to be served from \nthe transmission system on a firm basis) to vary their participation based on the price of \nenergy. \n \nWe are encouraged by SPP’s stakeholder efforts, and the proactive steps that SPP \nhas already taken to enhance its study processes and develop a new transmission service. \nHowever, we conclude that this FPA section 206 proceeding is necessary to generate \nadditional reforms in SPP that are sufficiently timely and comprehensive to address \nthe concerns we today identify. As such, and as the Commission explained in the \nApril Order Regarding Intent to Act, we find that the Commission must now take further \naction to ensure that SPP promptly proposes revisions to ensure that its Tariff remains \njust and reasonable. \nIII. \nDiscussion \n \nBased on the discussion below, pursuant section 206 of the FPA, we direct SPP \nand the Transmission Owners, within 60 days of the date of this order, to either: \n(1) show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential without provisions that: \n(a) require the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies, and \nmemorialize ongoing operational requirements in a transmission service \nagreement between SPP and the transmission customer taking transmission \nservice on behalf of a large load; \n(b) address additional transparency concerning the Network Upgrade costs \nto provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large \nloads, establish a pro forma cost recovery agreement between SPP, the \nrelevant transmission owner, and Eligible Customer taking transmission \nservice on behalf of the large load to mitigate the risk of cost shifting \namong transmission customers, and establish a mechanism to ensure \nsuch payments are appropriately credited toward transmission owners’ \ntransmission revenue requirements consistent with the Commission’s \ncost-of-service regulations; \n(c) address the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to \nco-location arrangements; and \n \n92 SPP November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7."},{"page":22,"startToken":7882,"endToken":8360,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 22 - \n(d) address transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of co-located loads, load with behind the \nmeter generation, and flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit \ntheir use of the transmission system under certain conditions; or \n(2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if \nthe Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and \nunreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to \nestablish a replacement Tariff. \n \nWe also direct SPP to submit, within 30 days of the date of issuance of this order, \nan informational report on how SPP intends to ensure that adequate generation will be \navailable to serve existing and new large loads. \n \nInterested entities may respond within 30 days of SPP’s and the Transmission \nOwners’ filings, addressing either or both of: (1) whether the existing Tariff remains just \nand reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and (2) if not, what changes \nto the Tariff should be implemented as replacement rates. \n \nWe recognize that SPP and/or the Transmission Owners (to the extent the matters \naddressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights) \nmay elect to address some or all of the issues discussed in this order by proposing \nrevisions to the Tariff pursuant to their applicable FPA section 205 filing rights. We \nstrongly encourage this. Although both the Secretary’s ANOPR and our own Order \nRegarding Intent to Act expressly recognized (and indeed encouraged) that possibility,93 \nno such filings were received from SPP by the Commission prior to the issuance of \nthis order. Should SPP and/or the Transmission Owners elect to make such filings in \nresponse to this order, those filings should state explicitly that the proposals are being \nsubmitted under FPA section 205. Should SPP and/or the Transmission Owners submit a \nfiling under FPA section 205, they should also explain which of the Commission’s above \ndirectives their filing addresses and how it resolves them. Additionally, any such filing \nshould provide a reasoned explanation for how the proposal will avoid disrupting existing \ncommercial arrangements and clearly identify a reasonable effective date that \naccommodates such existing commercial arrangements. \n \nThe Commission will consider requests from SPP and/or the Transmission Owners \nto hold, for up to 90 days, all or certain aspects of this FPA section 206 proceeding in \nabeyance, including the deadline to respond to this order. Any such abeyance, which will \nbegin as of the deadline to respond to this order, would be considered to provide SPP and \nthe Transmission Owners time while they work through the stakeholder processes to \ndevelop FPA section 205 filings to revise the Tariff to address the issues raised in this \n \n93 See ANOPR at P 32; Order Regarding Intent to Act, 195 FERC ¶ 61,045 at P 5."},{"page":23,"startToken":8360,"endToken":8843,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 23 - \norder. Requests for a full or partial abeyance94 should be submitted prior to the deadline \nto respond to this order, specifically within 45 days of issuance of this order, to allow \ntime for the Commission to act on the abeyance request. We emphasize that we will \nnot grant such abeyances reflexively, that any abeyance will be limited to 90 days, \nand that we will look with great disfavor toward requests to extend the abeyance period. \nWe anticipate that successful abeyance requests, if any, will include both (1) a robust \ndescription of the content of a potential future filing under FPA section 205 and \n(2) a reasoned and specific explanation of when such a filing is expected to be made. \n \nIn cases where, as here, the Commission institutes a section 206 investigation on \nits own motion, section 206(b) of the FPA requires that the Commission establish a \nrefund effective date that is no earlier than the date of the publication by the Commission \nof notice of its intention to initiate such proceeding nor later than five months after the \npublication date. In such cases, in order to give maximum protection to customers, and \nconsistent with our precedent, we have historically tended to establish the section 206 \nrefund effective date at the earliest date allowed by section 206, and we do so here as \nwell.95 That date is the date of publication of notice of initiation of this proceeding in \nthe Federal Register. \nA. \nTransmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large Loads \n \nAs noted above, the Commission recently approved revisions to SPP’s Tariff that \nestablished an enhanced process for SPP to study the provision of transmission service to \nEligible Customers on behalf of HILLs and help to ensure that integration of HILLs onto \nthe transmission system does not impair reliability. In that order, the Commission found \nthat the HILL process was a just and reasonable approach for integrating transmission \ncustomers’ new large loads onto SPP’s transmission system in a reliable manner.96 \nHowever, we preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable \nbecause it lacks (1) clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of alternative \ntransmission technologies, and (2) pro forma provisions in a transmission service \nagreement between SPP and the transmission customer taking transmission service on \nbehalf of the HILL to memorialize ongoing operational requirements in the Tariff. \n \n94 A partial abeyance may be appropriate to the extent SPP is developing FPA \nsection 205 filings in response to only a subset of the directives in this order. For any \nremaining directives, we expect a response to this order within the 60-day deadline set \nforth herein. \n95 See, e.g., Idaho Power Co., 145 FERC ¶ 61,122 (2013); Canal Elec. Co., \n46 FERC ¶ 61,153, order on reh’g, 47 FERC ¶ 61,275 (1989). \n96 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 61."},{"page":24,"startToken":8843,"endToken":9258,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 24 - \n \nWe direct SPP and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters addressed \nherein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to explain \nwhether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions requiring the \nevaluation of alternative transmission technologies and pro forma provisions in a \ntransmission service agreement memorializing ongoing operational requirements in a \ntransmission service agreement between SPP and the transmission customer, or propose \nTariff revisions to address these concerns. \n1. \nJurisdiction \n \nAt the outset, we clarify the principles relating to the Commission’s jurisdiction \nover the matters relevant to the integration of large loads onto the transmission system \nand the impacts of large loads on the transmission system. We recognize that rates, \nterms, and conditions associated with the addition of and service to large loads implicate \nboth federal and state interests. We also recognize that resolution of issues related to \nlarge load additions will require the involvement of both federal and state actors, \nincluding the Commission, state public utility commissions, and other state and local \nentities. We are encouraged by efforts made at the state level to address issues related to \nlarge load additions that fall within state jurisdiction.97 \n \nAs discussed below, however, certain aspects of the process for integrating large \nloads onto the transmission system fall squarely within the Commission’s exclusive \njurisdiction. Specifically, we find that it is within the Commission’s exclusive authority \nto ensure that transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs include sufficiently \nclear and consistent provisions governing how transmission service to Eligible Customers \non behalf of large loads interconnecting to the transmission system will be studied, \nincluding whether new or upgraded transmission facilities are necessary to provide \nthe requested transmission service. The Commission has jurisdiction over the study \nprocess for transmission service to both Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads \nand unbundled retail transmission service to end-use large load customers where, \npursuant to state law or a public utility’s voluntary offer of such service, the large load is \nan Eligible Customer under the transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs.98 \n \n97 See generally NARUC April 14 ANOPR Comments (highlighting action taken \nby state public utility commissions related to large loads). \n98 Under the pro forma OATT, Eligible Customers include end-use customers \nseeking unbundled retail transmission service, pursuant to state law or public utility’s \nvoluntary offer of such service. Pro forma OATT, § 1.12 (Definitions – Eligible \nCustomer); see also SPP Tariff, pt. I, § 1 (Definitions E) (6.1.0)."},{"page":25,"startToken":9258,"endToken":9695,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 25 - \n \nThe Commission is a creature of statute and has jurisdiction over only \nthose matters that Congress has given it the authority to regulate.99 That authority \nincludes jurisdiction over the wholesale sale and transmission of electricity in interstate \ncommerce, including all facilities used for such sale and transmission.100 As relevant \nhere, the Commission must ensure that the rates, charges, and classifications for such \ntransmission of electricity—as well as the practices directly affecting such transmission \nof electricity—are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.101 \nThe Supreme Court has held that the Commission’s authority over interstate transmission \nis not limited to wholesale transmission service and that the Commission has authority \nover unbundled retail transmission service.102 As part of its transmission authority, the \nCommission has exercised jurisdiction over the terms of certain interconnections to the \ntransmission system as an element of transmission service,103 including the \ninterconnection of wholesale load to the transmission system.104 \n \nAs applied to large load additions to the transmission system, these principles \nmean that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions \nof interstate transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads \nconnecting to the transmission system, and the practices directly affecting the provision \nof such interstate transmission of electricity. An essential component of providing \nsuch transmission service is the process by which the transmission provider and/or \ntransmission owner evaluates (1) whether it can provide the requested transmission \nservice and (2) the impact that providing such transmission service will have on the \njurisdictional transmission system, including determining whether any new or upgraded \n \n99 Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002). \n100 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). \n101 Id. §§ 824d, 824e; see FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 278 \n(2016) (EPSA) (approving “a common-sense construction of the FPA’s language, \nlimiting FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that ‘directly affect the \nwholesale rate’” (cleaned up)). \n102 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17, 19-20 (2002) (upholding the Commission’s \nexercise of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission service). \n103 Tenn. Power Co., 90 FERC ¶ 61,238, at 61,761 (2000) (Tennessee Power), \norder denying reh’g, 91 FERC ¶ 61,271 (2000); Standardization of Generator \nInterconnection Agreements & Procs., Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, at P 9 \n(2003); see also Laguna Irrigation Dist., 91 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,152 (2000). \n104 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 109 FERC ¶ 61,392, at P 37 (2004); Pac. Gas & Elec. \nCo., 115 FERC ¶ 61,193, at PP 36-38 (2006)."},{"page":26,"startToken":9695,"endToken":10149,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 26 - \ntransmission facilities are needed to provide transmission service while maintaining \nreliable operation of the transmission system. This transmission service study process \ndetermines what Network Upgrades are needed to provide transmission service to \nEligible Customers on behalf of large loads, the costs of which are included in \ntransmission rates. As such, this study process directly affects Commission-jurisdictional \ntransmission rates.105 The Commission has exclusive authority to ensure that the process \nto study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers is just and reasonable \nand not unduly discriminatory or preferential. We therefore find that we have authority \nto ensure that tariffs include provisions that clearly and consistently address the study \nprocess for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf \nof large loads, including the unique impacts that providing transmission service to \nEligible Customers on behalf of large loads may have on the transmission system. \n \nAt the same time, we continue to recognize that the FPA expressly reserves \nto states the authority over any other sale of electric energy, including retail sales \nand wholesale sales not in interstate commerce (such as wholesale sales within the \nElectric Reliability Council of Texas region), as well as facilities used for the generation \nand distribution of electricity.106 As such, we recognize that states will continue to \nregulate: (1) the specific terms of retail sales to large load;107 (2) which entities may \nmake retail sales within their borders, including which entities are legally permitted to \nprovide electricity to retail large load customers;108 and (3) any siting decisions and \nconstruction associated with the large load project.109 Nothing in this order is intended to \nintrude upon state authority over retail service to large loads. \n \n105 Cf. Transmission Plan. & Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & \nOperating Pub. Utils., Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, at P 112 (2011) (“It is \nthrough the transmission planning process that public utility transmission providers \ndetermine which transmission facilities will more efficiently or cost-effectively meet \nthe needs of the region, the development of which directly impacts the rates, terms and \nconditions of jurisdictional service.”). \n106 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); see Dayton Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 126 F.4th 1107, \n1129 (6th Cir. 2025). \n107 See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279-80 (recognizing state authority over retail electricity \nsales); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 28 (same). \n108 PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at PP 68-69. \n109 See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 229, 238 \n(D.C. Cir. 2025) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)) (recognizing state authority over \ngeneration resource mix, including through their siting authority); Order No. 1000,"},{"page":27,"startToken":10149,"endToken":10569,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 27 - \n \nIn sum, we today exercise our authority to ensure that the process by which \njurisdictional transmission providers and/or transmission owners will study the provision \nof jurisdictional transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads \ninterconnecting to the transmission system, including where, as allowed by state law or \na public utility’s voluntary offer of such service, an end-use large load seeks unbundled \nretail transmission service, is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or \npreferential. Pursuant to that authority, we find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust \nand unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it lacks sufficiently \nclear and consistent provisions regarding the study process related to the provision of \ntransmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. We need not \ncomprehensively address the Commission’s jurisdiction over other aspects of the addition \nof large loads to the transmission system at this time. \n2. \nTariff Provisions \n \nAs explained above, the HILL process addresses how SPP and/or the \nTransmission Owners will study the provision of transmission service to Eligible \nCustomers on behalf of large loads. In accepting the HILL process, the Commission \nfound that SPP’s study requirements would ensure the reliable integration of the \ntransmission customer’s HILL onto SPP’s transmission system and would provide \nSPP with information about its impact on SPP’s transmission system, including the \ntransmission system’s ability to withstand and control disturbances by the HILL at \nthe point of interconnection.110 However, the HILL process lacks two components, \nprovisions requiring the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies and \npro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement memorializing ongoing \noperational requirements, without which we are concerned that SPP’s Tariff may be \nunjust and unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or preferential. \n \nFirst, we preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable \nbecause it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of alternative \ntransmission technologies as potential solutions to accommodate an Eligible Customer’s \nrequest for transmission service on behalf of a large load. Alternative transmission \ntechnologies can add more capacity on existing transmission lines quickly, often within \none to three years.111 Unlike with traditional load growth,112 large load customers often \n \n136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 107 (acknowledging state authority over siting, permitting, and \nconstruction of transmission facilities). \n110 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 62. \n111 WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 5-6. \n112 See, e.g., SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 7 (explaining that the"},{"page":28,"startToken":10569,"endToken":11017,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 28 - \nhave development timelines requiring interconnection to the transmission system faster \nthan traditional Network Upgrades can be built, necessitating a sufficient evaluation of \nalternative transmission technologies that can more quickly accommodate transmission \nservice requests from Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.113 The Commission \nhas previously recognized that alternative transmission technologies have the potential to \nmitigate or defer the need for traditional Network Upgrades and often can be deployed \nboth more quickly and at lower cost than traditional Network Upgrades, and therefore \nfailing to consider whether alternative transmission technologies can meet transmission \nneeds more efficiently or cost-effectively than traditional Network Upgrades has the \npotential to render Commission-jurisdictional rates unjust and unreasonable.114 Further, to \n \nHILL proposal was needed in part due to large load customers frequently requesting \ntransmission service within months rather than years of their intended commercial \noperation, straining legacy regulatory frameworks and planning processes originally \ndesigned for slow, incremental, and predictable load growth); see also Commission Staff, \n2025 State of the Market Report 8 (Mar. 2026) (“[D]ata centers have characteristics \nunlike more traditional loads [including] size, strong desire for faster interconnection, and \npotential flexibility.”). \n113 Exec. Off. of the President, Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan at 1-2, \n15 (July 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-\nAction-Plan.pdf (explaining that accelerated deployment of AI data centers is a critical \nmatter of national security and international economic competitiveness, and \nrecommending federal policy action to optimize the existing grid through advanced \ngrid technologies); WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 5-8 (“[Alternative transmission technologies’] deployment timelines are \nmore aligned with the interconnection needs of new large loads, which may only take \n1-2 years to construct.”); Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 28 \n(“Achieving speed-to-power in the near-term, while also protecting customers, will \nrequire the use of GETs, advanced reconductoring, and unlocking all available system \ncapacity.”); Energy Systems Integration Group, Historical and Modern Large Loads: \nCharacteristics, Context, and Industry Action to Meet Grid and Customer Needs, at 4 \n(Mar. 2026), https://www.esig.energy/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ESIG-Historical-vs-\nModern-Large-Loads-white-paper-2026.pdf (describing the timing mismatch between \nhow long it takes to build a new data center and how long it takes to plan, permit, and \nbuild transmission). \n114 Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order \nNo. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 1583, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), \norder on reh’g, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, errata notice, 188 FERC ¶ \n61,134 (2024); see also Bldg. for the Future Through Elec. Reg’l Transmission Plan. & \nCost Allocation, Order No. 1920, 187 FERC ¶ 61,068 at P 1201, order on reh’g,"},{"page":29,"startToken":11017,"endToken":11467,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 29 - \nthe extent Network Upgrade costs to accommodate an Eligible Customer’s request for \ntransmission service on behalf of a large load are rolled into a transmission owner’s \ntransmission revenue requirement, transmission customers other than the Eligible \nCustomer may bear a portion of those Network Upgrade costs, highlighting the need \nfor clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of least-cost options like \nalternative transmission technologies to mitigate the rate impact on all transmission \ncustomers. \n \nSPP should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without \nprovisions that (1) require the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies in \ntransmission service request studies, using models that are capable of evaluating the \ntransmission system to accurately account for advanced transmission technologies, in all \ninstances, without the need for a request from the Eligible Customer seeking transmission \nservice on behalf of a large load; and (2) if traditional Network Upgrades are selected \ninstead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study report to the \nEligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of a large load of a sufficiently \nclear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., \nwould not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) \nor would not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission \nservice request; or propose Tariff revisions establishing such provisions. This \ntransparency and informational requirement is warranted for the regulatory scheme we \nare establishing for transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of \nlarge loads given demand from and the expedited development timelines for large load \ncustomers. We underscore that we are not mandating the use of alternative transmission \ntechnologies. To the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of providing \ntransmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads warrant requirements \nbeyond those contemplated here, we seek further briefing. \n \nSecond, the HILL process does not include pro forma provisions in a \ntransmission service agreement between SPP and the transmission customer taking \ntransmission service on behalf of a HILL that memorialize ongoing operational \nrequirements. While these requirements are included in the Tariff, we are concerned \nthat, without such pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement between \nSPP and the transmission customer, SPP may be unable to enforce ongoing operational \nrequirements for transmission customers taking transmission service on behalf of HILLs. \nWe therefore preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable \nbecause it lacks pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement between SPP \nand the transmission customer memorializing ongoing operational requirements for \ntransmission customers taking transmission service on behalf of HILLs. SPP should \n \nOrder No. 1920-A, 189 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2024), order on reh’g, Order No. 1920-B, \n191 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2025)."},{"page":30,"startToken":11467,"endToken":11916,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 30 - \nexplain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without such pro forma provisions \nin a transmission service agreement, or propose revisions to include pro forma provisions \nmemorializing the ongoing operational requirements in a transmission service agreement \nbetween SPP and the transmission customer. \nB. \nCost Shifting Risk Among Transmission Customers \n \nWe next preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting \namong transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates \nfor transmission service. In particular, we are concerned about the apparent lack of \n(1) transparency regarding the assignment of Network Upgrades, and their associated \ncosts, that are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf \nof large loads; and (2) a pro forma cost recovery agreement between SPP, the relevant \ntransmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of \nlarge loads that help ensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately \nresponsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of \nNetwork Upgrades. \n \nWe direct SPP and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters addressed \nherein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to explain \nwhether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) robust, accurate, and \nsystematic provision of data on SPP’s website in a single location, and in an easily \naccessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, regarding the cost \nfor Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on \nbehalf of large loads; and (2) a pro forma cost recovery agreement between SPP, the \nrelevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on \nbehalf of a large load, or to propose Tariff revisions to provide additional transparency \nand establish such a pro forma cost recovery agreement. We encourage state regulators \nresponsible for setting retail rates to provide input to SPP regarding their transparency \nneeds. \n1. \nJurisdiction \n \nThe Commission has a duty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission \ncustomers that may result in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates. As explained \nabove, the Commission is obligated to ensure that the rates charged for jurisdictional \ntransmission service—as well as any practice directly affecting such rates—are just and \nreasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. With respect to the addition \nof large loads to the transmission system, the Commission has exclusive authority to \nensure that transmission rates are just and reasonable. The costs of those upgrades to the \ntransmission system (i.e., Network Upgrades) necessary to provide transmission service \nto Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads are inputs to jurisdictional transmission"},{"page":31,"startToken":11916,"endToken":12338,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 31 - \nrates, and thus directly affect the Commission-jurisdictional rates paid by transmission \ncustomers. To fulfill its responsibility to ensure that transmission rates are just and \nreasonable, the Commission must act to address the risk of cost shifting among \ntransmission customers due to (1) the process transmission providers and/or transmission \nowners use to evaluate the facilities needed, and the associated costs, for the provision of \ntransmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and (2) speculative \ntransmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that could \nresult in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates. \n \nIn response to the ANOPR, many commenters raise concerns about the impact \nthat large load additions can have on retail ratepayers, particularly the concern that other \nretail ratepayers may be forced to subsidize Network Upgrades needed to add large loads \nto the transmission system.115 While we appreciate and are similarly concerned about \nthis issue, the Commission is limited to addressing jurisdictional transmission rates and \nas such, we do so herein. As the Commission has explained, states determine how \nCommission-approved rates are collected among the relevant retail consumers along with \nthe rates for state-jurisdictional matters.116 Specifically, states have authority over how \nthe wholesale costs of providing electricity, including transmission of such electricity, to \nthose retail customers are recovered through retail rates.117 We are encouraged by efforts \ntaken by states to reform retail tariffs to address the potential for retail cost shifting as \nlarge loads come online,118 as well as voluntary efforts by transmission owners to protect \nretail ratepayers through cost recovery agreements with large loads.119 We are also \nencouraged by the execution of the President’s Ratepayer Protection Pledge, through \n \n115 See, e.g., Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; \nMissouri Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11; Nebraska Board \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; Tri-State November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. \n116 PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at P 167. \n117 Id. P 68. \n118 See, e.g., Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-10; \nMissouri Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4; Oklahoma State Entities \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8. \n119 See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. 194 FERC ¶ 61,106; Commonwealth \nEdison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,109; Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,110; \nCommonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2026); PECO Energy Co., 193 FERC ¶ \n61,148 (2025); Dayton Power & Light Co., 192 FERC ¶ 61,103; Dayton Power & Light \nCo., 189 FERC ¶ 61,220 (2024)."},{"page":32,"startToken":12338,"endToken":12770,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 32 - \nwhich data center developers have committed to shield retail ratepayers from increased \nelectricity prices.120 \n \nWe expect that the additional cost transparency measures proposed in the \nfollowing section will give state public utility commissions and other state regulators \nthe information necessary to allow them to understand which transmission costs are \ncaused by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate these costs to the \nappropriate retail customers. Indeed, the Commission’s objective in this proceeding is to \nrespect the cooperative federalism approach established under the FPA. Specifically, one \nof the benefits of providing transparency on the costs of Network Upgrades necessary to \nprovide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads is so that \nstate regulators can use that information to protect residential and small commercial \ncustomers by incorporating those costs into the retail rates as they see fit given their \nauthority to set rates for different classes of retail customers. We encourage state public \nutility commissions, state regulators, and state consumer advocates to submit comments \nexplaining whether this information is sufficient and granular enough or to submit \ncomments explaining precisely which additional information on transmission cost \nallocation may be needed to inform proper state-jurisdictional cost allocation. \n2. \nAdditional Cost Transparency \n \nWe preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or \nunduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions requiring the \nprovision of data on SPP’s website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format \nthat is searchable and allows users to filter the data, on transmission service requested \nby Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, for Network Upgrades evaluated in \nthe local transmission planning process that are needed to provide transmission service \nto Eligible Customers on behalf of those large loads, and the costs for those Network \nUpgrades. We preliminarily find that cost transparency measures are needed to provide \nstakeholders with sufficient information and visibility regarding the Network Upgrades, \nand their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers \non behalf of large loads. \n \nAs an initial matter, we note that SPP has taken numerous steps to connect large \nloads to the transmission system in a reliable and expeditious manner and to enhance \nits study and operational requirements related to provision of transmission service to \nEligible Customers on behalf of large loads.121 SPP’s Tariff contains a process for \nidentifying Network Upgrades for new transmission service requests, including for \nEligible Customers requesting transmission service on behalf of large loads. As \n \n120 Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026). \n121 See supra PP 21-22."},{"page":33,"startToken":12770,"endToken":13260,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 33 - \ndiscussed above, Eligible Customers must satisfy several initial requirements within \nthe timeframe outlined in SPP’s Tariff before taking CHILLS, Firm Point-to-Point \nTransmission Service, or NITS on behalf of large loads. Should the studies associated \nwith such a request identify the need for Network Upgrades, those upgrades will be \nfurther evaluated in SPP’s transmission planning process and included in SPP’s \nTransmission Expansion Plan, and the costs will be allocated to transmission customers \nin certain pricing zones, subregions, the entire SPP region, or a combination thereof, \nbased on the voltage level and location of the specific Network Upgrade in accordance \nwith section III of Attachment J. However, if an Eligible Customer does not yet have \nenough existing Designated Resources to serve new load, then the cost of any Network \nUpgrades associated with the new load will be directly assigned to the Eligible Customer \nuntil the Eligible Customer designates a generating facility to serve the load, at which \npoint the remaining cost of the Network Upgrades will be allocated to transmission \ncustomers in accordance with section III of Attachment J. \n \nHowever, SPP’s Tariff does not appear to require that information identifying \nthe Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers \non behalf of large loads and the costs of those Network Upgrades determined through \nlocal transmission planning processes be readily available on SPP’s website in a single \nlocation, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter \nthe data. The speed and scale with which Eligible Customers are seeking transmission \nservice on behalf of large loads makes it difficult for interested parties, including \ntransmission customers and state regulators, to accurately assess which transmission \ncosts are driven by requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers to serve \nlarge loads. As SPP itself acknowledges, it is facing “unprecedented growth in large, \noften non-traditional, load interconnection requests.”122 The SPP TOs, for their part, \nnote the “risk of inappropriate cost-shift to non-large load customers” associated with \nlarge-load driven Network Upgrades.123 Although SPP has taken significant steps to \ncurb speculative requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of \nlarge loads through its HILL process, we are nonetheless concerned that the speed and \nscale with which large loads are seeking to be added to the transmission system, the \nprojected need for significant Network Upgrades to provide transmission service to \nEligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the lack of centralized information on \nthe associated transmission costs in SPP hamper the ability of the Commission and \nstakeholders (including transmission customers and state regulators124) to understand and \n \n122 SPP November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2. \n123 See SPP TOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3, 6, 8. \n124 See Transcript, NARUC Collaborative, Docket No. AD24-7-000, at 16-17 \n(Feb. 11, 2026) (Chair Bagot, Virginia) (asserting that additional transparency at the RTO \nlevel would help the states get the information they need to “identify . . . that bucket of"},{"page":34,"startToken":13260,"endToken":13700,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 34 - \naccurately assess the relationship between the addition of large loads to the transmission \nsystem and wholesale transmission costs. \n \nWe acknowledge that SPP provides some information to stakeholders regarding \nthe cost of Network Upgrades generally. For instance, SPP publishes an annual report \ndetailing the region’s holistic transmission needs over the next 10 years.125 But such \nreporting primarily presents aggregate transmission need and transmission project \ncost-benefit projections across the region, not detailed cost estimates for large-load driven \nNetwork Upgrades. Moreover, SPP’s Tariff does not contain provisions that require SPP \nto publicly post cost estimates for Network Upgrades necessary to provide transmission \nservice to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads. \n \nWe are concerned that without sufficient transparency regarding the \nNetwork Upgrades, and their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service \nto Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, stakeholders may lack information and \nvisibility regarding the costs driven by large load additions. We preliminarily find that, \nfor Network Upgrades evaluated in the local transmission planning process126 that are \n \ncosts” related to large load-driven transmission costs), 19 (Commissioner Chattopadhyay, \nNew Hampshire) (noting the need for “all parties to be able to see things transparently” \nwith respect to wholesale transmission costs), 35-37 (Chair Martz, Iowa) (raising concern \nthat currently RTOs/ISOs do not have to clearly explain when a “bucket of costs is \nspecifically for this large load” and noting that “if we, at the state level, can’t see the \ndriver [of transmission costs], we can’t assign the cost to the causer[,] [a]nd so we need \nthat clarity”), 69-70 (Chair Myers, Arizona) (“[B]eing able to allocate the large load costs \nto the correct bucket when it gets to the states is kind of a top priority.”). \n125 SPP, Integrated Transmission Planning, \nhttps://www.spp.org/engineering/transmission-planning/integrated-transmission-\nplanning/. \n126 Our concern with transparency regarding Network Upgrades needed to provide \ntransmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, as well as the costs of \nsuch upgrades, is limited to Network Upgrades planned through the local transmission \nplanning process. While we acknowledge that in Order No. 890, the Commission \nadopted requirements for RTOs/ISOs, as well as for transmission owners to the extent \nthat they perform transmission planning within an RTO/ISO, to have open and \ntransparent transmission planning processes, there are additional requirements that apply \nto regional transmission planning processes (that do not apply to local transmission \nfacilities) and thus is relevant to the distinction here. Specifically, under Order No. 1000, \npublic utility transmission providers, including RTOs/ISOs, must evaluate as part of their \nregional transmission planning process whether there are transmission facilities that more"},{"page":35,"startToken":13700,"endToken":14159,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 35 - \nneeded to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, \nSPP must provide clear, timely, and detailed information regarding the extent to which \nrequests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads \nnecessitate Network Upgrades to accommodate the transmission service to Eligible \nCustomers on behalf of large loads, as well as the costs of those Network Upgrades. \n \nWe note that centralized information regarding Network Upgrades needed to \naccommodate requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of \nlarge loads would also help inform stakeholders at the state and local level to address \naffordability and other challenges posed by the integration of large loads. Indeed, \ncommenters state that the opaque nature of requests for transmission service by \nEligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the associated Network Upgrades \nrequired to provide that transmission service, prevent wholesale and retail customers, \nstates, and other stakeholders from understanding such costs.127 \n \nAccordingly, we preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it does not require the provision of data on SPP’s website in a \nsingle location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to \nfilter the data, that identifies the Network Upgrades that are needed to accommodate \nrequests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the \ncosts of those Network Upgrades. SPP should explain whether the Tariff remains just \nand reasonable without provisions that would require SPP and the Transmission Owners \nto publicly post and regularly update data that details: (1) the aggregate amounts of \nproposed large load additions in SPP’s footprint, including the aggregate amounts in each \n \nefficiently or cost-effectively meet the transmission planning region’s identified \ntransmission needs. See Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 11. \n127 See Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-13 (noting the \nrisk of cost shifts at the wholesale transmission level due to large-load driven regional \ntransmission costs); Missouri Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14 \n(urging requirements that enhance transparency); see also OCC November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 3 (“Consumers, state advocates and state regulatory commissions have a \nright to know which entities are seeking large-load interconnections, the nature of the \nrequested service, and how related costs could flow through to transmission and \ndistribution rates.”); U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce \nRanking Members November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2 (urging the Commission to \n“require sufficient transparency from grid operators so it can determine which specific \nlarge load facilities are responsible for grid upgrade needs”); CPUC November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 16-17 (asserting that the public posting of large load cost \nresponsibility determinations would improve transparency, to the benefit of businesses \nand ratepayers)."},{"page":36,"startToken":14159,"endToken":14601,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 36 - \ntransmission pricing zone; (2) the planned Network Upgrades needed to provide \ntransmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, identified by \ntype of equipment and Network Upgrade (e.g., new substation, reconductoring, a new \nhigh-voltage transmission line) for each transmission service request; and (3) cost \nestimates for those Network Upgrades; or propose such Tariff revisions. SPP and the \nTransmission Owners should also consider what other data related to transmission costs \nresulting from the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of \nlarge loads would be useful to include on SPP’s website. To the extent there are concerns \nabout data confidentiality, SPP and the Transmission Owners should consider whether \nthere are ways to mitigate those concerns while still providing the necessary \ntransparency. \n3. \nCost Recovery Agreements \n \nWe next preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting \namong transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates \nfor transmission service. In particular, we are concerned about the apparent lack of a \npro forma cost recovery agreement between SPP, the relevant transmission owner, and \nthe Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of large loads that help \nensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs \nincurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of Network Upgrades. \n \nSeveral commenters discuss the risk of cost shifting among transmission \ncustomers that could result from transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on \nbehalf of large loads.128 Commenters also argue that retail-level large load tariffs do not \nprotect wholesale transmission customers from cost shifting.129 Specifically, commenters \nin the record contend that, while a retail-level large load tariff protects the load serving \n \n128 See, e.g., Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-13; APPA November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 6 (“Wholesale transmission customers in particular could be left \nshouldering massive costs if new large loads do not ultimately attain or maintain the level \nof electricity demand that is being forecasted.”); NRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 21 (noting the risk that other transmission customers could bear stranded upgrade costs \ncaused by large loads that they cannot absorb); TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 22-24; California DWR November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. \n129 TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26 (“[A] number of state \ncommissions are moving forward with retail large load tariffs, which provide for varying \nprotections, but may not require the revenues and minimum demand levels to be included \nin wholesale transmission rates.”); Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-16; \nKansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 15-16."},{"page":37,"startToken":14601,"endToken":15039,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 37 - \nentity taking wholesale transmission service and its retail customers, it fails “to provide \nany mechanism to protect other wholesale transmission customers” from stranded \ntransmission costs.130 The Kansas Commission states that while its Large Load Power \nServices rate plan that requires large loads to make minimum payments toward \ntransmission costs protects retail ratepayers from large-load driven transmission costs, \nit cannot protect against cost shifting associated with regional transmission buildout \nwhere “the large loads that formed the basis for the [regional] transmission plans do \nnot materialize, leaving only existing customers to pay for generational expansions of \nthe transmission grid.”131 TAPS contends, moreover, that it is not sufficient for the \nCommission to rely on transmission owners to voluntarily file cost recovery agreements \nto protect transmission customers from cost shifting for Network Upgrades.132 \n \nWe are likewise concerned that there may be speculative transmission service \nrequests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that could result in cost shifting \namong transmission customers, which may lead to unjust and unreasonable increases \nin jurisdictional transmission rates. When a transmission owner constructs Network \nUpgrades to accommodate an Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on \nbehalf of a large load, those transmission costs will be included in the transmission \nowner’s transmission revenue requirement. If, however, the Eligible Customer takes less \ntransmission service than anticipated because the large load operates at a lower demand \nthan anticipated or fails to materialize at all, other transmission customers may see an \nincrease in transmission rates. In such a situation, those other transmission customers \nmay have to pay for potentially unnecessary Network Upgrades that they neither caused \nthe need for nor benefit commensurately from. In other words, this introduces the risk \nthat costs may be unfairly shifted to other transmission customers, which may result in \nthose costs then being passed through to residential customers, among others. \n \nSPP’s Tariff does not require cost recovery agreements between SPP, the relevant \ntransmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of a \nlarge load. Such agreements would help ensure that the Eligible Customer makes a \nminimum contribution to the transmission owner’s transmission revenue requirement \ncommensurate with the costs incurred to provide the requested transmission service, \n \n130 Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15; see TAPS November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 26-27 & nn.50-51. \n131 Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12. \n132 TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 25-26 (noting that AES Ohio \n“committed to reflecting the payments it received from the data center in its Commission-\njurisdictional transmission revenue requirement so that other customers are protected,” in \na Construction Service Agreement with Amazon)."},{"page":38,"startToken":15039,"endToken":15496,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 38 - \nincluding the costs of any needed Network Upgrades. Absent such cost recovery \nagreements, we are concerned that there is no mechanism to help ensure that Eligible \nCustomers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads (as opposed to other \ntransmission customers) bear the risk of, and are ultimately responsible for, the costs \nincurred to provide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of \nany needed Network Upgrades. \n \nAccordingly, we preliminarily find that, in order to prevent unjust and \nunreasonable cost shifting among transmission customers, it appears necessary for \nSPP, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission \nservice on behalf of a large load to enter into a cost recovery agreement that requires the \nEligible Customer to make a minimum contribution toward the transmission owner’s \ntransmission revenue requirement, if the Eligible Customer ultimately takes less \ntransmission service than anticipated because the large load does not materialize as \nplanned or is not developed at all. We preliminarily find that such cost recovery \nagreements are necessary to help ensure that the Eligible Customer is responsible for \ntimely paying the costs of large load-driven transmission (i.e., the costs incurred to \nprovide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of any needed \nNetwork Upgrades), rather than having those costs paid by other transmission customers \nthat neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from those Network \nUpgrades.133 Our preliminary finding is not intended to alter or call into question \nexisting regional cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades, but instead is focused \non helping to prevent cost shifting among transmission customers. \n \nWe note that several transmission owners and large load customers have filed \ncost recovery agreements (Transmission Security Agreements or Construction Service \nAgreements) with the Commission that guarantee minimum contributions from a large \nload customer (rather than from the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on \nbehalf of the large load customer) to the transmission owner’s transmission revenue \nrequirement.134 Although we decline to preliminarily find that cost recovery agreements \nbetween the transmission owner and the large load customer (rather than the Eligible \nCustomer) are necessary to ensure just and reasonable transmission rates, we continue to \nfind that such agreements directly affect Commission-jurisdictional transmission rates. \nTherefore, to the extent a transmission owner and a large load customer enter into a cost \nrecovery agreement (whether voluntarily or pursuant to state law) through which the \nlarge load customer guarantees contributions to the transmission owner’s Commission-\njurisdictional transmission revenue requirement, we find that such an agreement should \n \n133 See, e.g., Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 \n(D.C. Cir. 2004); Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009). \n134 See supra note 119."},{"page":39,"startToken":15496,"endToken":15961,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 39 - \nbe filed with the Commission.135 To reduce duplicative credit requirements and \ntransaction costs, we direct further briefing on whether it would be appropriate for such \nan agreement to substitute for the requirement on the Eligible Customer to enter into a \ncost recovery agreement with the transmission owner, if the agreement with the large \nload customer provided comparable or greater protection against cost shifting among \ntransmission customers than an agreement between the transmission owner and the \nEligible Customer would. \n \nIn addition to our preliminary finding that SPP’s Tariff is unjust and unreasonable \nbecause it lacks a pro forma cost recovery agreement of this type, we also preliminarily \nfind that the minimum contribution required pursuant to such an agreement should be \nbased on the level of jurisdictional transmission service (in MW) requested by the \nEligible Customer on behalf of the large load. That figure is in turn tied to how SPP \nand/or Transmission Owners will study the requested transmission service and determine \nany necessary Network Upgrades that must be developed to provide the requested \ntransmission service. We note, however, that there may be other just and reasonable \nmethods for determining this minimum contribution, including methods that account for \npotential timing differences between when costs are incurred to develop needed Network \nUpgrades and the pace at which the large load ramps toward energizing at its full level of \nrequested service. We further preliminarily find that the cost recovery agreement should \ninclude a credit support (or other financial security) requirement sufficient to secure the \nobligations of the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of a large load \nto pay the amounts owed pursuant to the cost recovery agreement. We find that a cost \nrecovery agreement with a specified minimum financial contribution and financial \nsecurity sufficient to secure such contribution is necessary to mitigate cost shifting if the \nEligible Customer ultimately takes less transmission service than anticipated because the \nlarge load does not materialize as planned or is not developed at all. We preliminarily \nfind that an Eligible Customer may include a credit support or other financial security \nposted by a large load as part of a retail agreement to avoid creating duplicative credit \nsupport requirements. SPP should explain why such a pro forma cost recovery \nagreement is not necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates, or propose such a \npro forma cost recovery agreement. To the extent that stakeholders believe that other \nmechanisms could address our cost shifting concerns, we seek further briefing as \ndiscussed below.136 \n \n135 We emphasize that this finding is in no way intended to preempt or interfere \nwith the ability of states to implement ratepayer protection measures designed to mitigate \ncost shifting among retail customers, such as through state-jurisdictional large load \ntariffs. \n136 See infra P 94."},{"page":40,"startToken":15961,"endToken":16375,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 40 - \n \nLastly, we expect that any payments made by an Eligible Customer to a \ntransmission owner pursuant to such a cost recovery agreement (or by a large load to a \ntransmission owner pursuant to other voluntary agreement) will be appropriately credited \ntoward transmission owners’ transmission revenue requirements consistent with the \nCommission’s cost-of-service regulations.137 We preliminarily find that it appears \nreasonable for filers of formula rates to provide a separate workpaper in the annual \ninformational filing describing how any payments made pursuant to a cost recovery \nagreement are reflected in the transmission owner’s transmission formula rate. \nC. \nCo-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter \nGeneration \n \nThe Commission recently addressed in the PJM region the need for sufficiently \nclear and consistent tariff provisions addressing the rates, terms, and conditions that \napply to co-location arrangements and for transmission services that reflect an Eligible \nCustomer taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load138 that is willing \nand able to limit its energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain \nconditions.139 Although SPP recently established the HILLGA process to allow for \nexpedited review of generating facilities that are designated to serve a large load and \ninterconnected in the same local area as the large load (i.e., within a certain number of \nsubstations and transmission line segments from the HILL), we remain concerned, as \ndiscussed below, that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks \nsuch provisions.140 \n \nWe direct SPP and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters addressed \nherein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to explain \nwhether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions addressing the rates, \nterms and conditions that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load and \n \n137 See 18 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2025). \n138 As discussed below, for purposes of this order, we will use the term \nEligible Load to refer to co-located load and/or load with behind the meter generation. \nSee infra P 72. \n139 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 2; PJM Co-Location \nRehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 91, 102. \n140 We note that SPP does not allow Eligible Customers taking transmission \nservice on behalf of loads with behind the meter generation to reduce their transmission \nservice charges by netting output from the behind the meter generation in determining \nNITS charges. We therefore need not address behind the meter generation netting rules \nin this order."},{"page":41,"startToken":16375,"endToken":16781,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 41 - \nfor Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load, or propose \nTariff revisions establishing the rates, terms, and conditions that apply to co-location \narrangements. We recognize that SPP is currently considering reforms related to new \ntransmission services, which might also be available to Eligible Customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of co-located load, in its stakeholder process, and we \nencourage SPP to consider whether these efforts would, either fully or in part, address \nthe Commission’s concerns that the Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable. \n1. \nDefinition \n \nThe PJM Co-Location Order adopted the following definition of co-located load: \na “configuration [that] refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected to the \nfacilities of an existing or planned Customer Facility on the Interconnection Customer’s \nside of the Point of Interconnection to the PJM Transmission System.”141 The PJM \nCo-Location Order used the term co-location arrangement when referring to both the \nco-located load and the associated generator.142 \n \nFor purposes of this order, it appears that it would be reasonable to define \nco-located load as a configuration that refers to end-use customer load that is physically \nconnected to the facilities of an existing or planned generating facility on the generator \ninterconnection customer’s side of the point of interconnection to the RTO/ISO’s \ntransmission system. In this order, we will also use the term co-location arrangement \nwhen referring to both the co-located load and the associated generating facility. \n \nSPP defines Behind-The-Meter-Generation (BTMG) as “A generation unit that is \nconnected on the load side of a load Meter Settlement Location and is used by the load \nMarket Participant that is the registered owner for the Meter Settlement Location to serve \nall or part of its capacity, Energy or Ancillary Service needs.”143 \n \nFor purposes of this order, we will use the term Eligible Load to refer to co-located \nload and/or load with BTMG.144 \n \n141 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 164 (alterations in original). \n142 Id. P 3. \n143 SPP Tariff, attach. AE (MPL), § 1.1B (3.0.0). While we believe this definition \nis sufficient for purposes of this order, responses may explain whether changes to the \ndefinition of BTMG may be needed in order to comply with any future directives, should \nthe Commission find that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable. \n144 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 91."},{"page":42,"startToken":16781,"endToken":17145,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 42 - \n2. \nJurisdiction \n \nAs explained in the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission has exclusive \njurisdiction to oversee the interconnection of generating facilities to the interstate \ntransmission system, including where generators serve co-located load.145 The \nCommission retains exclusive authority to regulate the procedures and agreements that \napply to the interconnection of a generator that will make wholesale sales, both where \nthe generator interconnects directly to the interstate transmission system and where a \ngenerator interconnects to dual-use distribution facilities.146 Further, the Commission has \nexclusive jurisdiction over the provision of transmission service to an Eligible Customer \non behalf of Eligible Load, provided that transmission of electricity is in interstate \ncommerce.147 As the Commission found in the PJM Co-Location Order, we continue to \nacknowledge that the application of these principles depends on the specific facts and \ncircumstances presented in particular situations.148 \n \nAdditionally, we reiterate that certain other aspects of co-location arrangements fall \nsquarely within the jurisdiction of the states. As we explained in the PJM Co-Location \nOrder, states retain exclusive authority over the specific terms of retail sales and retail rate \ndesign, including retail cost allocation to the co-located load; which entities are legally \npermitted to provide electricity to retail customers in co-location arrangements; and which \ngenerating facilities are sited and allowed to serve co-located load.149 \n3. \nTariff Provisions \n \nWe preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or \nunduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions addressing \nwith sufficient clarity and consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that \napply to interconnection customers serving co-located load. We also preliminarily find \nthat SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or \npreferential because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity \nand consistency transmission services that reflect that an Eligible Customer taking \n \n145 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 171 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, \n824e; EPSA, 577 U.S. at 278). \n146 Id. P 172 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, \n1282 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). \n147 Id. P 173. \n148 Id. P 174. \n149 Id. PP 167-169."},{"page":43,"startToken":17145,"endToken":17599,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 43 - \ntransmission service on behalf of Eligible Load is willing and able to limit its energy \nwithdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. \n \nThe absence of such provisions may leave entities unable to determine what steps \nthey can or must take to effectuate co-location arrangements of various configurations. \nOne step includes determining how interconnection customers serving co-located load \nmay use generator interconnection processes in SPP’s Tariff to facilitate their co-location \narrangements. We encourage SPP to explain how its existing HILLGA process either \nmay already clarify some of these requirements or may be modified to provide such \nclarity. A further step includes requiring interconnection customers serving co-located \nload to specify the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of the \nco-located load under the Tariff for purposes of assessing charges, including the \nappropriate charges for wholesale services that should apply to such Eligible Customers. \nWithout such a common and consistent understanding of entities’ responsibilities relevant \nto co-location arrangements, many of which may significantly affect rates and are \nrealistically susceptible of specification,150 we are concerned that these arrangements \nmay be developed in a manner that is itself unjust and unreasonable or that may result in \nunjust and unreasonable rates for other customers. \n \nMoreover, as discussed further below, we are especially concerned that the \nabsence of Tariff provisions addressing transmission and ancillary service rates for \nEligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load creates the \npotential that Eligible Customers, on behalf of Eligible Load, may not be required to pay \nfor wholesale transmission services that they receive, as required by the cost causation \nprinciple. That principle provides that all Commission-jurisdictional rates and charges \nmust “reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay \nfor them,”151 and that costs must be allocated in a manner that is at least roughly \ncommensurate with the benefits that entity receives.152 \n \nWe preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable \nbecause it lacks sufficient clarity and consistency as to the rates, terms, and conditions \nof service that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load, including \nthe scope of the analyses SPP performs as part of its existing study process to evaluate \nthe impacts of co-location arrangements, which may need to account for any potential \ndynamic impacts of co-located load and any potential impacts of requests to modify an \nexisting generating facility’s interconnection service level to serve co-located load on \n \n150 Hecate Energy Greene Cnty. 3 LLC v. FERC, 72 F.4th 1307, 1312 \n(D.C. Cir. 2023). \n151 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361 at 1368. \n152 See, e.g., Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 at 476."},{"page":44,"startToken":17599,"endToken":18026,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 44 - \ntransmission system reliability. Additionally, in the PJM Co-Location Order, the \nCommission found that it was necessary to clarify that interconnection customers seeking \nto use new generating facilities to serve co-located load may (1) request interconnection \nservice at a level below the generating facility’s maximum facility output; (2) use \nexisting procedures to accelerate interconnection requests that satisfy certain tariff \ncriteria; and (3) request provisional interconnection service and surplus interconnection \nservice.153 As such, interconnection customers seeking to use their generating facilities \nto serve co-located load have no means of knowing the appropriate mechanism for setting \nforth the terms and conditions of co-location arrangements. We are concerned that the \ndetails of the existing rules and studies applicable to co-location arrangements are not \nsufficiently detailed in the Tariff to ensure clarity for how interconnection customers may \nseek to serve co-located load. Moreover, without an Eligible Customer designated to \ntake transmission service on behalf of a co-located load, there is no mechanism for SPP \nto address situations in which a co-located load withdraws energy from the transmission \nsystem. \n \nTherefore, we preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and \nconsistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection \ncustomers serving co-located load. SPP should explain whether the Tariff remains just \nand reasonable without such provisions, or propose Tariff revisions. \n \nWe have similar concerns regarding SPP’s existing rate designs for transmission \nand ancillary services that are used by Eligible Customers taking transmission service \non behalf of Eligible Load. The Commission has previously found that co-located loads \nthat are synchronized with the transmission system use and benefit from at least some \nancillary services and may be reasonably charged for such benefits.154 Specifically, the \nCommission has found that, regardless of whether a co-located load withdraws energy \nfrom the transmission system, co-located load relies on and benefits from regulation \nservice and black start service, and concluded that Eligible Customers taking one of the \nnew transmission services (discussed below) on behalf of co-located load must pay for \nthese ancillary services on a gross demand basis.155 In the PJM Co-Location Rehearing \nOrder, the Commission applied these findings to Eligible Customers taking transmission \n \n153 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 231-235. PJM’s \ncompliance filing proposing revisions in response to these directives was accepted \nin part on April 16, 2026. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030. \n154 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 183. \n155 Id. PP 184-185."},{"page":45,"startToken":18026,"endToken":18486,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 45 - \nservice on behalf of load with BTMG.156 However, SPP’s Tariff does not appear to \ninclude a mechanism by which an Eligible Customer, on behalf of Eligible Load, \nwould be charged for ancillary services commensurate with its usage of such services, \nparticularly if such customer did not withdraw energy from the transmission system. \n \nTherefore, we preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it does not address whether and how Eligible Customers taking one \nof the new transmission services on behalf of Eligible Loads will be charged for their use \nof regulation and black start services, which introduces the risk that Eligible Load may \nbenefit from regulation and black start services without contributing to cost recovery \nfor such services. As noted in the PJM Co-Location Order, this introduces the risk that \ncosts may be allocated entirely to other transmission customers and passed through to \nresidential customers, among others.157 SPP should explain whether the Tariff remains \njust and reasonable without requiring Eligible Customers taking one of the new \ntransmission services on behalf of Eligible Loads to pay for regulation and black start \nservices on a gross demand basis, or propose Tariff revisions that require them to do so. \n \nThe Commission also found in the PJM Co-Location Order that Eligible Customers \ntaking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads are willing and able to limit their \nenergy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. As such, \nthe Commission found that Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf \nof co-located loads should be allowed to choose a transmission service that aligns with \ntheir use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for service with the \nbenefits received.158 On rehearing, the Commission found that it is just and reasonable for \nthese services to be available to Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf \nof loads with BTMG.159 We are concerned that SPP’s Tariff lacks transmission services \nthat would reflect the ability of Eligible Customers on behalf of Eligible Loads to take \ntransmission services that align with their use of the transmission system, which may \nresult in inefficient and costly transmission buildout and costs paid by transmission \ncustomers.160 \n \n156 See PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 400. \n157 See PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 159. \n158 Id. P 199. \n159 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 101-103. \n160 See, e.g., PSEG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20 (“The Commission’s \nlong-standing policy is to encourage reduced use of the transmission system, which \nwould in turn reduce upgrades to the transmission system, to the benefit of all \ntransmission customers. For instance, if a co-located load’s use of the transmission"},{"page":46,"startToken":18486,"endToken":18913,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 46 - \n \nTherefore, we also preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust \nand unreasonable because it does not include transmission services that reflect \nEligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load that are willing \nand able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions. SPP \nshould explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without the transmission \nservices described by the Commission in the PJM Co-Location Order, with regional \nvariation as appropriate, being available to Eligible Customers taking transmission \nservice on behalf of Eligible Load, or propose appropriate Tariff revisions. Specifically, \nSPP should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) an interim \nnon-firm network transmission service while Network Upgrades are being constructed \n(i.e., interim NITS) and (2) permanent firm and non-firm contract demand transmission \nservices (transmission service up to a specified MW quantity, i.e., the contract level, on a \nfirm or non-firm basis). Finally, we note that the Commission has found it just and \nreasonable that, in order for an Eligible Customer to take interim NITS, firm contract \ndemand transmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission service, an \nEligible Customer must have necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, \nwhich may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to its \napproved level.161 \n \nWhile we recognize that SPP’s Tariff now provides CHILLS for HILLs, including \nHILLs with behind the meter generation, our concern regarding the lack of interim NITS \nthat Eligible Customers may take on behalf of Eligible Load remains because CHILLS \ndiffers from the interim NITS that the Commission required in the PJM Co-Location \nOrder. In response to this order, SPP may explain why CHILLS is sufficient to address \nour concerns regarding the lack of an interim NITS that Eligible Customers may take on \nbehalf of Eligible Load, propose revisions to CHILLS, or propose other Tariff revisions. \nWe further note that SPP’s PALS proposal is currently under development in its \nstakeholder process, and we encourage SPP to consider whether PALS would address \nour concern that SPP’s Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable because it does not \ninclude transmission services that reflect the use of the transmission system by \nEligible Customers on behalf of flexible large load, on both a temporary and permanent \nbasis.162 \n \nsystem is limited (or to a lesser degree) than other traditional in front of the meter loads, \nit should be responsible for costs based on its limited use.”). \n161 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480. \n162 See supra P 27."},{"page":47,"startToken":18913,"endToken":19346,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 47 - \nD. \nExtending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking \nService on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads \n \nIn response to the ANOPR, a number of commenters argue that certain large loads \nare able to limit their withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. \nNamely, commenters observe that flexible large loads163 can quickly and verifiably adjust \ntheir consumption in response to system conditions or price signals.164 Commenters in \nthe ANOPR also observe that, where load studies and system planning consider the \nflexible nature of large loads, flexible large loads can potentially defer or reduce the \nneed for Network Upgrades, among other potential benefits.165 In recognition of this \nflexibility, many commenters support new transmission services that reflect the \noperational capabilities of flexible large loads, including interim NITS while \nNetwork Upgrades are constructed, and non-firm transmission service.166 \n \nWe preliminarily find that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable \nbecause it does not include transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit \ntheir use of the transmission system under certain conditions. The transmission services \n \n163 For our purposes of this order, “flexible” large loads are a subset of HILLs that \nare not co-located with generation, but are willing and able to limit their energy \nwithdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. \n164 See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Land Trust Alliance \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; California DWR November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 5; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15; ClearPath November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 2-4; Digital Energy Council November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; EDF \nPower November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Emerald November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 2; Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4. \n165 See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; ELCON November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 9; Emerald November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7; Institute for \nProgress November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11; Land Trust Alliance November 21 \nANOPR Comments at 10; LS Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Microsoft \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11; National Grid November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 19-20; OMS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13-14; Southeast PIOs \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 50. \n166 See, e.g., Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 24-25; \nCalibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; Critical Loop November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 2; Digital Power Network November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; PIOs \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 27-28; Splight November 21 ANOPR Comments \nat 3-4."},{"page":48,"startToken":19346,"endToken":19794,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 48 - \navailable to Eligible Customers, including on behalf of flexible large loads, in SPP are \nNITS, firm and non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, and CHILLS.167 While \nthese remain just and reasonable options for an Eligible Customer to take on behalf \nof a flexible large load, based on the record before us, we preliminarily find that new \ntransmission services should be available to reflect the operational reality that large loads \nmay use the transmission system to differing extents and certain large loads are willing \nand able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.168 As \nexplained above, the Commission found that Eligible Customers taking transmission \nservice on behalf of Eligible Load should be allowed to choose a transmission service \nthat aligns with their use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for \nservice with the benefits received.169 As the record suggests, Eligible Customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of flexible large load also may be willing and able to limit \ntheir use of the transmission system under certain conditions. As recognized in the \nANOPR record, load flexibility can avoid inefficient and costly transmission system \nbuild-out.170 In addition, transmission services that reflect that flexible large loads are \nwilling and able to limit their withdrawals from the transmission system under certain \nconditions could help timely interconnect flexible large loads.171 Entities in the SPP \nfootprint acknowledge the importance of facilitating load flexibility.172 \n \n167 See supra P 22 (describing existing transmission services in SPP). \n168 See supra P 85. \n169 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 199; PJM Co-Location \nRehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 103. \n170 See supra P 85; see also PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 \nat PP 160, 177, 199 (finding that new transmission service options reflect a co-located \nload’s ability to limit withdrawals from the transmission system and potentially avoid \ncostly and inefficient transmission system buildout that may not be necessary). \n171 See supra P 85; see also PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 \nat PP 201 (finding that the interim, non-firm transmission service will facilitate the \n“timely” provision of transmission service and that “[t]his willingness to curtail would \npotentially allow them to obtain service more quickly”), 205 (recognizing that parties \nargue that co-located loads may be able to receive transmission service faster with use \nof a new, limited transmission service product than they would if they selected NITS, to \nthe extent that providing NITS would require Network Upgrades that the limited \ntransmission service would not). \n172 See, e.g., Oklahoma State Entities December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; \nState Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9."},{"page":49,"startToken":19794,"endToken":20242,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 49 - \n \nTherefore, we are concerned that SPP’s Tariff does not include transmission \nservices that reflect the use of the transmission system by Eligible Customers on behalf of \nflexible large load, on both an interim and permanent basis. SPP should explain whether \nthe Tariff remains just and reasonable without the transmission services described by \nthe Commission in the PJM Co-Location Order, with regional variation as appropriate, \nbeing available to Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible \nlarge loads, or propose appropriate Tariff revisions. Specifically, SPP should explain \nwhether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) an interim non-firm network \ntransmission service while Network Upgrades are being constructed (i.e., interim NITS) \nand (2) permanent firm and non-firm contract demand transmission services (transmission \nservice up to a specified MW quantity, i.e., the contract level, on a firm or non-firm basis). \nFinally, we note that the Commission has found it just and reasonable that, in order for an \nEligible Customer to take interim NITS, firm contract demand transmission service, and \nnon-firm contract demand transmission service, an Eligible Customer must have necessary \ncontrol technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection \nscheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to its approved level.173 \n \nSimilar to the discussion above, while SPP’s Tariff now provides CHILLS for \nHILLs, our concern regarding the lack of interim NITS that Eligible Customers may take \non behalf of flexible large loads remains because CHILLS differs from the interim NITS \nthat the Commission required in the PJM Co-Location Order. In response to this order, \nSPP may explain why CHILLS is sufficient to address our concerns regarding the lack of \ninterim NITS that Eligible Customers may take on behalf of flexible large loads, propose \nrevisions to CHILLS, or propose other Tariff revisions. We also note that SPP’s PALS \nproposal is currently under development in its stakeholder process, and we encourage \nSPP to consider whether PALS would address our concern that SPP’s Tariff may be \nunjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services that reflect the \nuse of the transmission system by Eligible Customers on behalf of flexible large load, on \nboth a temporary and permanent basis.174 \nE. \nInformational Report \n \nThe rapid addition and proliferation of large loads without commensurate \nadditions of supply or demand-side resources presents resource adequacy concerns. As \ndiscussed above and highlighted in the ANOPR, the growth of demand, and the speed \nof such growth, is driven in large part by the interconnection of large loads. While not \nexpressly contemplated in the ANOPR, commenters highlight the strain rapid demand \n \n173 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480. \n174 See supra P 27."},{"page":50,"startToken":20242,"endToken":20671,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 50 - \ngrowth is putting on resource adequacy in many regions.175 Indeed, the relative \nspeed and concentration at which large loads are seeking to interconnect appears to be \noutpacing the addition of new generation, which in turn heightens reliability risks and \ndrives up costs to ratepayers.176 We are concerned about whether SPP and load serving \nentities are planning adequate generation to serve all load at the pace such load seeks to \nconnect. \n \nWe recognize that RTOs/ISOs are engaging in efforts to more rapidly interconnect \ngeneration that is needed to serve this unprecedented growth in load. In particular, SPP’s \nHILLGA process and Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) process provide \ngenerator interconnection customers the opportunity to be studied and interconnect to \nSPP’s transmission system more quickly in order to help ensure load serving entities \nare able to meet resource adequacy requirements.177 While we are encouraged by the \nimplementation of such processes to ensure resource adequacy and faster interconnection, \nwe remain concerned that these efforts may fall short in light of generator retirements and \ntightening supply conditions. \n \nAccordingly, we direct SPP to submit in Docket No. EL26-68-000, within 30 days \nof the date of issuance of this order, a detailed informational report on any proposals \nunder consideration in its stakeholder process to address the issue of resource adequacy \nto serve new large loads or, to the extent that SPP is not considering such proposals, \nproviding information regarding how their existing processes, such as HILLGA and \nERAS, are working. We also encourage new proposals to the extent necessary to address \nthis concern. To the extent new proposals are being considered, the informational report \nmust include a detailed schedule of key milestones, such as stakeholder or SPP Board \nvotes, that includes the estimated date on which SPP expects to file any such proposals \nwith the Commission. \n \n175 See, e.g., Entergy November 21 ANOPR Comments at 29-30; Eolian \nNovember 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17; Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR \nComments at 24-26; R Street November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; South Dakota \nCommission November 13 ANOPR Comments at 5; Talen December 5 ANOPR Reply \nComments at 7. \n176 See, e.g., Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17; David Gardiner & \nAssociates November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Joint Consumer Advocates \nDecember 5 ANOPR Comments at 2; PSEG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; \nSouthern California Edison December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3. \n177 See SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 64, 67; Sw. Power Pool, Inc., \n192 FERC ¶ 61,062, at PP 104, 156 (2025)."},{"page":51,"startToken":20671,"endToken":21129,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 51 - \nIV. \nBriefing Questions \n \nWe note that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with \ntransmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take \ninterconnection and/or transmission service from, the transmission system and may \nbe at varying stages of that process. We appreciate that different large loads are \ncurrently at different stages of that process. We also understand that large loads and \nEligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads are negotiating, \nentering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the \ntransmission system and/or the provision of transmission service. We direct further \nbriefing regarding how SPP and the Transmission Owners, in responding to the order to \nshow cause, should protect existing commercial arrangements including: (1) what would \nbe a reasonable implementation period to ensure minimal disruption to such existing \ncommercial arrangements, and (2) how to allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize \nongoing agreements that are nearing completion as of the date such Tariff provisions are \nfiled with the Commission. \n \nToday’s order proposes, as part of a potential replacement rate, to establish new \ntransmission services that recognize flexible large loads’ ability and willingness to limit \ntheir use of the transmission system under certain conditions. As we assess this proposal, \nwe also consider how these new transmission services might affect other parts of SPP’s \nTariff and/or processes. Specifically, what, if any, potential impacts on regional and \nlocal transmission planning would arise from the introduction of the new transmission \nservices discussed herein? For example, when planning for load growth, how would \ntransmission providers and planners account for flexible large loads’ potential preference \nto take the new transmission services, including potential uncertainties around the type, \nlocation, and quantity of such expected loads? \n \nToday’s order preliminarily finds that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable without the inclusion of cost shifting protections. We find that there may \nbe a variety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts \nassociated with Network Upgrades triggered by large loads. To that end, we direct \nrespondents to include information regarding potential structures for agreements \nbetween the transmission owner/provider and an Eligible Customer to prevent unjust \nand unreasonable cost shifts among transmission customers related to Network Upgrade \ncosts required for large loads. Further, please include information on what an appropriate \nminimum level of cost recovery and financial security from an Eligible Customer would \nbe under any such agreements. \n \nToday’s order preliminarily finds that SPP’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of \nalternative transmission technologies. The order directs SPP to explain whether the \nTariff remains just and reasonable without provisions that (1) require the evaluation of"},{"page":52,"startToken":21129,"endToken":21598,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 52 - \nalternative transmission technologies in transmission service request studies, using \nmodels that are capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account \nfor advanced transmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request \nfrom the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load; and \n(2) if traditional Network Upgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission \ntechnologies, inclusion in the study report to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission \nservice on behalf of large load of a sufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative \ntransmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., would not resolve reliability violations \nidentified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would not result in lower costs or a \nfaster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request. As noted above, to \nthe extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of providing transmission \nservice to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads warrant requirements beyond those \ncontemplated here, we seek further briefing. \nThe Commission orders: \n \n(A) \nPursuant to the authority contained in and subject to the jurisdiction \nconferred upon the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by section 402(a) of the \nDepartment of Energy Organization Act and by the FPA, particularly section 206 thereof, \nand pursuant to the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and the regulations \nunder the FPA (18 C.F.R. Chapter I), the Commission hereby institutes a proceeding in \nDocket No. EL26-68-000 as discussed in the body of this order. \n(B) \nSPP and the Transmission Owners are hereby directed, within 60 days of \nthe date of the order, either: (1) to show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and \nreasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; or (2) to explain what changes \nto the Tariff they believe would remedy the identified concerns if the Commission were \nto determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable or unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to establish a replacement Tariff. \n(C) \nSPP is directed to submit an informational report within 30 days of the date \nof issuance of this order, as discussed in the body of this order. \n(D) \nAny interested person desiring to be heard in Docket No. EL26-68-000 \nmust file a notice of intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate, with the \nFederal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, \nin accordance with Rule 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, \n18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2025), within 21 days of the date of issuance of this order. The \nCommission encourages electronic submission of interventions in lieu of paper using \nthe “eFiling” link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically may \nfile by U.S. mail addressed to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of \nthe Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20426, or by hand"},{"page":53,"startToken":21598,"endToken":21786,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 53 - \n(including courier) delivery to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 12225 Wilkins \nAvenue, Rockville, MD 20852. \n(E) \nInterested entities may respond within 30 days of SPP’s and the \nTransmission Owners’ filing, addressing either or both of: (1) whether the Tariff remains \njust and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and (2) if not, what \nchanges to the Tariff should be implemented as a replacement rate. \n(F) \nThe Secretary shall promptly publish in the Federal Register a notice of \nthe Commission’s initiation of the proceeding under section 206 of the FPA in Docket \nNo. EL26-68-000. \n(G) \nThe refund effective date in Docket No. EL26-68-000 pursuant to \nsection 206 of the FPA shall be the date of publication in the Federal Register of the \nnotice discussed in Ordering Paragraph (F) above. \n \nBy the Commission. Chairman Swett is concurring with a separate statement attached. \nCommissioner Rosner is concurring with a separate statement \nattached. \nCommissioner See is concurring with a separate statement attached. \nCommissioner Chang is concurring with a separate statement \nattached. \nCommissioner LaCerte is concurring with a separate statement \nattached. \n \n( S E A L ) \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nDebbie-Anne A. Reese, \nSecretary."},{"page":54,"startToken":21786,"endToken":22007,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 54 - \nAppendix - Commenters in Docket No. RM26-4-000 \n \nAdvanced Energy Management Alliance (AEMA) \nAdvanced Energy United \nAdvancing Modern Powerlines Coalition \nAdvocates for Consumer Regulated Electricity \nAES Corporation \nAI Supply Chain Alliance \nAlexandre Figueras, on behalf of Monza Tech \nAlliance for Tribal Clean Energy \nAlliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc. \nAmazon Energy LLC \nAmerica’s Power \nAmerican Chemistry Council \nAmerican Clean Power Association \nAmerican Conservation Coalition \nAmerican Council on Renewable Energy \nAmerican Electric Power Service Corporation178 \nAmerican Public Gas Association \nAmerican Public Power Association (APPA) \nAmerican Terawatt, Inc. \nAmerican Transmission Company LLC179 \nAmericans for a Clean Energy Grid \nAntora Energy, Inc. (Antora) \nArevia Power \nArizona Public Service Company \nArkansas Public Service Commission (Arkansas Commission) \nAttorney General of the State of Oklahoma \nBase Power Company, Inc. \n \n178 American Electric Power Service Corporation submitted comments on behalf \nof its affiliates Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, \nKentucky Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, Ohio Power Company, \nWheeling Power Company, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Southwestern \nElectric Power Company, AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Indiana \nMichigan Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc., \nAEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc., AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, \nInc., AEP Oklahoma Transmission Company, Inc., and AEP Southwestern Transmission \nCompany, Inc. \n179 American Transmission Company LLC submitted comments on behalf of itself \nand its corporate manager ATC Management Inc."},{"page":55,"startToken":22007,"endToken":22205,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 55 - \nBloom Energy Corporation \nBuckeye Power, Inc. (Buckeye) \nCalibrant Energy Holdings, LLC (Calibrant) \nCalifornia Department of Water Resources State Water Project (California DWR) \nCalifornia Independent System Operator Corporation \nCalifornia Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) \nCenter for Biological Diversity \nChevron U.S.A., Inc. \nClean Energy Buyers Association (CEBA) \nClearPath, Inc. (ClearPath) \nConfederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation \nConstellation Energy Generation, LLC (Constellation) \nConsumer Energy Alliance \nConsumers Energy Company \nCritical Loop, Inc. (Critical Loop) \nCrusoe Energy Systems, Inc. \nCTC Global Corporation \nData Center Coalition (DCC) \nDavid Gardiner & Associates \nDelaware Division of the Public Advocate \nDigital Energy Council \nDigital Power Network \nDistributed Capacity Parties180 \nDr. Elisa Nelson \nDTE Electric Company \nDuke Energy Corporation \nEDF Power Solutions, Inc. (EDF Power) \nEdison Electric Institute (EEI) \nElectricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) \nElectricity Customers Alliance (ECA) \nElectric Power Supply Association (EPSA) \nEmerald AI (Emerald) \nEnchanted Rock, LLC \nEnergy New England, LLC \nEnergy Trading Institute \nENGIE North America, Inc. \nEntergy Services, LLC181 \n \n180 Distributed Capacity Parties include: Clovereleaf Infrastructure; Spark \nCommunity Investment d/b/a Sparkfund; and Voltus, Inc. \n181 Entergy Services, LLC submitted comments on behalf of the Entergy Operating \nCompanies, which include Entergy Arkansas, LLC, Entergy Louisiana, LLC, Entergy"},{"page":56,"startToken":22205,"endToken":22404,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 56 - \nEnvironmental Law & Policy Center \nEolian L.P. \nEquinix, Inc. \nesVolta, LP \nETX Upstream, LLC \nEversource Energy182 \nExelon Corporation (Exelon)183 \nFervo Energy Company \nFirstEnergy Service Company184 \nFluence \nFront Door Technologies LLC \nFuelCell Energy, Inc. \nGeorgia Public Service Commission \nGeronimo Power, LLC (Geronimo) \nGoogle LLC (Google) \nGovernors Josh Shapiro and Glenn Youngkin \nGridCARE \nGridStor LLC \nHarvard Electricity Law Initiative \nHelion Energy \nHerbert Schrayschuen \nHeron Power Electronics Company \nIndiana Energy Association \n \nMississippi, LLC, Entergy New Orleans, LLC, and Entergy Texas, Inc. \n182 Eversource Energy submitted comments on behalf of its affiliates The \nConnecticut Light and Power Company, NSTAR Electric Company, and Public Service \nCompany of New Hampshire, and through its agent Eversource Energy Service \nCompany. \n183 Exelon submitted comments on behalf of itself and its affiliates Atlantic City \nElectric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison \nCompany, Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc., Delmarva Power and Light \nCompany, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac Electric Power Company. \n184 FirstEnergy submitted comments on behalf of itself and its affiliates American \nTransmission Systems, Inc., Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic \nInterstate Transmission LLC, Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company, The \nPotomac Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company, and Trans-Allegheny \nInterstate Line Company."},{"page":57,"startToken":22404,"endToken":22724,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 57 - \nIndicated PJM Transmission Owners185 \nIndustrial Customer Organizations186 \nInformation Technology Industry Council \nInfrastructure Masons, Inc. (Infrastructure Masons) \nInstitute for Progress \nInternational Energy Credit Association \nInvenergy187 \nIron Mountain Data Centers, LLC \nISO New England, Inc. \nITC Holdings Corp. \nJason Miller, on behalf of VEIR Inc. \nKansas Corporation Commission (Kansas Commission) \n \n185 PJM TOs include: AEP on behalf of Appalachian Power Company, Indiana \nMichigan Power Company, Kentucky Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, \nOhio Power Company, Wheeling Power Company, AEP Appalachian Transmission \nCompany, Inc., AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Kentucky \nTransmission Company, Inc., AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc., and AEP West \nVirginia Transmission Company, Inc.; AMP Transmission, LLC; City of Cleveland, \nDepartment of Public Utilities, Division of Cleveland Public Power; City of Hamilton, \nOH; Dominion Energy Services, Inc. on behalf of Virginia Electric and Power Company \nd/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia; Duke Energy Corporation on behalf of its affiliates \nDuke Energy Ohio, Inc., Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc., and Duke Energy Business \nServices LLC; Duquesne Light Company; East Kentucky Power Cooperative; Exelon \nCorporation, on behalf of Atlantic City Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric \nCompany, Commonwealth Edison Company, Commonwealth Edison Company of \nIndiana, Inc., Delmarva Power & Light Company, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac \nElectric Power Company; FirstEnergy Service Company, as agent for its affiliates \nAmerican Transmission Systems, Incorporated, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, \nMid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission LLC, Keystone Appalachian Transmission \nCompany, The Potomac Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company and Trans-\nAllegheny Interstate Line Company; Old Dominion Electric Cooperative; PPL Electric \nUtilities Corporation; Rockland Electric Company; Southern Maryland Electric \nCooperative, Inc.; UGI Utilities Inc; and Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. \n186 Industrial Customer Organizations include: The Industrial Energy Consumers \nof America, the American Forest & Paper Association, the PJM Industrial Customer \nCoalition, and the Coalition of MISO Transmission Customers. \n187 Invenergy includes: Invenergy Wind Development North America LLC, \nInvenergy Solar Development North America LLC, and Invenergy Thermal Development \nHoldings LLC."},{"page":58,"startToken":22724,"endToken":23023,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 58 - \nL. Lynne Kiesling \nL.M. Marlowe \nLand Trust Alliance \nLarge Public Power Council \nLauren Hopkins \nLEAN Energy US \nLoad Flexibility Parties188 \nLong Island Power Authority \nLongroad Energy Holdings, LLC \nLouisiana Public Service Commission (together with the Mississippi Public Service \nCommission, Louisiana and Mississippi Commissions) \nLS Power Development, LLC (LS Power) \nMaine Office of the Public Advocate \nMaryland Energy Administration \nMaryland Public Service Commission \nMaven Solutions \nMCC Economics and Finance \nMeta Platforms, Inc. \nMichigan Attorney General Dana Nessel \nMicrosoft, Inc. (Microsoft) \nMidcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. \nMISO Transmission Owners189 \n \n188 Load Flexibility Parties include: Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC d/b/a \nCPower, Enel North America, Inc., and Voltus, Inc. \n189 MISO TOs include: Ameren Services Company, as agent for Union Electric \nCompany d/b/a Ameren Missouri, Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois and \nAmeren Transmission Company of Illinois; American Transmission Company LLC; Big \nRivers Electric Corporation; Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Citizens \nElectric Corporation; City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power LLC; \nCooperative Energy; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Duke Energy Business Services, \nLLC for Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; East Texas Electric Cooperative; Entergy Arkansas, \nLLC; Entergy Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi, LLC; Entergy New Orleans, LLC; \nEntergy Texas, Inc.; Great River Energy; GridLiance Heartland LLC; Hoosier Energy \nRural Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis Power \n& Light Company d/b/a AES Indiana; Lafayette Utilities System; MidAmerican Energy \nCompany; Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Montana-Dakota \nUtilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC; Northern States Power \nCompany, a Minnesota corporation, and Northern States Power Company, a Wisconsin \ncorporation, subsidiaries of Xcel Energy Inc.; Northwestern Wisconsin Electric \nCompany; Otter Tail Power Company; Prairie Power, Inc.; Republic Transmission, LLC; \nSouthern Illinois Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (d/b/a"},{"page":59,"startToken":23023,"endToken":23315,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 59 - \nMissouri Public Service Commission (Missouri Commission) \nMonitoring Analytics, LLC, acting in its capacity as the Independent Market Monitor for \nPJM \nNathan Peterson \nNational Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners \nNational Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates \nNational Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) \nNational Congress of American Indians \nNational Grid PLC (National Grid)190 \nNational Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) \nNebraska Power Review Board (Nebraska Board) \nNew England States Committee on Electricity \nNew England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners \nNew England Consumer-Owned Systems191 \nNew England Public Systems192 \nNew Mexico Public Regulation Commission \nNew York Independent System Operator, Inc. \nNew York State Department of State Utility Intervention Unit (NY UIU) \n \nCenterPoint Energy Indiana South); Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; \nWabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc. \n190 National Grid submitted comments behalf of its affiliates Niagara Mohawk \nPower Corporation; New England Power Company; New England Electric Transmission \nCorporation; New England Hydro-Transmission Corporation; New England Hydro-\nTransmission Electric Company, Inc.; and Massachusetts Electric Company. \n191 New England Consumer-Owned Systems include: Belmont Municipal Light \nDepartment, Block Island Utility District, Braintree Electric Light Department, Concord \nMunicipal Light Plant, Danvers Electric Division, Georgetown Municipal Light \nDepartment, Groveland Electric Light Department, Hingham Municipal Lighting Plant, \nHudson Light & Power Department, Littleton Electric Light & Water Department, \nMerrimac Municipal Light Department, Middleborough Gas & Electric Department, \nMiddleton Electric Light Department, North Attleborough Electric Department, Norwood \nMunicipal Light Department, Clear River Electric & Water District, Rowley Municipal \nLighting Plant, Stowe Electric Department, Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant, Town of \nWallingford, Connecticut Department of Public Utilities Electric Division, Westfield Gas \nand Electric Light Department, and Mid-Coast Regional Redevelopment Authority. \n192 New England Public Systems include: Connecticut Municipal Electric \nCooperative, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, and Vermont \nPublic Power Supply Authority."},{"page":60,"startToken":23315,"endToken":23555,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 60 - \nNew York Public Service Commission \nNew York State Reliability Council \nNew York Transmission Owners193 \nNorth American Electric Reliability Corporation \nNorth Carolina Utilities Commission \nNorth Carolina Utilities Commission Public Staff \nNorth Dakota Public Service Commission (North Dakota Commission) \nNortheastern Rural Electric Membership Corporation \nNRG Energy, Inc. \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \nOffice of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) \nOklahoma Corporation Commission (together with Attorney General of the State of \nOklahoma, Oklahoma State Entities) \nOklo Inc. (Oklo) \nOld Dominion Electric Cooperative (ODEC) \nOncor Electric Delivery Company LLC \nON Energy Storage Inc. \nOpenAI Inc. \nOracle America, Inc. \nOrganization of MISO States, Inc. (OMS) \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc. \nPaces AI Inc. \nPacific Gas & Electric Company \nPaige Lambermont, on behalf of Competitive Enterprise Institute \nPaul Statchen \nPennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate \nPennsylvania Public Utility Commission \nPew Charitable Trusts Energy Modernization Project \nPJM Interconnection, LLC \nPower for Tomorrow \nPPL Corporation194 \nPrime Mover Institute \n \n193 New York Transmission Owners include: Central Hudson Gas & Electric \nCorporation, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., New York Power \nAuthority, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. \n(d/b/a National Grid), Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Long Island Power Authority, \nand Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. \n194 PPL Corporation submitted comments on behalf of the PPL Companies, which \ninclude PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, Louisville Gas & Electric Company and \nKentucky Utilities, and The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a Rhode Island Energy."},{"page":61,"startToken":23555,"endToken":23808,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 61 - \nPSEG Companies195 \nPublic Citizen, Inc. \nPublic Interest Organizations (PIOs)196 \nPublic Utilities Commission of Ohio’s Office of the Federal Energy Advocate \nR Street Institute (R Street) \nRewiring America \nMCC Economics Ltd. \nRWE Clean Energy, LLC \nSarah McKinley \nShell Energy North America (US), L.P. \nSierra Club \nSMA Solar Technology AG \nSolar Energy Industries Association \nSouth Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff \nSouth Dakota Public Utilities Commission (South Dakota Commission) \nSoutheast Public Interest Organizations (Southeast PIOs)197 \nSouthern California Edison Company \nSouthern Companies198 \nSouthern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) \nSouthwest Power Pool Transmission Owner Group (SPP TOs)199 \n \n195 PSEG Companies include: Public Service and Gas Company, PSEG Power \nLLC, and PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, which are each wholly-owned, direct \nor indirect subsidiaries of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated. \n196 PIOs include: Clean Air Task Force, Inc., Coalition for Affordable Utility \nServices and Energy Efficiency in Pennsylvania, Earthjustice, Environmental Defense \nFund, Montana Environmental Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, \nSustainable FERC Project, Sierra Club, and Southern Environmental Law Center. \n197 Southeast PIOs include: Southern Environmental Law Center, Appalachian \nVoices, North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, South Carolina Coastal \nConservation League, and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy. \n198 Southern Companies include: Georgia Power Company, Alabama Power \nCompany, and Mississippi Power Company. \n199 SPP TOs include: American Electric Power Service Corporation, Evergy \nKansas Central, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy Missouri West, Inc., Oklahoma Gas and \nElectric Company, and Xcel Energy Services Inc., on behalf of Southwestern Public \nService Company."},{"page":62,"startToken":23808,"endToken":24050,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 62 - \nSplight Inc. (Splight) \nState Entities200 \nSteel Manufacturers Association \nSwitch, Ltd. (Switch) \nTalen Energy Corporation \nTerraflux LLC \nTesla, Inc. \nTexas Blockchain Council \nThermal Battery Alliance \nTract Holding Company I, LLC (Tract) \nTransmission Access Policy Study Group (TAPS) \nTri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. (Tri-State) \nTravis Fisher, on behalf of Cato Institute \nU.S. Chamber of Commerce \nU.S. Energy Storage Coalition \nU.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking \nMembers201 \nU.S. Representatives202 \nU.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources \nU.S. Senators203 \nU.S. Senator Jon Ossoff \nUnion of Concerned Scientists (UCS) \nVantage Data Centers (Vantage) \nVerrus \nVirginia State Corporation Commission \n \n200 State Entities include: Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, the Arizona \nAttorney General’s Office, the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, the Connecticut \nOffice of Consumer Counsel, the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, the Minnesota \nAttorney General’s Office, the Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Bureau of \nConsumer Protection, the New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate, the Oregon \nAttorney General, and the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. \n201 Submitted by Frank Pallone, Jr. (Ranking Member) and Kathy Castor (Ranking \nMember, Subcommittee on Energy). \n202 The U.S. Representatives that submitted comments include: Suhas \nSubramanyam, John W. Mannion, Mike Quigley, and Donald S. Beyer Jr. \n203 The U.S. Senators that submitted comments include: Edward J. Markey, Chris \nVan Hollen, Elizabeth Warren, Peter Welch, Raphael Warnock, Richard Blumenthal, and \nAdam B. Schiff."},{"page":63,"startToken":24050,"endToken":24076,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 63 - \nVistra Corp. (Vistra) \nWashington Utilities and Transportation Commission \nWorking for Advanced Transmission Technologies Coalition \nWIRES \nWisconsin Electric Company \nWisconsin Public Service Corporation"},{"page":64,"startToken":24076,"endToken":24384,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc., AEP Oklahoma \nTransmission Company, Inc., AEP Southwestern \nTransmission Company, Inc., Deseret Generation & \nTransmission Co-operative, Inc., Empire District \nElectric Company, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy \nKansas South, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy \nMissouri West, Inc., GridLiance High Plains LLC, ITC \nGreat Plains, LLC, Mountrail-Williams Electric \nCooperative, NextEra Energy Transmission Southwest, \nLLC, NorthWestern Energy Public Service Corporation, \nOklahoma Gas and Electric Company, Prairie Wind \nTransmission, LLC, Public Service Company of \nOklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, \nSouthwestern Public Service Company, Transource \nMissouri, LLC, Transource Oklahoma, LLC, Tri-State \nGeneration and Transmission Association, Inc., and \nUpper Missouri G. & T. Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nDocket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n(Issued June 18, 2026) \n \nSWETT, Chairman, concurring: \n \n \nToday, we take historic action to push our country’s electric markets and economy \ninto the future—a future of fair cost allocation, unprecedented transparency for the \nAmerican ratepayer, respect for states’ rights, efficient markets and speed to power. Last \nOctober, Secretary Wright articulated the monumental, generational and “urgent” \nchallenge FERC must solve for our country when he directed us to develop “reforms to \nensure the timely and orderly interconnection of large loads to the transmission system.”1 \nI strongly agree. And now, through this suite of six orders, we deliver. \n \nSimply put, the show cause orders the Commission issues today to each of the six \nelectric markets subject to its jurisdiction find that the status quo across much of the \ncountry is not good enough.2 Nowhere close. The record prompted by the Secretary’s \n \n1 Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) Interconnection of Large \nLoads to the Interstate Transmission System, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking \n(Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); see Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy \n(Oct. 23, 2025) (Secretary’s Letter). \n2 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026) (CAISO); ISO New"},{"page":65,"startToken":24384,"endToken":24835,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n- - 2 - - \n \nANOPR leaves no doubt that most of the markets (and their existing rules) are inherently \nslow and prohibitive of the dexterity necessary to adapt to and power societal evolution—\nwhether brought about by technological innovation or sustaining the great industrial \neconomy that anchors America. \n \nI wholeheartedly, fully concur with these orders, which we carefully crafted to \nexecute upon the problems the Secretary identified in a manner that is quick, efficient, \nand legally durable. I write separately to highlight certain considerations underlying the \nCommission’s procedural approach to delivering on the ANOPR and to today’s orders. \n \nBased on my analysis of the extensive record and numerous ongoing substantive \nstakeholder interactions, I have determined that the most productive way to “build upon \nthe[] principles”3 in the ANOPR and “work expeditiously”4 towards a solution is to issue \nindividualized orders to show cause to each market.5 That is so for two main reasons. \n \nFirst, the record the Commission collected in response to the challenges identified \nin the ANOPR and subsequent resulting developments indicate that an approach that \nhonors the ANOPR principles but accounts for widening regional variation may now be \nmore efficient than a one-size-fits-all rule.6 The world has changed a great deal since last \n \nEng. Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2026) (ISO-NE); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., \n195 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2026) (MISO); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,216 \n(2026) (NYISO); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) (PJM); Sw. \nPower Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2026) (SPP) (collectively, Orders to Show \nCause). \n3 Secretary’s Letter at 2. \n4 Id. \n5 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (“[A]n administrative \nagency must be equipped to act either by general rule or individual order. To insist upon \none form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. . . . [T]he \nchoice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one \nthat lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Wis. Gas \nCo. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is a well-settled principle of \nadministrative law that the decision whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication \nlies within the broad discretion of the agency.”). \n6 “[T]he Commission may rely on ‘generic’ or ‘general’ findings of a systemic \nproblem to support imposition of an industry-wide solution.” Interstate Nat. Gas Ass’n \nof Am. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). However, \nthe Commission “has long allowed different regional transmission organizations to \nfollow different rules, in recognition of regional variations including potential differences"},{"page":66,"startToken":24835,"endToken":25265,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n- - 3 - - \n \nOctober. The ANOPR itself, including the articulated principles, appears to have shifted \nthe playing field and prompted great progress across several electric markets. This \nchange (and the Commission’s alignment with the Secretary) is well illustrated by a \nnumber of landmark orders approving several market new constructs that we issued since \nOctober, which together operationalize the Secretary’s principles and laid groundwork \nfor meaningful reform and today’s actions.7 While working to develop those orders, the \nCommission has simultaneously devoted significant attention to evaluating the various \nprocedural paths through which we might comprehensively deliver. \n \nIndividual show cause proceedings will allow the Commission to ensure that \nsolutions to the problems the Secretary identified are tailored to the specific, varied \ncircumstances and market constructs of each region. Indeed, a careful review of today’s \nsix orders reveals the many ways in which those orders are customized for each market’s \nunique circumstances and progress (or lack thereof) towards serving large load. To name \njust a few examples, the orders recognize ongoing stakeholder processes in various \nregions and are adapted to existing tariff provisions concerning large and co-located \nloads; account for regional variances in allocating rights and responsibilities among \nRTOs/ISOs and the transmission owners; leave room for each market to tailor operational \nrequirements for large loads that are particular to their region; and otherwise account for \nincumbent regional differences on topics such as cost allocation and cost transparency, \nstudy processes, and network upgrade procedures. \n \nProceeding via show cause proceedings will also allow the markets (and their \nrespective transmission owners) to explain, in the first instance, how to address the \nCommission’s concerns. These entities have the deepest understanding of their \nrespective regions and are best positioned to implement solutions we identified, in the \nmost expeditious manner. The Commission will promptly evaluate their responses to \ntoday’s orders, and, with input from stakeholders, swiftly establish appropriate reforms. \n \nSecond, proceeding via individual show cause orders will allow the Commission \nto act more quickly than through traditional rulemaking. Notice-and-comment \nrulemaking may not capitalize upon individual market progress prompted since October \nand would be unduly time-consuming,8 as it also inevitably would require the additional \nsteps of accommodating the regional variations of the approach we take today. \nRulemaking efforts can be particularly inefficient when, as here, they risk incubating \n \nin ‘geographic size and location.’” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FERC, 138 F.4th \n531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted). \n7 See id. P 2 & nn.6-11. \n8 See, e.g., Comments of Talen Energy Corporation, Docket No. RM26-4, at 5-6 \n(filed Nov. 21, 2025)."},{"page":67,"startToken":25265,"endToken":25744,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n- - 4 - - \n \nuncertainty after progress has begun, and diverting scarce stakeholder resources away \nfrom other endeavors, such as the development of market-specific reforms submitted to \nthe Commission under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA). (To be clear, we \nvery much encourage 205 submissions encapsulating the principles we articulate in the \n206s, and with all due deliberate haste.) \n \nFurthermore, rulemaking requires a lengthy series of steps before the proposed \nreforms would actually take effect—e.g., a NOPR, then a final rule, then potential orders \non rehearing, and then a “compliance” process in which affected parties make filings (or, \nmore likely, multiple rounds of filings) explaining how they intend to implement the rule. \nBy their nature, these procedures take time. For example, the compliance process for the \nCommission’s Order No. 20239 (which matured out of an ANOPR issued in July 2021 \nand a NOPR issued in June 2022) still is not fully complete as of June 2026. The \ncompliance process for Order No. 222210 (NOPR issued in November 2016) could be \nconsidered completed in May 2026; however, even with that timing, not all of the \nRTOs/ISOs have yet fully implemented their Commission-accepted market rules. I \nprovide these examples not to suggest that the completion of a rulemaking process on the \ninterconnection of large loads would take this long,11 but rather to make clear the scope \nof the years-long delays in implementation that might be expected if the Commission \nelected to proceed via a NOPR. By contrast, we expect that individual show cause \nproceedings for each of the RTO/ISOs will enable the Commission to spearhead lasting \nreform much more expeditiously. \n \nThe six markets together cover nearly two-thirds of load subject to Commission-\njurisdictional rates, and therefore focusing initially on those regions is a prudent first step. \nBut I am under no illusion that the challenges discussed in today’s orders are somehow \n \n9 Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order No. \n2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), order on reh’g, \nOrder No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, errata notice, 188 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2024). \n10 Participation of Distributed Energy Res. Aggregations in Mkts. Operated by \nReg’l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators, Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 \n(2020), order on reh’g, Order No. 2222-A, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197, order on reh’g, Order \nNo. 2222-B, 175 FERC ¶ 61,227 (2021). \n11 I do not mean to suggest that the public utilities subject to compliance under \nthese rulemakings—or the Commission itself—have been derelict. The time-consuming \nnature of the compliance process is a natural consequence of complex, nuanced efforts \ntoward tariff reform. As Chairman, I will continue to evaluate Commission directives to \nensure that obligations on regulated entities are not unduly burdensome and to make \ncertain that Commission action during the compliance process is as timely as possible."},{"page":68,"startToken":25744,"endToken":25869,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n- - 5 - - \n \nunique to the RTO/ISO regions. Our actions today do not foreclose the possibility of a \nfuture rulemaking, and nor do they prevent us from acting on filings made under sections \n205 and 206 of the FPA. I encourage transmission providers and other stakeholders \noutside RTO/ISO regions to make individual filings to address the issues we discuss \ntoday. \n \nFERC is no longer the sleepy, responsive agency of the past—our country cannot \nafford for it to be. This is a time for the best thinkers we have to collaborate on solving \nour biggest problems, and thus it is my great honor to deliver a solution that honors the \nSecretary’s goals. For these reasons, I respectfully concur. \n \n \n________________________ \nLaura V. Swett \nChairman"},{"page":69,"startToken":25869,"endToken":26169,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc., AEP Oklahoma \nTransmission Company, Inc., AEP Southwestern \nTransmission Company, Inc., Deseret Generation & \nTransmission Co-operative, Inc., Empire District \nElectric Company, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy \nKansas South, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy Missouri \nWest, Inc., GridLiance High Plains LLC, ITC Great \nPlains, LLC, Mountrail-Williams Electric Cooperative, \nNextEra Energy Transmission Southwest, LLC, \nNorthWestern Energy Public Service Corporation, \nOklahoma Gas and Electric Company, Prairie Wind \nTransmission, LLC, Public Service Company of \nOklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, \nSouthwestern Public Service Company, Transource \nMissouri, LLC, Transource Oklahoma, LLC, Tri-State \nGeneration and Transmission Association, Inc., and \nUpper Missouri G. & T. Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nDocket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n(Issued June 18, 2026) \n \n \nROSNER, Commissioner, concurring: \n \n \nThe electric industry is in the midst of changes not seen in a generation. \nCompared to more traditional load growth, the large loads seeking to connect to the grid \ntoday are larger, sometimes by orders of magnitude, and more concentrated. They also \nexhibit different operational characteristics, such as the ability to quickly change their \nenergy consumption, sometimes in seconds. Often, these large loads seek to connect to \nthe grid as quickly as possible. And because of these dynamics, large loads are rapidly \ndriving the need for new transmission infrastructure and energy supply. This creates new \nchallenges that, if unaddressed, could jeopardize the reliability and affordability of the \ngrid on which we all depend. \n \nToday, we are taking an important step toward addressing these challenges. We \nare opening a dialogue with each of the six RTO/ISOs on a series of reforms that are \ntailored to address the unique reliability and affordability challenges posed by large load \ngrowth and the infrastructure buildout needed to serve dramatically growing demand. \nInformed by the record developed in response to the Secretary of Energy’s October 2025"},{"page":70,"startToken":26169,"endToken":26629,"text":"Docket No. EL26-70-000 \n- 2 - \nANOPR,1 and by innovative proposals that stakeholders have filed with the Commission \nunder FPA section 205, today’s orders are aimed at ensuring that the grid remains reliable \nand affordable for all customers, especially residential customers. It is also crucial that \nwe unlock the immense economic opportunity that once-in-a-generation growth \nrepresents. While each order’s specific focus varies according to the progress that each \nRTO/ISO has made, our actions today fit broadly into four key pillars that, taken \ntogether, provide a foundation for durable reform. Today, we are: (1) Protecting \nConsumers, (2) Safeguarding Reliability, (3) Enhancing Transparency, and (4) Fostering \nInnovation (see Figure 1). I write separately to explain how. \n***** \n \nProtecting Consumers: Today’s orders include key protections that promote \naffordability. First, today’s orders require “Cost Recovery Agreements”, which are \ndesigned to ensure that large loads pay their fair share of the costs incurred to serve them, \nregardless of whether the large load comes online as planned. Thus, if new infrastructure \nis built to accommodate a data center, and that data center doesn’t show up, residential \ncustomers are not left on the hook to pay the costs. Cost Recovery Agreements prevent \nthose costs from being shifted to residential customers. Depending on how they are \nstructured, Cost Recovery Agreements can also address the potentially uneven pacing of \nnew infrastructure costs, where grid upgrade costs may hit customer bills before the large \nload is fully online and energized. Data centers have committed to paying their own \nway.2 Today, with “Cost Recovery Agreements,” we are taking steps to ensure that those \ncommitments are honored. I note, however, that the door remains open to other creative, \nregionally-specific ideas to protect consumers. If there are other ways to accomplish that \ngoal, I welcome those proposals. \n \nAnother win for consumers is requiring RTO/ISOs to consider grid enhancing \ntechnologies (GETs), including dynamic line ratings, when adding new large loads to the \ngrid. GETs are technologies that squeeze more juice out of the existing grid, reducing the \nneed for expensive upgrades and speeding up the time connect. Ensuring that RTO/ISOs \nconsider GETs in the planning process—and if GETs are not used, explain why—not \nonly helps new large loads get connected more quickly, but is also a commonsense step \ntowards saving all consumers money. Put differently, today’s orders will help us \nunderstand if we are leaving efficiencies on the table, an outcome we cannot afford. \n \n1 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, Direction that the \nCommission Initiate Rulemaking Procedures and Proposal Regarding the Interconnection \nof Large Loads Pursuant to the Secretary’s Authority Under Section 403 of the \nDepartment of Energy Organization Act (Oct. 23, 2025). \n2 See Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026)."},{"page":71,"startToken":26629,"endToken":27057,"text":"Docket No. EL26-70-000 \n- 3 - \n \nSafeguarding Reliability: Today’s orders safeguard reliability. They help ensure \nthat RTO/ISOs use study procedures and operational requirements that reflect large \nloads’ unique characteristics and the reliability impacts of connecting them to the grid. \nThose novel characteristics and reliability impacts are well-documented, and it is not \nclear if existing study procedures or operational requirements account for them. Clear, \ncomprehensive, and specifically tailored study procedures and operational requirements \nare needed, such as enhanced data reporting and telemetry to increase visibility into how \nthese loads interact with the grid, and today’s orders represent progress towards this goal. \n \nFinally, although not part of today’s orders, I want to highlight NERC’s ongoing \nefforts to establish registration criteria for large computational loads and to develop \nreliability standards.3 NERC’s goal is to finish the first phase of this critical work this \nyear. It is essential that NERC meet this deadline. I encourage all stakeholders to \nparticipate in NERC’s process. \n \nEnhancing Transparency: Today’s orders provide regulators—the Commission \nand, critically, our state partners—and customers with data on how connecting large \nloads to the grid affects bills. Today’s orders embody a commonsense approach: if a \nNetwork Upgrade is built to connect a large load to the grid, consumers should know who \nthat upgrade was built for and what it cost. \n \nTransparency is important because “who pays?” has been and continues to be a \nfraught and contentious question for large load interconnection. Stakeholders, including \nstate regulators and the ratepayers that they represent, must know the costs, for whom \nthey are being incurred, and how they are being allocated, to know that everyone is \npaying their fair share. Today’s orders ensure that this information is public, accessible, \nand clear. State regulators in more than half of the country have enacted large load \ntariffs.4 Our action today helps them as they continue their critically important work. \n \nThe Commission’s action today also addresses speculative load interconnection \nrequests, which clog up load interconnection queues, divert resources, and distort \nforecasts. Under current rules, data centers can (and are incentivized to) “shop around” \ntheir prospective projects with different utilities to identify the fastest and cheapest \nlocation to connect. This wastes time and resources studying projects that are not real. \nWorse yet, it can inflate expected load growth by modeling projects that do not \n \n3 NERC, Large Loads Action Plan Q1 2026 Update (Apr. 2026), \nhttps://www.nerc.com/globalassets/initiatives/large-loads-action-plan/llap-quarterly-\nupdate-q1-2026.pdf. \n4 See, e.g., National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners \nSupplemental Comments at 2-6; Edison Electric Institute Supplemental Comments at \nApp. 9-13."},{"page":72,"startToken":27057,"endToken":27496,"text":"Docket No. EL26-70-000 \n- 4 - \nmaterialize, leading to double counting, inaccurate market signals, and unnecessarily high \nprices for consumers. Today, we target speculative projects by establishing escalating \nreadiness requirements for distinct phases of the study process to deter duplicative or \nspeculative requests for transmission service. I strongly encourage RTO/ISOs to pursue \nother improvements to load forecasts, such as using objective screening criteria like \nphysical site control, to ensure that the data used to plan the grid is as accurate as \npossible.5 \n \nFostering Innovation: As I have said, to meet the moment, “a business-as-usual \napproach . . . will not suffice.”6 Building new infrastructure is difficult and costly, which \ndelays efforts to connect large loads to the grid quickly, reliably, and cost effectively. \nThis is doubly true when generation and load are planned and studied separately. \nToday’s orders push beyond this status quo. \n \nFirst, today’s orders promote flexible transmission services—that is, non-firm \nservice to a co-located load that is willing and able to limit withdrawals from the grid—in \nevery RTO/ISO (see Figure 2). As we explained when we first created these \ntransmission services in PJM for co-located loads, customers willing to embrace \nflexibility can reduce the need for Network Upgrades and generating capacity to serve a \nco-located load, which speeds up connecting to the grid and reduces costs for the co-\nlocated load as well as other retail customers. \n \nSecond, today’s orders recognize that extending these same transmission services \nto large loads that are not co-located but that may also be willing to limit their \nwithdrawals from the grid can unlock even more efficiency. Just as for co-located loads, \nlegalizing flexible transmission service options for more large load customers can speed \ninterconnection, avoid constructing unnecessary transmission upgrades, reduce strain on \nthe grid, and make power bills cheaper for everyone. \n \nFinally, today’s orders embrace yet another innovation. Load and generation need \nnot be co-located to reduce the number of Network Upgrades; in other words, literal co-\nlocation is not the only way to facilitate faster, more efficient, and more cost-effective \nconnections to the grid. Rather, where a large load and an associated generator are \nelectrically proximate (i.e., close together) and studied together, the reliability impacts on \nthe grid may be more limited than if the load and generator are studied separately. Just \nlike with co-location, more limited impacts on the grid mean, all else equal, fewer \n \n5 See Comm’r David Rosner, Letter to the RTOs/ISOs on Large Load Forecasting \n(Sept. 18, 2025), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/chairman-rosners-letter-\nrtosisos-large-load-forecasting. \n6 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2026), (Rosner, Comm’r, \nconcurring) at P 3."},{"page":73,"startToken":27496,"endToken":27955,"text":"Docket No. EL26-70-000 \n- 5 - \nNetwork Upgrades, which makes connecting to the grid faster, more efficient, and \ncheaper for both the large load and the associated generator. That last point is key. To \nadd new supply to the grid, we must create incentives for “Bring Your Own New \nGeneration.” Today’s orders make BYONG faster and more efficient. \n \nSPP has been a leader in showing how to push beyond the status quo. With its \ninnovative HILLGA proposal, approved by the Commission in January,7 SPP leveraged \nthe opportunity for speed and efficiency by studying load and generation together, and by \ncreating a limited, expedited interconnection service to connect faster. By matching the \ngenerator’s output to the electrically proximate large load’s demand, the impacts to the \ngrid are less than they otherwise would be, minimizing the need for time-consuming and \ncostly Network Upgrades needed to connect. HILLGA is one solution that works for \nSPP, but today’s orders direct other regions to follow SPP’s lead in ways that work for \nthem. Today’s orders add a key tool by ensuring that all RTO/ISOs can study load and \ngeneration together. \n***** \n \nThe Commission’s action today is an important step forward, but the Commission \ncannot accomplish this work alone. States are essential partners in this work. The \nCommission’s actions here respect the long-standing jurisdictional line between federal \nand state authority provided by Congress and repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court. \nStates retain exclusive jurisdiction to allocate the costs of FERC-jurisdictional \ntransmission charges among their retail ratepayers, including co-located loads. States \nalso hold the keys to energy infrastructure permits, so we rely on their decisions to ensure \nthat needed transmission and generation get built. At a time when some large loads are \nretail customers that can consume as much energy as a small city, it is imperative that we \nwork within our respective jurisdictions, but that we collaborate. I look forward to \ncontinued collaboration. \n \nToday’s orders begin an important dialogue with RTO/ISOs. As a potential next \nstep, today’s orders invite RTO/ISOs to respond by submitting proposals under FPA \nsection 205. I cannot encourage this enough. I also encourage public utilities outside of \nRTO/ISOs across the country to do the same. The electric industry is rapidly evolving \nwith regions experiencing and addressing these challenges in different ways. Many of \nthe examples on which the actions in today’s orders are based on stakeholders thinking \ncreatively to develop solutions, and I welcome other new, innovative, and regionally \ntailored proposals that build on the four key pillars set forth today: (1) Protecting \nConsumers, (2) Safeguarding Reliability, (3) Enhancing Transparency, and (4) Fostering \nInnovation. Only by working together can we rise to the occasion and meet this once-in-\n \n7 See Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026)."},{"page":74,"startToken":27955,"endToken":27998,"text":"Docket No. EL26-70-000 \n- 6 - \na-generation moment to deliver the reliable and affordable energy on which we all \ndepend. It will not be easy, but I remain optimistic and look forward to the path ahead. \nFor these reasons, I respectfully concur. \n \n \n \n________________________ \nDavid Rosner \nCommissioner"},{"page":75,"startToken":27998,"endToken":28000,"text":"Figure 1"},{"page":76,"startToken":28000,"endToken":28002,"text":"Figure 2"},{"page":77,"startToken":28002,"endToken":28340,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc., AEP Oklahoma \nTransmission Company, Inc., AEP Southwestern \nTransmission Company, Inc., Deseret Generation & \nTransmission Co-operative, Inc., Empire District \nElectric Company, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy \nKansas South, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy Missouri \nWest, Inc., GridLiance High Plains LLC, ITC Great \nPlains, LLC, Mountrail-Williams Electric Cooperative, \nNextEra Energy Transmission Southwest, LLC, \nNorthWestern Energy Public Service Corporation, \nOklahoma Gas and Electric Company, Prairie Wind \nTransmission, LLC, Public Service Company of \nOklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, \nSouthwestern Public Service Company, Transource \nMissouri, LLC, Transource Oklahoma, LLC, Tri-State \nGeneration and Transmission Association, Inc., and \nUpper Missouri G. & T. Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nDocket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n \n(Issued June 18, 2026) \n \nSEE, Commissioner, concurring: \n \n \nGrowing electricity demand underscores America’s economic strength and the \nopportunities that come with it. And with new opportunities come new challenges. The \npace and scale of emerging large loads create new circumstances that require us to adapt \nin how we build and manage the grid. Large and flexible loads can materially change \nsystem operations, for instance, as well as near-term planning needs, upgrade \nrequirements, and how we allocate costs. Most existing systems were not designed to \naccommodate those changes—especially not at the pace needed to support AI growth and \nadvanced manufacturing that are central to America’s economic competitiveness. As a \nresult, uncertainty over the operative rules and delays in interconnecting large loads can \nundermine reliability and investment and add unacceptable and avoidable costs. \n \nToday, the Commission takes strong action within our jurisdictional sweep to \naddress these and other challenges that large load growth poses to the interstate \ntransmission system. Today’s orders support both just and reasonable rates and speed to \n(reliable) power. I’m deeply grateful for the many commenters who shared their insight \nand ideas in this action. They let us build a record that highlights the need for clearer \nprocesses, better information, and faster analysis while our country moves new large load \nadditions online. As we press forward in these dockets, I will be looking to continue"},{"page":78,"startToken":28340,"endToken":28798,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 2 - \nbuilding on the momentum already underway across the country to craft more practical, \nregion-specific solutions that support timely action while protecting consumers. Our \ncontinued ability to deliver reliable and affordable electricity requires nothing less. \n \nToday’s orders speak for themselves. I write separately to briefly highlight two \nprinciples baked throughout them and that I believe must remain central as the \nCommission evaluates further steps. \n \nFirst, these issues extend beyond the Commission. Creating efficient, predictable \nlarge load interconnection processes is a joint and overlapping task for us, other federal \nagencies, the States, and the RTOs/ISOs and utilities. My animating principle here is that \nwe must use FERC’s statutory authority to bring clarity to the parts of this national issue \nwe own, and to complement and aid others as they tackle theirs. The very procedure the \nCommission deploys today reflects that goal: Recognizing the value in region-specific \napproaches, we are directing individual action in each of the RTO/ISO regions and \nencouraging—strongly—proposals under section 205 of the Federal Power Act from \ntransmission providers or other entities that are molded to their unique system needs. \n \nMost critically, exercising our authority fully without hamstringing our regulatory \nand industry partners means respecting the States. States make many of the key decisions \nthat affect how we manage large loads. States bring indispensable expertise over local \nconditions, siting needs, retail structures, and the resource decisions within their borders. \nAnd they have been hard at work pursuing the retail implications and other State-specific \nconcerns that large load interconnection presents.1 All this effort flows from the States’ \nstatutorily preserved role in regulating the power system. Today’s order understands that \nlimit—our power “extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by \nthe States.”2 It also embraces the value in a statutory lens that views large load issues as \nan area of shared federal-State responsibility. As we require clear study and operational \nparameters for large load interconnection, we should remember that the nation’s energy \nlandscape is not monolithic. State and regional diversity is a strength, and today’s orders \nknow that the best solutions reflect differing system characteristics. Our action today is \ndesigned to support further State efforts in this urgent and fast-moving space, not \noverride them. \n \nSecond, affordability must be at the forefront as we protect consumers from \nunnecessary costs in a time of rising demand. True, the Commission lacks authority over \nall the factors that drive electricity costs at the retail level. Today’s orders recognize that. \nIn response, the orders strive to aid the States in their front-line affordability duties by \n \n1 See EEI Supplemental Comments at Appendix 9 – 13 (listing pending and \napproved State large load tariffs). \n2 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)."},{"page":79,"startToken":28798,"endToken":29302,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 3 - \ngetting into their hands all relevant information about Commission-jurisdictional costs. \nAs these matters move forward, I am particularly interested in continued feedback from \nthe States on what information they most need to assess cost implications as new loads \ncome online. Are the cost transparency measures we identify today sufficient, or are \nadditional or more granular data needed for States to appropriately suballocate \ntransmission costs among retail customers? Tools like alternative cost allocation \nstructures, greater clarity in transmission service agreements, accounting for States’ \nlarge-load-specific tariffs, and direct assignment in appropriate cases may help States \nensure that retail consumers do not bear costs incommensurate with the benefits they \nreceive. \n \nMoving to areas where the Commission has a more direct role in ensuring cost \nresponsibility, we need to pull all the levers we have to keep rates fair and transparent. \nToday we reaffirm our responsibility to assign jurisdictional costs to the customers who \ndrive or benefit from grid upgrades, not shift them onto families and small businesses. \nFor instance, today’s orders seek to reduce large-load driven network upgrade costs \nthrough alternative transmission technologies, or ATTs (also commonly called Grid \nEnhancing Technologies). In determining how best to meet the needs of this historic \nlarge load growth, technologies that can improve system capability faster than traditional \nupgrades and at lower costs deserve a hard look. ATTs may not be the best tool in every \ncircumstance, but where they are they can support timely interconnections and avoid \npotentially tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in unnecessary network upgrade costs \nthat would otherwise flow into transmission customers’ bills. \n \nSo our approach today supports continuing the Commission’s policy to roll most \nnetwork upgrade costs—including those in the large load space—into the embedded-cost \nrate most transmission customers pay. But it includes an asterisk that this policy works \nfor ratepayers only so long as we remain committed to pursuing technological \ninnovations that keep those costs at a responsible and accountable level. Today’s order \nthus calls for transmission providers to sufficiently evaluate ATTs to assess if and how \nthey can meet large loads’ interconnection needs. The answer may be yes or no in a \ngiven case. But if the transmission provider opts for traditional network upgrades, they \nmust demonstrate why ATTs are not feasible or would not result in lower costs or a faster \ntimeline for the large load interconnection customer. In short, the goal is to respect \ntransmission providers’ engineering judgments while protecting against upgrade costs \nwhen ATTs could solve transmission needs faster and with a lower bill. \n \nI am also sensitive to novel questions about cost shifting that interconnecting large \nload may present. Today’s findings on cost recovery agreements between transmission \nowners and Eligible Customers are an important step in mitigating the risks of stranded \nassets if large loads prove speculative. We are also reducing unnecessary redundancy by \nallowing an Eligible Customer to meet its financial security requirements by relying on \ncredit support or other financial security a large load customer may have posted under a"},{"page":80,"startToken":29302,"endToken":29602,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 4 - \nretail agreement. As we gain more experience studying transmission service requests on \nbehalf of large loads, it may become appropriate to further streamline financial security \narrangements. Perhaps, for instance, cost -recovery agreements between a transmission \nowner and a large load customer itself could satisfy an Eligible Customer’s financial \nsecurity requirements. As we move forward, I’ll be looking to ensure cost-recovery \nagreements contain fair and transparent measures to ensure the right costs get on the right \nbills. (Relatedly, the discussion about the full nature of transmission-related charges in \nour concurrent PJM Order on Rehearing, Clarification, Compliance, and Paper Hearing3 \nmay prove relevant here: Real-world experience with new transmission services for co-\nlocated load may clarify if future action becomes needed to address potential cost shifts \nas Eligible Customers take new transmission services on behalf of large loads.4) \n \nMore generally, as we gain more experience as an industry and a country in \ngetting large loads connected to the grid, I welcome bold proposals to keep affordability \ncentral. Large load growth presents a real opportunity to build a stronger, more capable, \nand more reliable electric system that can benefit all ratepayers. Meeting that opportunity \nat the pace we need and at an acceptable cost requires innovative thinking and fast action. \nI commend the States in their continued work in these areas. I urge the RTOs and ISOs \nto continue their good work as they respond quickly to today’s orders. I also remain \ncommitted to moving forward within the Commission’s statutory zone with clarity and \ndecisiveness. I am proud to support the Commission’s important steps today. And we all \nhave more work ahead. \nFor these reasons, I respectfully concur. \n \n \n \n______________________________ \nLindsay S. See \nCommissioner \n \n3 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2026). \n4 See id. P 456."},{"page":81,"startToken":29602,"endToken":29904,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc., AEP Oklahoma \nTransmission Company, Inc., AEP Southwestern \nTransmission Company, Inc., Deseret Generation & \nTransmission Co-operative, Inc., Empire District \nElectric Company, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy \nKansas South, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy Missouri \nWest, Inc., GridLiance High Plains LLC, ITC Great \nPlains, LLC, Mountrail-Williams Electric Cooperative, \nNextEra Energy Transmission Southwest, LLC, \nNorthWestern Energy Public Service Corporation, \nOklahoma Gas and Electric Company, Prairie Wind \nTransmission, LLC, Public Service Company of \nOklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, \nSouthwestern Public Service Company, Transource \nMissouri, LLC, Transource Oklahoma, LLC, Tri-State \nGeneration and Transmission Association, Inc., and \nUpper Missouri G. & T. Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nDocket Nos. EL26-68-000 \n \n \n(Issued June 18, 2026) \n \nCHANG, Commissioner, concurring: \n \n \nIn a series of orders today, the Commission initiates separate proceedings under \nFederal Power Act (FPA) section 206 to explore the impact of the increasing growth of \nlarge loads in Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) and Independent System \nOperator (ISO) regions. The preliminary findings in these orders, and the associated \nproposed reforms to RTO/ISO and transmission owner tariffs, could significantly change \nhow loads procure, use, and pay for transmission service, with ramifications for \nRTO/ISO operations, planning, and markets. I write separately to emphasize the \nimportance of building actionable records in these proceedings, particularly with respect \nto our consideration of customer protection, transmission service, and alternative \ntransmission technology reforms. \nI. \nOverview of Today’s Orders \n \nIn each of today’s orders to show cause, the Commission identifies a series of \nissues raised by the ongoing growth of large loads, directs briefing on whether existing \ntariffs remain just and reasonable in light of those developments, and describes possible \nsolutions to those issues if the Commission ultimately concludes that the relevant tariffs \nare unjust and unreasonable. Each order is directed to a specific RTO/ISO and relevant"},{"page":82,"startToken":29904,"endToken":30352,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 2 - \ntransmission owners that play a role in interconnecting large loads to the Commission-\njurisdictional transmission system. The Commission does not pursue the broad assertion \nof jurisdictional authority contemplated in the Advanced Notice of Proposed \nRulemaking, which I hope assuages concerns raised by our state colleagues that the \nCommission ought not encroach upon matters properly left to their jurisdiction.1 \n \nBroadly summarized, each order seeks regional input on a specific list of issues: \n(1) the clarity and consistency of existing rules governing how each RTO/ISO and its \nrelevant transmission owners analyze the impact of providing transmission service to \nEligible Customers on behalf of large loads; (2) whether each RTO/ISO tariff requires \nreforms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among wholesale transmission customers; (3) \nwhether each RTO/ISO tariff (other than PJM) requires additional clarity regarding the \nprovisions addressing co-located generation and load arrangements; (4) the potential \nextension of new firm and non-firm transmission services to co-located load, load with \nbehind the meter generation, and other flexible loads; and (5) the need for reforms, \nmodeled on Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s High Impact Large Load Generation \nAssessment concept, to facilitate a process through which a generator may temporarily \nserve a co-located or electrically proximate load until interconnection and transmission \nservice is available. The Commission also invites each region to submit FPA section 205 \nfilings that can address each issue identified in the orders, thereby resolving the \nCommission’s concerns. \nII. \nThe Commission Needs Good Records to Ensure Reasoned Decision-Making \n \nI first want to emphasize that the Commission needs active participation from \ninterested stakeholders to develop thorough records in each region. The Commission \ncannot make reasoned decisions about whether reforms might be needed without an \naccurate understanding of the existing processes, which differ by region. Because the \nCommission is acting via FPA section 206 rather than generically through a rulemaking, \nthe issues addressed by these orders will be subject to ex parte restrictions across the \nRTOs/ISO regions, including with our state colleagues whose regulation can and will \ndirectly affect the individual transmission owners that need to comply with the orders \nissued today. This will limit the Commission’s ability to engage in informal fact-finding \nand discussions with regional stakeholders, and thus, it is even more essential that the \nrecord in each region fully reflects the views of all interested parties. \n \n1 I will do my part to ensure that the Commission continues to be a collaborative \npartner to our state counterparts, other federal agencies, and the industry as we seek to \naddress this wide-ranging challenge. Accordingly, I welcome feedback from our state \ncolleagues and others if they believe the Commission’s preliminary findings raise \njurisdictional concerns."},{"page":83,"startToken":30352,"endToken":30800,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 3 - \n \nSecond, I highlight three issues below that will be especially important to the \nsuccess of this effort, and I hope that interested parties will take particular care in helping \nthe Commission address those issues. Importantly, I recognize that the record established \nin each RTO/ISO region will (and should) differ, which will allow the Commission to \nensure any required changes to an RTO/ISO’s tariff are appropriately tailored to that \nregion’s needs. \nIII. \nThe Commission Needs to Pursue Meaningful Customer Protection \n \nThe FPA is fundamentally a customer protection statute,2 and the Commission has \nan obligation to ensure that the rates that wholesale and transmission customers pay are \njust and reasonable. Rapid large load growth has strained planning and resource \nprocurement processes around the country, as transmission owners, load serving entities, \nand generators accelerate the building of new infrastructure needed to serve these new \nloads. As we develop the new infrastructure, many have raised concerns about whether \nthese costs are being fairly assigned to new and existing customers, whose benefits must \nbe commensurate with the costs they pay. While individual states have been exploring or \nusing various approaches to protect retail customers against unjustified cost shifts, the \nCommission to date has not initiated any proactive exploration of how to protect \nwholesale customers against unjustified cost shifts. I am laser-focused on this issue \nbecause we should not create unjustified costs for consumers in our efforts to connect and \nserve large loads. \n \nIn today’s orders, the Commission launches an inquiry into whether existing \nRTO/ISO tariffs include adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of undue cost shifting \namong transmission customers. To address this risk, the Commission preliminarily \nidentifies a two-part solution: (1) that each RTO/ISO post public information about the \namount of new large loads seeking to connect to the RTO’s/ISO’s transmission system, \nany Network Upgrades identified in the local transmission planning process to serve \nthose loads, and the costs of those Network Upgrades; and (2) that each RTO/ISO adopt a \npro forma cost recovery agreement to help ensure that Eligible Customers serving large \nloads bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide \ntransmission service. I strongly support this effort to provide additional transparency \nregarding jurisdictional transmission service requests and the costs associated with \nproviding transmission service to the requesting parties, as the Commission cannot \neffectively execute its statutory responsibilities without sufficient understanding of the \ncosts that feed into jurisdictional rates. \n \n2 See, e.g., Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, \n1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the FPA’s “primary aim is the protection of \nconsumers from excessive rates and charges”)."},{"page":84,"startToken":30800,"endToken":31217,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 4 - \n \nExploring how agreements between transmission owners and Eligible Customers \ncan protect wholesale customers against cost shifts is important. However, as I have \npreviously explained, bilateral agreements that simply provide transmission revenue \ncontributions untethered from any assessment of the actual cost of providing transmission \nservice induced by individual large loads may be insufficient to adequately protect other \ncustomers against unjustified cost shifts.3 It is therefore important that the resulting \nregulatory and rate design are not limited to a pre-defined solution set, and that parties \nprovide the Commission with comprehensive records outlining various and innovative \napproaches to protect customers. I am encouraged by the continued development of the \nANOPR record on this subject,4 innovative solutions being developed at the state level,5 \nand a growing body of thoughtful analyses and proposed approaches to provide customer \nprotection for costs driven by large load growth.6 Without prejudging any particular \nproposed solution, the Commission needs a robust record in each docket and each region \nto ensure we establish the right cost shift protections for wholesale customers, including \nbut not limited to the commitments outlined in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.7 \n \nI support initiating our own review of customer protection approaches, rather than \nsimply relying on voluntary commitments that may fall short of optimal protection, \nbecause the Commission has the opportunity and obligation to get this issue right. I \n \n3 E.g., PECO Energy Co., 193 FERC ¶ 61,148 (2025) (Comm’r \nChang, concurring); Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2026) (Comm’r \nChang, concurring). \n4 E.g., Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Trans. Sys., Supplemental \nComments of FirstEnergy Svc. Co., Docket No. RM26-4-000 (filed June 5, 2026); id., \nComment of the Harvard Electricity Law Initiative, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Apr. 15, \n2026); id., Supplemental Comments of WIRES, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Mar. 30, \n2026). \n5 E.g., Utility Dive, Microsoft seeks Nevada tariff to shield ratepayers from data \ncenter costs (June 8, 2026), available at https://www.utilitydive.com/news/microsoft-\nseeks-nevada-tariff-to-shield-ratepayers-from-data-center-costs/822250/. \n6 E.g., Travis Kavulla, How Will Data Centers Pay for Power?, American Affairs \n(may 2026), available at https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2026/05/how-will-data-\ncenters-pay-for-power/ ; Electricity Customer Alliance, A Customer-Centric Agenda for \nthe Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n (Jan. 2026), available at https://lnkd.in/em-apfuQ; \nGrid Strategies, Federal Transmission Pricing Vol. 2, Options for Ensuring Affordability \nin an Era of High Load Growth (June 2026), available at \nhttps://gridstrategiesllc.com/project/federal-transmission-pricing. \n7 Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026)."},{"page":85,"startToken":31217,"endToken":31677,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 5 - \ntherefore encourage interested parties to assist the Commission in that effort by clearly \nand comprehensively explaining the benefits and tradeoffs of alternative customer \nprotection approaches. How power infrastructure costs will be assigned across Eligible \nCustomers that serve large loads and other customers is at the core of the efforts we \ninitiate today. \nIV. \nThe Commission Needs to Understand the Implications of Extending New \nTransmission Services to Additional Loads and Regions \n \nThe orders also preliminarily find that the Commission should extend the \ntransmission services developed in the PJM co-location proceeding – Interim NITS, Firm \nContract Demand, and Non-Firm Contract Demand – to new types of load and new \nregions. These new transmission services represent a fundamental paradigm shift from \nthe traditional network service and point-to-point transmission service models established \nin Order No. 888 that have been used across the country for the last three decades. While \nthese services have the potential to facilitate more efficient use and build out of the \ntransmission system, they also contemplate running the system “tighter” than we have \ndone in the past, potentially with more loads on the system served by co-located or \nbehind-the-meter generation, and potentially more use of batteries, load control systems, \nand backup resources to manage demand during system peaks or other stressed \nconditions. While it is important to identify innovative solutions that can adapt to the \nneeds of the system, the Commission and grid operators must also be careful not to \nimplement changes that create unforeseen reliability risks. Ultimately, we must find the \nproper balance (and I would argue we are exploring a new balance) between costs of \ninvestments versus reliability. \n \nThe Commission’s experience in the PJM co-location proceeding highlights the \ncomplexities and challenges of introducing these new transmission services, which have \nsignificant ramifications for system operations, transmission planning, grid reliability, \nmarket dispatch, resource adequacy, and cost allocation. As the Commission considers \nwhether to expand these transmission services to new types of load and new regions, I \nencourage commenters to address what impacts the introduction of new firm and non-\nfirm transmission products would have in their regions, as well as any relevant \ncharacteristics that might distinguish their regions from the Commission’s findings in the \nPJM co-location docket. Ultimately, this topic will have direct long-term impacts on how \nfuture transmission systems will be planned and configured, how efficiently future power \nmarkets will operate, and how customers will respond to prices and system needs. \nTherefore, I am specifically interested in understanding how extending the new \ntransmission services might affect individual suppliers or customers, as well as how \nexisting systems or processes might be affected by these new services. I am open to \nunderstanding how these services might be helpful to a region or that they may create \nproblems not yet anticipated."},{"page":86,"startToken":31677,"endToken":32078,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 6 - \nV. \nThe Orders Recognize the Importance of Evaluating Advanced Transmission \nTechnologies \n \nLastly, today we preliminarily find that each RTO/ISO’s tariff is unjust and \nunreasonable because the tariff lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the \nevaluation of alternative transmission technologies as potential solutions to accommodate \nan Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large load. \nSpecifically, it is important for RTO/ISOs and transmission owners to evaluate whether \nalternative transmission technologies are feasible in reducing the cost of transmission \nsystem upgrades or allow for a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission \nservice request. As many transmission owners have explored various alternative \ntechnologies in pilot projects,8 it is time to roll out all available technologies to reduce \nrisks and costs for customers, as well as help the industry continue to develop new \ntechnologies that can increase the robustness of our transmission system while protecting \ncustomers from higher costs. \nVI. \nConclusion \n \nToday’s orders address some of the most consequential issues currently in the \nindustry and before the Commission. I hope that these proceedings provide vehicles \nthrough which the Commission can provide much-needed clarity and direction, and it is \nimperative that we build strong and comprehensive records on each issue in each region \n \n8 See, e.g., Increasing Mkt. and Planning Efficiency Through Improved Software, \nEffective Congestion Mitigation with Transmission Topology Optimization at Alliant \nEnergy and ATC, Docket No. AD10-12-016, available at \nhttps://www.ferc.gov/media/effective-congestion-mitigation-transmission-topology-\noptimization-alliant-energy-and-atc (Alliant and ATC were able to save customers \napproximately $24 million over a 12-month period through the use of topology \noptimization); Pablo Ruiz and Derek Brown, “Reliable and Efficient Congestion \nMitigation Using Transmission Reconfigurations,” NewGrid and Evergy presentation \n(Oct. 2022)¸ available at https://www.spp.org/Documents/67968/SAG%20Meeting%20 \nMaterials%2020221007.zip (identifying reconfigurations, had they been implemented, \nwhich could eliminate 98% of overloads and reduce congestion costs by 85% for \ncongestion patterns associated with 10 significant constraints on Evergy’s system); \nPacific Gas & Electric Press Release, PG&E and Smart Wires Enhance Grid Reliability, \nCapacity for Data Centers in San Jose (May 28, 2025), available at \nhttps://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-details/2025/PGE-\nand-Smart-Wires-Enhance-Grid-Reliability-Capacity-for-Data-Centers-in-San-\nJose/default.aspx (describing PG&E’s deployment of advanced power flow control \ndevices were able to mitigate thermal overloads by up to 34%, enabling an additional 100 \nMW of firm power delivery over existing lines at a congested substation)."},{"page":87,"startToken":32078,"endToken":32152,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 7 - \nto inform our decision-making. I therefore encourage all interested parties to fully \nengage and help the Commission navigate these complex, multi-faceted challenges. Our \nsuccess will ultimately be measured by our shared ability to deliver reliable and \naffordable power to all customers, to ensure new loads can interconnect in a timely \nfashion while paying their fair share of system costs, and to protect existing customers \nagainst adverse reliability or economic impacts."},{"page":88,"startToken":32152,"endToken":32166,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 8 - \nFor these reasons, I respectfully concur. \n \n \n________________________ \nJudy W. Chang \nCommissioner"},{"page":89,"startToken":32166,"endToken":32501,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nSouthwest Power Pool, Inc., AEP Oklahoma \nTransmission Company, Inc., AEP Southwestern \nTransmission Company, Inc., Deseret Generation & \nTransmission Co-operative, Inc., Empire District \nElectric Company, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy \nKansas South, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., Evergy Missouri \nWest, Inc., GridLiance High Plains LLC, ITC Great \nPlains, LLC, Mountrail-Williams Electric Cooperative, \nNextEra Energy Transmission Southwest, LLC, \nNorthWestern Energy Public Service Corporation, \nOklahoma Gas and Electric Company, Prairie Wind \nTransmission, LLC, Public Service Company of \nOklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, \nSouthwestern Public Service Company, Transource \nMissouri, LLC, Transource Oklahoma, LLC, Tri-State \nGeneration and Transmission Association, Inc., and \nUpper Missouri G. & T. Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nDocket No. EL26-68-000 \n \n \n(Issued June 18, 2026) \n \nLACERTE, Commissioner, concurring: \n \n \nI support today’s fleet of show cause orders. We are at an inflection point in the \nhistory of American energy infrastructure. The extraordinary and rapid growth of large \nloads in RTOs and ISOs is faster than the current system can handle. This order charts a \ncourse for addressing the potential gaps and shortcomings in SPP’s Tariff that need to be \nresolved to appropriately respond to this growth, as informed by careful review of the \nthousands of pages of comments received in response to the advance notice of proposed \nrulemaking (ANOPR).1 I write separately to underscore my expectation for RTOs and \nISOs, including SPP, to timely submit their robust, thoughtful, and region-specific \nproposals to address the concerns that we have preliminarily identified in their respective \ntariffs and agreements. By harnessing your region-specific expertise and creativity to \nbring tailored solutions to the table, together we can efficiently, reliably, and affordably \nintegrate large load, co-located load and generation and/or storage, as well as electrically \nproximate large load onto the transmission system. I also support the use of alternative \n \n1 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Advance \nNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000, (Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); \nsee also Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Oct. 23, 2025) \n(Secretary’s Letter)."},{"page":90,"startToken":32501,"endToken":32968,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 2 - \ntransmission technologies to unlock every megawatt of existing capacity from our current \ntransmission system. We have the technology. We should use it now to enable faster \ninterconnection of large loads, lower costs to customers, and help prevent cost shifting. \n \nTo that end, and in light of our action in today’s orders, I also ask the state public \nutility commissions—whether they have already approved large load retail tariffs, are in \nthe process of crafting large load retail tariffs, or have yet to embark on this essential \ntariff design process—to take a hard look and ensure their large load retail tariff \nprovisions insulate ratepayers from the negative impacts of data center growth. \nAdditionally, I expect SPP to design proposals in response to this show cause order that \ndovetail with the efforts on the retail side to implement the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, \nprotect customers, and ensure that large loads cover the costs they incur to integrate with \nthe grid. \n \nThe stakes here could not be higher and every gambler knows that the secret to \nsurviving is knowing what to throw away and knowing what to keep.2 Today’s orders do \nexactly that—adopting thoughtful proposals that position our nation for success, driving \nmeaningful change, and rejecting the gridlock, half-measures, and failure to plan that \nhave gone on for far too long. The data center odyssey that we embarked upon first with \nPJM, then SPP, we now aggressively extend to all the RTO/ISO regions.3 Enabling the \nswift and efficient interconnection of large loads to the transmission system while \nmaintaining affordability, reliability, commitment to open access, competitive principles \nand cooperative federalism, will only be achieved through consistent, coordinated action \nand persistence. But without that first step,4 there is no direction, no forward momentum, \nno journey, and no way to arrive at our future destination. In the show cause orders we \nissue today, the Commission takes a series of long strides towards our ultimate large load \ninterconnection destination: we make preliminary findings that the RTO/ISO tariffs, \nincluding SPP, may be unjust and unreasonable and/or unduly discriminatory or \npreferential because they lack features necessary to timely, reliably, and safely \ninterconnect and serve new large loads in a way that produces just and reasonable rates. \n \n2 Kenny Rogers, The Gambler (United Artists Records 1978). \n3 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, 195 \nFERC ¶ 61,045 at P 2 (2026) (Order Regarding Intent to Act) (citing PJM Co-Location \nOrder, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217; SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; Commonwealth \nEdison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2026); Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n, \n193 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2025); Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025)). \n4 Admittedly, we are further down the road in some regions as compared with \nothers."},{"page":91,"startToken":32968,"endToken":33459,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 3 - \n \nI commend each commentor for their robust and ongoing responses to the \nconcerns that Secretary Wright and the Commission raised in the ANOPR proceeding. \nThe comments helped us identify the common issues, common solutions, and individual \ndifferences among the RTOs/ISOs. We heard a plea for broad flexibility and regionally \ntailored solutions. And we will strive to work towards those solutions, not through top-\ndown, one-size-fits-all mandates, but through consideration of region-specific proposals. \nAnd we endeavor to support an appeal for federal policies that build upon rather than \ndisrupt current and planned developments, reflecting state and local processes and \nstakeholder efforts. Through these individually tailored and region-specific show cause \norders, we are delivering to ensure that our transmission system can accommodate new \nlarge loads in a timely, safe, and reliable manner. And, importantly, in a manner that \nensures benefits and protection for all customers. Affordability remains a top concern as \nwe proceed forward. \n \nThe collective voices in the ANOPR comments have shaped our decision to issue \nsix separate individually tailored and region-specific show cause orders, rather than a \nproposed final rule at this time. But the success of the next phase of this journey rests \nwith you, SPP, and your stakeholders. We are directing you to expeditiously bring \nforward for our consideration your novel, region-specific solution(s). Time is of the \nessence. By inviting you to proceed under FPA section 205, we are giving you \nsignificant perks: the benefits of first wielder of the pen and the relatively capacious \nstandard under FPA section 205 that allows us to accept a potentially broad range of \nproposals provided they are shown to be just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential.5 We are even giving you flexibility to propose the \nimplementation date for your innovative proposals. But such freedom comes with great \nand concomitant responsibility. \n \nThis is not a time to be cavalier and dodge the urgent need to meet the moment. \nWhile this is a long journey, even so, we must continue to move at breakneck pace to win \nthe AI race. So let me be direct. If you choose not to submit timely, reasonable, non-\ndiscriminatory or preferential, comprehensive, and substantiated proposal(s), as directed \nand as required under our applicable statutes, your deficient response will not go \n \n5 See, e.g., NRG Power Mktg, LLC v. FERC, 862 FERC 108, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2017) \n(FERC may not employ a rate design that follows “a completely different strategy” than, \nor is “methodologically distinct” from, a proposed rate) (internal quotations omitted); \nOxy USA, Inc. v. FERC, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that a proposal under \nFPA section 205 “need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most \naccurate”); City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, at 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1984) \n(comparing the respective authorities of the Commission and public utilities under \nsections 205 and 206)."},{"page":92,"startToken":33459,"endToken":33815,"text":"Docket No. EL26-68-000 \n- 4 - \nunnoticed. I am prepared to play jurisdictional hardball, if needed.6 This Commission \nhas appropriately exercised considerable restraint in asserting the full scope of our \njurisdiction in these orders. However, the Commission has very broad jurisdiction over \ntransmission that we will not hesitate to utilize as necessary to ensure that we meet our \nobjectives in all show cause proceedings, including this SPP proceeding we initiate here. \nIf we find your Tariff is in fact unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory or \npreferential, any failure on your end to provide a sufficient FPA filing or filings to \naddress the large-load-related concerns that we have identified will result in the \nCommission dictating the solutions for you. I say this not as a threat, but as a statement \nof duty. While you may not like our remedies—I have often said that the federal \ngovernment generally does not come up with the best solutions—this is an outcome we \nare prepared to pursue given the gravity of the moment and our statutory obligation. \nNotwithstanding our readiness to step in, it greatly benefits everyone for you to come up \nwith an approach tailored to your region. \n \nI will end my concurrence where I began: We have heard your concerns, and, let \nme underscore, now is the time for you to heed ours. This is an extraordinarily \nconsequential proceeding. The stakes for reliability, for affordability, and for the \nAmerican ratepayer could not be higher. We owe it to the public to get this right. I look \nforward to reviewing and acting as expeditiously as possible on your responses to this \nshow cause order, which I expect will include an FPA section 205 proposal or proposals. \n \nFor these reasons, I respectfully concur. \n \n \n______________________________ \nDavid LaCerte \nCommissioner \n \n \n6 16 U.S.C. § 824(b); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 17 (2002) (“There is no \nlanguage in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale \nmarket[.]”)) (emphasis in original); id. at 20 (stating that “the FPA authorizes FERC's \njurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are \nsold to a reseller or directly to a consumer[.]”)."}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":2,"endAt":2568,"startToken":0,"endToken":285},{"p":2,"at":2568,"title":"D. 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