{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260819-5134","title":"Comments of the Illinois Commerce Commission in support of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s 07/31/2026 filing","issued":"2026-08-19","accession":"20260819-5134","docket":"ER26-3380-000","group":"PJM filings","filer":"Illinois Commerce Commission","kind":"comments","file":"sources/originals/20260819-5134_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260819-5134","sha256":"1154f23903589a43650328526c68eef2bcd45a05256f0ceff41afa9b2bad8694","pages":9,"tokens":2134,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":223,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \n \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C.  \n \n) \n \n \nDocket No. ER26-3380-000 \n \n \nILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION \n  COMMENTS \n \nPursuant to the Notice of Filing issued August 3, 2026, setting August 21st as the \nComment date in this docket, the Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) respectfully submits \nthese comments in support of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) July 31, 2026, filing \nproposing revisions to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) and the Reliability \nAssurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities (“RAA”) to establish a Reliability Backstop \nProcurement (“RBP”) addressing resource adequacy and large loads.1  The ICC submitted a \nnotice of intervention in this docket on August 5, 2026, and, therefore, it is a party in this docket. \nThe ICC generally supports PJM’s proposal to implement a one-time, supplemental \nprocurement of new capacity to address the identified resource adequacy shortfall that aligns \nwith the National Energy Dominance Council/PJM Governors’ Principles and the Commission’s \nrecognition of the need for action.  The proposed one-time actions strengthen regional resource \nadequacy.  While appropriately recognizing that implementation may require complementary \nstate action to ensure that RBP costs are allocated to the appropriate retail loads, the ICC does \n \n1 1 PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns \nStemming from Large Loads, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026) (“Backstop Filing”)."},{"page":2,"startToken":223,"endToken":490,"text":"2 \n \nhave some implementation concerns, particularly for retail access states like Illinois.  The ICC \nrecommends that the Commission require sufficient mitigation efforts to protect against cost \nshifts to or any negative impacts on existing ratepayers, impose no new obligations upon the \nstates, and require PJM to provide the clarifications, transparency, and access to data as \ndiscussed herein. \nI. COMMENTS \nA. The Core Elements of PJM’s Reliability Backstop Procurement Proposal are \nGenerally a Just and Reasonable Approach to Assigning Costs While Maintaining \nReliability  \n \nGiven the time constraints under which PJM is operating, PJM’s RBP proposal is a \nreasonable path forward to secure much needed capacity for the footprint.  As PJM notes in its \ntransmittal letter, capacity shortfalls have appeared over the last two capacity auctions.2  PJM’s \nmarket faces a host of difficulties in meeting its capacity needs, most notably a sudden increase \nin load due to rapid and large data center growth in the footprint in addition to persistent \ninterconnection delays for new generation, supply constraints, and permitting and siting delays. \nTo address this capacity shortfall, PJM developed a plan to bring more generation online.  \nAt its core, PJM’s recommendation is a two-phase procurement process.  The first phase \nis bilateral contracting, followed by central procurement.  PJM’s development of a more robust \nbilateral matchmaking phase, with assistance from Charles River Associates, is a particularly \nwell-designed method for meeting capacity needs.  Bilateral contracts provide new load with an \nopportunity to purchase capacity and address the shortfall to which they directly contributed. \nFurther, bilateral contracting protects ratepayers and assigns costs directly to those most \n \n2 Backstop Filing, at 7, 27."},{"page":3,"startToken":490,"endToken":790,"text":"3 \n \nresponsible for cost increases.  As we understand it, this bilateral matching process has already \nbegun and is ongoing. \nThe second phase is the proposed RBP to address the capacity shortfall.  PJM is setting \nthe procurement target based on the region-wide Unforced Capacity megawatt (“MW”) quantity \nthat cleared short of the Reliability Requirement in the July 2026 Base Residual Auction for the \n2028/2029 Delivery Year.  Resource eligibility requirements for the RBP ensure that the \nprocurement is more likely to bring on new generation by outlining what resources can \nparticipate in the procurement.  New resources included those that have not committed their \ncapacity previously, uprates with an affiliated increase in Capacity Injection Rights, and \nincremental capacity created by utilizing Supplemental Interconnection Service.  \nPJM’s RBP approach has two particularly insightful features. First, PJM’s RBP \nmethodology insists on only new generation participating.  This prevents existing generation \nresources from being purchased away from extant load.  Second, PJM’s approach also makes full \nuse of the existing transmission system.  This allows new resources to come online more quickly, \nshowing PJM’s awareness of the time constraints under which they are operating.  \nIn addition to these core features, PJM’s RBP solution includes a number of other \nbeneficial aspects.  For instance, the ICC appreciates the Large Load Registry, which will \nimprove transparency in the backstop procurement processes, which PJM filed separately in \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 on August 13, 2026.  Additionally, PJM set an appropriate \ndefinition for New Large Loads as end-use customer load that has a cumulative peak load \nquantity greater than or equal to 50 MW.  The ICC also appreciates PJM’s attempt to mitigate \ngaming by New Large Load customers.  PJM clarified in its definition that if a load increases its \npeak demand after June 1, 2027, including any new incremental load that causes an existing load"},{"page":4,"startToken":790,"endToken":1120,"text":"4 \n \nto meet the Large Load definition, the new large load definition applies.  This should discourage \ngaming by New Large Load customers. \nWhile PJM’s general procurement strategy makes sense, the proposal does not include \nmeasures to mitigate errors in forecasting and related prices. It is hard to overstate the significant \nincrease in load forecast compared to prior years.  After years of nearly flat load growth, PJM \nexpects load growth to average 5.3% over the next 10 years and 3.4% over 20 years.  By 2036, \ntotal PJM energy is forecasted to be over 1.4 million GWh - a nearly 600,00 GWh increase.3 \nHistorically, PJM tended to over-procure capacity: from the 2018/2019 to the 2022/2023 \nplanning years, PJM purchased 8,066MW-11,912MW of excess capacity each Planning Year. \nThis was excess capacity in the order of 5-8% over PJM’s Installed Reserve Margin (IRM).4 \nWhen forecasts are off, even by a small percentage, the error has a significant impact on both the \namount of MWs needed and prices for capacity.   \nThe PJM proposal does not include any mechanism to moderate any potential error, such \nas cost reconciliation.  Even where overall cumulative regional forecasts remain roughly \naccurate, failure to accurately forecast the locations where such growth will materialize may \nsignificantly mean the wrong zones are shouldering the costs.  Further only offering 15-year \ncontracts may compound the impact of forecasting errors.  Longer contracts will likely attract \nnew generation.  Such long contracts can lock ratepayers into contracts with high prices that may \ncome down over time as supply increases.  The procurement price cap assuages some concerns \nbut not all.  PJM should have pursued a way to mitigate forecast error’s impact and a range of \n \n3 PJM, PJM Load Forecast Report, posted January 14, 2026, p. 8, https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2026-load-report.pdf \n4 Monitoring Analytics, State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume 2: Detailed Analysis, March 10, 2022, Table 5-\n7, p. 313"},{"page":5,"startToken":1120,"endToken":1434,"text":"5 \n \ncontract periods for the central procurement to better balance reliability needs against \naffordability concerns.  \nIn addition, PJM’s proposed new term and approach, “RBP Obligation” or “RBO,” will \nimpose new obligations on the states to assess the state and/or Relevant Electric Retail \nRegulatory Authority (“RERRA”)-determined allocation of RBP UCAP MW to Load Serving \nEntities within each Electric Distributor’s zone/area.  PJM should provide clarification as to how \nit envisions states making those determinations and whether and how PJM plans to assist states \nin that process.  PJM proposes to “empower” states by imposing on them an obligation to \n“submit RBP RBOs, which PJM would then apply to the allocation of RBP Charges” to load \nserving entities (“LSEs”).5  Given the timing and the lack of implementation details, particularly \nfor retail access states like Illinois, PJM’s proposal will take time to develop.  \nMoreover, it is unclear how states, particularly retail access states like Illinois, would be \nable to assign wholesale capacity costs to retail load in the manner PJM proposes, particularly \nwithout an appropriate rider or retail tariff sheet to do so through the LSEs.  It is unclear whether \nit may be necessary to conduct a rulemaking proceeding, a legislative change, or create a new \ncustomer classification for large loads, in order to properly assign these costs at the retail level.  \nThis will also take time to develop.  While the Virginia proposal to develop model state tariff \nprovisions by January 1, 2028,6 may be good starting point, a solution that works for Virginia \nmay not work for a retail access state like Illinois.  For Illinois, it will take time to develop its \nown state tariff provisions. \nWe appreciate that the Commission acknowledged that it “has a duty to address the risk \nof cost shifting among transmission customers that may result in unjust and unreasonable \n \n5 Backstop Filing at 104.  \n6 Id. at 12."},{"page":6,"startToken":1434,"endToken":1772,"text":"6 \n \ntransmission rates.”7 In the PJM Show Cause Order, the Commission said, “[w]e expect that the \nadditional cost transparency measures proposed  . . . will give state public utility commissions \nand other state regulators the information necessary to allow them to understand which \ntransmission costs are caused by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate \nthese costs to the appropriate retail customers.”8  We continue to have concerns about this \nassumption.  The ICC supports cooperative federalism. In the case of assessing cost causers \nand/or beneficiaries of transmission costs and/or in the case here of assessing cost causers of \nwholesale capacity procurement, however, expecting the states to make such determinations for \nPJM and the Commission may be unreasonable.  PJM would seem to be in a better position and \nhave access to the appropriate data to make an assessment of the cost causers and even \nbeneficiaries of those transmission costs or wholesale capacity costs at issue here.   \nDespite these concerns, however, given the need to rapidly bring on generation, the ICC \nis generally supportive of the filing.  We recommend that the Commission requires sufficient \nmitigation efforts to protect against cost shifts to or any negative impacts on existing ratepayers, \nimpose no new obligations upon the states, and require PJM to provide the clarifications \nrequested herein as well as state access to any and all RBP related data. \nB.  PJM’s Proposal Requires Active Collaboration Between PJM and States \n \nAs PJM recognizes, under its proposal, states will play a central role in ensuring costs are \npaid by cost causers.  It will be critical for PJM to support states in this critical endeavor.  PJM’s \nterritory covers vastly different market structures and PJM’s proposals must work for all of them. \nPut simply, flexibility is essential.  The proposal must work for all fourteen jurisdictions across \nthe region, and what works for Virginia will not be same solution that Illinois needs.   \n \n7 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. et al, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211, P 68 (2026) (“PJM Show Cause Order”).  \n8 Id. P 70."},{"page":7,"startToken":1772,"endToken":2022,"text":"7 \n \nAlso to enable the states, PJM needs to provide data support, analytic insight, and \ntransparency to states when necessary to ensure costs are correctly allocated.  The proposed \nLarge Load Registry is an admirable first step that will track the size and location of new large \nloads, improving accuracy of load forecasts.  The registry should collect all necessary data on \nload size, location, ramp rate, and other relevant features in an easy-to-use format that states can \nmake use when assigning costs.   \nFurther, it is important that PJM ensure the data collected in the registry is available to all \nstates.  States have different rules that can limit their access to confidential data.  Due to state \nlaws and limitations, the ICC, for instance, would not be in a position to sign the pro forma non-\ndisclosure agreements to access confidential data from PJM as it reads at this time.  There should \nbe flexibility with the non-disclosure form language if such accommodations to particular states \nlike Illinois become necessary.  It is crucial that any large load registry be accessible to ICC staff \nin order to fulfill any state’s cost allocation obligations.  \nII. CONCLUSION \nWHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Illinois Commerce Commission does \nhereby submit these comments for your consideration.  The ICC further requests any and all \nother appropriate relief. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n/s/ Christine F. Ericson \n \n     \n \n \n \n \n____________________________ \nChristine F. Ericson \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSpecial Assistant Attorney General \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIllinois Commerce Commission \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOffice of General Counsel \n \n \n \n \n \n \n160 N. LaSalle St., Suite C-800 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nChicago, IL 60601 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n(312) 814-3706"},{"page":8,"startToken":2022,"endToken":2039,"text":"8 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nChristine.Ericson@Illinois.gov \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n                                                              \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCounsel on behalf of the \nILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION \n \n \n \n \nDated: August 19, 2026"},{"page":9,"startToken":2039,"endToken":2134,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n \nI hereby certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document of the Illinois Commerce \nCommission to be served this day upon each person designated on the official service list compiled \nby the Secretary in this proceeding in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the \nCommission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. \n \n \n          Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 19th day of August, 2026. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n/s/ Christine F. Ericson \n \n \n \n \n \n \n_____________________________ \n \n \n \n \n \n \nChristine F. Ericson \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSpecial Assistant Attorney General \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIllinois Commerce Commission \n \n \n \n \n \n \nOffice of General Counsel \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n160 N. LaSalle St. \n \n \n \n \n \n \nSuite 800-C \n \n \n \n \n \n \nChicago, IL 60601 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n(312) 814-3706"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":2,"endAt":402,"startToken":0,"endToken":280},{"p":2,"at":402,"title":"I. COMMENTS","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":415,"startToken":280,"endToken":282},{"p":2,"at":415,"title":"A. The Core Elements of PJM’s Reliability Backstop Procurement Proposal are","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":1476,"startToken":282,"endToken":1661},{"p":6,"at":1476,"title":"B. PJM’s Proposal Requires Active Collaboration Between PJM and States","method":"printed heading","endPage":7,"endAt":1179,"startToken":1661,"endToken":1960},{"p":7,"at":1179,"title":"II. CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":9,"endAt":0,"startToken":1960,"endToken":2039},{"p":9,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":9,"endAt":792,"startToken":2039,"endToken":2134}]}