{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260821-5183","title":"Protest, Motion to Reject, and Alternative Request for the Imposition of Conditions of Delaware Division of the Public Advocate et al","issued":"2026-08-21","accession":"20260821-5183","docket":"ER26-3380-000","group":"PJM filings","filer":"Delaware Division of the Public AdvocateDistrict of Columbia Office of People's CounselIllinois Citizens Utility Board ,Maryland Office of the People's Counsel ,New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel ,Office of the Illinois Attorney General ,","kind":"motion","file":"sources/originals/20260821-5183_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260821-5183","sha256":"e280af49f099cd9e42a9d0ac0618baae4ca5258975c3350e3500781bbabc747b","pages":38,"tokens":12346,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":247,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \nDocket No. ER26-3380-000 \n \nPROTEST, MOTION TO REJECT, AND ALTERNATIVE REQUEST  \nFOR THE IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS OF JOINT CONSUMER \nADVOCATES  \nPursuant to Rules 211 and 212 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s \n(Commission) Rules of Practice and Procedure,1 the Delaware Division of the Public \nAdvocate, District of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens Utility Board, \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General, Maryland Office of the People’s Counsel, and New \nJersey Division of Rate Counsel (Joint Consumer Advocates)2 protest the July 31, 2026, \nfiling by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) of a proposed Reliability Backstop \nProcurement (RBP) framework.3  For the reasons stated here, the Commission should \nreject the RBP as unjust and unreasonable. If this request is denied, the Commission should \ncondition acceptance of the proposal as described below. \nSUMMARY \nThe PJM Filing purports to implement “just one part”4 of the January 16, 2026, \n“Statement of Principles Regarding PJM” that was signed earlier this year by federal \nofficials on behalf of the White House National Energy Dominance Council and the \n \n1 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211, 385.212. \n2 Each of the Consumer Advocates has separately and timely moved for leave to intervene in this proceeding. \n3 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns \nStemming from New Load Adjustments (July 31, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260731-5214 (PJM Filing). \n4 Id. at 1-2."},{"page":2,"startToken":247,"endToken":600,"text":"- 2 - \n \ngovernors of all thirteen PJM states (but not the Mayor of the District of Columbia).5 Those \nprinciples include calling for the development of a “Reliability Backstop Auction” to \n“procure new capacity,” and provide that “PJM should allocate the cost of any new capacity \nprocured through” the auction to Load Serving Entities (LSEs) “with new data centers that \nhave not self-procured new capacity or agreed to be curtailable.”6 Along the same line, the \nWhite House issued its Ratepayer Protection Pledge on March 4, 2026, which states:7 \nCompanies will build, bring, or buy the new generation \nresources and electricity needed to satisfy their new energy \ndemands, paying the full cost of those resources whether by \nbuilding, or buying from, new or otherwise additive power \nplants. Where possible, these companies will also add more \ncapacity that serves the broader public by increasing supply. \n*     *     * \nCompanies will pay for all new power delivery infrastructure \nupgrades required to service their data centers, including \nadequate network upgrade costs to ensure that these \nexpenses are not passed on to the ordinary household. \nPJM’s proposed tariff language does not require that large load customers “pay[] \nthe full cost of” resources “needed to satisfy their new energy demands.” RBP would \ninstead allocate new capacity costs to “each Electric Distributor’s zone/area using that \nzone/area’s pro-rata share of the difference between the forecasted Load Adjustments for \nthe 2026/2027 Delivery Year and the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.”8 The subsequent \n \n5 Statement of Principles Regarding PJM, National Energy Dominance Council (Jan. 16, 2026), \nhttps://energy.gov/documents/statement-principles-regarding-pjm (https://perma.cc/35HJ-W56E) \n(Statement of Principles). \n6 Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). \n7 Press Release, The White House, Ratepayer Protection Pledge (Mar. 4, 2026), \nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/. PJM reports that on July 23, \n2026, “the signatories to the Ratepayer Protection Pledge expanded to include more than 200 utilities, data \ncenter developers, and cooperatives, and state governors, including the governors of PJM states Tennessee, \nWest Virginia, Ohio, and Indiana.” PJM Filing, Transmittal at 18. \n8 PJM Filing, Attach. B (Proposed Tariff), Attach. DD § 18.3(a)."},{"page":3,"startToken":600,"endToken":937,"text":"- 3 - \n \nallocation of those costs among retail customers—i.e., the assignment of those costs to \nlarge loads or others—is dependent on actions at the state/retail level. As PJM states \nsuccinctly in the filing’s Transmittal Letter, the “success of the RBP requires state \nparticipation.”9  \nThe machinery through which a state will act is described in the filing. PJM \nproposes that “cost allocation to LSEs within an Electric Distributor’s zone/area be based \non ‘the state and/or [Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA)]-determined \nallocation of cleared RBP [Unforced Capacity (UCAP)] megawatts [(MW)] to LSEs within \neach Electric Distributor’s zone/area, as reported by each Electric Distributor to PJM.’”10  \nPJM affiant Danielle Croop explains that the “Electric Distributor designated to coordinate \nwith the states and/or RERRAs” will report, “where available,” to PJM the “MW for the \nLSEs in an Electric Distributor’s zone/area.”11 In other words, the Electric Distributor12 \nwill tell PJM how its RERRA and/or state commission plan to allocate the RBP costs to \nLoad Serving Entities in the state commission’s zone/area.  Ms. Croop also states that \nbesides the LSE, the RERRA or state commission may also allocate “RBP UCAP MW to \nspecific . . . end-use customers.”13  \n \n9 PJM Filing, Transmittal  at 10. \n10 Id. at 97-98 (quoting Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.3(b)(iii)). \n11 PJM Filing, Attach. C, Affidavit of Ms. Danielle Croop ¶ 51 (Croop Aff.). \n12 Section 1, Definitions E - F of the PJM Operating Agreement defines “Electric Distributor” as a “Member \nthat:  1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership electric distribution facilities that are used to \nprovide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region; or 2) is a generation and \ntransmission cooperative or a joint municipal agency that has a member that owns electric distribution \nfacilities used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.” Ms. Croop \ndoes not elaborate on how (or by whom) an Electric Distributor would be “designated.” \n13 Croop Aff. ¶ 41."},{"page":4,"startToken":937,"endToken":1247,"text":"- 4 - \n \nAn example (using actual companies instead of acronyms) may help in \nunderstanding how PJM’s proposal is intended to work. In Illinois (a state represented by \nthe Joint Consumer Advocates), PJM’s process would apparently be as follows:  \nCommonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), the Electric Distributor for the PJM ComEd \nzone, will report to PJM how the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), a RERRA in the \nComEd zone, plans to assign RBP costs to LSEs, which include ComEd, the default \nsupplier, as well as the alternative retail energy suppliers that serve ComEd customers \n(because Illinois is a restructured state). We assume that the ICC will need to engage in \nsome process to identify large load customers or LSEs with large load customers.  From \nthat list, the ICC will then have to identify the specific LSE linked to each large load \ncustomer—though the ICC questions whether it will have access to the data necessary to \nmake these identifications.14 Finally, the ICC would have to identify a means by which to \n“allocate” those charges to the LSE or specific large load customers—a process that may \nwell take more time than feasible, given the proposed RBP schedule. This allocation to be \ndeveloped by state commission or RERRA is given a name by PJM, the “RBP Obligation” \n(RBO).15  \nIn the “unexpected event”16 that “RBOs are ultimately not reported to PJM,” PJM \nproposes that the costs for up to 15 years of capacity payments to zones/areas to which \nRBP cost responsibility is assigned will simply default to a “back-up cost allocation \nmethodology to determine allocation to LSEs.” In other words, where a state does not act—\nor acts late—zonal RBP charges are allocated onto the general ratepayer body within the \n \n14 Illinois Commerce Commission Comments at 6 (Aug. 19, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260819-5134. \n15 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 98. \n16 Id."},{"page":5,"startToken":1247,"endToken":1662,"text":"- 5 - \n \nrelevant zone.17 Where costs are assigned to a specific PJM zone, and large load customers \nin that zone fail to materialize in the Delivery Year, other customers in the affected zone \nwill be assigned the RBP costs, barring a binding agreement for the large load to cover its \nstranded costs. In other words, even where a state is able to navigate PJM’s process in a \ntimely manner, the proposed tariff provisions can result (e.g., where the forecasted large \nload customer does not materialize) in allocating the costs in a manner directly contrary to \nthe outcome sought in the Statement of Principles and the commitments made in the \nRatepayer Protection Pledge.18  \nThese concerns aside, RBP falls well short of the just and reasonable standard. The \nproposal effectively defeats itself, as it is awash in fundamental contradictions: \n• PJM asserts that ensuring regional reliability demands the immediate \nprocurement of 6.8 gigawatts (GW) of new supply, but proposes various RBP \nopt-outs19 that could shrink that number substantially—calling into question the \nextent of any claimed reliability need. \n• Although RBP permits a reduction in the procurement target to reflect opt-outs \nand large load self-supply, there is no comparable provision to reduce the target \nto reflect demand reductions that have occurred since the establishment of the \nBase Residual Auction (BRA) reliability requirement for the 2028/2029 \nDelivery Year or which may occur before October 21, 2026 (the deadline for \nthe submission of opt-out and offsetting self-supply requests20) if data centers \nare delayed, cancelled, or otherwise not expected to be in-service by the \n2028/2029 Delivery Year.  \n \n17 Id. at 99 (“[I]f no allocation is reported by the relevant Electric Distributors with allocated RBP UCAP \nMW, PJM will allocate RBP Charges based on the Peak Load Contribution submitted to PJM for the LSEs \nin the relevant zone/area.”). \n18 PJM explains: “[a]t bottom, ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ rests with the states to ensure that the appropriate retail \ncustomers, i.e., new large loads, including data centers—and not residential customers or small industrial \ncustomers—are suballocated costs associated with the wholesale costs of RBP Resources procured through \nthe RBP.” Id. at 16 (footnote omitted). \n19 Id. at 31-33; Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.1(d). \n20 PJM Staff & Charles River Associates, Reliability Backstop Procurement Execution: Post CIFP Workshop \nat \n5 \n(Aug. \n10, \n2026) \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-\nrbp/2026/20260810/20260810-pjm-and-cra-reliability-backstop-procurement-presentation.pdf \n(requested \nopt-outs and offsets to be reported by October 21, 2026)."},{"page":6,"startToken":1662,"endToken":2057,"text":"- 6 - \n \n• RBP seeks to alleviate a one-time, near-term capacity shortfall, yet truncates \nthe universe of possible suppliers through extended commitment requirements. \nNew capacity available as of the beginning the 2028/2029 Delivery Year is \neligible to bid only if the resource can be offered for a “fixed 15-Delivery Year \nterm.”21 \n• PJM proposes that selected resources must be paid for as long as fifteen years, \nbut at the same time explains that the reliability shortfall can be met through \nbilateral agreements of only “five years [because these] will address the \nreliability shortfall.”22  \n• Unlike the BRA, PJM proposes no market mitigation protocol for the RBP, \neven as it admits that the RBP’s pay-as-bid design is subject to market power \nconcerns, including that “sellers are more likely to offer the expected clearing \nprice” rather than their marginal cost.23  \n• PJM posits mitigation measures are not needed in part because an abundant \nsupply of competitors will discipline bidders.24 But the supporting data offered \nby PJM shows the opposite, and the assertion is contradicted by PJM’s \nacknowledgement that sellers will bid the expected clearing price—not their \nmarginal cost.25  \n• PJM proposes using the price at which resources would have cleared in the \n2027/2028 BRA but for the imposition of a price collar ($555/MW-day) to set \nthe weighted average RBP ceiling price.26  The BRA cap price is set using the \nCost of New Entry for a combustion turbine reference unit and constitutes \nscarcity rent for a one-year capacity commitment. A cap set on that basis is \nirrelevant to the determination of what should be paid to a set of heterogenous \nRBP-selected resources earning these rents for up to fifteen years. And PJM \nadmits that a fifteen-year price lock “creates revenue certainty” and “may \nimprove financing opportunities” but fails to discount the RBP cap to reflect \nthis reality.27  \n \n21 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 48; Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.4. \n22 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 39. \n23 Id. at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33). \n24 Id. at 68-69. If substantial amounts of new generation are in fact in the offing, then that would be an \nindication that the BRA and related initiatives are working—which would counsel against adopting a \nmassively expensive (and, as we will demonstrate, ill-conceived) supplemental generation procurement \nprogram. \n25 Id. at 71.  \n26 Id. at 61-62. \n27 Id. at 63-64."},{"page":7,"startToken":2057,"endToken":2475,"text":"- 7 - \n \n• RBP includes no locational procurement signal, as PJM asserts that it does not \nhave the information needed to determine locational parameters for a 15-year \nperiod. That assertion cannot be reconciled with PJM’s intention to allocate \nRBP costs to zones based on their large load forecasts. PJM understands the \nlocations of the shortfall, but RBP fails to target new capacity procurements \nthat are tied to those zones.28 This risks burdening ratepayers with additional \nnew transmission and energy costs that could be avoided or ameliorated through \nthe use of a locational procurement signal. \n• The RBP payments are structured as contracts for differences with RBP \nresources bidding into the BRA as price takers.29 This means that the total \npayment to an RBP-selected resource will remain unchanged—even as PJM’s \nother initiatives incent the development of new generation and its proposed \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service (IRAS) removes new data center load from \nthe BRA.30 The result is that, as the region’s generation supply catches up with \ndemand, and BRA prices moderate, the RBP payments will remain as excessive \nand unjustified as ever. \nIn short, this is not a situation in which PJM has filed a more or less reasonable \nproposal that the Commission is duty-bound to accept even though there may be a more \nreasonable alternative. As shown above and detailed below, PJM’s own filing explains why \nthe RBP is a flawed, unjust, and unreasonable proposal. While it may be the case that there \nis some level of capacity shortfall that needs to be addressed near-term to ensure reliability, \nPJM has failed to show that the proposed RBP is the way to procure it. As was made clear \nduring the stakeholder process, there are more efficient, cost-effective, and just and \nreasonable ways to accomplish this goal, including potentially through PJM’s recently-\nfiled IRAS proposal. \n \n28 See Croop Aff. ¶ 46 (listing chart of zonal allocations and stating “[t]he initial allocation of RBP UCAP \nMW to each Electric Distributor zone/area will be based on Load Adjustments, as set forth in PJM Table \nB9b from the 2026 PJM Load Forecast, and each zone/area’s share of the Initial RBP Target of 6,831.3 \nMW”). \n29 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 79-81; Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD §§ 18.5(g), 18.6. \n30 Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large \nLoad Registry to Address System Reliability, Transmittal Letter at 109, Docket No. ER26-3515 (Aug. 13, \n2026), eLibrary No. 20260813-5118 (PJM IRAS Filing)."},{"page":8,"startToken":2475,"endToken":2895,"text":"- 8 - \n \nThe Commission should reject the proposed RBP because it will needlessly inflate \ncosts—no matter who is ultimately called upon to pay them.31 Instead, we urge the \nCommission to adopt a subscription-based model. Alternatively, the Commission could \nconsider accepting and making the IRAS proposal, under which new large load that does \nnot self-supply will be subject to curtailment and excluded from the BRA beginning in the \n2029/2030 Delivery Year, immediately effective. The Commission could consider \nadvancing IRAS such that beginning with the 2028/2029 Delivery Year large load \ncustomers will have the option of either bringing their own generation sufficient to meet \ntheir needs or have that amount of load subject to curtailment if and as necessary.32  \nAlternatively, if the Commission declines to reject RBP, then Joint Consumer \nAdvocates propose a set of conditions that should be imposed as part of any approval of \nthe proposal. The conditions are designed to limit needless and excessive RBP cost \nexposure while continuing to meet the claimed objectives of RBP. \n \n31 The large load data centers that are at the heart of PJM’s claimed need for new capacity have made \nstatements that go both ways on the question of whether they acknowledge the obligation to fund the new \ngeneration needed to address the shortfall (and beyond). On July 23, 2026, the “Data Center Coalition” (DCC) \nissued a press release concerning the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it asserted: “The data center \nindustry remains committed to being responsible partners where we operate, which includes paying our full \nenergy costs and investing in local jobs and workforce development.” Press Release, DCC, Statement from \nthe Data Center Coalition on the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge (July 23, 2026), \nhttps://www.datacentercoalition.org/cpages/dcc-statement-on-ratepayer-protection-pledge-\n20/6a62879e96385f05ff0782c6. Two months earlier, on May 18, 2026, the DCC issued a press release \nannouncing that it had commissioned a “new independent report” by a consulting firm that “finds no \nhistorical evidence that data centers are driving increases in residential electricity costs under existing rate \nstructures.” The release also notes that the report found that, “[i]n the PJM market (13 states and Washington, \nD.C.), data center load growth accounted for approximately half of the recent increase in capacity prices, \nwith the remainder attributable to market design changes, supply constraints, and power plant retirements.” \nPress Release, DCC, New Report Finds No Evidence Data Centers are Driving Higher Residential Electricity \nCosts (May 18, 2026), https://www.datacentercoalition.org/cpages/e3-energy-white-paper.  \n32 PJM IRAS Filing at 49, 109."},{"page":9,"startToken":2895,"endToken":3196,"text":"- 9 - \n \nI. \nPROTEST \nPJM says that reliability demands that nearly 7 gigawatts of new supply be procured \nin the near-term, yet permits an untold number of megawatts (or possibly gigawatts) to \nopt-out of the auction with no evident reliability consequence. RBP will saddle ratepayers \nwith fifteen years of payments, even as PJM admits that the proposed commitment period \nis as much as a decade longer than the five-year bilateral procurements that will meet PJM’s \nreliability needs. The design constrains, if not prohibits, the participation of short-term \nresources that are most likely to align with the immediate-term need. The proposed price \ncap is unjustified, as it bears no meaningful relationship to the costs of the resources to be \nprocured, is excessive, and was lifted from a design in which it is used in setting clearing \nprices for a one-year commitment, not a period as long as fifteen years. Extended price \ncertainty should mean lower, not higher, prices. PJM admits that its RBP’s pay-as-bid \ndesign is subject to market power concerns because sellers are more likely to offer the \nexpected clearing price rather than their marginal cost, yet its proposal contains no market \nmitigation protocols. A competitive procurement rife with obvious market power problems \nthat includes no meaningful mitigation measures is per se unjust and unreasonable.  \nA. \nRBP’s design is contrary to PJM’s assertion that the proposal is \nneeded to address a reliability risk associated with a 6.8 GW \ncapacity shortfall. \nPJM says that the RBP is necessary to address the BRA’s second consecutive \nfailure to clear sufficient capacity to meet the region’s reliability requirement. As explained \nin the Transmittal Letter:33 \nPJM’s BRA for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, which ran \nfrom June 30, 2026, to July 7, 2026, cleared 6,831.3 MW (in \n \n33 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 7."},{"page":10,"startToken":3196,"endToken":3481,"text":"- 10 - \n \nUnforced Capacity (“UCAP”)) short of PJM’s Regional \nTransmission \nOrganization \n(“RTO”)-wide \nreliability \nrequirement at the market price cap of $325/MW-day. \nThe mechanics of the RBP proposal call the extent of the claimed reliability risk \ninto question. Public power entities (municipally-owned and cooperative utilities) are \nafforded substantial opt-out rights from the requirement to secure RBP capacity. PJM \nexplains:34 \nthe region-wide Initial RBP Target will be further reduced \nby Opt-Out UCAP MW to the extent that an Electric \nDistributor, whose rates are not regulated by the state (e.g., \ncooperatives or municipal utilities), that is unable to allocate \ncosts associated with capacity bid submission in the RBP to \nlarge loads, submits a request to PJM to opt-out from the \nRBP within the bid submission window and provides \nrelevant information and written support. \nIn addition, utilities who are required to participate in state-enacted peak shaving programs \nare also authorized to opt-out to the extent of such participation. Proposed Tariff \nAttachment DD, section 18.1(d) provides in part:35 \nThe Initial RBP Target shall be further decremented, if \nrequested by an Electric Distributor, by up to the associated \nMW quantity of load that participates in a peak shaving \nadjustment program where such Electric Distributor’s \nzone/area addresses their capacity needs through peak \nshaving adjustment programs that are codified in state law \nand that also meet the requirements of Tariff, Attachment \nDD-2. \nIf exercised, these opt-outs would reduce the amount to be procured, perhaps \nsignificantly. For example, three Virginia-based cooperatives (co-ops) appear to be in line \nfor initial allocations of RBP UCAP MWs (in the aggregate) of 1,940.9 MW, or more than \n \n34 Id. at 32-33. \n35 Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.1(d)."},{"page":11,"startToken":3481,"endToken":3843,"text":"- 11 - \n \n1.9 GW.36 Were the three Virginia coops to exercise opt outs for these megawatts, that \naction could reduce the amount of capacity procured in the RBP, perhaps by as much as \n28%. The potential scope of the megawatts that would be “decremented” if the peak \nshaving plan opt-out is exercised is not specified but is evidently unconstrained and could \nwell be substantial. \nThe ability to opt-out—and thereby lower the amount of the shortfall \nsubstantially—calls into question the urgency and scope of the claimed need. The assertion \nthat reliability imperatives demand taking on a multi-year and multi-billion-dollar \ncommitment to procure 6,831 megawatts of new capacity does not accord with a design \nthat permits ignoring substantial megawatts of the claimed need with no apparent reliability \nconsequence.37 \n In addition, the shortfall is premised on large load development forecasts that are \nsuspect at best, and could be materially incorrect by October 21, 2026—the date on which \nopt-outs and qualifying supply must be reported to PJM in order for the final RBP \nprocurement target to be set. While the shortfall is fueled by the anticipated arrival of \nsubstantial new data center load, how much of this new demand will appear (let alone do \nso in accord with scheduled arrival dates) is fraught with uncertainty. The facts on the \nground are changing rapidly. In May, a “JP Morgan analysis found that more than 60% of \ndata-center capacity planned for completion in 2027 isn’t yet under construction, and \n \n36 Croop Aff. ¶¶ 46-47 (associated tables showing initial RBP UCAP MW allocations for NOVEC (Northern \nVirginia Electric Cooperative), ODEC (Old Dominion Electric Cooperative) and Rappahannock Electric \nCooperative (REC), and an example of qualifying self-supply decrements submitted by ODEC and REC \n(Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW)). \n37 To be clear, the answer to this concern is not to eliminate the opt-out provisions. Our point is simply that \nthe presence of substantial opt-out eligibility reveals that the supposed reliability need for these resources is \nunproven and, as we develop below, could be met more efficiently by other means. Those include \naccelerating the date when new large loads that do not self-supply become subject to IRAS."},{"page":12,"startToken":3843,"endToken":4213,"text":"- 12 - \n \nanother 7% is delayed.”38 Even more recently, Exelon Corporation announced a 7-GW \nreduction (to 11 GW) in its “high probability” data center load within PJM following a \nreview that resulted in culling out speculative projects.39 \nIn like regard, RBP has been developed against a backdrop of ever-diminishing \nlarge load forecasts. On April 17 of this year, PJM identified an anticipated RBP \nprocurement target of 14.8 GW.40 In a little over three months, that forecast has fallen by \nmore than half, to 6.8 GW, a rate of 2.3 GW per month.41 Notwithstanding this trend line, \nthe RBP contains no measures to reduce the final RBP procurement target to reflect \nadditional data center load that is delayed or cancelled (and thus not expected to be in-\nservice by the 2028/2029 Delivery Year) before October 21, 2026, when the requests for \nopt-outs and/or qualifying self-supply offsets are due. In the same way that PJM proposes \nto reduce the RBP procurement amount to reflect new self-supply, that amount should also \nbe adjusted to reflect known reductions in large load demand (and require reporting of \nsame).42 \n \n38 Katherine Blunt, America’s Data-Center Build-Out Is Falling Way Behind Schedule, Wall Street Journal \n(June \n3, \n2026), \nhttps://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/americas-data-center-build-out-is-falling-way-behind-\nschedule-e408a9a8?mod=hp_lead_pos1. \n39 Ethan Howland, Exelon ‘High Probability’ Data Center Load Falls 40%, Utility Dive (July 31, 2026) \nhttps://www.utilitydive.com/news/exelon-data-center-load-new-jersey-battery-earnings/826686/. \n40 PJM Staff, Reliability Backstop Procurement Design: Reliability Backstop CIFP at 11 (Apr. 16-17, 2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260416/20260416-item-05---\npjm-reliability-backstop-procurement-design---pjm-presentation.pdf. \n41 Croop Aff. ¶ 4. \n42 Note that the failure to credit this reduction is significant. The delay or cancellation of just one large data \ncenter that is not reflected in the RBP procurement target could result in the acquisition of 1,000 MW of \nknowingly unneeded capacity. Charging an average price of $555/MW-day for 15 years translates into more \nthan $3 billion in gross capacity costs to ratepayers to serve an unproven shortfall (1,000 MW x $555/MW-\nday x 365 x 15 = $3,038,625,000). By any measure that is unjust and unreasonable."},{"page":13,"startToken":4213,"endToken":4540,"text":"- 13 - \n \nB. \nPJM fails to demonstrate that 15-year resource commitments \nare needed to meet the capacity shortfall. \nPJM repeatedly characterizes the RBP as a “one-time, supplementary mechanism” \nand an “interim step” to address a “near-term” shortfall.43 The RBP identifies its object as \na discrete, near-term reliability gap rather than a durable long-term deficiency. The Initial \nRBP Target is the 6,831.3 MW UCAP shortfall observed in the July 2026 BRA for the \n2028/2029 Delivery Year.44 No additional RBP procurements are proposed.  \nThe design of the selection process reinforces the near-term orientation. To pass \nStage 1 gating, a resource must demonstrate a firm in-service date no later than \nJune 1, 2032.45 In Stage 2, PJM does not select on price alone: offers are ranked first by \nearliest commercial operation date (COD) and only then, within that ordering, by least \nlevelized cost of capacity, up to the target.46 The RBP thus places a premium on speed—\non the capacity that can be delivered fastest against a near-term gap. \nNotwithstanding its near-term orientation, the RBP limits supply options in ways \nthat are contrary to its stated purpose. First, RBP purchases only one product: a “fixed 15-\nDelivery Year term” running from the 2028/2029 Delivery Year through the 2042/2043 \nDelivery Year.47 The 2042/2043 endpoint is set; resources with later CODs will be subject \n \n43 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 6-7, 21-22. \n44 Id. at 31; Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.1(a). \n45 Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.5(f)(i)(1). \n46 Id. § 18.5(f)(ii); see also PJM, Supplemental Filing, Attach. A, Supplemental Affidavit of Ms. Danielle \nCroop (Aug. 14, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260814-5244 (explaining Delivery Year prioritization of RBP \nresource selection). \n47 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 48; Proposed Tariff § 18.4 (“The Reliability Backstop Procurement shall offer \ncommitments for RBP UCAP MW for a fixed period of fifteen (15) Delivery Years, starting with the \n2028/2029 Delivery Year.”)."},{"page":14,"startToken":4540,"endToken":4925,"text":"- 14 - \n \nto shorter payout periods, but the terminal delivery year remains unchanged.48 The \nlimitation that resources cannot offer a commitment term ending before 2042/2043 \nexcludes those that can energize quickly and in time for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year but \nare unwilling or unable to be bound through 2042/2043 Delivery Year. The design defeats \nitself by requiring the purchase of longer-term resources while constraining the \nparticipation of shorter-term resources that could better align with the identified need. \nThis limitation notwithstanding, PJM does not defend the 15-year commitment \nterm as necessary to cure the reliability shortfall. PJM instead supports this facet of the \nproposal by pointing to the Statement of Principles, referencing the document’s call to \n“[p]rovide 15-year price certainty for new capacity resources.”49 PJM offers no analysis \ncomparing the ratepayer cost of a 15-year term against shorter alternatives. And the Charles \nRiver Associates (CRA) Request for Information (RFI) survey information PJM relies \nupon shows that there are resources willing to agree to shorter terms. Roughly 1/5 (21%) \nof the supply-side response projects would agree to terms of 10 years or less, and another \n13% of respondents were “flexible” as to term.50 \nAnd the proposed RBP design includes provisions that undercut the notion that \nfifteen years of payments are needed to address the shortfall.51 The proposal is express that \n \n48 Proposed Tariff § 18.4 (“Resources with a commercial operation date later than the 2028/2029 Delivery \nYear shall be committed for the remainder of the fifteen-year term of the Reliability Backstop Procurement \ncommitment period, i.e. through the end of the 2042/2043 Delivery Year.”). \n49 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 48 (quoting Statement of Principles at 1). \n50 Charles River Associates, PJM Reliability Backstop RFI Summary at 5 (May 27, 2026) (CRA RFI \nSummary), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260527/20260527-\ninformational-only---reliability-backstop-rfi-summary---charles-river-associates.pdf. \n51 Note that Ms. Croop nowhere explains why the procurement period must be fifteen years. Every reference \ntreats “15 years” as a fixed input and deploys it to justify some other feature, without ever defending the \nlength itself. For example, Ms. Croop states the RBP term and its endpoints—“a fixed, 15-year period . . . \nfrom the 2028/2029 Delivery Year to the 2042/2043 Delivery Year”—and explains that individual"},{"page":15,"startToken":4925,"endToken":5247,"text":"- 15 - \n \nLSEs can fulfill their share of the RBP capacity obligation outside of the auction by \nentering into five-year bilateral contracts. Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, section 18.2(c) \nexplains that “Evidence of Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW” can include “[s]igned \nbilateral contracts . . . for at least five Delivery Years with a commercial operation date \nprior to the start of the 2032/2033 Delivery Year.” In its Transmittal Letter, PJM calls a \nfive-year term “balanced,”52 explaining:53  \nCapacity with a bilateral contract of at least five years is \ncapacity that will address the reliability shortfall and is not \ntransitory. Furthermore, a five-year term is not so lengthy as \nto undermine the flexibility needed for commercial \ncontracting or to pose a significant barrier to eligibility for \nQualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW, in recognition of the \nfact that bilateral agreements may not need to be longer than \nfive years to develop new capacity. \nThe proposed tariff amendments provide no limit on the amount of self-supply or opt-out \noffset megawatts.54 “The final RTO-wide procurement target, as proposed, is determined \nby subtracting both verified Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW and the unforced capacity \nobligation value of load with opt-outs.”55 In other words, there is no minimum amount of \nRBP capacity necessary to ensure reliability—meaning  that the amount of RBP-procured \ncapacity could be zero. \n \ncommitments vary by commercial operation date; that is a description of the term’s mechanics, not a rationale \nfor choosing fifteen years. Croop Aff. ¶ 5. \n52 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 39. \n53 Id. at 39-40. \n54 Proposed Tariff, Attach. DD § 18.1(b) (“The Final RBP Target shall be a PJM region-wide value equal to \nthe Initial RBP Target minus the total PJM region-wide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW and the \nunforced capacity obligation value of load that have successfully requested and obtained an opt-out \npursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 18.1(d).”).  \n55 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 31-32."},{"page":16,"startToken":5247,"endToken":5526,"text":"- 16 - \n \nAnd PJM does not allege, nor could it reasonably do so, that the proposed 15-year \nprocurements provide some residual/additional reliability benefit. The purpose of the RBP \nis to remediate a one-time, short-term shortfall. Moreover, PJM’s IRAS proposal may \nremediate the new large load issue going forward. New large loads will either self-supply \nor their associated load will be subject to curtailment. And all new large loads will be \nexcluded from the BRA beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year.56 Nor does PJM \ncontend that the RBP procurement serves any economic purpose. As shown below, PJM \nhas made no showing that the RBP’s procurement of capacity at an average price of \n$555/MW-day bears any meaningful relationship to the project costs of the resources that \nwill be procured.  \nIt is unjust and unreasonable to charge ratepayers for the acquisition of ten years of \ncapacity that is not needed to “address the reliability shortfall” and serves no \ncost-efficiency or other economic purpose. In Citadel FNGE Ltd. v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit \nexplained that the “application of [a PJM auction rule] was unjust and unreasonable not \njust because of how much it increased the wholesale rate, but because it caused that increase \nfor no justifiable purpose” and “without any commensurate [consumer] benefit.”57 That \n“comfortably fits the definition of unjust and unreasonable.”58 Where a price increase \n“serv[es] no good purpose,” the absence of a reasoned justification for it makes it “unjust \nand unreasonable in its own right.”59  \n \n56 PJM IRAS Filing at 49, 109. \n57 Citadel FNGE Ltd. v. FERC, 77 F.4th 842, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2023). \n58 Id. \n59 Id. at 857."},{"page":17,"startToken":5526,"endToken":5831,"text":"- 17 - \n \nAlthough the foregoing demonstrates that the fifteen-year period is unjust and \nunreasonable, we note that it is also unduly discriminatory to require some ratepayers to \npay for fifteen-year procurements when other ratepayers are insulated from RBP charges \ndue to exemptions or bilateral/self-supply arrangements of only five-years.60 PJM’s \nassertion that a five-year contract is sufficient to satisfy the RBP’s short-term reliability \nneed cannot be squared with a proposal requiring 15-year commitments to meet the same \nneed.  \nC. \nThe RBP fosters the exercise of seller-side market power and is \nunlikely to secure the least-cost combination of resources.  \nPJM proposes to run the RBP “procurement mechanism as a pay-as-bid, capacity-\nonly structure, with a MW-weighted average levelized procurement cost maximum \nwillingness to pay equal to $555/MW-day UCAP across all Delivery Years.”61 PJM affiant \nCroop explains that unlike the BRA, the RBP “is designed as a pay-as-bid procurement in \nwhich each selected resource is compensated based on its individual offer rather than a \nmarket-clearing price established by the marginal resource.”62 Tellingly, PJM concedes \nthat no seller in the RBP is incented to bid its marginal cost. As Ms. Croop explains, “[i]n \na pay-as-bid approach, unlike a uniform clearing price construct where sellers are expected \nto offer a marginal cost, sellers are more likely to offer the expected clearing price.”63 \n \n60 To be clear, Joint Consumer Advocates are not arguing for an extension of the terms of qualifying bilateral \nself-supply arrangements. If IRAS is implemented as proposed, then the reliability problems associated with \nthe projected data centers will be remediated. If the Commission does not reject the RBP, the correct solution \nis to limit RBP procurement terms to five years, the same as qualifying self-supply. \n61 Croop Aff. ¶ 6.  \n62 Id. ¶ 32. \n63 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33)."},{"page":18,"startToken":5831,"endToken":6195,"text":"- 18 - \n \nAs proposed, PJM’s RBP violates basic tenets governing the use of competitive \nacquisitions to set just and reasonable rates under the Federal Power Act (FPA). The \nSupreme Court has held that “the Commission lacks the authority to place exclusive \nreliance on market prices,”64 explaining that the “prevailing price in the marketplace cannot \nbe the final measure of ‘just and reasonable’ rates mandated by the [FPA].”65 Accordingly, \nand as the D.C. Circuit has explained, it is only “when there is a competitive market [that] \n[the Commission] may rely upon market-based prices in lieu of cost-of-service regulation \nto assure a ‘just and reasonable’ result.”66 In other words: 67 \nIn a competitive market, where neither buyer nor seller has \nsignificant market power, it is rational to assume that the \nterms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable, and \nspecifically to infer that the price is close to marginal cost, \nsuch that the seller makes only a normal return on its \ninvestment. \n \nThe proposed RBP is not a just and reasonable competitive procurement because—as PJM \nadmits—no seller is incented to bid their marginal cost. Moreover, PJM offers no \nsupporting evidence that the resulting procurement price will be the result of true price \ncompetition, or that the outcome will reflect the marginal cost of the resources to be \nprocured. \n \n64 FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 400 (1974). \n65 Id. at 397. \n66 Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1993). \n67 Id. (quoting Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). See also PJM, Revisions \nto Reliability Pricing Model, Transmittal Letter at 74, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER25-682 \n(Dec. 9, 2024), eLibrary No. 20241209-5207 (“The Commission uses a market-based approach to wholesale \nelectric regulation, reasoning that, in a ‘competitive market, where neither buyer nor seller has significant \nmarket power, it is rational to assume that the terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable, and \nspecifically to infer that price is close to marginal cost, such that the seller makes only a normal return on its \ninvestment.’” (quoting Tejas Power Corp., 908 F.2d at 1004))."},{"page":19,"startToken":6195,"endToken":6629,"text":"- 19 - \n \nThe proposed RBP is unlike PJM’s standard auction capacity procurement \nmechanism, the BRA. In contrast to the RBP, “the objective of [the BRA is] to procure the \nleast-cost, competitively-priced combination of resources necessary to meet the region’s \nreliability objectives.”68 The Commission has found the BRA design to be just and \nreasonable because it is intended to ensure competition and mitigate seller-side market \npower by myriad means.69 The BRA includes must-offer resource obligations, market \nseller resource offer caps, a market price cap, and oversight of bids/bidding by the \nIndependent Market Monitor; and competitive new entry disciplines incumbent market \npower.70 A central premise of the design is that capacity sellers are expected to bid their \nown marginal costs. In accepting the BRA construct and its single clearing price model, \nthe Commission found that “under this model, the generator has the proper incentive to bid \nthe lowest price that covers its marginal cost.”71 \nBy contrast, the RBP includes none of the BRA’s approved mitigation measures. \nPJM concedes that “[n]o direct market power screens or mitigation are being proposed for \n \n68 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 101 (3d Cir. 2014). \n69 PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 (2006) (RPM Order), reh’g granted in part, \n119 FERC ¶ 61,318, reh’g denied, 121 FERC ¶ 61,173 (2007), pet. for review denied sub nom., Pub. Serv. \nElec. & Gas Co. v. FERC, 324 Fed. Appx. 1 (2009). \n70 The forward-looking BRA was the product of a settlement with “design features [intended to] discourage \nthe exercise of market power and market manipulation generally. Specific mitigation rules and increased \ncompetition from new entry are the most important design elements in this regard.” Id. P 6. It must be \nemphasized that Joint Consumer Advocates do not concede that the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) is at \npresent competitive or just and reasonable. As a subset of the Joint Consumer Advocates have shown in their \npending complaint in FERC Docket No. EL25-18-000, there is inadequate new entry to mitigate the market \npower of incumbent resources and inadequate measures to mitigate that market power. Among other things, \ndemand-side resources should be subject to a must-offer obligation to avoid the exercise of physical and \neconomic withholding. RBP fails to provide even the less-than-acceptable protections in the current \nRPM/BRA structure. \n71 RPM Order, P 141 n.101 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co., 113 FERC ¶ 61,278, P 43 (2005)); see also \nCroop Aff. ¶ 33 (in a “uniform clearing price construct” such as the BRA “sellers are expected to offer [at \ntheir] marginal cost”)."},{"page":20,"startToken":6629,"endToken":6925,"text":"- 20 - \n \nthe RBP,”72 and acknowledges that “[i]n the context of a pay-as-bid structure with a \nmaximum willingness to pay set at $555/MW-day UCAP, the effectiveness of direct \nmarket screens or mitigation is limited.”73 By its own admission, the proposal is fatally \nflawed because PJM concedes that RBP sellers are not incented to bid their own production \ncosts but are instead “more likely to offer the expected clearing price.”74 A seller’s ability \nto bid unconstrained by its competitors’ cost of production is a paradigmatic example of \nthe exercise of seller-side market power.75 Here, every resource eligible to offer into the \nRBP can bid to raise prices to the $555/MW-day average price cap regardless of its \nmarginal cost or that of its competitors. Resources bidding into the RBP will be engaged \nin a gaming strategy rather than price competition. \nThe ability of offering resources to exercise market power and thereby set RBP \nrates is not an unanticipated consequence—it is baked into the procurement’s design. PJM \nadmits that RBP’s design leaves it powerless to protect against the exercise of seller-side \nmarket power. “Given offers will likely have less variation and information underlying \noffers it can be difficult and ineffective to determine offers exhorting market power.”76 But \nthis is no defense where the “difficult[y]” PJM faces is a consequence of its having \nproposed an inherently anti-competitive procurement structure.  \n \n72 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 66. \n73 Id. \n74 Id. at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33). \n75 A “resource[] [that can] increase prices in a specific area . . . [has] the ability to exercise market power.” \nFERC Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, Energy Primer A Handbook for Energy Market Basics at 72 \n(2023). \n76 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33)."},{"page":21,"startToken":6925,"endToken":7217,"text":"- 21 - \n \nPJM proffers a series of unconvincing arguments purporting to show that the RBP \nconstruct “minimize[s] the potential for [the] exercise of market power.”77  \nFirst, PJM asserts that unlike the single-clearing price BRA structure, the RBP \ndesign protects against economic/physical withholding for portfolio benefits and against \nthe ability to collect inframarginal rents.78 While this may be true, the inapplicability of \none market power strategy does not show that the design is immune from other forms of \nseller-side market power. To the contrary, PJM and its witness, Ms. Croop, admit that \nmarket power concerns remain, acknowledging that bidders are “most likely to offer the \nexpected price” and not their own marginal cost of production.79 \nSecond, PJM asserts that “[t]he existence of a reasonable maximum willingness to \npay further discipline[s] costs” because an offer may not clear “due to more economical \noffers and/or the costs exceeding the set maximum willingness to pay.”80 But PJM explains \nthat the pay-as-bid design incentivizes resources to offer at prices close to what they expect \nthe “clearing” price to be, so there is no reason to expect meaningful quantities of \nsignificantly more “economical” offers. And the $555/MW-day “maximum willingness to \npay” benchmark is not self-evidently just and reasonable. What PJM must show is that \nthere is a meaningful relationship between its proposed $555/MW-day average price cap \nand the actual costs of the resources that will be procured. “[T]he prevailing price in the \nmarket cannot be the final measure of ‘just and reasonable’ rates mandated by the [FPA].”81 \n \n77 Id. at 66. \n78 Id. at 67-68. \n79 Id. at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33). \n80 Id. at 67. \n81 FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. at 397."},{"page":22,"startToken":7217,"endToken":7515,"text":"- 22 - \n \nIt cannot reasonably be inferred that the RBP as proposed will create meaningful cost-\nbased price competition between and among offering resources.82 PJM itself admits that \nthis is unlikely, as it is in the economic self-interest of bidders to offer somewhere around \nthe expected clearing price.83    \nThird, based upon data provided in response to an RFI and compiled by CRA, PJM \ncontends that there is a sufficient number of potential suppliers to cause “suppliers to \nsubmit competitive offers” and thereby discipline market power concerns.84 This statement \nis contrary to a statement two pages later that bidders are “more likely to offer the expected \nclearing price.”85  \nIn fact, Ms. Croop’s affidavit does not support the assertion that the RFI data show \nthat the RBP will function as a competitive solicitation. Ms. Croop says that the RFI’s \nidentification of a “large set of potential supply to participate in the RBP . . .  allows the \nRBP to function more like a competitive solicitation.”86 The phrase “more like” is an \nimplicit concession that the RBP will not be a price-competitive solicitation. And the RFI \ndata make that clear. The RBP will secure resources by order of delivery year (and then \ncost) with priority beginning in the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.87 Only about 80 of the 397 \nprojects identified by CRA claim an ability to achieve commercial operation by this date \nand only 3% of all projects are under construction.88 And it is not clear that all of these \n \n82 See Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 10 F.3d at 870. \n83 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33). \n84 Id. at 69. \n85 Id. at 71. \n86 Croop Aff. ¶ 35 (emphasis added). \n87 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 75. \n88 CRA RFI Summary at 6."},{"page":23,"startToken":7515,"endToken":7868,"text":"- 23 - \n \nprojects will be eligible to bid into RBP.89 Given that there are relatively few resources that \ncan fill the immediate need, those with marginal costs less than $555/MW-day will have \nevery incentive to bid somewhere around the expected clearing price as opposed to their \nmarginal costs. As opposed to newly constructed power plants, the pool of resources most \nlikely to enter commercial operation within two-years may well consist of unit \nreactivations, unit uprates, or demand response, and may well have marginal costs far lower \nthan $555/MW-day.  \nFourth, PJM’s reliance upon the Commission’s 2015 acceptance of the California \nIndependent System Operator’s (CAISO) “Capacity Procurement Mechanism” (CPM) as \nsupport for approval of the RBP fails.90 CPM was intended to “procure an individual \nresource to respond to unexpected, unplanned-for system conditions or meet unique \nreliability needs.”91 CPM procurements were limited from one-month to one-year, and the \nprogram’s soft offer cap represented the high end of the range of then current resource \nadequacy prices, with CPM subject to stakeholder review every four years to ensure the \njust and reasonableness of the acquisition cost.92 Significantly, the Commission had \nrejected prior versions of CPM because “the continuation of a fixed going-forward cost \nha[d] not been shown to be just and reasonable because of the likelihood that market \nconditions, which can affect the price of capacity, will fluctuate over time.”93 The design, \n \n89 The eligibility of those projects to bid into the RBP is unknown, as is the accuracy of the information \nprovided to CRA. \n90 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 64 (citing Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 153 FERC ¶ 61,001, P 29 (2015) \n(CAISO CPM Order), clarified, 154 FERC ¶ 61,034 (2016)). \n91 Id. at 70 n.179 (quoting CAISO, Tariff Amendment and Offer of Settlement Regarding Capacity \nProcurement Mechanism Revisions and Request for Waiver of Notice Requirement, Transmittal Letter at 15, \nCal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Docket No. ER15-1783 (May 26, 2015), eLibrary No. 20150526-5272). \n92 CAISO CPM Order, PP 6, 29. \n93 Id. P 4 (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 134 FERC ¶ 61,211, P 58 (2011))."},{"page":24,"startToken":7868,"endToken":8191,"text":"- 24 - \n \nscope, length, and pricing of PJM’s RBP is likewise nothing like the CPM. Even setting \naside the RBP’s more expansive scope (seeking to procure 6.8 GWs), 15-year term, and \nabsence of any tether to underlying unit resource costs, the Commission did not identify \nany aspect of CPM that would permit the unmitigated exercise of seller-side market power. \nFifth, and finally, PJM’s reliance on the tariff’s treatment of Planned Generation \nCapacity Resources as a cure for RBP’s market power concerns is misguided. Planned \nGeneration Capacity Resources’ sell offers “may be rejected if [they] exceed[] 140% of an \naverage price established around the [Variable Resource Requirement (VRR)] Curve.”94 \nThere is no VRR Curve applicable to the RBP. As further discussed below, the RBP’s \n$555/MW-day figure derives from what would have been the Point 1 market cap for the \n2027/2028 Delivery Year but for the replacement price collar, and is tied to the Cost of \nNew Entry for a new combustion turbine. There is no reference unit applicable to the RBP. \nThe BRA is intended to meet one-years’ worth of capacity needs based upon the least-cost \nprocurement of capacity resources. PJM nowhere claims, nor could it show, that the RBP \nis designed to secure a least-cost combination of resources. PJM simply plans to funnel \ndollars to resources at prices divorced from their marginal costs in an auction that PJM \nadmits will not be based on resource price competition.  \nIn summary, RBP leaves consumers at the mercy of suppliers who, unconstrained \nby resource price competition or any other meaningful mitigation measures, have every \nincentive and opportunity to bid as close to the price cap as possible. And bidders will be \noperating in an admittedly supply-constrained environment, subject only to a wholly \narbitrary “willingness to pay” provision at an average (and potentially higher) $555/MW-\n \n94 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 70 n.182 (citing PJM Tariff, Attach. DD § 6.5(a)(ii)(C))."},{"page":25,"startToken":8191,"endToken":8448,"text":"- 25 - \n \nday capacity price untethered to any selected resource’s actual cost minus its energy and \nancillary services revenues. This is transparently unjust and unreasonable, an invitation for \nthe abuse of seller market power, and a burdening of ratepayers with billions in unjustified \ncapacity charges. \nD. \nThe proposed $555/MW-Day cap price is excessive. \nPJM contends the $555/MW-day average price cap is just and reasonable because \nit corresponds to the “uncollared price cap based on Point 1 of the VRR curve for the \n2028/2029 Delivery Year BRA.”95 PJM’s reliance on what would have been the hard \nmarket cap for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year (but for the collar) is unsound for multiple \nreasons. \nPJM concedes that the “willingness to pay for a 15-year commitment should not \nexceed the amount that load would be willing to pay for a single-year commitment under \nthe RPM framework.”96 But in fact, the willingness to pay for a 15-year commitment—\nand the price that resources should be willing to accept, if guaranteed for 15 years—should \nbe substantially less than the corresponding amounts for a one-year commitment. That is \ntrue as a general matter, as 15-year price certainty reduces supplier risk and eases financing. \nBut it is particularly true where the reliability need is concentrated in the early part of the \nperiod, when the one-year commitment would occur. In that context, the one-year \ncommitment reflects a scarcity price that simply should not be expected to apply across the \nfull 15-year term. \n \n95 Id. at 62. \n96 Id. at 64."},{"page":26,"startToken":8448,"endToken":8817,"text":"- 26 - \n \nAdditionally, as it is used in the BRA structure, Point 1 of the VRR curve for the \n2028/2029 Delivery Year is a hard cap. Load would never under any outcome pay more \nthan the $555/MW-day fixed price cap. But as used in the RBP, the $555/MW-day price is \na soft price cap, meaning that ratepayers are subject to paying a selected resource’s “as \nbid” offer price—and are not protected by a fixed, $555/MW-day cap. It is plausible that \nratepayers may pay more than $555/MW-day for RBP-acquired capacity and there is \nnothing to protect against it. This is because the RBP’s actual $/MW-day average price cap \nwill increase to the extent any resource or combination of resources that bid less than \n$555/MW-day fail to enter commercial operation or cease operation prior to the end of \ntheir RBP commitment term. \nThe possibility that ratepayers may pay more than an average acquisition price of \n$555/MW-day is a matter of simple mathematics and can be shown through the following \nexample. Assume, for simplification purposes, that the RBP procures a total of 5,000 MW \n(due to offsets) at an average price of $555/MW-day. Assume further that 1,000 MW of \nload has bid in at a price of $400/MW-day: a price higher than the 2028/2029 Delivery \nYear $325/MW-day price collar but sufficiently below the $555/MW-day average price to \nfacilitate being selected. Assume further that the selected low-price load does not enter \ncommercial operation. The loss of this load would cause the actual RBP average price to \nincrease to $593.75/MW-day.97 This outcome is not implausible; PJM recognizes that RBP \ncommitted resources may fail to achieve commercial operation for sundry legitimate \n \n97 An RBP acquisition of $555/MW-day multiplied by 5,000 MW equals $2,775,000 per day in capacity \ncharges. Removing 1,000 MW of committed resources at $400/day results in $2,375,000 per day in capacity \ncharges ($2,775,000 minus $400,000) now spread over 4,000 MW of resources. This results in a \n$593.75/MW-day average price: an increase of $38.75/MW-day over the soft cap of $555/MW-day."},{"page":27,"startToken":8817,"endToken":9263,"text":"- 27 - \n \nreasons including the lack of necessary Network Upgrades.98 Over the 15-year RBP \ncommitment term, the price increase in this example results in roughly $850 million in \ngross costs beyond what “load would be willing to pay” as measured against PJM’s own \nstandard.99 \nPJM’s borrowing of Point 1 of the VRR curve is likewise inapposite because it is a \nreference cost grounded in the estimated Cost of New Entry for a combustion turbine, and \nis the market price cap in a BRA auction where bidders are expected to offer at their \nmarginal cost of production.100 By comparison, the RBP has no reference resource or VRR \ncurve, nor is it anticipated that bidders will bid their cost of production.101 And, again \nunlike the BRA, PJM concedes that the RBP is designed to procure a set of sufficiently \nheterogenous resources such that it cannot objectively establish a uniform clearing price:102  \n[T]he proposed procurement is not acquiring a uniform \ncommodity. Although the RBP will seek a fixed, 15-year \nperiod of time for procurement and cost allocation of RBP \nResources, those resources may differ based on contract \nduration (dependent on the projected in-service date of \nselected resources), commercial operation dates, and other \nfactors such as differences in [Effective Load Carrying \n \n98 PJM Filing, Attach. D, Affidavit of Ms. Gwen Kelly ¶¶ 10-11 (Due to a variety of RBP project development \nrisks, “PJM concluded that resources seeking RBP commitments present risks that a committed resource may \nfail to achieve commercial operation or experience delays in reaching commercial operation.”); see also PJM \nFiling, Transmittal at 60 (excusing from RBP shortfall charges RBP resources that fail to meet their \ncommercial operation dates solely because of Network Upgrade issues). \n99 While in some circumstances there may be charges imposed on resources that fail to achieve commercial \noperation, those charges are limited, and such shortfall charge amounts are unlikely to overcome the cost \nincrease described here. \n100 “PJM states that the choice of a [combustion turbine] plant as the Reference Resource is consistent with \ncriteria that PJM has used in previous Periodic Reviews, including: (1) feasibility to build; (2) whether the \nresource is an economic source of incremental capacity; and (3) whether the resource’s Net [Cost of New \nEntry] can be accurately estimated. [The Commission] find[s] that PJM reasonably supports its conclusion \nthat a [combustion turbine] plant meets these criteria because it is feasible to build and offers an economically \nviable source of incremental capacity.” PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 194 FERC ¶ 61,049, P 16 (footnote \nomitted), on reh’g, 196 FERC ¶ 61,007 (2026). \n101 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 71 (quoting Croop Aff. ¶ 33). \n102 Croop Aff. ¶ 25."},{"page":28,"startToken":9263,"endToken":9552,"text":"- 28 - \n \nCapability (ELCC)] accreditation and varying UCAP across \nthe full term of the commitment. These differences create \ndistinct products rather than a single homogeneous offering. \nEstablishing a uniform clearing price across such varied \nproducts would require PJM to normalize offers through \npotentially complex and subjective assumptions. \n \nNor will PJM undertake to ascertain whether any offer reflects the resource’s cost of \nproduction.103 A review of PJM’s proposed gating criteria confirms that PJM’s offer review \nwill be limited to a “demonstrat[ion] that the proposed resource will be successfully \ncompleted and able to provide capacity.”104 \nIn short, PJM has simply plucked a figure from the RPM construct and suggested \nit fits with the RBP design. This maneuver fails where PJM does not show any rational \nconnection between its proposed price cap and the RBP, including that its proposed \n$555/MW-day average RBP price is either just and reasonable or bears any meaningful \nrelationship to the marginal costs of production of the resources to be acquired. \nE. \nThe absence of locational criteria for RBP resource \nprocurements poses unjustified cost risks for ratepayers. \n Affiant Croop explains that while PJM “recognizes there are locational \nconsiderations at large for resource adequacy, and these constraints are modeled in the \nReliability Pricing Model[,]”105 RBP includes no locational procurement signal. She states, \n“PJM does not propose to match specific supply to specific demand or to apply locational \nconstraints in the central procurement.”106 PJM does not take the position, however, that \nlocational information is irrelevant; it asserts instead that it simply “does not have the \n \n103 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 66 (“No direct market power screens or mitigation are being proposed for the \nRBP.”). \n104 Id. at 71. \n105 Croop Aff. ¶ 8. \n106 Id. ¶ 7."},{"page":29,"startToken":9552,"endToken":9892,"text":"- 29 - \n \ninformation needed to determine such locational parameters for 15-year term capacity \ncommitments.”107 \nThat assertion cannot be reconciled with PJM’s intention to allocate RBP costs to \nzones based on their large load forecasts.108 As proposed, the RBP structure is unjust and \nunreasonable because it risks burdening ratepayers with additional new transmission and \nenergy costs (if the large load’s arrival on the grid creates congestion) that could be avoided \nor ameliorated through the use of a locational procurement signal. \nII. \nREQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVE TO PJM TO IMPLEMENT \nONE OF TWO JUST AND REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES \nAs shown above, the proposed RBP is unjust and unreasonable, and the \nCommission should reject it. The identified deficiencies are fundamental, broad ranging in \nscope and impact, and contrary to the Commission’s “first and foremost duty” under the \nFPA to “protect consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates.”109  \nPJM says that reliability demands that nearly 7 GW of new supply be procured in \nthe near-term, yet permits an untold number of megawatts (or possibly gigawatts) to \nopt-out of the auction with no evident concern that doing so will adversely impact system \nreliability. PJM proposes no counterpart provision to adjust the target forecast for known \nreductions in projected new large loads even as those forecasts have been rapidly and \ncontinuously plummeting. \n \n107 Id. ¶ 8. \n108 “The initial allocation of RBP UCAP MW to each Electric Distributor zone/area will be based on Load \nAdjustments, as set forth in PJM Table B9b from the 2026 PJM Load Forecast, and each zone/area’s share \nof the Initial RBP Target of 6,831.3 MW.” Id. ¶ 46 (with chart of zonal allocations). \n109 Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 551 (2008). See also \nAtl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (The FPA’s sister Act, the Natural Gas \nAct, was “framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from \nexcessive rates and charges.”)."},{"page":30,"startToken":9892,"endToken":10261,"text":"- 30 - \n \n RBP will saddle ratepayers with fifteen years of payments,110 even as PJM admits \nthat the proposed commitment period is as much as a decade longer than the five-year \nbilateral procurements that will meet PJM’s reliability needs. The design constrains, if not \nprohibits, the participation of short-term resources, even though those are the megawatts \nmost likely to align with the immediate-term need.  \nThe proposed price cap is unjustified. It bears no meaningful relationship to the \ncosts of the resources to be procured and was simply lifted from a design in which it is used \nin setting clearing prices for a one-year commitment, not a period as long as fifteen years. \nAnd, the cap is excessive given the extended period of rate certainty, which should mean \nlower, not higher, prices.  \nFinally, PJM admits that its RBP’s pay-as-bid design is subject to market power \nconcerns because sellers are more likely to offer the expected clearing price rather than \ntheir marginal cost, yet its proposal contains no market mitigation protocols. A competitive \nprocurement rife with obvious market power problems that includes no meaningful \nmitigation measures is per se unjust and unreasonable.  \nInstead of RBP, the Commission should exercise its FPA section 206 authority and \ndirect PJM to implement one of the following two just and reasonable alternatives.111 \nOption One: Direct PJM to Propose a “Subscription-Based” Procurement \nFramework. PJM should be directed to refile the RBP as a “subscription” model, in which \n \n110 The amount of RBP charges for a procurement total of 6,831 MWs at a rate of $555/MW-day x 365 \ndays x 15 years would be $20,756,847,375. \n111 The Commission has already found in the recently-initiated show cause order proceeding (Docket \nNo. EL26-67-000)  that “PJM’s existing Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff) appears to be unjust, \nunreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or preferential,” PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211, \nP 3 (2026), and we show here that RBP is as well. Joint Consumer Advocates assert that the Commission can \nuse its authority under FPA section 206, 16 U.S.C. § 824e, to rectify certain of the issues highlighted in the \nShow Cause Order proceeding by implementing one of the two options presented below."},{"page":31,"startToken":10261,"endToken":10533,"text":"- 31 - \n \nLSEs, as the entities legally or contractually obligated to supply a large load’s capacity and \nenergy needs, would be responsible for determining both the procurement target for the \nlarge loads that they serve and bearing the associated financial and credit obligations \nassociated with those loads. LSEs wishing to participate in a centralized procurement \nwould indicate to PJM the megawatt quantity that should be procured on their behalf \nthrough the RBP. With a subscription-based model, there is no need for opt-outs because \nthe procurement target is based on requests from LSEs to buy, and not forecasts, which in \nthis environment are uncertain at best. \nA proposal along these lines was presented and debated during the stakeholder \nprocess and received greater than the two-thirds sector-weighted member support required \nfor adoption. The PJM Board of Directors nonetheless rejected the subscription model, \nstating in a July 27, 2026 “Decisional Letter” that it had “concluded that a voluntary \nsubscription framework would not provide sufficient assurance that capacity equal to the \nidentified near-term shortfall would actually be procured.”112 We are unsure why that is \nnecessarily the case. LSEs presumably work with the loads they serve to determine how \nbest to satisfy capacity obligations, including making resource build, demand response, \nand bilateral contracting decisions. Moreover, a general concern about failing to procure \nsufficient capacity rings hollow when considered against the proposed RBP, which \nincludes opt-out rights that could reduce substantially the amount of capacity to be \nprocured. \n \n112 Letter from Paula Conboy, Chair, PJM Board of Managers, to Stakeholders at 1 (July 27, 2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/2026/20260727-board-\ndecisional-letter-on-cifp-reliability-backstop-procurement-and-connect-and-manage.pdf."},{"page":32,"startToken":10533,"endToken":10832,"text":"- 32 - \n \nThe likely success of a subscription model should also be assessed in the context \nof PJM’s IRAS proposal. New large loads that want firm service should be highly incented \nto self-supply rather than face the prospect of interruptible service. \nOption Two: Advance the Effective Date of the Recently-Filed IRAS Proposal. \nPJM explains that while the instant filing is “focused on the RBP framework, PJM \nintends to quickly follow this filing with another FPA section 205 filing to propose an \ninterim resource adequacy service (“IRAS”).”113 That filing has now been made, and is \npending before the Commission in Docket No. ER 26-3515-000.114 As proposed, IRAS \nwill provide large load customers with a choice: they can either bring their own new \ngeneration to meet their emerging and substantial generation needs or avoid that obligation \nand be treated as involuntary demand response; effectively, non-firm load. The Board’s \nJuly 27 letter explains (at 2) that under IRAS: \nElectric Distributors will be required to implement an \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service for new Large Loads \nthat, as of June 1, 2027, do not bring sufficient capacity to \nserve their resource adequacy needs and cannot otherwise be \nserved at the 1-in-10 reliability standard. Load reductions \nunder this service will occur prior to the deployment of Pre-\nEmergency Load Management. \nJoint Consumer Advocates will have more to say about the IRAS proposal once we \nhave had a chance to complete our review. In the meantime, it seems clear that a proposal \ndeveloped along the lines of IRAS will help to meet reliability concerns and address the \ndata center load capacity problem—without burdening states with the obligation to develop \napproaches to allocate incremental RBP costs to large load customers, or for consumers to \n \n113 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 4. \n114 See PJM IRAS Filing."},{"page":33,"startToken":10832,"endToken":11147,"text":"- 33 - \n \nbear the burden of incremental costs that are (for whatever reason) not assigned to the large \nloads. Based on our preliminary review, the IRAS structure meets PJM’s reliability needs, \nprovides new large loads a way to come on the system, enables PJM’s BRA to return over \ntime to a competitive balance between supply and demand, protects ratepayers from further \nincreases in BRA prices by removing the load from the BRA, and protects ratepayers from \nstranded costs.  \nFor these reasons, and assuming the IRAS proposal is found to be just and \nreasonable, the Commission should, in lieu of approving the RBP, advance the effective \ndate of IRAS such that, beginning with the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, large load customers \nshould be given the option of bringing their own new resources online or having the amount \nof their new large load treated as “first-off” to ensure system reliability in emergency \ncircumstances.115 \nIII. \nIF THE COMMISSION DECLINES TO REJECT RBP, IT SHOULD \nCONDITION ACCEPTANCE TO ADDRESS EVIDENT AND \nSUBSTANTIAL CONCERNS. \nIf the Commission is not inclined to reject the RBP or adopt either of the options \ndescribed above, then at a minimum any approval of RBP should be conditioned. PJM \nstates a willingness to accept “the Commission’s exercise of authority to modify and/or \nsever any element of the proposed Tariff and [Reliability Assurance Agreement] language” \nto the extent consistent with law and “where such modification and/or severance is \nconsistent with PJM’s overarching objectives in this filing.”116 We assert that there are \n \n115 To the extent that there are large load customers who can demonstrate that they have taken steps to \ninterconnect based on the promise of capacity-backed service through the BRA, those loads should (in some \nfashion) be grandfathered. \n116 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 3. To the extent necessary, the Commission could impose these conditions by \nmeans of its FPA section 206 authority."},{"page":34,"startToken":11147,"endToken":11410,"text":"- 34 - \n \nseveral conditions that could be imposed that would be both on solid legal grounds and \nfully consistent with the purposes PJM seeks to achieve. \nThese include: \n1. Limit the acquisition period. The Commission should limit the RBP \nprocurement period to five years, consistent with PJM’s assertions that new bilateral \narrangements with a five-year term (from 2028 through 2032) will address PJM’s identified \nreliability need and are “balanced” and sufficient to incent new generation. PJM’s \nassertions demonstrate that it is unjust and unreasonable to require ratepayers to bear \nprocurement costs over a fifteen-year period. As noted earlier, PJM does not attempt to \ndefend the fifteen-year payout period, stating only that it has been included in the proposal \nto implement the Statement of Principles, which includes the extended payout period. \nRespectfully, absent more, that agreement is insufficient to justify the imposition of \nenormous and unnecessary costs on ratepayers. At minimum, if the Commission declines \nto require a shorter commitment period, it should require the inclusion of a Tariff provision \nauthorizing the Commission to change prices and performance terms if it finds, upon \ncomplaint or its own motion, that they have become unjust and unreasonable. \n2. Provide for procurement target adjustment to reflect additional known forecast \nreductions. The RBP should be modified to permit a reduction in the procurement target \nto reflect demand reductions that have occurred since the large load forecast used for the \n2028/2029 BRA or that will occur before October 21, 2026, the deadline for the submission \nof opt-out and offsetting self-supply requests, to reflect data centers that are not expected"},{"page":35,"startToken":11410,"endToken":11765,"text":"- 35 - \n \nto be in-service by the 2028/2029 Delivery Year and require utilities to provide this \ninformation to PJM.117 \nThe RBP proposal provides for a possible reduction in the Initial RBP Target \nresulting from certain off-setting new capacity.118 The Commission should direct that PJM \ninclude a similar off-set option to address anticipated data center projects that have been or \nwill be substantially delayed or cancelled, to better ensure the accuracy of the final RBP \ntarget. Utilities should be required, prior to the October 21, 2026 deadline, to update the \nprocurement target and exclude any cancelled or delayed data center load that is included \nin PJM’s current large load forecast for the RBP.119 Absent such relief, ratepayers could \nbe forced to bear RBP procurement costs to satisfy illusory reliability needs. \n3. Opt-Out Rights for LSEs with No Large Load Customers. The opt-out afforded \nto municipal and cooperative utilities should be expanded to be available to any LSE in a \nzone that is allocated RBP costs that has no large load customers. In both cases, absent \nrelief those incremental RBP costs will simply be passed to customers who will have no \nother option but to bear them. \n4. Deferral where a state is intending to act but has not completed its action. There \nmay be situations in which retail ratepayers are charged RBP costs because a state plans to \nact but that action is delayed. It that instance, the Commission could condition approval of \n \n117 As explained above, between now and January 16, 2026, when the Statement of Principles were released, \nPJM’s reliability needs associated with projected new large loads have changed markedly. Data centers \nwithin PJM continue to be delayed or cancelled at a rapid pace, and the Commission has endorsed the use of \nflexible transmission to maintain system reliability while permitting the interconnection of new large loads \nto the grid. Sw. Power Pool, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196, P 1 (2026) (approving the Southwest Power Pool’s \nimplementation of a new type of non-firm transmission service called Conditional High Impact Large Load \nService). \n118 PJM Filing, Transmittal at 35-37. \n119 See Croop Aff. ¶ 42."},{"page":36,"startToken":11765,"endToken":12068,"text":"- 36 - \n \nthe RBP on the inclusion of a true-up mechanism that would hold those customers \nharmless. Alternatively, where a state intends to act but has not yet done so, the RBP could \nrequire that a zone’s charges be held in abeyance for a period of time to accommodate the \nintended—but not yet completed—state action. \n5. Mechanisms to ensure just and reasonable prices. As explained above, it is \nunjust and unreasonable for 15-year RBP prices to be set by a mechanism likely to produce \nprices centered on the “willingness to pay” cap based on the uncollared BRA price cap. \nThat proposal spreads and extends the BRA price cap’s one-year scarcity price, \nunnecessarily and unreasonably, for as long as 15 years. And, as also shown above, that \nwillingness to pay threshold is applied on an average basis across all RBP resources, which \nmeans that some resources may demand and receive prices far above those levels. Neither \naspect has been shown to be just and reasonable. Accordingly, the Commission should \nsubstantially reduce the willingness to pay average price cap. Additionally, the \nCommission should consider allowing PJM to use RBP to identify the resources with which \nit seeks to contract but require the sellers to file cost-based rates, with appropriate cost \njustifications, for review by this Commission. \n6. Incorporation of locational price signals. PJM knows the zones in which new \nlarge loads are projected to interconnect; that is what drives part of its cost allocation \nproposal. PJM should prefer to select resources that propose to be located in the zones \nwhere the new large loads are located. Doing so will help to prevent the incorporation of \nnew large loads from driving up transmission costs to deliver energy from far-flung new \ncapacity resources to the places where the load is located. And it will mitigate RBP’s"},{"page":37,"startToken":12068,"endToken":12279,"text":"- 37 - \n \ntendency to mute the BRA’s price signals by displacing locationally-selected BRA \nresources with non-locationally-selected RBP resources. \nCONCLUSION \nPJM’s RBP proposal should be rejected. It is self-contradictory, deeply flawed, and \nlikely to result in significant and excessive costs to ratepayers that are “all pain and no \ngain.” As the stakeholder process made clear, the purported capacity shortfall and whatever \nreliability concerns it engenders can be addressed through far less costly and more efficient \nmeans. We urge the Commission to move toward those options, rather than risk burdening \nPJM consumers with enormous and unnecessary costs. \n \n  /s/ Susan L. Satter                              \n      /s/ Scott H. Strauss \nSusan L. Satter \nChief, Public Utilities Bureau \nScott Metzger \nPublic Utilities Policy Counsel \nKimberly B. Janas \nCounsel to the Attorney General \nILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE \n115 South LaSalle Street, 25th Floor \nChicago, IL 60603 \nsusan.satter@ilag.gov \n \nCounsel for the Office of the Illinois \nAttorney General \n \nScott H. Strauss \nPeter J. Hopkins \nJeffrey A. Schwarz \nLauren L. Springett \nSPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP \n1818 N Street, NW, 8th Floor \nWashington, DC 20036 \nscott.strauss@spiegelmcd.com \n \nCounsel for Delaware Division of the \nPublic Advocate, District of Columbia \nOffice of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens \nUtility Board, Maryland Office of People’s \nCounsel and New Jersey Division of Rate \nCounsel \n \nAugust 21, 2026"},{"page":38,"startToken":12279,"endToken":12346,"text":"- 38 - \n \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have this day caused the foregoing pleading to be served \nupon each person designated on the official service list  compiled by the Secretary in this \nproceeding. \nDated on this 21st day of August, 2026. \n \n/s/ Lauren L. Springett \nLauren L. Springett \n \nLaw Offices of: \nSPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP \n1818 N Street, NW \n8th Floor \nWashington, DC 20036 \n(202) 879-4000"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":999,"startToken":0,"endToken":147},{"p":1,"at":999,"title":"SUMMARY","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":9,"endAt":9,"startToken":147,"endToken":2896},{"p":9,"at":9,"title":"I. Protest","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":9,"endAt":1375,"startToken":2896,"endToken":3109},{"p":9,"at":1375,"title":"A. RBP’s design is contrary to PJM’s assertion that the proposal is needed to address a reliability risk associated with a 6.8 GW capacity shortfall.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":13,"endAt":10,"startToken":3109,"endToken":4214},{"p":13,"at":10,"title":"B. PJM fails to demonstrate that 15-year resource commitments are needed to meet the capacity shortfall.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":17,"endAt":544,"startToken":4214,"endToken":5604},{"p":17,"at":544,"title":"C. The RBP fosters the exercise of seller-side market power and is unlikely to secure the least-cost combination of resources.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":25,"endAt":309,"startToken":5604,"endToken":8235},{"p":25,"at":309,"title":"D. The proposed $555/MW-Day cap price is excessive.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":28,"endAt":1084,"startToken":8235,"endToken":9428},{"p":28,"at":1084,"title":"E. The absence of locational criteria for RBP resource procurements poses unjustified cost risks for ratepayers.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":29,"endAt":543,"startToken":9428,"endToken":9632},{"p":29,"at":543,"title":"II. Request for issuance of directive to pjm to implement one of two just and reasonable alternatives","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":33,"endAt":936,"startToken":9632,"endToken":10983},{"p":33,"at":936,"title":"III. If the Commission declines to reject RBP, it should condition acceptance to address evident and substantial concerns.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":37,"endAt":149,"startToken":10983,"endToken":12085},{"p":37,"at":149,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":38,"endAt":10,"startToken":12085,"endToken":12280},{"p":38,"at":10,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":38,"endAt":421,"startToken":12280,"endToken":12346}]}