{"document":{"slug":"opsi-september-iras-comments","filename":"opsi-september-iras-comments.pdf","title":"PJM states request clarification or separate consideration of the interim service proposal","url":"https://opsi.us/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/ER26-3515-000-IRAS-Comments.pdf","issued":"2026-09-03","group":"PJM filings","docket":"ER26-3515-000","filer":"Organization of PJM States","provenance":"Signed original published by the filer; eLibrary accession not verified.","file":"sources/originals/opsi-september-iras-comments.pdf","kind":"stakeholder document","sha256":"ca5f1ac293fbb5337384eff35b7f740e5fec94d5ea655c2ef3c93ad4439f96a5","pages":12,"tokens":3171,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":318,"text":"1 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n) \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 \nCOMMENTS, REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION, AND,  \nIN THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST TO SEVER OF THE \nORGANIZATION OF PJM STATES, INC. \nThe Organization of PJM States, Inc. (“OPSI”) files these comments and request for \nclarification in response to PJM’s August 13, 2026, filing proposing revisions to the Open Access \nTransmission Tariff (“Tariff”) and the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving \nEntities (“RAA”) to establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service (“IRAS”) and a New Large \nLoad (“NLL”) Registry.1  \nOPSI appreciates PJM’s expeditious work to develop IRAS and the constructive \nengagement from PJM’s stakeholders. OPSI is supportive of both identifying NLLs that have not \nbrought capacity to meet their needs in an NLL registry and the need to send a wholesale \ncurtailment signal, equivalent to the NLL quantity that does not have associated capacity, prior to \nentering into pre-emergency procedures. However, the Commission should not accept PJM’s \nproposed compensation mechanism, without further clarification. Should the issues raised below \npersist following this clarification, the Commission should sever it and find the proposed \ncompensation rate and mechanism to be unjust and unreasonable, while allowing all of the other \ncomponents of PJM’s proposal to go into effect as requested.2  \n1 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Proposal to Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load Registry \nto Address System Reliability, Docket No. ER26-3515-000 (Aug. 13, 2026) (“IRAS Filing”). \n2 The following OPSI members support these comments: the Delaware Public Service Commission, Public Service \nCommission of the District of Columbia, Illinois Commerce Commission, Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, \nMaryland Public Service Commission, Michigan Public Service Commission, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, \nNorth Carolina Utilities Commission, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Tennessee Public Utility Commission, \nand Public Service Commission of West Virginia. The Kentucky Public Service Commission, Public Utilities \nCommission of Ohio, and Virginia State Corporation Commission abstained."},{"page":2,"startToken":318,"endToken":601,"text":"2 \n \nI. \nCOMMENTS \nRecognizing the 2027/2028 Base Residual Auction (“BRA”) cleared short of the PJM \nRegion Reliability Requirement, PJM now proposes several measures intended to improve \nregional resource adequacy, including the creation and maintenance of an NLL Registry, \nestablishment of IRAS, requiring new large loads to Bring Your Own New Capacity (“BYONC”) \nto avoid IRAS, and excluding NLL without an associated capacity commitment from the variable \nresource curve in future auctions.3 \nAs proposed, IRAS would only apply “in Delivery Years when the amount of Capacity \nResources committed falls short of the PJM Region Reliability Requirement.”4 These shortfalls \nare directly correlated to when NLL enters the market without bringing on associated capacity.5 \nBy establishing IRAS, PJM is providing a path to accommodate the interconnection of these new \nlarge loads when insufficient capacity is procured and available to reliably serve the system while \nalso limiting cost shifting to legacy ratepayers as described in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.6 \nCompensating them further is not just and reasonable. \nA. \nOPSI SUPPORTS THE BYONC INCENTIVE, BUT PJM SHOULD \nFURTHER EXPLAIN WHETHER IT IS EXPECTED TO EXACERBATE \nVOLATILITY OF SUPPLY \nPJM defines BYONC as “megawatts of Unforced Capacity” associated with qualifying \nnew resources, including new-build generation, incremental capacity from uprates or Surplus \nInterconnection Service, certain repowered generation, and incremental capacity resulting from a \nchange to a more efficient fuel type.7 The new capacity requirement is a critical component of \n \n3 IRAS Filing at 21–23. \n4 Id. at 39. \n5 Id. \n6 See The White House, Ratepayer Protection Pledge (Mar. 4, 2026), available at \nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ ratepayer-protection-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/N8PH-K82T]. \n7 IRAS Filing, Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4 § VI."},{"page":3,"startToken":601,"endToken":911,"text":"3 \n \nPJM’s filing. One of the very purposes of IRAS is “for New Large Loads to bring new capacity to \naddress their capacity needs instead of relying on PJM’s capacity market” and eliminate resource \nadequacy shortfalls.8 OPSI is supportive of the primary objectives of this proposal. \nHowever, OPSI notes that the availability of IRAS in some delivery years but not others, \nalong with the associated BYONC requirements, is complex and could introduce volatility into \nPJM’s capacity construct. For example, BYONC resources may disappear after they are no longer \nrequired to contribute capacity value in a period of capacity shortfall when IRAS is available, but \ncontribute to future scarcity conditions by not being obligated to be a part of the capacity construct. \nPJM should explain the potential interaction and impacts between scarcity and non-scarcity \nperiods, how its proposal promotes stability, and address any impacts that may increase long term \ninstability to the capacity market caused by entering and exiting periods of scarcity. \nB. \nOPSI SUPPORTS CURTAILING NEW LARGE LOADS WITHOUT \nSUFFICIENT CAPACITY BEFORE PRE-EMERGENCY LOAD \nMANAGEMENT \nOPSI has supported the proposed curtailment priority throughout the Critical Issue Fast \nPath (“CIFP”) process this year. In March, OPSI wrote, “NLLs that fail to procure sufficient new \ncapacity either bilaterally or through the [Reliability Backstop Procurement (“RBP”)] should be \nsubject to a … framework under which PJM directs [Electric Distribution Companies (“EDCs”)] \nto curtail their load before emergency operations, with states responsible for implementing the \ncurtailment prioritization. NLLs that come online before their paired capacity should also be \nsubject to [this] framework until their paired capacity comes online.”9 However, towards the end \nof the CIFP process this summer, PJM proposed no mandatory curtailment of new large loads in \n \n8 Id. at 80. \n9 OPSI, OPSI Board Feedback to PJM (March 2026) available at: https://opsi.us/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/OPSI-\nRBP-Feedback.pdf."},{"page":4,"startToken":911,"endToken":1238,"text":"4 \n \nlieu of simply providing a registry for states to implement these curtailments at the retail level.10  \nOPSI pushed back on PJM’s recommendation at that time to not include any type of \nregional curtailment response, writing, “Because PJM’s updated proposal declines to address the \nregion’s current resource adequacy challenges at the regional level, by fairly identifying the \namount and location of curtailments across the region, electric customers in the PJM region lose \nthe very efficiencies they rely on PJM to provide. More importantly, the proposal functionally \neliminates the incentive for NLL to bring new capacity.”11 \nPJM now proposes to implement an IRAS Action before calling on Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement when available economic real-time supply may be insufficient to maintain required \nreserves or applicable reliability limits and prevent cascading outages.12 Under this sequencing, \nNLLs that have not brought sufficient new capacity may be required to reduce load before PJM \nturns to existing Pre-Emergency Load Management resources.13 OPSI supports this curtailment \npriority.  \nCalling on IRAS first appropriately places the initial operational consequences of a \ncapacity shortfall on the amount of demand associated with NLLs that entered the system without \nsufficient new capacity, with an eye towards protecting existing customers and preserving demand \nresponse resources. It also reduces the likelihood that NLL-driven resource adequacy shortfalls \nwill unnecessarily trigger scarcity conditions, which inflated escalates energy prices that all loads \nmust pay.  \nOPSI expects some parties to argue that NLLs should receive the same firm-service as \n \n10 PJM, PJM Connect and Manage CIFP Proposal Stage 4 (June 23, 2026) available at: https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260630/20260630-item-02a---pjm-stage-4-proposal---connect-\nand-manage---executive-summary.pdf. \n11 OPSI, Statement of OPSI to the PJM Board of Managers at the June 30, 2026, Critical Issue Fast Path Meeting \n(June 30, 2026) available at: https://opsi.us/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/OPSI-RBP-CM-Verbal-Remarks.pdf. \n12 IRAS Filing at 75; Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4 § I(b). \n13 Id. at 94–97."},{"page":5,"startToken":1238,"endToken":1535,"text":"5 \n \nother customers and should be permitted to rely on PJM’s capacity market to procure the capacity \nneeded to serve them. But where an NLL has entered the system without bringing sufficient new \ncapacity, delaying its curtailment until after PJM has called on existing Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement resources would shift the consequences of that shortfall onto customers and resources \nthat did not cause it. That outcome would undermine the basic purpose of IRAS. Further, given \nthe magnitude and rapid addition of NLLs, OPSI agrees with PJM’s argument that NLLs should \nbe treated differently. This differential treatment should reasonably include less firm service. \nThe scale and speed of NLL additions make this prioritization particularly important. PJM \nhas now experienced consecutive capacity auction shortfalls while adding unprecedented levels of \nlargely flat, high-usage load. In these circumstances, existing customers should not bear the first \noperational consequences of capacity shortages associated with NLLs that have not brought \nsufficient new capacity. The challenges associated with the rapid influx of NLLs are not temporary, \nand PJM should preserve a regional mechanism that places curtailment responsibility where the \nassociated resource adequacy risk originates. \nC. \nOPSI SUPPORTS EXCLUDING NEW LARGE LOADS WITHOUT \nBYONC FROM THE VRR CURVE UNTIL THEY BRING THEIR OWN \nCAPACITY \nBeginning with the 2029/2030 BRA, PJM proposes to exclude NLLs without sufficient \nBYONC or Allocated RBP Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW from the Variable Resource \nRequirement (“VRR”) Curve.14 PJM will start with all NLL in the relevant Delivery Year forecast \nand subtract the NLL included in the 2028/2029 forecast, leaving only incremental NLL. PJM will \nthen subtract the incremental NLL supported by BYONC or Allocated RBP UCAP MW and \nconvert the remainder to UCAP using the Forecast Pool Requirement for the RTO or the estimated \n \n14 Id. at 109–10."},{"page":6,"startToken":1535,"endToken":1822,"text":"6 \n \nimport-impact factor for a Locational Deliverability Area (“LDA”).15 The resulting “Excluded” \nNLL Amount is removed from the applicable RTO or LDA VRR Curve beginning with the \n2029/2030 Delivery Year.16 Subsequently, PJM will reduce the quantity position of Points A, B, \nand C on the VRR curve by the applicable excluded NLL amount, thereby removing that load from \nthe capacity demand curve for the relevant BRA.17 PJM will add an excluded NLL back to the \nVRR Curve in the same RPM Auction in which its associated BYONC or Allocated RBP UCAP \nMW enters the supply curve, thereby matching the additional demand with commensurate \ncapacity.18 \nOPSI supports this component of PJM’s proposal. NLLs entering the system without \nsufficient new capacity should not be permitted to increase capacity-market demand and rely on \nPJM’s existing capacity supply to satisfy that incremental requirement. PJM’s proposal \nappropriately places an ongoing obligation on these loads to secure the new capacity necessary to \nsupport their entry into the system. Only when an NLL obtains BYONC or Allocated RBP UCAP \nMW would its demand be added back to the VRR Curve, with the associated new capacity entering \nthe market at the same time.19 This approach preserves the fundamental incentive underlying \nPJM’s proposal. NLLs should “build, bring, or buy” the capacity needed to serve their incremental \ndemand rather than shifting that responsibility and the resulting impact on capacity costs to \nexisting customers.20  \n \n15 Id. at 112–14. \n16 Id. Proposed Tariff, Definitions—Excluded RTO New Large Load Amounts and Excluded LDA New Large Load \nAmounts. \n17 IRAS Filing at 117–18. \n18 Id. at 115–16. \n19 Id. at 111, 115–16. \n20 Id. at 110–11 & n.294."},{"page":7,"startToken":1822,"endToken":2149,"text":"7 \n \nD. \nOPSI SUPPORTS THE LARGE LOAD REGISTRY TO INFORM RETAIL \nCURTAILMENT AND COST ALLOCATION \nOPSI supports PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry because it will provide states and \nElectric Distributors with the information needed to design and administer retail curtailment and \ncost-allocation mechanisms for NLLs. The Registry will include information such as location, in-\nservice date, peak load, backup generation, peak-shaving adjustments, BYONC, and other relevant \ncharacteristics, and PJM will use that information to identify and allocate IRAS obligations by \nzone/area.21 PJM also recognizes that this information will “give Electric Distributors and state \nentities access to critical information they may elect to rely upon when fashioning such load \nreduction protocols.”22 OPSI supports appropriate confidentiality protections,23 but states must \nhave meaningful access to the Registry so they can determine how curtailment should be \nimplemented at the retail level and how resulting costs or responsibilities should be allocated \nconsistent with state law and policy. \nII. \nPJM SHOULD CLARIFY THE PROPOSED IRAS COMPENSATION RATE AND \nTHE MECHANISM USED TO DETERMINE IT \nThe framework PJM describes leaves considerable uncertainty as to the eventual wholesale \nrate that NLLs may be entitled to under this proposal and the authority of retail regulators to set \nthe IRAS compensation rate. PJM describes the IRAS framework as squarely within the \nCommission’s established transmission jurisdiction and proposes that “[t]he rate for the provision \nof Interim Resource Adequacy Service shall be 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate” unless \nan Eligible NLL elects to accept less in its retail rates or waive receipt in its retail rates.24 However, \n \n21 Id. at 5, 28, 37. \n22 Id. at 7. \n23 This is a key component. For example, Illinois law limits the Illinois Commerce Commission’s (“ICC”) access to \nconfidential data. It is important that PJM’s registry reflect the confidentiality limitation and still be usable for states \nsuch as Illinois or other similarly restricted states. \n24 IRAS Filing at 2. Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4 § X(a)."},{"page":8,"startToken":2149,"endToken":2480,"text":"8 \n \nit is not clear who has the ultimate authority to modify this rate if NLL and retail regulators \ndisagree. PJM states that should an Eligible NLL agree to either of these conditions in its retail \nrates then the wholesale rate for the provision of IRAS shall reflect the accepted sum.25 But PJM \nwrites in its transmittal letter that “[w]hether a specific New Large Load may be entitled to \ncompensation for provision of IRAS will be determined by state authorities under state law or \n[Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authorities] as may be applicable.”26  \nRequest for clarification \nPJM should clarify whether retail regulators can set the IRAS rate itself at retail or if they \nsimply have the ability to determine whether specific retail loads are entitled to \ncompensation, independent of the rate itself. \n \n \nFurther, PJM’s proposal does not compel states to do anything. PJM should clarify whether \nstate action or inaction, alone – independent of waiver or modification of the rate by the NLL, \ncould prevent an NLL from receiving compensation for providing wholesale Interim Resource \nAdequacy Service. PJM writes, “[I]f states decline to act and Eligible New Large Loads decline \nto initiate regulatory proceedings to recover through retail rates the wholesale IRAS rate, they \nwould effectively waive a right to compensation.”27 \nRequest for clarification \nPJM should clarify which determination it expects to control if an NLL initiates a regulatory \nproceeding to recover the wholesale IRAS rate, but the state either declines to act or approves \na compensation rate different from the amount agreed to by the Eligible NLL. \n \nRequest for clarification \nIf PJM’s proposal permits retail regulators to establish or modify the IRAS rate, PJM should \nconfirm that interpretation, describe where that is stated in its tariff language, and explain \nhow the Commission may accept a proposal that delegates to retail regulators the authority \nto set the rate for a wholesale service provided by a retail customer. \n \n \n25 Id. \n26 Id. at 106. \n27 Id. at 107."},{"page":9,"startToken":2480,"endToken":2779,"text":"9 \n \nIII. \nIF THE COMMISSION REACHES THE MERITS ON THE EXISTING \nRECORD, IT SHOULD SEVER THE COMPENSATION PROVISIONS AND \nFIND THEM TO BE UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE  \nPJM has not demonstrated that compensating Eligible NLLs at 50% of the Non-\nPerformance Charge Rate is just and reasonable. By PJM’s own account, rapid large-load growth \nhas outpaced new supply, tightened the capacity market, and produced resource-adequacy \nshortfalls.28 PJM attributes the current shortfall particularly to the “unprecedented surge in data \ncenter load” occurring faster than new supply can come online, placing regional resource adequacy \n“under significant stress.”29 IRAS nevertheless permits an NLL to obtain the “speed to power” it \ndesires – to connect even when sufficient new capacity is not yet available if it accepts possible \ncurtailment before PJM initiates Pre-Emergency Load Management procedures.30 That accelerated \naccess is the benefit the NLL receives in exchange for accepting reduced reliability. Existing \ncustomers should not be required to compensate the NLL when PJM exercises the very curtailment \ncondition that enabled the load to enter service before sufficient capacity became available. Indeed, \nPJM describes IRAS as a mechanism that “support[s] reliability while allowing New Large Loads \nto connect even when new capacity supply lags behind load growth” and describes demand-\nsupported capacity as providing a “bridge to power” until new generation comes online.31  \nFurther, PJM’s reliance on the compensation rate applicable to Pre-Emergency Load \nResponse does not justify a different result. That rate addresses customers that paid for capacity \nbut did not receive the load-response service for which they paid during stressed system \nconditions.32 IRAS presents the opposite cost-causation and benefits relationship. The eligible \n \n28 Id. at 13-14. \n29 Id. at 21. \n30 Id. at 14, 49–50, 105. \n31 Id. at 14, 57. \n32 IRAS Filing at 102–03."},{"page":10,"startToken":2779,"endToken":3044,"text":"10 \n \nNLL has not brought sufficient new capacity, its accelerated interconnection contributes to the \ncondition necessitating curtailment, and it receives the principal benefit of entering service before \nthe supporting capacity can come online. PJM offers no reason why customers that neither caused \nthat incremental capacity need nor received the benefit of accelerated interconnection should pay \nthe NLL to mitigate the reliability risk its uncovered entry created. Nor does PJM tie the proposed \n50% rate to the Eligible NLL’s incremental costs, demonstrated forgone value, or any other \nmeasure of the cost of providing IRAS. Most tellingly, PJM expressly provides that the wholesale \nIRAS rate may be reduced to zero and affirmatively represents that “[t]his is a just and reasonable \nrate.”33 PJM therefore concedes that no additional wholesale compensation is necessary to make \nIRAS just and reasonable, and should all the states set the IRAS rate at $0, agrees that this would \nbe a just and reasonable wholesale rate. The Commission should sever and reject proposed \nAttachment DD-4 § X and accept the remainder of PJM’s filing without the unsupported 50% \ncompensation mechanism if it reaches the merits on the existing record. \nIV. \nCONCLUSION  \nThe rapid influx of NLLs appearing in the PJM region presents a real threat to regional \nresource adequacy and reliability, and the status quo is not an option. OPSI appreciates PJM’s \nefforts to identify appropriate curtailment procedures and provide information to the states to better \ninform their retail decision-making. PJM should reexamine the curtailment compensation \nframework and provide clarification in this filing. \n \n \n \n33 Id. at 105; Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4 § X(a)."},{"page":11,"startToken":3044,"endToken":3099,"text":"11 \n \n \nRespectfully Submitted,  \nBenjamin B. Sloan \nExecutive Director  \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc.  \n700 Barksdale Road, Suite 1 \nNewark, DE 19711  \n601-214-8481  \nben@opsi.us  \nEllen B. Egen \nDirector of Legal and Regulatory Affairs  \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc.  \n700 Barksdale Road, Suite 1 \nNewark, DE 19711  \n336-254-4915 \nellen@opsi.us  \nDated: September 3, 2026"},{"page":12,"startToken":3099,"endToken":3171,"text":"12 \n \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n \nI hereby certify that the foregoing has been served in accordance with 18 C.F.R. §385.2010 \nupon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this \nproceeding.  \n \n \nDated at Newark, Delaware this September 3, 2026. \n \n \nEllen B. Egen \nDirector of Legal and Regulatory Affairs  \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc.  \n700 Barksdale Road, Suite 1 \nNewark, DE 19711  \n336-254-4915 \nellen@opsi.us"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":2,"endAt":5,"startToken":0,"endToken":319},{"p":2,"at":5,"title":"I. Comments","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":2,"endAt":1124,"startToken":319,"endToken":486},{"p":2,"at":1124,"title":"a. OPSI Supports the BYONC Incentive, but PJM Should Further explain whether it is expected to exacerbate volatility of supply","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":3,"endAt":1050,"startToken":486,"endToken":763},{"p":3,"at":1050,"title":"b. OPSI Supports Curtailing New Large Loads Without Sufficient Capacity Before Pre-Emergency Load Management","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":5,"endAt":1299,"startToken":763,"endToken":1424},{"p":5,"at":1299,"title":"c. OPSI Supports Excluding New Large Loads Without BYONC from the VRR Curve Until They Bring Their Own Capacity","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":7,"endAt":5,"startToken":1424,"endToken":1823},{"p":7,"at":5,"title":"d. OPSI Supports the Large Load Registry to Inform Retail Curtailment and Cost Allocation","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":7,"endAt":1089,"startToken":1823,"endToken":1978},{"p":7,"at":1089,"title":"II. PJM should clarify the proposed IRAS compensation rate and the mechanism used to determine it","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":9,"endAt":5,"startToken":1978,"endToken":2481},{"p":9,"at":5,"title":"III. If the Commission reaches the merits on the existing record, it should sever the compensation provisions and find them to be unjust and unreasonable","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":10,"endAt":1244,"startToken":2481,"endToken":2970},{"p":10,"at":1244,"title":"IV. Conclusion","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":10,"endAt":1249,"startToken":2970,"endToken":2971},{"p":10,"at":1249,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":12,"endAt":6,"startToken":2971,"endToken":3100},{"p":12,"at":6,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":12,"endAt":457,"startToken":3100,"endToken":3171}]}