{"document":{"slug":"protest-er27-25-acp-srea","title":"Protest and Request for Clarification of the American Clean Power Association and Southern Renewable Energy Association","issued":"2026-10-23","accession":"20261023-5176","docket":"ER27-25-000","group":"MISO Large Load Addition Resource Study (LARS)","filer":"ACP and SREA","kind":"protest and request for clarification","file":"sources/originals/20261023-5176_ACP_Protest_MISO_LARS_ER27-25_CLEAN_10.23.2026.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_number=20261023-5176","sha256":"152c9efc4f1d75bed3c1a2287e1105cb37861f4e4cdb827be183379fedf799ae","pages":32,"tokens":9632,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":300,"text":"1 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \nMidcontinent Independent System \n) \n \nOperator, Inc. \n) \nDocket No. ER27-25-000 \n \n) \n \nPROTEST AND REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE \nAMERICAN CLEAN POWER ASSOCIATION AND  \nSOUTHERN RENEWABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION \n \nPursuant to Rules 211 and 212 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s \n(“Commission”) Rules of Practice and Procedure,1 the American Clean Power Association \n(“ACP”) and Southern Renewable Energy Association (“SREA”) (together, “Clean Energy \nTrades”) submit this protest and request for clarification regarding the Large Load Addition \nResource Study (“LARS”) proposal filed by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. \n(“MISO”) on October 2, 2026 (“Filing”).2 \nACP is the leading national trade association representing companies across the clean \npower industry, including developers, owners, and operators of wind, solar, and energy storage \nfacilities, many of which hold or are pursuing generator interconnection requests in MISO’s \nDefinitive Planning Phase (“DPP”) queue. SREA is a non-profit regional trade association that \nworks to promote the responsible development and use of utility-scale wind energy, solar energy, \nenergy storage, and transmission solutions throughout the South. The Clean Energy Trades’ \n \n1  \n18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211, 385.212. \n2  \nMidcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Large Load Addition Resource Study Process, Docket No. \nER27-25-000 (Oct. 2, 2026) (“Transmittal Letter”). The Filing includes redlined Tariff sheets (Tab A) and \nthe Prepared Direct Testimony of Christina Drake (Tab C) (“Drake Testimony”). Capitalized terms not \notherwise defined herein have the meanings given in the Transmittal Letter or the MISO Tariff. ACP and \nSREA previously submitted to the Commission timely doc-less motions to intervene on October 21,2026 and \nOctober 7, 2026, respectively. See Doc-Less Motion to Intervene of the American Clean Power Association, \nDocket No. ER27-25-000 (Oct. 21, 2026); Doc-Less Motion to Intervene of the Southern Renewable Energy \nAssociation, Docket No. ER27-25-000 (Oct. 7, 2026)."},{"page":2,"startToken":300,"endToken":611,"text":"2 \nmembers include independent power producers (“IPPs”) that develop generation to serve large \nloads and that would be directly affected by both the access rules LARS establishes and the effect \nof LARS on the transmission capacity and Network Upgrade costs available to projects in the DPP. \nMISO describes LARS as a proposal that “leverages the existing success in the MISO’s \nExpedited Project Review (‘EPR’) process on the load side and lessons learned from Expedited \nResource Additions Study (‘ERAS’) process on the generation side.”3 The structure of LARS is \nindeed similar to that of ERAS and it raises the same open access, undue discrimination, and queue \nintegrity concerns that the Clean Energy Trades raised in the ERAS proceedings, which remain \npending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.4 But LARS goes \nfurther than ERAS in ways the Commission has never accepted. It is permanent and uncapped. It \nis untethered to any identified resource adequacy need. It hands the application and the pairing \ndecision to the load-serving entity (“LSE”) rather than to MISO. And it is not what the \nCommission’s Show Cause Order described. Most fundamentally, LARS unduly discriminates \nagainst IPPs by failing to provide comparable access to a Commission-jurisdictional generator \ninterconnection process. LARS is also an attempt to convert what was a temporary, extraordinary \nmeasure into a permanent feature of MISO’s operations. Further, MISO fails to justify LARS as \nan independent entity variation from the Commission’s pro forma Large Generator \nInterconnection Procedures (“LGIP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Commission should \nreject the Filing. \n \n3  \nTransmittal Letter at 2. \n4  \nSee Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2025) (“ERAS Acceptance Order”), order \naddressing arguments raised on reh’g, 194 FERC ¶ 61,050, at P 1 & n.4 (2026) (“ERAS Rehearing Order”) \n(noting rehearing request of the Clean Energy Associations, including ACP)."},{"page":3,"startToken":611,"endToken":908,"text":"3 \nI. \nBACKGROUND \nA. MISO’s Initial and Revised ERAS Proposals \nOn May 16, 2025, the Commission rejected MISO’s initial ERAS proposal, finding that \nMISO had “not demonstrated that its ERAS proposal is a just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential approach for addressing MISO’s stated resource adequacy and \nreliability needs.”5 The Commission identified two defects. First, the proposed Tariff placed “no \nlimit on the number of projects that could be entered in the ERAS process,” which could produce \nan ERAS queue with processing times “similar to the challenges with the current DPP queue” and \n“a volume of ERAS interconnection requests untethered to reliability or resource adequacy \nneeds.”6 Second, MISO had not shown “how the ERAS process is sufficiently targeted to study \nonly interconnection requests needed to meet the anticipated shortfall in generating capacity \ndescribed by MISO.”7 Commissioners Rosner and See each concurred separately.8 \nMISO refiled a revised ERAS proposal that the Commission accepted on July 21, 2025. \nThe accepted ERAS process is capped at 68 interconnection requests, with ten reserved for IPPs \nthat have agreements with entities other than LSEs and eight reserved for requests serving retail-\nchoice load; it requires verification by a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (“RERRA”) \nof a specific resource adequacy need; and it sunsets on the earlier of August 31, 2027 or completion \nof the sixty-eighth study.9 The Commission explained that these changes “ensure the ERAS \nprocess is sufficiently limited in scope to swiftly address discrete, demonstrated resource adequacy \n \n5  \nMidcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,131, at P 197 (2025) (“ERAS Rejection Order”). \n6  \nId. P 199. \n7  \nId. P 201. \n8  \nId. (Rosner, Comm’r, concurring); id. (See, Comm’r, concurring). \n9  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at PP 16-17, 203."},{"page":4,"startToken":908,"endToken":1206,"text":"4 \nneeds in a narrowly tailored fashion, and on a temporary, time-limited basis,” and that “the limited, \none-time design of the process weighed significantly on our decision here.”10 MISO’s own witness \nin this proceeding describes ERAS as the “temporary Expedited Resource Addition Study \n(‘ERAS’) process.”11 \nB. The Show Cause Order \nOn June 18, 2026, the Commission instituted a proceeding under section 206 of the Federal \nPower Act (“FPA”) in Docket No. EL26-70-000.12 As relevant here, the Commission preliminarily \nfound that MISO’s Tariff “appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks a generator \ninterconnection study process and/or generator interconnection service to reflect an \ninterconnection customer’s commitment in an interconnection agreement to limit the generating \nfacility’s output to minimize the impact on the transmission system while serving an electrically \nproximate large load or large co-located load.”13 The Commission defined “electrically proximate \nlarge load” as a large load sufficiently close to the generator’s requested point of interconnection \n(“POI”) “such that the impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating \nfacility and the load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be \neffectively the same as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is located \nno more than two substations away from the generating facility).”14 The Commission further stated \nthat, where the generating facility serves an electrically proximate large load, “we believe that the \ngenerator interconnection service should be of an interim nature until the interconnection customer \n \n10  \nId. P 195; see also ERAS Rehearing Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,050 at P 12 (quoting same). \n11  \nDrake Testimony at 2. \n12  \nMidcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2026) (“Show Cause Order”). \n13  \nId. P 113. \n14  \nId. P 112."},{"page":5,"startToken":1206,"endToken":1491,"text":"5 \nobtains Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) or Network Resource Interconnection \nService (NRIS).”15 Separately, the Commission directed MISO to file an informational report on \nproposals under consideration to address resource adequacy for new large loads.16 \nC. The LARS Proposal \nMISO proposes LARS as a new, permanent study process under which a large load of at \nleast 200 megawatts (“MW”) and one or more new Generating Facilities are studied in parallel, \nwith the generator receiving a Large Load Generator Interconnection Agreement (“LLGIA”) for \nNRIS in approximately 120 days.17 MISO will run three LARS study periods per year, each with \nup to ten LARS Applications studied serially on a first-come, first-served basis.18 The LARS \nApplication may be initiated and submitted only by the “LARS Associated Transmission \nCustomer”—the entity that procures Transmission Service for the load, which MISO \nacknowledges “is often” an LSE.19 The LARS Associated Transmission Customer also pays the \n$250,000 non-refundable application deposit.20 A LARS Generating Facility need only be located \nin the same Local Resource Zone (“LRZ”) as the load, may request NRIS up to 150% of the load’s \npeak demand, and must remain paired with the load for fifteen years, after which its \nInterconnection Service continues regardless of whether the load remains.21 LARS studies will \n \n15  \nId. P 115. \n16  \nId. P 122. \n17  \nTransmittal Letter at 7, 11; Drake Testimony at 5, 28. \n18  \nTransmittal Letter at 9; Drake Testimony at 22; Tab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.3. \n19  \nTransmittal Letter at 6, 8; Tab A, Attachment X, §§ 1, 3.12.1. \n20  \nTransmittal Letter at 8. \n21  \nId. at 10, 16-18; Tab A, Attachment X, §§ 3.12.2, 3.12.7.4."},{"page":6,"startToken":1491,"endToken":1774,"text":"6 \nexclude DPP Interconnection Requests that lack an executed Generator Interconnection \nAgreement (“GIA”).22 \nII. \nPROTEST \nBecause MISO filed LARS under FPA section 205, MISO bears the burden of \ndemonstrating that its proposal is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or \npreferential.23 MISO has not carried that burden. LARS is unduly discriminatory because it makes \nthe LSE the gatekeeper of a Commission-jurisdictional generator interconnection process and \ngives LSEs contracting options that IPPs do not have. It is also unjust and unreasonable on its own \nterms.  It is a permanent, uncapped priority queue untethered to any demonstrated need, it does not \nreflect the electrically proximate configuration the Show Cause Order described, and it shifts \ntransmission capacity and costs away from DPP customers.  These are the same defects the \nCommission identified when it rejected MISO’s initial ERAS proposal. Finally, MISO has not \nshown that LARS satisfies the independent entity variation standard. \nA. LARS Would Unduly Discriminate Against Independent Power Producers and \nCreate Opportunities for LSE Self-Dealing. \ni. Open access requires that all interconnection customers have comparable \naccess to Commission-jurisdictional interconnection service. \nThe Commission’s open access framework rests on the premise that a transmission \nprovider must offer service to third parties on the same or comparable basis that it provides service \nto itself. In Order No. 888, the Commission required “that all public utilities must offer . . . services \non a non-discriminatory open access basis” and explained that “[a]n open access tariff that is not \nunduly discriminatory or anticompetitive should offer third parties access on the same or \n \n22  \nTransmittal Letter at 12; Drake Testimony at 14, 28-29. \n23  \n16 U.S.C. § 824d; see ERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 197."},{"page":7,"startToken":1774,"endToken":2203,"text":"7 \ncomparable basis, and under the same or comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission \nprovider’s uses of the system.”24 The Commission adopted that rule because it found that \ntransmission owners with generation interests have the incentive to use their control of the grid to \nfavor their own resources.25 \nIn Order No. 2003, the Commission extended those requirements to generator \ninterconnection, recognizing that interconnection is a “critical component of open access \ntransmission service and thus is subject to the requirement that utilities offer comparable service \nunder the [pro forma open access transmission tariff].”26 The Commission adopted standard \nprocedures to “minimize opportunities for undue discrimination and expedite the development of \nnew generation, while protecting reliability and ensuring that rates are just and reasonable.”27 \nCentral to that framework is a single, non-discriminatory generator interconnection queue \nadministered by the transmission provider, to which any interconnection customer may submit a \nrequest on equal terms. The Commission has consistently found the comparable ability of all \n \n24  \nPromoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Servs. by Pub. \nUtils.; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Pub. Utils. & Transmitting Utils., Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. \n¶ 31,036, at 31,647 (1996) (cross-referenced at 75 FERC ¶ 61,080) (“Order No. 888”), order on reh’g, Order \nNo. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), \norder on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission \nAccess Pol’y Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 \nU.S. 1 (2002); see also ERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 193 & n.483. \n25  \nSee Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,682 (“It is in the economic self-interest of \ntransmission monopolies, particularly those with high-cost generation assets, to deny transmission or to offer \ntransmission on a basis that is inferior to that which they provide themselves.”).  \n26  \nStandardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procs., Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, \nat PP 9, 12 (2003) (“Order No. 2003”), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-A, 106 FERC ¶ 61,220, order on \nreh’g, Order No. 2003-B, 109 FERC ¶ 61,287 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-C, 111 FERC ¶ 61,401 \n(2005), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 194. \n27  \nOrder No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 11."},{"page":8,"startToken":2203,"endToken":2537,"text":"8 \ngenerator interconnection customers to submit an interconnection request to be a critical element \nof a just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory process.28 \nPriority interconnection processes are, by their nature, in tension with these principles. As \nCommissioner See explained in concurring in the rejection of MISO’s initial ERAS proposal, \n“where a proposal’s goal is to get some interconnection requests through the study process faster \nthan others, the Commission is by definition asked to greenlight discrimination,” and “[t]o justify \nthat step under our statutory mandate, priority processes should be tailored enough to accomplish \nthe identified ends.”29 The Commission likewise held that MISO “must ensure that this proposal \nis aligned with the Commission’s open access principles in an objective and transparent manner \nin order to meet the FPA’s requirements that rates be just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential.”30 LARS does not meet that standard. \nii. LARS makes the LSE the gatekeeper of a Commission-jurisdictional generator \ninterconnection process. \nUnlike any generator interconnection process the Commission has accepted, an \ninterconnection customer seeking LARS treatment cannot submit its request to MISO. Under \nproposed Section 3.12.1, “[t]he LARS Associated Transmission Customer initiates the submission \nof the LARS Application for the proposed load and associated generation,” and MISO confirms \nthat the LARS Associated Transmission Customer “is the only party that may submit the LARS \n \n28  \nSee ERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 204 & n.510 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 \nFERC ¶ 61,084, at P 123 (2025) (“PJM RRI Order”) (comparable ability to submit an interconnection \nrequest); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 188 FERC ¶ 61,225, at P 94 (2024) (“CAISO IPE Order”) \n(comparable ability to join the cluster)); Protest of the Clean Energy Associations, Docket No. ER25-1674-\n000, at 43 (Apr. 7, 2025) (“CEA Protest”). \n29  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (See, Comm’r, concurring at P 2) (citing PJM RRI Order, 190 \nFERC ¶ 61,084 at P 248). \n30  \nId. P 203."},{"page":9,"startToken":2537,"endToken":2880,"text":"9 \nApplication.”31 In practice, the LARS Associated Transmission Customer will be the LSE that \nprocures transmission service on behalf of the large load (hereinafter, the “LSE”). The LSE pays \nthe non-refundable application deposit, designates which load is “formally paired” with which \nInterconnection Request, and decides whether any application is submitted at all.32 MISO states \nthat allowing the generator and load to contract directly “does not supersede the role of the LARS \nAssociated Transmission Customer to determine whether to submit a LARS Application.”33 The \nPOI, in turn, must be negotiated by the Interconnection Customer with and attested to by the \nTransmission Owner before the application may be filed.34 Because MISO is primarily a vertically \nintegrated region, in which the LSE and the Transmission Owner are frequently the same utility \nor affiliates, the LSE thus controls the generator-side application process entirely. \nEven an IPP with a direct offtake agreement with the large load must be sponsored by the \nLSE’s application; there is no path for an IPP to deal directly with MISO for purposes of accessing \nthe generator interconnection queue. And in most MISO states, retail service laws prohibit an IPP \nfrom contracting to serve the load directly—a point MISO itself acknowledges by adding Tariff \nlanguage providing that LARS does not authorize a generator that is not an LSE to serve load \nwhere state law does not allow it.35 In those states, the IPP’s only possible counterparty is the same \nutility that controls the application and that may compete to self-build the generation. To be clear, \nthe Clean Energy Trades’ concern is with ensuring that access to a Commission-jurisdictional \ngenerator interconnection process is not unduly discriminatory, consistent with the Commission’s \n \n31  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.1; Transmittal Letter at 8; see also Drake Testimony at 18. \n32  \nTransmittal Letter at 8-9; Tab A, Attachment X, § 1 (definition of LARS Associated Transmission Customer). \n33  \nTransmittal Letter at 9. \n34  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.1. \n35  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2; Transmittal Letter at 30."},{"page":10,"startToken":2880,"endToken":3211,"text":"10 \nopen access principles. The Clean Energy Trades fully acknowledge that certain state laws in \nMISO restrict third-party competitive generation from serving retail load and the Clean Energy \nTrades do not seek to change those laws or to expand retail competition through this proceeding. \nThe Commission has recognized that utilities with generation interests have the incentive \nto discriminate when given the opportunity. Indeed, that is the premise of Order Nos. 888 and \n2003, and of the independent entity variation itself.36 The concern is particularly acute in MISO, \nwhich, as Commissioner See observed, “is largely comprised of vertically integrated States.” \nIllinois and part of Michigan are the only retail choice jurisdictions in MISO.37 The Commission \naddressed this very risk in ERAS, where MISO reserved ten slots for IPPs with agreements with \nentities other than LSEs specifically “to address claims that LSEs could block independent power \nproducers from participating in the ERAS process,” and eight slots for retail-choice load.38 The \nCommission relied on those carve-outs to find that “all interconnection customers will have \ncomparable ability to seek to participate in the ERAS process, regardless of location and ownership \ntype.”39 ERAS also required a RERRA to verify the need for each project, including LSE self-\nsupply projects.40 LARS has no carve-out, no RERRA or other regulatory check, and no scoring \ncriteria. \nWhile it is reasonable for LSEs to initiate and oversee LARS requests on the load side, \ngiven state jurisdiction over retail service and LSEs’ obligations to serve load, that logic does not \n \n36  \nSee Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,682; Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 827. \n37  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (See, Comm’r, concurring at P 4 & n.6); see also id. (Rosner, \nComm’r, concurring at P 5) (“[I]n MISO, . . . most states are vertically integrated.”).  \n 38  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at PP 203-205. \n39  \nId. P 204. \n40  \nId. PP 198-201, 207."},{"page":11,"startToken":3211,"endToken":3532,"text":"11 \nextend to the generation side, where generator interconnection procedures fall within the \nCommission’s exclusive jurisdiction and are subject to open access requirements.41 Nothing \nprevents MISO from allowing an interconnection customer to initiate the generator portion of a \nLARS Application directly with MISO, with an obligation on the LSE and Transmission Owner \nto respond. Stakeholders asked MISO to do exactly that and MISO declined without explanation.42 \nAllowing incumbent LSEs to gain complete control of the entry point to a new, expedited generator \ninterconnection process is inconsistent with the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over \ngenerator interconnection and with its open access rules. \niii. LARS does not offer interconnection service on a comparable and non-\ndiscriminatory basis to similarly situated interconnection customers. \nThe designation of the LSE as the sole entity that may submit an application is not the only \nobstacle to open access. LARS’ eligibility requirements also discriminate against third-party \ncompetitive generation. Every LARS application requires an executed, binding agreement between \nthe Interconnection Customer and either the LSE or the entity that owns or controls the load.43 \nEven in the hypothetical scenario in which an LSE agrees to incorporate a third party’s \nInterconnection Request into its LARS application, the third party must produce either a power \npurchase agreement (“PPA”) or similar offtake agreement with the load, or a Build-Own-Transfer \n \n41  \nSee Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 110 (“The Commission also has exclusive jurisdiction to \nregulate the procedures and agreements applicable to generating facilities seeking to interconnect to a \nCommission-jurisdictional distribution facility or transmission facility.” . . . “[T]he Commission retains \njurisdiction over a generator’s interconnection even where the generator plans to serve an electrically \nproximate large load.”). \n42  \nSee American Clean Power Association Comments on Generation and Large Load Alignment, MISO Large \nLoad Working Group (July 30, 2026), available at: LLWG: Generation and Large Load Alignment (LLWG-\n2026-6) (20260716).  \n43  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2(i)."},{"page":12,"startToken":3532,"endToken":3841,"text":"12 \nagreement transferring the facility to the LSE or load.44 An LSE, however, may instead rely on \n“evidence of other types of agreements that provide that the generation is intended to serve the \nLARS Associated Load customer,” including “a special contract, a large load tariff agreement, or \nretail service agreement.”45 MISO’s witness explains that this third option was added specifically \nto accommodate “specific utility arrangements with large loads where the LSE business model \nuses one or more agreements that are not traditional PPAs.”46 LSEs are thus afforded far more \nflexible means of qualifying than are IPPs. \nComparable flexibility for third parties is necessary both to avoid undue discrimination and \nto provide commercially viable options. Requiring an executed PPA as a condition of entry into \nan interconnection process is inconsistent with the project development life cycle. In Order No. \n2023, the Commission declined to adopt the non-financial commercial readiness demonstrations \nproposed in the NOPR—which included executed contracts—recognizing that such \ndemonstrations “may be unavailable to interconnection customers with commercially viable \nprojects,” for example “as a result of a misalignment of the timing between resource procurement \ndecisions and interconnection study processes.”47 Network Upgrade costs were not known at the \ntime of an ERAS application and they will not be known at the time of a LARS application; an \nIPP must commit to binding offtake terms without knowing its interconnection costs, while the \nLSE may rely on a retail tariff arrangement whose costs can be passed through to ratepayers. \n \n44  \nId. § 3.12.2(i)(a)-(b). \n45  \nId. § 3.12.2(i)(c). \n46  \nDrake Testimony at 31-32; see also Transmittal Letter at 9. \n47  \nImprovements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054, at \nPP 694-695 (2023) (“Order No. 2023”), order on reh’g, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2024)."},{"page":13,"startToken":3841,"endToken":4183,"text":"13 \nThe Clean Energy Trades recognize that, in ERAS, the Commission found that a similar \ndistinction between IPP agreement options and LSE self-supply did not render the proposal unjust \nand unreasonable.48 But the Commission reached that conclusion because LSE self-supply under \nERAS “must still be verified by a RERRA,” because ERAS reserved slots for IPPs with non-LSE \nagreements, and because the process was limited in duration and size.49 None of those safeguards \nexists in LARS. The ERAS agreement requirement was also more flexible for IPPs than the LARS \nrequirement. Under ERAS, any interconnection customer—including an IPP—could satisfy the \nrequirement through an “other” executed agreement, an option MISO added to establish “a \nminimum requirement that an arrangement exists between the driver of the need and the project to \naddress that need,” and which the Commission found “provides considerable flexibility for \ninterconnection customers, including independent power producers.”50 LARS includes a similar \ncatch-all—“other types of agreements that provide that the generation is intended to serve the \nLARS Associated Load customer”—but makes it available only to LSEs and Alternative Retail \nElectric Suppliers.51 That IPPs were able to participate in ERAS therefore says little about whether \nthey can do so on comparable terms under LARS. \nThe practical result of these restrictions on open access will be (1) a reduction in the pool \nof supply options with timely GIAs available to large load offtakers and for state consideration in \ncompetitive solicitation processes; (2) the ability of LSE self-supply to drive the cost of new \ngeneration serving large loads; and (3) the general elimination of visibility into the pricing of \n \n48  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 207. \n49  \nId. PP 195, 203-207. \n50  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 208 & n.520 (quoting Witmeier Testimony at 42). \n51  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2(i)(c); see Drake Testimony at 31 (describing option (c) as establishing “a \nminimum requirement that an arrangement exists between the LARS Associated Transmission Customer and \nthe Interconnection Customer”)."},{"page":14,"startToken":4183,"endToken":4470,"text":"14 \nalternative generation that could have obtained timely GIAs on comparable terms. MISO’s \nassurance that LARS is “open to all Interconnection Customers that meet the Tariff’s \nrequirements” does not answer these concerns, because the Tariff’s requirements themselves are \nwhat deny comparable access.52 \nB. LARS Is Not Just and Reasonable. \ni. LARS is a permanent, uncapped expedited queue untethered to any identified \nneed, unlike every expedited interconnection process the Commission has \naccepted. \nThe Show Cause Order did not direct MISO to create a separate, permanent, expedited \ngenerator interconnection queue. The Commission expressed concern about the absence of “a \ngenerator interconnection study process and/or generator interconnection service” reflecting a \ngenerator’s commitment to limit its output while serving an electrically proximate large load.53 \nThe Commission did not require that such a process operate outside of, or ahead of, the DPP, and \nit stated that service to a generator serving an electrically proximate large load “should be of an \ninterim nature until the interconnection customer obtains [ERIS] or [NRIS].”54 LARS does the \nopposite: it grants permanent NRIS through a parallel process that MISO describes as “a \npermanent MISO study process.”55 Moreover, the Filing makes clear that even where the paired \nLARS Associated Load ceases taking service, or the agreement pairing the generator and the load \nterminates, during the fifteen-year pairing period, the LARS generator may continue to operate \nunder its LLGIA—subject to MISO’s Annual ERIS and Quarterly Operating Limit processes—\n \n52  \nTransmittal Letter at 52; see also Drake Testimony at 18-19 (asserting that LARS requirements are “facially \nneutral”). \n53  \nShow Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 113. \n54  \nId. P 115. \n55  \nTransmittal Letter at 11; see also Drake Testimony at 10-12, 28."},{"page":15,"startToken":4470,"endToken":4832,"text":"15 \nnot only for a one-year transition period, but for as long as DPP processing of its new \nInterconnection Request is delayed beyond that year.56 In effect, this work-around creates an \nexclusive pathway for LSE-selected generators to leverage their access to LARS to obtain \nexpedited interconnection that persists even after the paired load is gone, undermining the very \nbasis for granting those generators priority access in the first place. \nNor did the Show Cause Order’s invitation for resource adequacy proposals relax the FPA \nsection 205 standard. The Commission directed MISO to report on proposals under consideration \nto address resource adequacy for new large loads and “strongly encourage[d] new proposals to the \nextent necessary to address these concerns.”57 An invitation to propose solutions is not a pre-\napproval of whatever MISO proposes and it does not displace the Commission’s consistent \nrequirement that priority interconnection processes be bounded and tailored to an identified need. \nEvery expedited interconnection process the Commission has accepted has been bounded. \nIn PJM’s Reliability Resource Initiative (“RRI”), PJM specified that it would study no more than \n50 projects on a one-time basis, “providing clear bounds in its tariff.”58 The revised MISO ERAS \nprocess is capped at 68 requests and sunsets no later than August 31, 2027—limits that remained \nin place even when the Commission later accepted an increase in the number of requests MISO \nmay study each quarter.59 SPP’s ERAS was a one-time process that limited the capacity that may \nparticipate through a formula tied to each participating load-responsible entity’s resource adequacy \n \n56  \nTransmittal Letter at 16-18, 41-42; Tab A, Attachment X, Appendix 6, art. 2.3.1; Drake Testimony at 36-37. \n57  \nShow Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 122. \n58  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 200 (citing PJM RRI Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 at P 242). \n59  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at PP 17, 203, 264; see Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, \nInc., 193 FERC ¶ 61,168, at P 1 (2025) (accepting increase in quarterly ERAS study limit from 10 to 15 \nrequests); ERAS Rehearing Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,050 at P 45."},{"page":16,"startToken":4832,"endToken":5159,"text":"16 \ndeficiency.60 SPP’s High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment (“HILLGA”)—the model \nthe Show Cause Order itself discussed—is an “interim” service that the Commission accepted as \n“a flexible, expedited, and separate serial interconnection process that will facilitate the prompt \ninterconnection of generating facilities that are limited to serving a [High Impact Large Load \n(“HILL”)] in the same local area.”61 HILLGA interconnection agreements automatically terminate \nfive years after commercial operation, so that generators using the process must ultimately obtain \ncontinued service through SPP’s standard generator interconnection queue.62 In accepting MISO’s \nrevised ERAS proposal, the Commission emphasized that “the limited, one-time design of the \nprocess weighed significantly on our decision.”63 Commissioner Chang likewise explained that \nlimiting the number of participating projects is “a minimum requirement to avoid creating a \nperpetual process under which certain resources can bypass the existing queue,” and that ERAS \nwas acceptable only because it is “truly a one-time exception to the traditional interconnection \nprocess as required by Orders No. 2003 and 2023.”64 \nLARS has none of these bounds. It has no overall cap, no sunset, and no limit on the total \nmegawatts that may be studied: thirty generation/load pairs may enter every year, indefinitely.65 \nThe ten-application limit per study period controls only MISO’s workload, not the volume of \ncapacity that LARS will ultimately allocate. That is the precise defect the Commission identified \n \n60  \nSee Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 192 FERC ¶ 61,062, at PP 32, 111 (2025); ERAS Rehearing Order, 194 FERC ¶ \n61,050 at n.205.  \n61  \nShow Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 115 (quoting Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at P 64 \n(2026) (“SPP HILL Order”)). \n62  \nSPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 34, 69.  \n63  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 195. \n64  \nId. (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at PP 7-8). \n65  \nTransmittal Letter at 9; Tab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.3."},{"page":17,"startToken":5159,"endToken":5463,"text":"17 \nin the initial ERAS proposal, which it rejected in part because MISO proposed “up to 14 \nopportunities to enter the ERAS process through 2028,” exacerbating “the potential for a volume \nof ERAS interconnection requests untethered to reliability or resource adequacy needs.”66 LARS \noffers unlimited opportunities with no end date. Moreover, unlike SPP’s HILLGA agreements, \nLARS LLGIAs have no term limit to ensure that LSE-selected generators are ultimately processed \nthrough a non-discriminatory generator interconnection queue.67 \nNor is LARS tethered to any identified resource adequacy need. Unlike ERAS, LARS \nrequires no RERRA verification of a resource adequacy deficiency, and it does not limit \nparticipation to resources needed to meet a demonstrated shortfall. To the contrary, MISO \nconcedes that “MISO’s existing processes have been sufficient to ensure resource adequacy in the \nshort term.”68 MISO’s witness states that “LARS primarily addresses a timing issue”: EPR studies \nfor large loads can be completed on a 90-day timeline, while the DPP is designed for a 365-day \ntimeline.69 A timing mismatch is a reason to complete the DPP reforms MISO describes, or at most \nto adopt a transitional, bounded tool of the kind the Commission accepted for ERAS—not to create \na permanent parallel queue controlled by LSEs. MISO itself testifies that its ongoing queue reforms \n“are producing—and will continue to produce—significant process efficiencies.”70 MISO has \nimplemented automated interconnection studies through its SUGAR software, a queue cap, and, \nmost recently, proposed the Legacy Queue Acceleration framework, which the Clean Energy \n \n66  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 199. \n67  \nCompare SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 34, 69 ], with Tab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.7.4 \n(Interconnection Service continues after fifteen years). \n68  \nTransmittal Letter at 3. \n69  \nDrake Testimony at 12. \n70  \nId. at 6."},{"page":18,"startToken":5463,"endToken":5835,"text":"18 \nTrades support.71 If MISO believed those reforms would fail, it should have said so and supported \nthat claim. It says the opposite. \nMISO’s stated reasons for permanence do not cure the problem. MISO argues that a \ntemporary process “would create unnecessary costs and uncertainty,” that it would be inefficient \nto “weigh down the DPP” with requests already paired with a large load, and that a permanent \nprocess “will help MISO avoid a rush of projects like was experienced with ERAS.”72 Each of \nthose rationales is an argument for giving a favored class of interconnection customers a \npermanent, faster path to injection rights—not a reason the Commission’s tailoring requirement \nshould not apply. The “rush of projects” MISO experienced under ERAS is evidence of the demand \nfor priority treatment, which is exactly why the Commission has insisted on firm limits.73 \nii. LARS does not provide the electrically proximate, output-limited service the \nShow Cause Order described, and its same-LRZ pairing grants broad priority \ninjection rights to generators that need not be operationally tied to the load. \nThe Show Cause Order’s preliminary finding was premised on a specific operational \nconfiguration: an interconnection customer’s “commitment in an interconnection agreement to \nlimit the generating facility’s output to minimize the impact on the transmission system while \nserving an electrically proximate large load.”74 The Commission repeatedly described service that \nreflects “an interconnection customer’s commitment in an interconnection agreement to limit a \n \n71  \nId. at 6; Transmittal Letter at 15 n.67; see Comments of the American Clean Power Association, Docket No. \nER26-3813-000 (Oct. 5, 2026). MISO asked the Commission to act on that proposal by October 19, 2026, \nahead of the October 20, 2026 close of Decision Point II for the DPP-2022 cycle. See Motion for Leave to \nAnswer and Answer of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3813-000, \nat 1 (Oct. 12, 2026). As of the date of this filing, the Commission has not acted on the proposal. \n72  \nDrake Testimony at 10-11. \n73  \nSee ERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (Rosner, Comm’r, concurring at P 3) (“[T]here is no \nguarantee that interest in ERAS will be limited . . . .”). \n74  \nShow Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 113."},{"page":19,"startToken":5835,"endToken":6156,"text":"19 \ngenerating facility’s output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large load,” \nand generating facilities “with necessary control technologies and/or protection systems” that \nensure injections do not exceed contractual limits.75 The rationale was that, where the generating \nfacility and load are so close that their combined impact is “effectively the same as if they were \nlocated at the same substation,” the transmission provider “would need to study only the local \nimpacts,” potentially reducing Network Upgrades.76 The Clean Energy Trades read the Show \nCause Order to contemplate a study process and service that is predicated on the generator’s ability \nand commitment to minimize its impact on the transmission system while serving the associated \nload, namely through output limits matched to the load’s demand and the control technologies or \nprotection systems necessary to enforce them. \nLARS contains no such predicate. A LARS Generating Facility need only have a POI in \nthe same LRZ as the load’s Point of Withdrawal.77 MISO’s LRZs are resource adequacy zones \nthat can span an entire state or multiple states. MISO acknowledges that it considered—and \nrejected—narrower alternatives such as requiring the generator and load to be in the same Local \nBalancing Authority area “or through requiring that the location of the Generating Facilities be \nwithin a specific number of substations of the LARS Associated Load,” and instead chose a \nconstruct that “enables more generation to serve a single load across a broader area.”78 MISO even \ndescribes the multiple-POI option as a “proximate plus” solution.79 In direct contrast to the Show \nCause Order’s reasoning, LARS does not require the generator to limit its output to the load’s \n \n75  \nId. PP 113, 116, 118. \n76  \nId. PP 112, 113 & n.256. \n77  \nTransmittal Letter at 10; Tab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2. \n78  \nTransmittal Letter at 10, 21; see also Drake Testimony at 40. \n79  \nTransmittal Letter at 21."},{"page":20,"startToken":6156,"endToken":6455,"text":"20 \ndemand, to operate behind protection schemes, or to forgo injections beyond the load’s needs. To \nthe contrary, it grants full NRIS, studied for deliverability “across MISO’s footprint,” with the \nfifteen-year pairing term as the only meaningful limitation.80 MISO confirms that it “will not limit \nthe study process to the specific LRZ the generation/load pair will be located in.”81 After fifteen \nyears, even the pairing requirement falls away, and the generator retains unrestricted \nInterconnection Service.82 \nThis design is unjust and unreasonable even apart from the Show Cause Order. The \njustification for studying generation and load together—and for affording that study expedited \ntreatment—is that electrically proximate generation and load reduce the burden on the \ntransmission system. Where the generator may be located anywhere in a multi-state LRZ, that \njustification disappears. LARS would instead give a subset of generators access to an exclusive, \nexpedited queue for full network injection rights without any requirement that they be \noperationally tied to the load they are intended to serve, allowing them to consume transmission \nheadroom—potentially in already congested areas—ahead of DPP projects that have waited years \nfor study. That is a preference for a class of interconnection customers defined by their contractual \nrelationship with an LSE, not by any reduced impact on the grid. \niii. LARS projects would gain priority access to transmission capacity and avoid \nNetwork Upgrades they would otherwise trigger, shifting costs to DPP \ncustomers and other transmission customers. \nMISO asserts that LARS will be conducted in “parallel” with the DPP and is “designed to \npreserve the integrity of MISO’s existing generator interconnection processes,” because LARS \n \n80  \nDrake Testimony at 12-13, 29; Transmittal Letter at 10, 16-18. \n81  \nTransmittal Letter at 13. \n82  \nId. at 18; Tab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.7.4."},{"page":21,"startToken":6455,"endToken":6767,"text":"21 \nrequests “will not be included in ongoing DPP studies and therefore will not utilize any available \ntransmission capacity in those studies.”83 On the surface, that appears equitable. The harm is in \nthe details. \nLARS studies “will not include Interconnection Requests currently in the generator \ninterconnection queue that do not have an executed GIA.”84 LARS projects will therefore be \nstudied as if the only other generation on the system is generation that already holds a GIA. That \nexcludes every request in the DPP-2022 cycle without an executed GIA and every request in the \nDPP-2023 and DPP-2025 cycles, including projects with Phase III results and GIAs in negotiation. \nBecause LARS cycles are designed to move significantly faster than the DPP, and because multiple \nbacklogged DPP cycles have not yet reached GIA, LARS projects will claim available headroom \nand will avoid Network Upgrades that would likely be assigned to them if the higher-queued DPP \nprojects were modeled. The practical effect is that LARS projects are treated as if they were studied \nfirst, even though the studies occur in “parallel” on paper, resulting in more constraints and higher \nNetwork Upgrade costs for DPP projects when they are finally studied against a system that LARS \nprojects have already used. \nMISO’s answer to this concern is that “[t]he models from LARS and the DPP process will \nbe reconciled through MTEP.”85 That is not a protection. MISO acknowledges that, where \noverallocation occurs, the resulting constraints “would be formalized in a future MTEP project” \nwhose cost “will be allocated based on existing Tariff rules, which is likely to be the load within \nthe transmission pricing zone where the transmission upgrade is required,” and MISO candidly \n \n83  \nTransmittal Letter at 4, 13. \n84  \nId. at 12 (quoting Drake Testimony at 29); see also Drake Testimony at 14. \n85  \nTransmittal Letter at 20; Drake Testimony at 33."},{"page":22,"startToken":6767,"endToken":7081,"text":"22 \nstates: “This cost shift is consistent with MISO’s existing processes.”86 Nothing in the Filing \nensures that the reconciliation will produce minimal upgrades, or that the resulting costs will not \nbe borne by DPP interconnection customers as they move through later studies or by other \ntransmission customers through MTEP cost allocation. MISO’s assurance that there is only “a \nminimal risk of overallocation” is unsupported by any analysis in the record.87 The Show Cause \nOrder expressly identified the “risk of cost shifting among transmission customers” associated \nwith large load additions as a potential source of unjust and unreasonable rates.88 LARS would \ninstitutionalize that risk. \nThe risk is not hypothetical. MISO reports that during the MTEP26 cycle it approved 26 \nGW of Spot Loads through the EPR process, along with an additional 40 Corrective Action Plan \ntransmission projects, and that another 10 GW of load is under study.89 Eight of the top ten \nMTEP26 projects, totaling roughly $6 billion (approximately 41% of the $14.7 billion MTEP26 \nportfolio), are EPR projects. LARS is designed to channel a substantial share of that load growth, \npaired with generation, through a process whose cumulative effects on DPP studies MISO has not \nevaluated. High concentrations of new load and LARS generation in particular areas could create \nconstraints that limit import capability, increasing congestion and the need for Network Upgrades \nwhere they might not otherwise have been needed—costs that DPP generators may become \nresponsible for as they move through their own studies. \nThe asymmetry in model updates compounds the problem. MISO explains that the DPP \n“uses the most up to date MTEP base case when the study is kicked off and is not modified to \n \n86  \nTransmittal Letter at 13; Drake Testimony at 33. \n87  \nDrake Testimony at 33. \n88  \nShow Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at PP 66, 68. \n89  \nDrake Testimony at 7."},{"page":23,"startToken":7081,"endToken":7373,"text":"23 \ninclude later approved MTEP projects or LLGIAs.”90 LARS studies, by contrast, begin from the \nlatest MTEP base case, including recently approved EPR projects and prior LARS outcomes.91 \nDPP customers therefore will not have the benefit of new load-driven MTEP projects in their \nmodeling, while LARS customers will—which can produce very different Network Upgrade \nassignments and cost outcomes for DPP interconnection customers that sign GIAs after multiple \nLARS cycles have been processed. \nThe Clean Energy Trades recognize that, in accepting the revised ERAS proposal, the \nCommission found similar concerns about modeling exclusions and MTEP reconciliation to be \nspeculative.92 But that finding rested on a process capped at 68 requests and scheduled to end in \n2027, and on the Commission’s observation that future DPP customers would have notice of a \ntime-limited ERAS process.93 Those premises do not hold for LARS. A permanent process that \nadds up to thirty generation/load pairs per year, with no limit on total MW and no end date, will \nrepeatedly and cumulatively claim headroom ahead of the DPP. The question is not whether harm \nto DPP customers is possible in a single bounded cycle, but whether MISO has shown that a \nperpetual priority process will not systematically shift capacity and costs to them. MISO has not \nattempted that showing. \niv. LARS diverts MISO’s attention and resources from completing the reforms \nrequired by Order No. 2023. \nIn Order No. 2023, the Commission acted to address interconnection queue backlogs, \nreduce delays and uncertainty, and ensure that new resources can interconnect in a reliable, \n \n90  \nDrake Testimony at 32. \n91  \nId. at 14, 28-29; Transmittal Letter at 12. \n92  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at PP 259, 261-263. \n93  \nId. PP 258, 262, 264."},{"page":24,"startToken":7373,"endToken":7663,"text":"24 \nefficient, transparent, and timely manner on a non-discriminatory basis.94 The Commission found \nthat the serial, first-come, first-served study process is a source of queue delays.95 LARS is a serial, \nfirst-come, first-served process.96 MISO has now twice prioritized separate, one-off expedited \nprocesses that not all market participants can feasibly access on a comparable, not unduly \ndiscriminatory basis, while the DPP remains significantly backlogged. Although MISO asserts that \nLARS fees will fund additional staff and that “no staff time or resources will be shifted between \nthe DPP queue and LARS,”97 the time and resources MISO and its stakeholders devote to \ndesigning, defending, and administering parallel processes are time and resources not spent \ncompleting the DPP reforms that would benefit all interconnection customers. Commissioner \nChang has observed that “[o]ne-off short-term fixes can create additional problems and at times \nbeget further one-off fixes,” and that “[d]eveloping these types of temporary proposals can detract \nfrom our collective efforts to address the more fundamental underlying issues.”98 A permanent \nparallel process is that concern made structural. \nC. The Commission’s Orders on MISO’s ERAS Proposals Confirm That LARS Is \nNot Just and Reasonable. \nAlthough MISO is entitled under FPA section 205 to propose a different approach than the \nCommission has previously accepted, the Commission’s orders on MISO’s ERAS proposals \nidentify the elements that rendered an expedited interconnection process unjust and unreasonable, \nas well as the guardrails that ultimately allowed one to be accepted. LARS shares the flaws the \n \n94  \nOrder No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at PP 1-3. [Confirm pin cite.] \n95  \nId. P 47. \n96  \nDrake Testimony at 10, 22. \n97  \nId. at 32. \n98  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 3)."},{"page":25,"startToken":7663,"endToken":7947,"text":"25 \nCommission identified in the initial ERAS proposal and lacks the guardrails that saved the revised \none. \ni. No limit on volume. \nThe Commission rejected the initial ERAS proposal because “MISO’s proposed Tariff \nplaces no limit on the number of projects that could be entered in the ERAS process,” which \nthreatened processing times “similar to the challenges with the current DPP queue.”99 \nCommissioner Rosner explained that he could not find the proposal just and reasonable “because \nthe lack of limitations on the volume of interconnection requests threatens to overwhelm the ERAS \nqueue with processing delays,” and urged MISO to adopt practical limits such as “a one-time \nERAS submittal window with a limit on the number of projects.”100 LARS limits the number of \napplications per study period but places no limit on the number of periods, the total number of \nprojects, or the total MW that may be studied.101 \nii. No tether to an identified need. \nThe Commission found that the initial, rejected MISO ERAS proposal did “not sufficiently \ndescribe how the ERAS process is sufficiently targeted to study only interconnection requests \nneeded to meet the anticipated shortfall in generating capacity,” and that it was “difficult to \ndetermine whether the volume of resource additions . . . will exceed what is needed to address \nMISO’s near-term resource adequacy needs — in other words, whether the solution is narrowly \ntailored to fix the problem.”102 MISO did not even identify a shortfall here; it states that its existing \n \n99  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 199. \n100  \nId. (Rosner, Comm’r, concurring at PP 3, 6). \n101  \nSee supra Part II.B.i. \n102  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at PP 199, 201."},{"page":26,"startToken":7947,"endToken":8218,"text":"26 \nprocesses have been sufficient to ensure resource adequacy.103 LARS eligibility turns on the size \nof a load and the existence of a contract, not on any resource adequacy or reliability need. \niii. Selection outsourced to non-independent entities without objective, \ntransparent criteria. \nCommissioner See explained that the initial, rejected MISO ERAS proposal “outsource[d] \nthe expedited study selection process altogether,” and that “MISO is the regulated entity, not the \nStates, and the Commission’s statutes require us to evaluate its processes.”104 She concluded that \n“the Commission cannot evaluate criteria that do not yet exist, that will vary State-by-State when \nthey do, and that MISO does not plan to police.”105 LARS goes further: it outsources selection not \nto state regulators, but solely to LSEs—market participants that may compete with the IPPs \nseeking access. There are no criteria an LSE must apply in deciding which generators to sponsor, \nno transparency into the LSE’s decision-making, and no mechanism for an excluded \ninterconnection customer to challenge that decision. \niv. None of the guardrails that supported prior expedited processes. \nIn each instance in which the Commission accepted an expedited process that raised undue \ndiscrimination concerns, it weighed the proposal against guardrails that protected against undue \ndiscrimination. In PJM’s RRI and CAISO’s Interconnection Process Enhancements (“IPE”), all \nprojects had the comparable ability to submit a request and work directly with the RTO/ISO; they \nwere simply subject to objective, published scoring criteria rather than the traditional queue \n \n103  \nTransmittal Letter at 3. \n104  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (See, Comm’r, concurring at PP 6-7). \n105  \nId. (See, Comm’r, concurring at P 7)."},{"page":27,"startToken":8218,"endToken":8544,"text":"27 \norder.106 PJM’s RRI was a one-time process limited to 50 projects.107 The revised ERAS process \nwas accepted only after MISO added a cap, IPP and retail-choice carve-outs, strengthened RERRA \nverification, a same-LRZ need requirement, and a sunset date.108 LARS contains no scoring \ncriteria, no carve-outs, no regulatory verification, no cap, and no sunset. It is designed to be a \npermanent process in which one subset of market participants controls access to a generator \ninterconnection queue. Accepting LARS would be inconsistent with the Commission’s \ndeterminations in the ERAS proceedings.109 \nv. Legal durability. \nBoth concurring Commissioners emphasized that an expedited process must be legally \ndurable to provide the certainty that customers need. Commissioner Rosner warned that \n“insufficient limitations on the requests that may be studied through ERAS risks a court striking \ndown the proposal,” and that if ERAS agreements had to be rescinded, “the upheaval could \nseriously harm MISO’s customers.”110 Commissioner See likewise cautioned that “proposals that \nare not just and reasonable and not unduly preferential or discriminatory are vulnerable to judicial \nscrutiny,” and that “a win today but a loss in court months (or years) later would not help MISO \naddress its resource adequacy concerns.”111 Those concerns apply with greater force to a \n \n106  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 202 (discussing PJM RRI location criterion and CAISO IPE \nsystem need criterion); ERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 204 n.510; see also ERAS \nRejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (See, Comm’r, concurring at P 7 n.13) (comparing PJM RRI “scoring \ncriteria that are calibrated to satisfy PJM’s resource adequacy needs”). \n107  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 200. \n108  \nERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at PP 195, 203-205. \n109  \nSee CEA Protest at 42-45. \n110  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (Rosner, Comm’r, concurring at PP 1, 4). \n111  \nId. (See, Comm’r, concurring at P 9)."},{"page":28,"startToken":8544,"endToken":8865,"text":"28 \npermanent process under which LLGIAs will be executed three times a year for the indefinite \nfuture. \nD. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That LARS Satisfies the Independent Entity \nVariation Standard. \nIn Order No. 2003, the Commission permitted RTOs and ISOs to propose “independent \nentity variations” from the pro forma LGIP and LGIA, recognizing that an RTO or ISO “has \ndifferent operating characteristics depending on its size and location and is less likely to act in an \nunduly discriminatory manner than a Transmission Provider that is a market participant.”112 Under \nthat standard, an RTO/ISO must demonstrate that its proposed variations “are just and reasonable \nand not unduly discriminatory or preferential and accomplish the purposes of Order No. 2003.”113 \nThe flexibility the standard affords rests on the RTO/ISO’s independence. Although RTOs have \nfar less incentive to discriminate, the same cannot be said of the LSEs and Transmission Owners \nto which LARS delegates control. \nLARS deviates from at least three core elements of the pro forma LGIP. First, under the \npro forma LGIP, an interconnection customer submits its interconnection request directly to the \ntransmission provider, and the transmission provider—not a third party—administers access to \ninterconnection service.114 LARS instead requires that the request be submitted by the LSE, and it \nrequires a POI agreed to and attested by the Transmission Owner before the request may be \nfiled.115 Second, the pro forma LGIP establishes a single queue in which requests are studied on \n \n112  \nOrder No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 827; see also id. P 26. \n113  \nERAS Rejection Order, 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 at P 3 (citing Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 185 FERC \n¶ 61,084, at P 11 (2023)); see also ERAS Acceptance Order, 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 259 (applying standard \nto ERAS). \n114  \nSee pro forma LGIP § 3.1.  \n115  \nTab A, Attachment X, §§ 3.12.1, 3.12.2."},{"page":29,"startToken":8865,"endToken":9162,"text":"29 \nthe basis of queue position and, following Order No. 2023, in clusters on a first-ready, first-served \nbasis.116 LARS creates a separate, permanent queue studied serially on a first-come, first-served \nbasis and excludes DPP requests without executed GIAs from its models.117 Third, the pro forma \nLGIP makes interconnection service available on equal terms to any interconnection customer that \nsatisfies objective readiness requirements; LARS conditions access on a commercial relationship \nwith, and the sponsorship of, the LSE, with qualifying agreements that differ depending on whether \nthe customer is an LSE.118 \nMISO does not attempt to justify these deviations under the independent entity variation \nstandard; it simply asserts that LARS is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.119 \nBecause MISO itself is not the entity to which the generator submits its LARS application, and \nbecause working through the LSE is a requirement for IPP participation, MISO has effectively \ninstalled the LSE as the facilitator of the LARS process. The rationale for the independent entity \nvariation—that an independent RTO is less likely to discriminate—cannot justify a variation \nwhose effect is to transfer gatekeeping authority from the independent RTO to market participants. \nBecause the LSE is the gatekeeper of LARS in a way that goes beyond even the initial ERAS \nproposal, MISO cannot satisfy the independent entity variation standard, and LARS does not \naccomplish the purposes of Order No. 2003: to “minimize opportunities for undue discrimination \nand expedite the development of new generation.”120 \n \n116   \nSee pro forma LGIP §§ 4.1, 7; Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 47.  \n117  \nDrake Testimony at 10, 14, 22. \n118  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2(i). \n119  \nSee Transmittal Letter at 18-22. \n120  \nOrder No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103 at P 11."},{"page":30,"startToken":9162,"endToken":9461,"text":"30 \nIII. \nREQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION \nIf the Commission does not reject the Filing, it should direct MISO to clarify whether the \nLARS same-LRZ requirement applicable to a LARS Interconnection Customer is determined \nbased on a Generating Facility’s physical location or on its POI to the MISO Transmission System. \nProposed Attachment X, Section 3.12.2 appears to apply the same-LRZ requirement based on the \nGenerating Facility’s POI for an individual LARS Interconnection Customer, providing that “[t]he \nPoint of Interconnection specified in a LARS Application must be located in the same Local \nResource Zone as the Point of Withdrawal of the LARS Associated Load.”121 However, where \nmultiple Generating Facilities serve a single LARS Associated Load behind different POIs, the \nproposed Tariff states that the Generating Facilities must “[b]e located in the same LRZ as the \nLARS Associated Load,” creating ambiguity as to whether the requirement applies to the physical \nlocation of the Generating Facilities or to their respective POIs.122 \nThe Clean Energy Trades request that the Commission direct MISO to clarify that, for \npurposes of the same-LRZ requirement, the relevant location is the applicable POI to the MISO \nTransmission System rather than the physical location of the Generating Facility, including where \nmultiple Generating Facilities serve a single LARS Associated Load. \nIV. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the reasons stated above, the Clean Energy Trades respectfully request that the \nCommission reject MISO’s LARS proposal. In the event the Commission accepts any portion of \nthe Filing, the Clean Energy Trades request that the Commission direct MISO to provide the \nclarification requested in Part III above. \n \n121  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2; see also Transmittal Letter at 10. \n122  \nTab A, Attachment X, § 3.12.2 (multiple Generating Facilities provision, item 2(a)); see also Drake \nTestimony at 23, 30."},{"page":31,"startToken":9461,"endToken":9562,"text":"31 \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ Brett White \nBrett White \nVice President, Markets & Transmission \nAmerican Clean Power Association \n1299 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Suite 1300 \nWashington, D.C. 20004 \n(771) 212-6069 \nbwhite@cleanpower.org \n \n \nSimon Mahan \nSouthern Renewable Energy Association \n11610 Pleasant Ridge Road, Suite 103 #176 \nLittle Rock, AR 72223 \n(337) 303-3723 \nsimon@southernwind.org \n \nAbby Sherman \nManager, Electricity Markets \nAmerican Clean Power Association \n1299 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Suite 1300 \nWashington, D.C. 20004 \n(202) 255-4063 \nasherman@cleanpower.org \n \nWhit Cox \nSouthern Renewable Energy Association \n11610 Pleasant Ridge Road, Suite 103 # 176 \nLittle Rock, AR 72223 \n(501) 701-0874  \nwhit@southernrenewable.org"},{"page":32,"startToken":9562,"endToken":9632,"text":"32 \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nThe undersigned certifies that a copy of this pleading has been served this day upon each \nperson designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \nDated this 23rd day of October, 2026. \n/s/ Brett White \nBrett White \nVice President, Markets & Transmission \nAmerican Clean Power Association \n1299 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Suite 1300 \nWashington, D.C. 20004 \n(771) 212-6069 \nbwhite@cleanpower.org"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":3,"endAt":3,"startToken":0,"endToken":612},{"p":3,"at":3,"title":"I. BACKGROUND","method":"printed heading","endPage":3,"endAt":7,"startToken":612,"endToken":613},{"p":3,"at":7,"title":"BACKGROUND","method":"printed heading","endPage":3,"endAt":19,"startToken":613,"endToken":614},{"p":3,"at":19,"title":"A. MISO’s Initial and Revised ERAS Proposals","method":"printed heading","endPage":4,"endAt":313,"startToken":614,"endToken":955},{"p":4,"at":313,"title":"B. The Show Cause Order","method":"printed heading","endPage":5,"endAt":274,"startToken":955,"endToken":1243},{"p":5,"at":274,"title":"C. The LARS Proposal","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":111,"startToken":1243,"endToken":1505},{"p":6,"at":111,"title":"II. PROTEST","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":1028,"startToken":1505,"endToken":1642},{"p":6,"at":1028,"title":"A. LARS Would Unduly Discriminate Against Independent Power Producers and","method":"printed heading","endPage":14,"endAt":307,"startToken":1642,"endToken":4226},{"p":14,"at":307,"title":"B. LARS Is Not Just and Reasonable.","method":"printed heading","endPage":24,"endAt":1207,"startToken":4226,"endToken":7550},{"p":24,"at":1207,"title":"C. The Commission’s Orders on MISO’s ERAS Proposals Confirm That LARS Is","method":"printed heading","endPage":28,"endAt":106,"startToken":7550,"endToken":8561},{"p":28,"at":106,"title":"D. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That LARS Satisfies the Independent Entity","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":4,"startToken":8561,"endToken":9163},{"p":30,"at":4,"title":"III. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":1398,"startToken":9163,"endToken":9375},{"p":30,"at":1398,"title":"IV. CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":1403,"startToken":9375,"endToken":9376},{"p":30,"at":1403,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":32,"endAt":4,"startToken":9376,"endToken":9563},{"p":32,"at":4,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":32,"endAt":458,"startToken":9563,"endToken":9632}]}