{"document":{"slug":"protest-er27-25-google","title":"Limited Protest of Google LLC","issued":"2026-10-23","accession":"20261023-5177","docket":"ER27-25-000","group":"MISO Large Load Addition Resource Study (LARS)","filer":"Google","kind":"limited protest","file":"sources/originals/20261023-5177_Limited Protest of Google LLC - ER27-25-000.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_number=20261023-5177","sha256":"373b876a3681d902cab2b0c90eb3c17e73fa9b58b4bd522521791958e9350897","pages":11,"tokens":3016,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":242,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \n \n \nMidcontinent Independent System Operator, \nInc. \n \n) \n) \n) \n) \n) \n \nDocket No. ER27-25-000 \n \nLIMITED PROTEST OF GOOGLE LLC \n \nPursuant to Rule 211 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy \nRegulatory Commission (“Commission”),1 Google LLC (“Google”) submits this limited protest \nof Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) proposal to establish a Large \nLoad Addition Resource Study (“LARS”) process.2  Google commends MISO for working \nproactively to address the concerns that the Commission identified in the Large Load Show Cause \nOrder.3  The concept underlying LARS is a particularly important one that is worth prioritizing, \nand it is a concept that Google continues to strongly support.  Studying new large loads together \nwith paired generation resources that will serve those loads will maximize the use of existing \ninfrastructure and minimize strain on the grid,4 which will, in turn, accelerate interconnection \n \n1 18 C.F.R. § 385.211 (2026). \n2 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Large Load Addition Resource Study Process, Docket No. ER27-25-\n000 (filed Oct. 2, 2026) (“Transmittal”). \n3 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at PP 112-114 (2026) (“Large Load Show Cause \nOrder”). \n4 See Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Comments of Google LLC, Docket \nNo. RM26-4-000, at 5-6 (filed Nov. 21, 2025); Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Comments of Google \nLLC, Docket No. ER26-3552-000, at 2 (filed Sep. 8, 2026) (“Google ZGIA Comments”)."},{"page":2,"startToken":242,"endToken":588,"text":"-2- \ntimelines and reduce the cost to serve both the load and the generation.5  Again, Google supports \nthe intent and conceptual direction of LARS.   \nNevertheless, Google is filing a limited protest because MISO has filed LARS without \naccompanying and necessary protections against cost shifting, which prevents the Commission \nfrom finding that LARS is just and reasonable.  The lack of cost shifting protections is especially \nconcerning because, despite the benefits—especially speed to power—that LARS would promote, \nit is structured in a way that threatens Google’s ability to meet its foundational commitment to \nensuring that other retail customers do not bear the costs of serving its data centers, including \nthrough the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.6  Our concern is two-fold.  First, LARS upgrades needed \nto address violations caused by large loads—or caused by the load and generation together—are \nclassified as Baseline Reliability Projects (“BRPs”) or “Other” projects.  Under current rules, the \ncosts of those project types are recovered from all network customers in a Transmission Pricing \nZone.  Second, if LARS generating facilities/load end up relying on transmission capacity that \nother projects were also relying on—a scenario MISO refers to as “overallocation”—MISO would \naddress the resulting transmission constraints through a “future MTEP project,” the costs of which \nare “likely” to be borne by “the load within the transmission pricing zone where the transmission \nupgrade is required.”7  Under either scenario, MISO could end up saddling residential customers \nand other existing commercial customers with increased rates resulting from the costs of \ntransmission facilities needed to interconnect and serve large loads.  And while MISO indicates \n \n5 Transmittal at 15 (explaining how LARS will “identify the solution that best fits both the generation and load \nneeds at the lowest cost”). \n6 See, e.g., Amanda Peterson Corio, Supporting the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge: Google’s \nApproach for Responsible Energy Growth, Google: The Keyword (Mar. 4, 2026), https://blog.google/innovation-and-\nai/infrastructure-and-cloud/global-network/affordability-pledge-responsible-energy-growth/; PJM Interconnection, \nL.L.C., Protest of Google LLC, Docket No. ER26-3515-000, at 14 (Sep. 3, 2026).   \n7 Transmittal at 13."},{"page":3,"startToken":588,"endToken":876,"text":"-3- \nthat it will file a pro forma cost shifting agreement in November,8 the details of that agreement \nand how it will protect against cost shifts are open questions, which the Commission cannot simply \nassume away.   \nTo be clear, Google supports both the concept underlying LARS, which will improve speed \nto power and transmission planning, and provisions that protect other network customers against \ncost shifting.  The issue, however, is that MISO has decoupled LARS’s speed to power provisions \nfrom cost shifting protections.  By timing and sequencing its filings in this way, MISO has made \nit impossible for the Commission to determine that the LARS proposal is just and reasonable.  \nGoogle remains actively engaged in the ongoing MISO stakeholder process and is hopeful that the \nanticipated November filing will include the necessary guardrails to hold other network customers \nharmless, at which point the significant benefits of LARS may be realized without the potential \nfor cost shifting. \nAccordingly, to address the cross-subsidization concerns outlined above, the Commission \nshould either reject LARS with guidance indicating that it needs to be filed concurrently with \nprocedures to prevent cross-subsidization or, in the alternative, accept and suspend the proposal, \nuntil it can be evaluated alongside any necessary customer protection measures, including the \ncontemplated pro forma cost shifting agreement.  Regardless of the avenue selected by the \nCommission, Google supports future implementation of a refined LARS process that mitigates the \nidentified cost-shifting concerns, while still enabling the benefits of a targeted, combined process \nfor studying a large load and its contractually paired generation together.  \nIn addition, MISO must also continue to refine and improve its principal interconnection \nprocess, the Definitive Planning Phase (“DPP”), so that all generation resources in MISO—not \n \n8 Id. at 14."},{"page":4,"startToken":876,"endToken":1253,"text":"-4- \njust those paired with large loads—can interconnect on a reasonable timeline.  A viable DPP that \ntimely interconnects large quantities of new generation is the single most important step that MISO \ncan take to continue ensuring resource adequacy. On that score, MISO recently took a step in the \nright direction with its legacy queue acceleration proposal, which is aimed at clearing the DPP-\n2022 Cycle and preventing “endless” Phase III system impact study restudies for all future DPP \ncycles.9  As Google has previously stated, “fixing the sluggish timelines in the DPP is a more \ndurable and lasting solution to MISO[’s] interconnection challenges than an endless series of \nshortcuts, even if some of those shortcuts are merited for the foreseeable future,”10 and Google \ntherefore urges MISO to continue refining the DPP process even as it continues to develop a \nworkable interconnection pathway for paired load and generation. \nA. The LARS Proposal Opens the Door to Shifting the Costs of Serving LARS Pairs \nonto Other Customers and Future MTEP Cycles \nCustomers like Google could be prevented from using LARS without violating their \nRatepayer Protection Pledge commitments.  That is because, under LARS, MISO will study the \nload and generation in a pair and “any common violations that show up in the generation and load \nstudies [will be] assigned to [BRPs] and Other project types.”11  Only the violations specifically \ncaused by the generator’s interconnection are assigned to the generator.  Under the MISO tariff, \nthe costs of BRPs and “Other” projects are recovered through Attachment O by the Transmission \nOwner developing the project, for the portion of the project located in that Transmission Owner’s \n \n9 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Legacy Queue Acceleration Proposal and Request for Expedited \nAction, Shortened Comment Period, and Waiver of the Sixty-Day Prior Notice Requirement, Docket No. ER26-3813-\n000 (filed Sep. 21, 2026).  MISO requested expedited Commission action on its legacy queue acceleration proposal \nby no later than October 19, 2026, and an October 19, 2026 effective date.  Id. at 1-2.  That date has passed, and the \nCommission has not acted on MISO’s proposal. \n10 Google ZGIA Comments at 4.   \n11 Transmittal at 12; see Proposed Tariff, Attach. X § 3.12.4; Proposed Tariff, Attach. FF § I.D.1.b.ii(i)."},{"page":5,"startToken":1253,"endToken":1580,"text":"-5- \npricing zone.12  This means that the cost of transmission upgrades needed to serve a LARS large \nload—or to address violations caused jointly by the LARS load and its paired generation—will \nflow into rates paid by other network customers in the zone, and—under current rules—could raise \nrates paid by residential or other commercial customers.  Allocating costs in this way could prevent \nGoogle and other signatories from honoring their pledge to “pay for all new power delivery \ninfrastructure upgrades required to service their data centers, including adequate network upgrade \ncosts to ensure that these expenses are not passed on to the ordinary household.” 13 \nMISO states that the transmission customer serving the large load “remains responsible for \nthe identified BRPs and Other assigned projects.”14  But MISO fails to explain how the tariff \nprovisions proposed in LARS and that are now before the Commission will ensure that result, and \ntherefore hold other network customers harmless.  Instead, MISO simply states that cost impacts \nfrom the load study “will be assigned to Baseline Reliability Projects and Other type projects,” \nwith “cost responsibility flowing from such designation under existing rules.”15  But under existing \nrules, that responsibility flows indiscriminately to the Transmission Pricing Zone, without \nnecessary “hold-harmless” protections for other network customers.  Without an explanation on \nthe record, there is no way to ensure that LARS adequately guards against cost shifting, and the \nfiling cannot be deemed just and reasonable.16  \n \n12 MISO, FERC Electric Tariff, Attach. FF § III.A.2.c; id. § III.A.2.k. \n13 The White House, Ratepayer Protection Pledge (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/0\n3/ratepayer-protection-pledge/. \n14 Proposed Tariff, Attach. FF § I.D.1.b.ii(g); see also Proposed Tariff, Attach. X § 3.12.7.4. \n15 Transmittal at 14; id. at 14 n.66 (emphasis added). \n16 MISO could potentially explain in an answer or deficiency letter how LARS sufficiently protects against cost \nshifting."},{"page":6,"startToken":1580,"endToken":1895,"text":"-6- \nIn addition, LARS could shift costs onto residential customers and other existing \ncommercial customers by relying on the MTEP process as a backstop to develop projects needed \nto resolve transmission issues caused by LARS pairs.  MISO explains that if it allocates headroom \nto a LARS generator that has also been allocated to a DPP project—a phenomenon that MISO \ncalls “overallocation”17—then any resulting constraints caused by that overallocation “will be \nformalized in a future MTEP project.”18  Put differently, residential and other commercial \ncustomers could be left holding the bag for transmission projects needed to interconnect LARS \ngenerators any time MISO “overallocat[es]” available headroom.    \nThat too represents an unacceptable risk of cross-subsidization.  That is particularly so \ngiven that LARS’s design creates the very real risk of overallocation because ongoing DPP cycles \ndo not include LARS requests and the LARS studies do not include DPP projects before they have \nsigned Generator Interconnection Agreements.19  As a result, each process is based on an \nincomplete snapshot of the transmission system and how it will operate in practice, which increases \nthe likelihood that the LARS and DPP processes will produce incompatible results.  MISO would \nnot, however, reconcile the DPP and LARS study processes until after both are complete,20 and, if \nthe cumulative impacts of the two separate studies create constraints not identified in either, the \nupgrades necessary to resolve those constraints will be deferred to the MTEP process.  \nThat result would be unjust and unreasonable and inconsistent with Google’s customer-\nprotection commitments, including the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.  The Commission should \n \n17 MISO never explains what it means by “overallocation,” but it appears to refer to double allocating headroom \nto projects in both the DPP and in LARS. \n18 Transmittal at 13. \n19 Id. at 12-13, 20. \n20 Id. at 20 (“The models from LARS and the DPP process will be reconciled through MTEP.”)."},{"page":7,"startToken":1895,"endToken":2236,"text":"-7- \nrequire MISO to adopt mechanisms that protect against this result before concluding that LARS is \njust and reasonable.  For example, LARS could be modified to use more conservative \nassumptions—e.g., accounting for DPP requests that have reached an advanced stage, such as \nDecision Point II, or explicitly stating that concurrent Large Load study requests (i.e., those in the \nsame project review cycle) are likewise included in the LARS study assumptions—so that MISO \navoids “overallocating” transmission headroom.  This, in turn, would ensure that large load \ncustomers and their paired generators internalize the risk of inaccurate load and generation studies \nrather than leaving residential customers on the hook for transmission infrastructure needed to \nserve large loads.21  Together, rigorous study assumptions and high commercial readiness \nrequirements would allow MISO to study LARS requests based on a more accurate snapshot of \nthe grid, which would protect existing customers from bearing the costs of transmission projects \npushed into the MTEP process.  Although, as noted below, a sufficiently rigorous agreement to \nprevent cost shifting could address these concerns, the absence of any such agreement for the \nCommission to review in the record of this proceeding prevents the Commission from relying on \nit to find the proposal just and reasonable.   \nB. Without the Pro Forma Cost Shifting Agreement, the Commission Cannot Find \nLARS Just and Reasonable  \nMISO’s forthcoming pro forma cost shifting agreement could address some of the cost \nallocation issues identified above.  But the Commission cannot know for certain until MISO files \nthat agreement with the Commission.  MISO states that “a pro forma cost shifting agreement will \n \n21 Further, resolving LARS-driven constraints with future MTEP projects is, at the very least, in tension with the \npremise of LARS.  Indeed, as MISO itself explains, one benefit of a coordinated study is that it identifies an optimized \nset of upgrades.  See id. at 15.  But if LARS-driven constraints are instead discovered later and resolved through future \nMTEP projects, the resulting upgrades are developed in the piecemeal fashion that holistic planning is meant to avoid."},{"page":8,"startToken":2236,"endToken":2568,"text":"-8- \nneed to be executed and any new terms in transmission services agreements will need to be met.” 22  \nBut that statement raises more questions than it answers.  Without information on what the pro \nforma will cover or how it will work, the Commission cannot be sure that it will, in fact, work to \nprotect residential and other commercial customers from bearing at least some of the costs \nassociated with new large loads.  Accordingly, even though MISO states that the cost shifting \nagreement will be submitted in a separate section 205 filing by November 16, 2026, and that LARS \n“can be implemented based on the Tariff revisions filed herein and need not await these future \nfilings,”23 the Commission cannot determine that LARS is just and reasonable because the record \nlacks such a key piece of the puzzle.24 \nThat leaves the Commission with two options to address the cost-shift concerns.  It could \nreject the LARS proposal outright with direction to MISO that if it refiles LARS it must contain \nadequate protections against cost shifting, including any pro forma agreement.  Alternatively, \nbecause MISO states that the pro forma cost shifting agreement will be filed in November, the \nCommission could accept and suspend the proposal and consolidate it with the MISO Large Load \nShow Cause proceeding, in order to evaluate the proposal together with the cost shifting \nagreement.  Either way, Google urges the Commission to direct MISO toward future \nimplementation of a refined LARS process that mitigates the identified cost-shifting concerns, \nwhile enabling the benefits that such a process would deliver. \n \n22 Id. at 14. \n23 Id. at 14 n.66. \n24 See Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“When acting on a public \nutility’s rate filing under section 205, the Commission undertakes ‘an essentially passive and reactive role’ and \nrestricts itself to evaluating the confined proposal.” (quoting City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 875-76 (D.C. \nCir. 1984) (emphasis added))."},{"page":9,"startToken":2568,"endToken":2887,"text":"-9- \nC. LARS Opens the Door to Undue Discrimination  \nFinally, Google is concerned that LARS opens the door to undue discrimination and could \nundermine core open access principles by making load-serving entities (“LSEs”) the gatekeepers \nof the LARS process.  Under MISO’s proposal, LARS applications must be submitted through a \ndesignated LARS Associated Transmission Customer, which MISO indicates is typically the LSE. \nThis appears to give LSEs discretion to determine whether and under what circumstances to submit \na LARS application because it gives the LSE the central role of submitting applications, with no \nguardrails should an LSE simply decline to submit an application on behalf of an independent \ngenerator.  This concern is particularly acute given that many of the states within MISO’s footprint \nare vertically integrated, and vertically integrated utilities have a structural incentive to favor their \ngenerators over those that are independently owned.25 While Google recognizes that LSEs have \nan obligation to serve load and are responsible for submitting load study requests, making LSEs \ngatekeepers for the LARS process will unnecessarily restrict supply available to serve new large \nloads, particularly where independent generators have direct offtake arrangements with loads. \nGoogle encourages FERC to provide targeted guidance to MISO to modify the proposal to include \nprotections providing that all forms of generation, including independent generation, have \nnondiscriminatory, direct access to the expedited generation interconnection study process under \nLARS.  This could include requirements to file a LARS application that meets objective criteria, \nan ability for independent generators to secure Commission resolution of disputes with the relevant \nLSE, similar to how the Commission resolves unexecuted generator interconnection agreements, \nor an alternative mechanism that addresses these concerns.  \n \n25 Cf. Am. Clean Power Ass’n v. FERC, 54 F.4th 722, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (explaining that “a majority of \nMISO-region transmission owners also generation facilities,” which gives rise to a risk that those vertically integrated \ntransmission owners could engage in undue discrimination)."},{"page":10,"startToken":2887,"endToken":2957,"text":"-10- \n \n \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n \n/s/ Brian George \nBrian George \nSr. Lead, US Energy Markets  \nStephen Lindeman \nLead, Energy Market Development \nGoogle LLC \n655 New York Ave., NW \nWashington, DC 20001 \n(202) 999-0990 \nbriangeorge@google.com \nlindemans@google.com     \n \n                             \n \nMatt Christiansen \nBryan Shpall \nWilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati \n1700 K Street NW \nFifth Floor \nWashington, DC 20006 \n(617) 598-7871 \nmchristiansen@wsgr.com  \nbshpall@wsgr.com \n \nCounsel for Google LLC \n \nDated:  October 23, 2026"},{"page":11,"startToken":2957,"endToken":3016,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n \nI hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person \ndesignated on the official service lists compiled by the Secretary of the Commission in these \nproceedings. \n \nDated:  October 23, 2026 \nWashington, D.C. \n \n \n/s/ Bryan Shpall \nBryan Shpall \nWilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati \n1700 K Street NW \nFifth Floor \nWashington, DC 20006"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":4,"endAt":943,"startToken":0,"endToken":1026},{"p":4,"at":943,"title":"A. The LARS Proposal Opens the Door to Shifting the Costs of Serving LARS Pairs onto Other Customers and Future MTEP Cycles","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":7,"endAt":1380,"startToken":1026,"endToken":2103},{"p":7,"at":1380,"title":"B. Without the Pro Forma Cost Shifting Agreement, the Commission Cannot Find LARS Just and Reasonable","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":9,"endAt":5,"startToken":2103,"endToken":2569},{"p":9,"at":5,"title":"C. LARS Opens the Door to Undue Discrimination","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":11,"endAt":0,"startToken":2569,"endToken":2957},{"p":11,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":11,"endAt":388,"startToken":2957,"endToken":3016}]}