{"document":{"slug":"answer-er27-25-consumer-advocates","title":"Six MISO-state consumer advocates answer in support of the Organization of MISO States","issued":"2026-11-12","accession":"20261112-5134","docket":"ER27-25-000","group":"MISO filings","filer":"Citizens Utility Board of Michigan and five other consumer advocates","kind":"answer","file":"sources/originals/20261112-5134_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20261112-5134","sha256":"246fc8b777aa54c68c2634c866f1b9c93fb513287132fc31b44446c8c299794f","pages":12,"tokens":3104,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":336,"text":"1 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \nMidcontinent Independent System \nOperator, Inc. \n) \n) \n) \n) \nDocket No. ER27-25-000 \nMOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND ANSWER OF MISO CONSUMER \nADVOCATES \nPursuant to the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory \nCommission (Commission or FERC), the Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin, the Citizens \nUtility Board of Minnesota, the Citizens Utility Board of Michigan, the Illinois Attorney \nGeneral’s Office, the Iowa Office of Consumer Advocates, and the Minnesota Department of \nCommerce (collectively, the MISO Consumer Advocates) respectfully submit this Motion for \nLeave to Answer and Answer in support of the comments filed by the Organization of MISO \nStates, Inc. (OMS) concerning the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) \nproposed Large Load Addition Resource Study (LARS) process.1 \nI. \nMOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER  \nAlthough the Commission’s rules do not require it to accept answers to protests or \nanswers, the Commission has discretion to do so, and regularly does when the information \nprovided in the proposed answer will assist the Commission in its decision-making process.2 \nGood cause exists for the Commission to accept this Answer because it will “clarify the \nissues in dispute” and will help the Commission “achieve a more complete and accurate record” \n \n1 Notice of Intervention and Comments of the Organization of MISO States, Inc. at 1-3, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. \nOperator, Inc., Docket No. ER27-25-000 (filed Oct. 23, 2026) (OMS Comments). \n2 See, e.g., Nev. Power Co., 190 FERC ¶ 61,096 at P 11 (2025) (“Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of \nPractice and Procedure . . . prohibits an answer to a protest or an answer unless otherwise ordered by the decisional \nauthority. We accept the answers filed in this proceeding because they have provided information that assisted us in \nour decision-making process.”) (citing 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2)); Great Basin Transmission, LLC, 190 FERC ¶ \n61,110 at P 26 (2025) (“We accept Great Basin’s answer because it has provided information that assisted us in our \ndecision-making process.”)"},{"page":2,"startToken":336,"endToken":664,"text":"2 \nin this proceeding.3 Further, consideration of this Answer will not delay Commission action.4 \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates thus request that the Commission accept this Answer and \nconsider their comments below. \nII. \nINTRODUCTION \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates represent residential and other ratepaying customers that \nultimately bear substantial portions of the costs of the generation and transmission systems \nserving the MISO region. From that perspective, the Consumer Advocates agree with OMS that \ncoordinated study of sufficiently mature, electrically proximate Large Loads and associated \ngeneration may provide meaningful efficiencies if appropriately designed.5 \nMISO has proposed safeguards intended to limit speculative projects and forecasted \ndemand, including application deposits, generator milestones, site-control requirements, binding \narrangements between associated generation and load, service deadlines, and continuing \nresponsibility for certain assigned Network Upgrade costs following withdrawal. Those \nprovisions should be required by FERC and adopted by MISO.6 \nBut they do not resolve the central ratepayer risk raised by OMS: transmission \ninvestments caused by a Large Load may ultimately be recovered from customers that neither \ncaused the investment nor receive commensurate benefits from it. \nMISO’s own filing confirms that risk. MISO explains that certain constraints identified \nthrough LARS may become Baseline Reliability Projects (BRPs) or Other Projects through the \nMISO Transmission Expansion Plan (MTEP). The costs attributable to one Transmission \n \n3 Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 93 FERC ¶ 61,017, at 61,036 (2000) \n(accepting an answer that was “helpful in the development of the record”).   \n4 Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 FERC ¶ 61,198, at P 5 n.3 (2012) (finding good cause to accept an unauthorized \nanswer where it “[did] not delay the proceeding, may assist the Commission in understanding the issues raised, and \nwill ensure a complete record.”) (citations omitted).   \n5 OMS Comments at 3-5. \n6 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Large Load Addition Resource Study Process, Transmittal Letter at 8-10, \n16, 25, 34-36, Docket No. ER27-25-000 (filed Oct. 2, 2026) (MISO Transmittal)."},{"page":3,"startToken":664,"endToken":941,"text":"3 \nCustomer seeking service on behalf of a single large load could then be allocated under existing \nTariff rules, likely to the broader load in the transmission pricing zone where the upgrade is \nrequired. MISO expressly describes that result as a “cost shift” consistent with its existing \nprocesses.7 \nThat explanation reinforces rather than resolves the concern of the MISO Consumer \nAdvocates and OMS. The Commission instituted the related show-cause proceeding because it \npreliminarily found that MISO’s existing Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable insofar as it \ndoes not adequately protect transmission customers against cost shifts resulting from Large Load \nintegration. Compliance with an existing cost-allocation process therefore does not establish that \nthe resulting allocation is just and reasonable when a discrete but extraordinary Large Load such \nas a data center has caused or materially accelerated the underlying investment.8 \nThe Commission should condition acceptance of LARS on protections that preserve cost \ncausation, prevent construction of a project before the associated cost-recovery framework is \napproved, require an actual electrically-proximate relationship between associated generation \nand load, and provide appropriate review when material changes undermine the assumptions \nsupporting identified transmission investments.  These conditions are necessary to prevent \nstranded investment and to enable the States and consumer representatives to have the \ninformation necessary to adopt rates that reflect cost causation. \nIII. \nLARS SHOULD PRESERVE COST CAUSATION THROUGH \nSUBSEQUENT PLANNING AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESSES \nOMS appropriately recommends that costs caused by Large Load integration remain \nattributable to the responsible Large Load regardless of whether the resulting transmission \n \n7 MISO Transmittal at 12-14 (quotation at 13). \n8 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at ¶¶ 66-83, 43-53 (2026) (Show Cause Order)."},{"page":4,"startToken":941,"endToken":1225,"text":"4 \nsolution subsequently proceeds through MTEP, Expedited Project Review, generator \ninterconnection, or another planning process.9 \nMISO’s proposed methodology demonstrates why that protection is necessary. Mitigation \nto address violations observed only in the generation study generally would be assigned to the \nInterconnection Customer as a Generator Interconnection Project. By contrast, mitigation to \naddress violations found in the transmission study, including common violations found in both \nthe load and generation studies, may become BRPs or Other Projects. That classification may \nmaterially affect who ultimately pays for the investment.10 \nFor ratepayer-protection purposes, the inquiry should begin with cost causation, not the \nplanning label subsequently assigned to the facility. If a LARS Associated Load causes or \nmaterially accelerates the need for a transmission investment, or the investment would not be \nmade “but for” the Large Load, classification of that investment as a BRP, Other Project, or \nanother MTEP project should not erase the causal relationship or allow the costs to be assigned \nto customers who did not cause and do not benefit from the investment. \nThe Commission should therefore require MISO to identify and preserve that relationship \nthroughout the planning process. Where a LARS participant causes or materially accelerates an \ninvestment, the attributable costs should remain the responsibility of that participant except to the \nextent MISO demonstrates that broader allocation is independently justified by identifiable \nbenefits to other customers.  A key inquiry is whether the investment would have been made \n“but for” the Large Load’s need. \nThis does not mean every facility identified in connection with LARS must automatically \nbe directly assigned to a Large Load. A project may address preexisting system needs or provide \n \n9 OMS Comments at 5-7. \n10 MISO Transmittal at 12, 31-32."},{"page":5,"startToken":1225,"endToken":1513,"text":"5 \nsubstantial regional or local benefits. But broader allocation should follow from demonstrated \ncost causation and benefits, not merely from a later change in project classification.11 \nIV. \nLARS SHOULD NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL BEFORE THE \nASSOCIATED COST-RECOVERY PROTECTIONS ARE APPROVED \nMISO acknowledges that the LARS process ultimately will require a pro forma cost-\nshifting agreement and additional transmission-service provisions for Large Loads. Those \nprovisions, however, were not included in the LARS filing and remain under development for \nsubmission in a separate proceeding. MISO nevertheless maintains that LARS can be \nimplemented without awaiting Commission consideration of those protections.12 \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates respectfully disagree. The cost-recovery agreement is \nnot an incidental administrative component of LARS. It is the mechanism intended to protect \ncustomers against one of the principal risks created by accelerated Large Load integration: \nconstruction of transmission facilities in reliance on projected demand that is delayed, reduced, \nor never materializes, and to provide supplemental payments when Network Upgrades needed \nfor a large load create cost shift to other customers. \nThe Show Cause Order preliminarily found that MISO’s Tariff may be deficient because \nit lacks an adequate pro forma cost-recovery agreement addressing transmission investments \nassociated with Large Loads. The Commission specifically contemplated financial commitments \nand credit support sufficient to reduce the risk that other transmission customers would be left \npaying for those investments.13 \nThe Commission should not approve the mechanism that accelerates transmission \ninvestment decisions before it can evaluate the mechanism intended to protect customers from \nthe resulting financial exposure. Implementation of LARS should therefore be conditioned upon \n \n11 See Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at ¶¶ 79-80, 51-52. \n12 MISO Transmittal at 14, 19-20. \n13 Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at ¶¶ 78-83, 49-53."},{"page":6,"startToken":1513,"endToken":1736,"text":"6 \nCommission acceptance of an enforceable Large Load cost-recovery and financial-security \nframework applicable to LARS participants, as well as mandatory operational rules including \nvoltage ride-through standards and power-swing mitigation requirements tailored to high-density \ndata center and large loads. \nV. \nMISO’S READINESS AND WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS DO NOT \nRESOLVE THE COST-CAUSATION ISSUE \nMISO’s proposed readiness and withdrawal provisions are meaningful. Among other \nmeasures, MISO proposes a $250,000 nonrefundable application deposit, a $30,000/MW \ngenerator milestone, 100 percent site control, binding generation-load arrangements, service \ndeadlines, financial-security requirements, and continuing responsibility for certain Network \nUpgrade costs following withdrawal or termination.14 \nThese provisions reduce the risk presented by speculative or insufficiently mature \nprojects. They do not, however, determine which costs should be assigned to a LARS participant \nin the first instance. \nFinancial assurance and cost causation perform different functions. Financial assurance \nhelps ensure that an entity can satisfy costs properly assigned to it. Cost-causation rules \ndetermine what costs should be assigned to that entity. If a Large Load-driven constraint is \nclassified for broader recovery before the financial security is utilized, even complete \nenforcement of the financial security withdrawal provisions will not prevent the underlying cost \nshift. \nLARS requires both meaningful financial assurance and rules that preserve responsibility \nfor costs caused or materially accelerated by participating projects. \n \n14 MISO Transmittal at 8-10, 15-17, 25, 33-36, 41-44."},{"page":7,"startToken":1736,"endToken":2013,"text":"7 \nVI. \nSAME-LRZ MEMBERSHIP DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE \nELECTRICAL PROXIMITY NECESSARY FOR SPECIALIZED \nTREATMENT \nOMS also correctly questions MISO’s use of LRZ boundaries to establish proximity \nbetween a LARS Associated Load and associated generation. Facilities within one LRZ may \nremain geographically and electrically remote from one another.15 \nMISO explains that the LRZ standard aligns with its resource-adequacy construct, avoids \ncapacity import and export limitations between LRZs, accommodates large or landlocked loads, \nand allows multiple generation points of interconnection to support one load. Those \nconsiderations may help determine whether generation contributes to resource adequacy within \nan LRZ. They do not necessarily establish electrical proximity.16 \nThe Show Cause Order described an “electrically proximate large load” in functional \ntransmission-system terms. The relevant question is whether the load is sufficiently close to the \ngenerator’s requested point of interconnection that their combined transmission-system impact, \napart from the connecting facilities, is effectively the same as if they were located at the same \nsubstation. The Commission identified a Large Load located no more than two substations from \nthe generator as one example.17 \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates do not recommend converting that example into an \ninflexible geographic rule. MISO may reasonably develop an approach suited to its transmission \nsystem. But the standard should remain electrical, rather than merely geographic or \nadministrative. \nMISO should be required to demonstrate through the LARS study that associated \ngeneration materially offsets the Large Load at the relevant transmission constraints and that the \npair meets explicit quantitative engineering criteria—such as a maximum electrical \n \n15 OMS Comments at 8. \n16 MISO Transmittal at 10-11, 20-22, 28-29. \n17 Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 112, 67."},{"page":8,"startToken":2013,"endToken":2291,"text":"8 \ndistance/impedance threshold or a maximum physical distance of no more than two substations--\nnecessary to justify coordinated and expedited treatment. Same-LRZ membership should not be \nconsidered “proximity” and should not alone establish eligibility. \nVII. \nMATERIAL CHANGES SHOULD TRIGGER REVIEW OF \nCONTINUING NEED AND COST RESPONSIBILITY \nMISO proposes that there will be no LARS restudy when an Associated Load withdraws. \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates recognize that routine comprehensive restudies could \nundermine the speed and predictability LARS is intended to provide.18 \nBut categorical elimination of restudy presents the opposite risk. MISO proposes to \nevaluate the cumulative effects of participating projects and allow subsequent studies to rely on \ntransmission facilities identified in earlier LARS studies. Withdrawal, material downsizing, or \nfailure of a participating load or generator may therefore change the need for, scope of, timing \nof, or beneficiaries of an identified transmission investment.  Large load projects that require \nhundreds of megawatts of power can materially affect the need for transmission investment and \nchanges in those projects should be readily incorporated into transmission planning. \nThe Commission need not require automatic repetition of the entire LARS study. It \nshould instead require a materiality review following a withdrawal, material downsizing, or other \nsignificant change. MISO should determine and document whether the change: \n1. eliminates or materially reduces the need for an identified upgrade; \n2. changes its appropriate scope or timing; \n3. alters the projects responsible for the underlying constraint; or \n4. materially affects the proper allocation of costs. \nWhere the change is material, MISO should perform a targeted restudy sufficient to \nconfirm the continuing need, appropriate scope, and cost responsibility for the affected facilities. \n \n18 MISO Transmittal at 16, 38, 48."},{"page":9,"startToken":2291,"endToken":2540,"text":"9 \nVIII. TRANSPARENCY AND PERIODIC REVIEW ARE NECESSARY TO \nPROTECT RATEPAYERS \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates support OMS’s recommendations concerning public \nreporting and a five-year sunset.19 \nTransparency should permit regulators and consumer advocates to trace a LARS-driven \ntransmission investment from the initial study through MTEP approval, reclassification, \nconstruction, final cost determination, allocation, and recovery. Without that traceability, \nstakeholders may be unable to determine whether a facility originally driven by a LARS \nparticipant later appears under a different project designation or rate treatment.  Transparency \nand traceability are thus required to ensure proper cost allocation to protect existing customers. \nMISO should therefore assign a persistent identifier or use an equivalent mechanism to \npreserve the connection between a LARS project and the facilities it causes or materially \naccelerates. \nA five-year sunset and formal review are also appropriate because MISO proposes LARS \nas a permanent process from its inception.20 \nBefore continuing LARS, MISO should report at least: \n• LARS applications, completed projects, and withdrawals; \n• forecast and actual Large Load additions; \n• transmission investments identified through LARS; \n• initial and subsequent project classifications; \n• estimated and final costs; \n• amounts recovered from LARS participants and other customers; \n• withdrawal-related materiality reviews and restudies; and \n• measurable effects on MISO’s ordinary generator interconnection process. \nIf LARS produces the efficiencies MISO anticipates while protecting existing customers, \ncontinuation should be supportable by that evidence. If it does not, customers should not be \nlocked into a permanent process adopted before its effects are known. \n \n19 OMS Comments at 8-10. \n20 MISO Transmittal at 11."},{"page":10,"startToken":2540,"endToken":2767,"text":"10 \nIX. \nCONCLUSION \nThe MISO Consumer Advocates support OMS’s central position. Coordinated study of \nmature Large Loads and genuinely associated, electrically proximate generation may provide \nmeaningful benefits. MISO has also proposed valuable project-readiness and financial-\ncommitment requirements that should remain part of any LARS framework the Commission \naccepts. \nBut MISO’s filing confirms that LARS can produce cost shifts under existing Tariff \nmechanisms, proposes implementation before the associated cost-recovery agreement is before \nthe Commission, relies on an LRZ construct that does not necessarily demonstrate electrical \nproximity, and categorically eliminates restudies following load withdrawal. \nThe Commission should condition acceptance and implementation of LARS upon: \n1. assignment of cost responsibility where a LARS participant causes or materially \naccelerates a transmission investment; \n2. prior Commission acceptance of an enforceable Large Load cost-recovery and financial-\nsecurity framework including technical power-quality operational rules; \n3. an engineering-based demonstration of electrical proximity bounded by quantitative \nimpedance or substation distance criteria; \n4. materiality review and targeted restudy following material project changes; \n5. transparent tracking of LARS-driven investments through planning and cost recovery; and \n6. a five-year sunset followed by a public, data-driven review. \nThese conditions would preserve the potential benefits of coordinated study while \nadhering to a basic consumer-protection principle: customers should not bear transmission costs \nor development risks merely because an expedited process causes those costs to move into a \ncategory subject to broader recovery."},{"page":11,"startToken":2767,"endToken":2998,"text":"11 \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ John Liskey \n  \nJohn Liskey  \nGeneral Counsel  \nCitizens Utility Board of Michigan  \n921 N. Washington Ave  \nLansing, MI 48906  \n(517) 913-5105  \nJohn.liskey@cubofmichigan.org \n \n \nFor the Citizens Utility Board of Michigan \n \n \n/s/ Anthony A. Alvarez  \nAnthony A. Alvarez  \nUtilities Regulation Engineer 2  \nIowa Attorney General  \nOffice of the Consumer Advocate  \n1375 East Court Avenue  \nDes Moines, IA  50319  \nAnthony.Alvarez@oca.iowa.gov  \n \n/s/ Jennifer C. Easler   \nJennifer C. Easler  \nAttorney  \nIowa Attorney General  \nOffice of the Consumer Advocate  \n1375 East Court Avenue  \nDes Moines, IA  50319  \njennifer.easler@oca.iowa.gov  \n \nFor the Iowa Office of the Consumer Advocate \n \n/s/ Corey Singletary  \nCorey Singletary \nDirector, Regulatory Affairs \nCitizens Utility Board of Wisconsin \n625 N. Segoe Rd., Suite 101 \nMadison, WI 53705 \nsingletary@cubwi.org \n \n/s/ Daniel Narvey \n \nDaniel Narvey \nGeneral Counsel \nCitizens Utility Board of Wisconsin \n625 N. Segoe Rd., Suite 101 \nMadison, WI 53705 \nnarvey@cubwi.org \n \nFor the Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin \n \n/s/ Brandon Crawford  \n \nBrandon Crawford \nRegulatory Advocate \nCitizens Utility Board of Minnesota \n332 Minnesota St., Suite W1360 \nSaint Paul, MN 55101 \nbrandonc@cubminnesota.org \n \n/s/ Samuel C. Lukens                                \nSamuel C. Lukens \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Utilities Bureau \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n115 South LaSalle Street, 25th Floor \nChicago, Illinois 60603 \nsamuel.lukens@ilag.gov \n \nFor the Citizens Utility Board of Minnesota \n \n \n \n \n \nFor the Office of the Illinois Attorney General"},{"page":12,"startToken":2998,"endToken":3104,"text":"12 \n/s/ Sydnie Lieb  \n  \nSydnie Lieb       \nAssistant Commissioner of Regulatory \nAffairs, Energy Resources Division   \nMinnesota Department of Commerce  \n85 7th Place East, Suite 280  \nSaint Paul, MN  55101    \nSydnie.Lieb@state.mn.us \n \n  \nFor the Minnesota Department of Commerce \n \n \n \nDated: November 11, 2026 \n \nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated \non the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \nDated at this 11th day of November 2026 \n/s/ Daniel Narvey \n \nDaniel Narvey \nGeneral Counsel \nCitizens Utility Board of Wisconsin \n625 N. Segoe Rd., Suite 101 \nMadison, WI 53705 \nnarvey@cubwi.org"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":912,"startToken":0,"endToken":128},{"p":1,"at":912,"title":"I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":215,"startToken":128,"endToken":369},{"p":2,"at":215,"title":"II. INTRODUCTION","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":2,"endAt":220,"startToken":369,"endToken":370},{"p":2,"at":220,"title":"INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":3,"endAt":1565,"startToken":370,"endToken":881},{"p":3,"at":1565,"title":"III. LARS SHOULD PRESERVE COST CAUSATION THROUGH SUBSEQUENT PLANNING AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESSES","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":5,"endAt":189,"startToken":881,"endToken":1252},{"p":5,"at":189,"title":"IV. LARS SHOULD NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL BEFORE THE ASSOCIATED COST-RECOVERY PROTECTIONS ARE APPROVED","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":6,"endAt":312,"startToken":1252,"endToken":1551},{"p":6,"at":312,"title":"V. MISO’S READINESS AND WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS DO NOT RESOLVE THE COST-CAUSATION ISSUE","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":7,"endAt":3,"startToken":1551,"endToken":1737},{"p":7,"at":3,"title":"VI. SAME-LRZ MEMBERSHIP DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE ELECTRICAL PROXIMITY NECESSARY FOR SPECIALIZED TREATMENT","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":8,"endAt":258,"startToken":1737,"endToken":2048},{"p":8,"at":258,"title":"VII. MATERIAL CHANGES SHOULD TRIGGER REVIEW OF CONTINUING NEED AND COST RESPONSIBILITY","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":9,"endAt":3,"startToken":2048,"endToken":2292},{"p":9,"at":3,"title":"VIII. TRANSPARENCY AND PERIODIC REVIEW ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT RATEPAYERS","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":10,"endAt":4,"startToken":2292,"endToken":2541},{"p":10,"at":4,"title":"IX. CONCLUSION","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":10,"endAt":9,"startToken":2541,"endToken":2542},{"p":10,"at":9,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":12,"endAt":318,"startToken":2542,"endToken":3041},{"p":12,"at":318,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":12,"endAt":710,"startToken":3041,"endToken":3104}]}
