{"document":{"slug":"filing-er27-506-caiso-large-loads","title":"CAISO files large-load tariff revisions under section 205 in response to the show cause order","issued":"2026-11-16","accession":"20261116-5179","docket":"ER27-506-000","group":"CAISO filings","filer":"California Independent System Operator Corporation","kind":"filing","file":"sources/originals/20261116-5179_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20261116-5179","sha256":"ca3237a5dfe7cff2a87445b260e851588c138a31b8dbc567f7b489557ee91571","pages":48,"tokens":20166,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":317,"text":"www.caiso.com     │     250 Outcropping Way, Folsom, CA 95630     │     916.351.4400 \n \nCalifornia Independent System Operator Corporation \n \nNovember 16, 2026 \n \n \n \nThe Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nSecretary  \nFederal Energy Regulatory Commission \n888 First Street, NE \nWashington, DC 20426 \n \n \nRe: \nCalifornia Independent System Operator Corporation \n \n \nDocket No. ER27- ___-000 \nLarge Loads Tariff Amendment  \nResponse to Order to Show Cause \n \nDear Secretary Reese: \n \nThe California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) \nsubmits this filing to (1) enhance its large load interconnection procedures \nthrough a tariff amendment, and (2) address the issues the Commission raises in \nits Order to Show Cause (Order).1 Taken together, the CAISO and Participating \nTransmission Owner (PTO) tariff revisions supply the tariff-level clarity, customer \nprotections, and operational tools the Order seeks. The result is a \ncomprehensive near-term response to the Order that can accelerate viable large \nload projects without compromising reliability, affordability, or open access. \n \nI.  \nExecutive Summary \n \n \nCalifornia and the West have an established framework for integrating \nnew load growth, including for data centers and other large loads. Through \ncoordinated resource planning, long-term procurement of clean and reliable \ngeneration, and an unprecedented expansion of the transmission system, the \nCAISO and its PTOs are working to ensure that new demand can be served \nwithout compromising reliability or affordability. This work entails close, careful \ncoordination with California’s principal energy agencies, the California Public \nUtilities Commission (CPUC) and the California Energy Commission (CEC), and \nlocal regulators across the West. It also recognizes that generation and \n \n1  \nThe CAISO submits this filing pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 \nU.S.C. § 824d, and Part 35 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 35. Capitalized terms \nnot otherwise defined herein have the meanings set forth in appendix A to the CAISO tariff, and \nreferences to specific tariff sections and appendices are references to sections and appendices in \nthe existing CAISO tariff unless otherwise specified."},{"page":2,"startToken":317,"endToken":734,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 2 \n \n \ntransmission are complementary investments: securing adequate generating \nresources is only valuable if those resources can be delivered where and when \nthey are needed. By planning both in tandem over longer time horizons, \nCalifornia’s framework supports continued investment in innovation, \nelectrification, and advanced computing infrastructure while maintaining a \nreliable, resilient, and increasingly carbon-free electric grid for all customers. \n \nThe CAISO and PTOs have complementary and clearly defined \nresponsibilities within this framework. The PTOs lead customer interconnection \nand the development, engineering, construction, and maintenance of the \ntransmission facilities needed to reliably serve new and expanding customers. \nFor more than a century, that work has enabled California’s growth, supporting \neverything from Silicon Valley and the State’s agricultural and industrial base to \nits ports, cities, and emerging centers of technological innovation. The CAISO \nbuilds on that foundation through independent, systemwide transmission \nplanning, coordination of interconnection and grid-development activities, and \nreliability oversight, evaluating individual projects and load additions in the \ncontext of the broader needs of California and the Western interconnected \nsystem. \n \nThe Commission’s Order asks whether the CAISO tariff remains just and \nreasonable as unprecedented large load growth tests utility tariffs nationwide. \nThe CAISO’s proposed reforms answer the Commission’s concerns through a \nframework tailored to the CAISO’s distinctive market design and the existing \ndivision of responsibility between the CAISO and its PTOs. The CAISO’s \nproposals constitute a major step toward enabling the timely development and \ninterconnection of data centers and other new large loads. The concepts \nproposed rest on a foundation of highly integrated planning and coordination \namong the CAISO, PTOs, State energy agencies, and local regulatory \nauthorities, and provide a framework upon which the PTOs will layer their own \nprocesses to serve new large loads while upholding and reinforcing the CAISO’s \ncommitment to reliability. The proposed reforms strengthen accountability and \nprotect existing customers. They improve transparency, operational visibility, \ntechnical standards, cost responsibility, and protection against speculative \ndevelopment. \n \nFirst, the CAISO and PTO tariff revisions create streamlined paths for \nlarge loads to interconnect to the transmission system while preserving the \nPTOs’ lead role in connecting and serving load. Standardized application \ninformation, deposits, milestones, study coordination, and service agreements \nwill make the process more transparent and predictable. A large load threshold \nand enhanced data requirements will give the CAISO and PTOs earlier visibility \ninto a project’s size, timing, operating profile, and potential system effects. \nCoordinated studies, technical standards, telemetry, modeling, ride-through, \nramping, power-quality, and other operating requirements will allow the CAISO to"},{"page":3,"startToken":734,"endToken":1100,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 3 \n \n \nidentify and mitigate reliability impacts before service begins and to operate the \ngrid reliably after the load comes online. \n \nSecond, the PTOs will implement just and reasonable deposit, security, \nreimbursement, and cost-recovery provisions in their own tariffs. Milestone and \nreadiness requirements will reduce the risk that speculative projects drive \npremature investment, and expanded reporting will provide greater transparency \ninto large load requests, study status, projected demand, required upgrades, and \ncost responsibility. Together, these measures align costs with beneficiaries and \ncost causers and reduce the risk that abandoned, delayed, or underutilized \nprojects leave other transmission customers paying for facilities built principally to \nserve a new large load. \n \nThird, the CAISO’s tariff revisions close any gaps presented by co-located \nand behind-the-meter arrangements. The CAISO clarifies their treatment and \nrequires generator interconnection customers to disclose plans to serve co-\nlocated load, enabling the CAISO to coordinate its generator studies with the \nPTOs’ load-interconnection review. The framework distinguishes service to load \nfrom generator interconnection service, preserves applicable transmission \ncharges and reliability obligations, and allocates upgrade costs based on the \nfacilities and service actually required. These provisions give load and generation \ndevelopers significant flexibility regardless of their planned configuration. The \nCAISO also has clarified how developers can submit new interconnection \nrequests or modify existing load or generation sites. \n \nFourth, the CAISO proposes new service options for flexible large loads \nthat can reduce consumption when transmission capability is unavailable. The \nCAISO’s Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) can permit earlier \nenergization while network upgrades are pending, enabling the PTOs to provide \nbespoke solutions to large loads based on their configurations and constraints. \nEligibility, study, metering, communications, dispatch, and compliance \nrequirements ensure that flexibility is real and operationally dependable rather \nthan assumed. FILI provides a near-term, prioritized solution for large load \ndevelopers, with additional work planned on permanent flexibility and other \nemerging configurations. \n \nCollectively, these tariff revisions will ensure the CAISO tariff remains just \nand reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential in the face of the \nchallenges the Commission identified in the Order associated with providing the \ntransmission service needed to serve the ongoing influx of large loads while \nmaintaining reliability and affordability."},{"page":4,"startToken":1100,"endToken":1513,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 4 \n \n \nII. \nBackground  \n \nA.  \nLarge Loads \n \nThe CAISO’s work on large loads has unfolded against a rapidly evolving \npolicy landscape. The CAISO’s initial focus was to address the most immediate \noperational challenges that could impact reliability. As the stakeholder initiative \nprogressed, the priorities and expectations of federal and State regulators for \nlarge load interconnections continued to develop. Through it all, the CAISO has \nsought to remain responsive to that evolving direction. The CAISO adjusted the \nscope and sequencing of its stakeholder process accordingly, while continuing to \nprovide stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to shape the proposals presented \nin this filing.  \n \n \nIn 2025, the CAISO began regular engagement with the PTOs and formed \na Large Load Technical Requirements Working Group (LLTRWG) to explore \npossible technical standards to ensure reliable operations as new large loads \ninterconnect to the CAISO system. The CAISO’s Issue Paper, posted in January \n2026, described current roles, considerations, and processes for large loads, \nincluding transmission and resource planning, transmission service offerings, \ncost allocation and responsibility, technical requirements and standards, \noperational requirements, and related issues.2 The CAISO has continued to \nmonitor and engage in State and federal regulatory discussions regarding large \nloads and explored central issues and procedural steps that require additional \ntransparency or new products. On June 15, 2026, the CAISO issued a Large \nLoads Technical Requirements Straw Proposal on behalf of the LLTRWG in \norder to stay ahead of any potential operational concerns that large loads may \npresent. As NERC’s work on large loads ramped up, the LLTRWG focused on \nresponding to NERC alerts and inquiries to help share eventual reliability \nstandards. \n \nOn June 18, 2026, the CAISO and PTOs received the Order to Show \nCause with the other ISO/RTOs.3 The CAISO immediately re-scoped its large \nload stakeholder initiative to work with stakeholders to address each issue in the \nOrder. The CAISO’s work included weekly coordination meetings with all of its \nPTOs, and continuous discussions with local regulators and stakeholders. \nSeveral major large load developers participated actively in the CAISO’s \nstakeholder process, including Google, Microsoft, Tesla, and the California Large \nEnergy Consumers Association. The CAISO received written comments on its \nproposal to address the Order from the following parties: American Clean Power-\n \n2  \nSee CAISO Large Loads Issue Paper at https://www.caiso.com/documents/issue-paper-\nlarge-load-consideration-jan-20-2026.pdf. \n3  \nOrder Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 195 FERC ¶ \n61,214 (2026) (Order to Show Cause)."},{"page":5,"startToken":1513,"endToken":1896,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 5 \n \n \nCalifornia, AltaGas, Antora Energy, Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group, \nCalifornia Community Choice Association, the California Department of Water \nResources – State Water Project, the California Large Energy Consumers \nAssociation, the CPUC, the Public Advocates Office of the CPUC, the California \nSolar and Storage Association, Constellation, Google, GridLiance West, IGNIS \nEnergy USA, Independent Energy Producers Association, KritiGrid, Lotus \nInfrastructure Partners, LS Power Grid California and DesertLink, Microsoft, \nNextEra Energy Resources, Northern California Power Agency, Pacific Gas and \nElectric Company, Pattern Energy, Persistence Analytics, Power Applications \nand Research Systems, San Diego Gas and Electric, the Six Cities,4 Solar \nEnergy Industries Association, Southern California Edison, State Water \nContractors, SunZia Transmission, Tesla, Trimark Associates, Valley Electric \nAssociation, Viridon California, and Voltus. These parties and more also \nparticipated on the CAISO’s public stakeholder calls and tariff development \nprocess.5 Stakeholders overwhelmingly support the CAISO’s final proposal as \napproved by the CAISO Board of Governors.6  \n \nIndependent of this proceeding, the CAISO’s work with stakeholders and \nregulators continues, and with cause for optimism. As described in the CAISO’s \n30-day informational report on resource sufficiency to serve large loads,7 current \nState planning forecasts and procurement trajectories indicate that California can \naccommodate the large load growth reflected in the adopted demand forecast, \nprovided planned resource additions, procurement and transmission \ndevelopment continue to materialize. As of January 2026, the CEC forecasts that \ndata center load in the CAISO-managed grid will increase by 1.8 GW by 2030 \nand 4.7 GW by 2035.8 The CAISO also is aware that utilities are receiving an \nincreasing number of large load interconnection and service applications, and is \ncommitted to staying ahead of the curve, with the timely serving of new energy \ndemand reliably and affordably. To date, California’s integrated resource \nplanning efforts have resulted in more than 37 GW of nameplate new generation \n \n4  \nThe cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, California are \nCAISO PTOs and metered subsystems (MSS).  \n5  \nhttps://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/StakeholderInitiatives/Large-loads.  \n6  \nhttps://www.caiso.com/about/governance-committees.  \n7  \nSee Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency at \nhttps://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-\nloads-el26-71.pdf.  \n8  \nCalifornia Energy Demand 2025 Hourly Forecast – CAISO – Planning Scenario: \nhttps://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=268127&DocumentContentId=105135."},{"page":6,"startToken":1896,"endToken":2277,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 6 \n \n \nand storage capacity coming online to serve CAISO load since 2020.9 The close \ncoordination between the CAISO, State agencies, and local regulatory authorities \non demand forecasts and resource planning provides a pathway for proactive \ntransmission planning that anticipates emerging large load growth by aligning \nthat growth with commensurate resource and infrastructure development to serve \nnew loads. This will enable the CAISO to accommodate growth reliably and \naffordably.  \n \n \nThe CAISO and PTOs coordinated closely throughout the development of \ntheir respective proposals. Consistent with their distinct tariff responsibilities and \ngovernance processes, each entity developed and submitted its own tariff \nrevisions. The CAISO’s proposals are designed to complement the PTOs’ filings \nwhile preserving the existing allocation of responsibilities. \n \nB. \nKey CAISO Differences  \n \n1. \nCapacity Requirements \n \nThe CAISO’s approach to large loads differs from approaches advanced \nin other ISO/RTO regions because the CAISO does not condition large load \ninterconnection on a requirement to “bring your own generation.” Rather than \nrequiring each new large load to develop or procure a matching increment of \ndedicated generation, California addresses supply adequacy through coordinated \nlong term demand forecasting, integrated resource planning, resource \nprocurement, and transmission planning. These processes are designed to \nanticipate new demand and develop the resources and delivery infrastructure \nneeded to serve it. Continued generation and storage additions are expected to \nsupport forecast load growth, subject to timely procurement and project \ndevelopment. As such, the CAISO currently can accommodate large loads \nwithout making each customer’s energization and transmission service \ncontingent on completion of a separate generation project. At the same time, the \nCAISO recognizes that resource sufficiency depends on the realization of \nplanned additions, and large loads may develop faster than forecast or \nprocurement processes anticipate. For this reason, the CAISO continually works \nwith the California energy agencies on forecasting, procurement, and planning.10  \nThe CAISO will continue assessing whether new loads create incremental \nreliability risks; however, at this time, a bring-your-own generation requirement is \nnot a condition for interconnection or transmission service.  \n \n \n9  \nSee CPUC Resource Tracking Data Reports at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-\ntopics/electrical-energy/summer-2021-reliability/tracking-energy-development/cpuc-resource-\ntracking-data-reports.  \n10  \nThe CAISO describes its resource adequacy framework and current load and supply \nforecasts in the 30-day Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency."},{"page":7,"startToken":2277,"endToken":2727,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 7 \n \n \nThis distinction can remove an important barrier to timely service: a large \nload customer need not independently secure new generating capacity or satisfy \na separate CAISO forward-capacity-market requirement as a condition of \ninterconnection. The CAISO has no centralized forward capacity market; instead, \nserving load remains subject to the resource adequacy obligations applicable to \nits load-serving entity (LSE) and the requirements of the relevant local regulatory \nauthority. The absence of a customer-specific generation requirement therefore \ndoes not eliminate advance capacity procurement obligations or guarantee \nimmediate service at every location. Large loads must still complete applicable \ninterconnection studies, satisfy technical and operating requirements, and fund or \nawait required facilities and network upgrades. The resulting framework \nfacilitates access to the shared grid without requiring a one-for-one pairing of \neach new load with new generation, while preserving the planning, procurement, \nand cost-responsibility safeguards necessary to protect reliability and existing \ncustomers. This framework has enabled the construction of many data centers, \nincluding those supporting Silicon Valley, for several years. \n \nThis distinction also explains why the CAISO does not propose to replicate \ngeneration-linked mechanisms developed or proposed in other ISO/RTO regions. \nWhere a large load’s access to service depends on identifying sufficient \nincremental generation, special arrangements may be needed to pair the load \nwith a generating project, coordinate their development schedules, or condition \nthe load’s operation on the availability of designated supply. Those arrangements \naddress a constraint that the CAISO’s framework does not impose: a large load \ncustomer need not sponsor a corresponding generation project to obtain \ninterconnection. Adopting mechanisms whose principal purpose is to satisfy or \nprovide an exception to that requirement would therefore add complexity without \nremoving a comparable barrier to service in the CAISO. The relevant question is \nnot whether another region has adopted a particular innovation, but whether the \ncondition that makes that innovation necessary exists under the CAISO’s market \nand regulatory framework. \n \nThe CAISO’s proposed reforms in the instant filing instead focus on the \nconstraints that actually govern a large load’s ability to interconnect and operate \nreliably: available transmission capability, timely completion of necessary \nupgrades, adequate visibility into load characteristics, enforceable operating \nrequirements, and appropriate cost responsibility. A flexible interim \ninterconnection arrangement, for example, can address a transmission \nbottleneck by allowing earlier energization subject to operating limits while \nupgrades are completed; it need not also function as a bridge until the \ncustomer’s dedicated generation enters service. This does not eliminate the \nserving LSE’s resource adequacy obligations or the need to plan and procure \nsufficient supply. It means that those obligations remain within the existing \nplanning and procurement framework, rather than becoming a separate, \ncustomer-specific generation-matching condition layered onto the load"},{"page":8,"startToken":2727,"endToken":3089,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 8 \n \n \ninterconnection process. As explained in detail in the CAISO’s Informational \nReport on Resource Sufficiency, the CAISO will continue to assess reliability and \ncapacity needs presented by large load growth with stakeholders, PTOs, LSEs, \nand State energy agencies. \n \n2. \nEligible Customers and Order No. 888 \n \nSimilarly, the CAISO’s framework for providing transmission access differs \nfrom the traditional Order No. 888 model. First, the CAISO does not use the \n“Eligible Customer” construct in any significant way. The very few references to \nEligible Customer in the CAISO tariff are merely catch-alls to prescribe that all \nmarket participants use a scheduling coordinator to interact with the markets.11 \nSecond, the CAISO does not offer specific transmission services. As the \nCommission stated in the Order to Show Cause: \n \nUnlike other regions, CAISO does not offer traditional Order No. \n888 network and point-to-point transmission services, offers no \nfirm, long-term transmission reservations of capacity, and does not \nprovide a formal application process for transmission service. \nInstead, CAISO offers a single “daily” transmission service that is \navailable to all Eligible Customers on a day-to-day basis. All energy \nthat is transmitted under CAISO’s Tariff that is not associated with \nhistorical rights or certain wheeling transactions is treated as “new \nfirm use,” and those accessing the CAISO-controlled transmission \nsystem cannot reserve transmission capacity beyond the day-\nahead time frame.12  \n \nIn other words, transmission service is assumed in the sales of energy and \nancillary services. Stakeholders agreed with the suggestions in the Commission’s \nOrder that large loads do not warrant reforming how the CAISO complies with \nOrder No. 888, which has remained unchanged for 30 years. As such, the \nCAISO’s compliance focuses on achieving the Order’s goals without redesigning \ntransmission service or creating a centralized capacity market for the first time in \nthe CAISO. The CAISO’s reforms thus provide interconnection services to enable \nlarge loads to interconnect to the transmission system expeditiously, and without \njeopardizing reliability or just and reasonable rates.  \n \n \n11  \nSee, e.g., Sections 2.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.2.1, 4.5.4.6.1 of the CAISO tariff. \n12  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 19."},{"page":9,"startToken":3089,"endToken":3570,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 9 \n \n \n3. \nAllocation of Responsibilities \n \nThe Commission’s Order does not require the CAISO and its PTOs to \nreallocate their existing responsibilities for interconnecting and serving load.13 \nThe Commission expressly stated it recognizes that the PTOs are responsible for \nconducting load interconnection studies, the Commission “appreciate[s] that this \nrole may stem from how CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners \nallocated rights and responsibilities in the governing documents establishing \nCAISO,” and that the Commission “do[es] not seek to alter that allocation of \nrights and responsibilities.”14 Rather than requiring a reallocation of responsibility \nbetween the CAISO and PTO tariffs, the Order identifies a need for greater clarity \nand consistency in the applicable tariffs, including a clear identification of the \nentity responsible for studying service to large loads. The distinction is important: \naddressing potential gaps in the governing procedures does not require \ntransferring the load interconnection study function from the PTOs to the CAISO. \nStakeholders’ preference was for the existing framework to remain in place, with \nthe PTOs administering load interconnection requests and performing the \nassociated studies under their tariffs, coordinated with the CAISO’s transmission \nplanning, generator interconnection, and system reliability responsibilities. The \nnecessary reforms can make those complementary roles explicit and improve \ncoordination without centralizing all interconnection functions in the CAISO tariff. \n \nAlthough the PTOs will conduct load interconnection studies under their \ntariffs, the CAISO will play a pivotal role as the balancing authority and planning \ncoordinator for the CAISO area in reviewing those studies. Because each PTO \nstudies requests on its own system, the CAISO is uniquely positioned to evaluate \nstudy results in the context of the integrated grid, including the transmission \nfacilities of other PTOs, pending generation, and the CAISO’s approved \ntransmission plans. In its role, the CAISO will review PTO load interconnection \nstudies to confirm that study assumptions, load characteristics, and results are \nconsistent with the CAISO’s planning models and long-term plans. Most \nimportantly, the CAISO will identify any PTO-proposed solution that could create \nreliability risk, whether because it relies on an operating measure that cannot be \ndependably implemented, it shifts or exacerbates constraints elsewhere on the \nsystem, or it is inconsistent with the CAISO’s planning and operational needs. \n \nThe same distinction applies to cost responsibility. Preserving the existing \nallocation of functions allows the PTOs’ tariffs to continue to set forth the \n \n13  \nSee, e.g., Order to Show Cause at PP 37, 40, 51, 86. The CAISO also recognizes that \nthe Order implicates various types of PTOs, including non-load-serving PTOs and approved \nproject sponsors that could be impacted by large load interconnection requests but are not LSEs \nand do not have retail interconnection tariffs. The CAISO expects the PTOs to work together to \nclarify and develop complementary roles and responsibilities in their respective tariffs regarding \nrequests for interconnections to non-load-serving PTO facilities. \n14  \nId. at P 51."},{"page":10,"startToken":3570,"endToken":4038,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 10 \n \n \napplicable rules for assigning and recovering the costs of facilities needed to \ninterconnect and serve large loads. The CAISO, meanwhile, retains independent \nresponsibility for evaluating systemwide reliability, transmission planning, and \noperational consequences. The CAISO, PTOs, and stakeholders believe this is \nthe prudent approach because many of the PTOs have a direct relationship with \ntheir retail ratepayers and the regulators of those ultimate rates, including the \nCPUC. Likewise, it is the PTOs that will construct and own the network upgrades \nif required for the large load interconnection. As such, the CAISO does not \npropose to issue a new “top-down” cost allocation solution through its own tariff. \nThe CAISO believes that the PTOs may develop their own proposals to address \nany cost shifting concerns raised in the Order, and that the current transmission \nrevenue requirement and credit mechanisms in the transmission access charges \ncan accommodate those proposals.  \n \nThe PTOs worked in good faith to establish consistent cost allocation rules \nin their tariffs; however, there is little case law or Commission precedent to guide \nwhat constitutes just and reasonable rates for large loads specifically. Such \nprecedent will likely come from these responses to the Order to Show Cause, \noffering greater regulatory certainty in the future. If the Commission requires \nadditional tariff provisions or greater uniformity, the CAISO is prepared to work \nwith the PTOs and stakeholders to develop an appropriate response consistent \nwith the existing allocation of responsibilities.  \n \n4. \nNon-jurisdictional Transmission Owners \n \nThe Order was directed to the CAISO and all its PTOs; however, the Order \nstated that if a non-public utility wished to be removed from the proceeding, the \nCommission would rescind the Order against them. In such a case, the \nCommission “expected CAISO to respond to this order regarding the non-public \nutility’s CAISO tariff provisions on file with the Commission.”15 Based on this \ndirection, the CAISO’s non-public utilities requested the Commission rescind the \nOrder, which the Commission granted.16 Importantly, these PTOs explained that \ntheir exits from the proceeding were not simply a legal issue, but that these PTOs \nwere generally unlikely to receive large load interconnection requests, and as \nsuch, did not require tariff revisions. Morongo Transmission, for example, \nexplained that it is a non-load-serving PTO, and has no end users. The Six Cities \nsimilarly explained that their facilities and transmission entitlements in the CAISO \ngenerally represent shares of jointly-owned facilities with other transmission \n \n15  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 2 n. 9.  \n16  \nSpecifically, the Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, \nCalifornia (Six Cities); and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Morongo \nTransmission—wholly owned by the Morongo Band of Mission Indians, a federally recognized \nAmerican Indian Tribe exercising jurisdiction over the Morongo Indian Reservation—also filed for \nrescission on August 12, 2026."},{"page":11,"startToken":4038,"endToken":4449,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 11 \n \n \nowners. WAPA likewise explained only a portion of its Path 15 line, between two \nPG&E substations, is under the CAISO’s operational control.  \n \nThe CAISO thus believes that its tariff revisions, combined with the \nanticipated tariff revisions of the other PTOs in this proceeding, satisfy the Order. \nTogether, they will cover the transmission lines and substations in the CAISO \nwhere large loads will interconnect to the transmission system.  \n \nIII. \nTariff Revisions and Order to Show Cause  \n \nAlthough the CAISO believes the tariff revisions in this filing do not \nsubstantially affect Order Nos. 888, 1000, 2003, 792, 845, 2023, or 1920 policies, \nthe CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions meet both the just and reasonable standard \nand the independent entity standard. The tariff revisions address issues unique \nto the CAISO, and were generally designed to work without significant conflict \nwith the CAISO’s tariff provisions modeled on the Commission’s pro forma Open \nAccess Transmission Tariff and Large Generator Interconnection Procedures. \nThe proposed tariff revisions build upon the CAISO tariff with independent entity \nvariations previously accepted by the Commission.  \n \nA. \nTransmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large \nLoads \n \n1. \nDefinition and Applicability \n \nThe Commission noted in the Order that the CAISO and PTO tariffs lack a \ndefinition of large load as a new category of load.17 The Commission directed the \nCAISO and PTOs to create an appropriate definition, including a load size and \ninterconnection voltage threshold, based on the characteristics of CAISO’s \ntransmission system. The Commission suggested that a potentially reasonable \ndefinition would be Southwest Power Pool’s (SPP) definition of “a new \ncommercial or industrial customer, located at a single site behind one or more \npoints of interconnection, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater, \ninterconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, \nand is not part of a co-location arrangement.”18 \n \nThe CAISO proposes to define a Large Load as “An End User located at a \nsingle site behind one or more points of interconnection to the CAISO Controlled \nGrid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”19 The CAISO believes this \n \n17  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 58. \n18  \nId. at P 57. \n19  \nProposed Appendix A to the CAISO tariff. The CAISO tariff defines an End User as “A \nconsumer of electric power who consumes such power to satisfy a Load directly connected to the"},{"page":12,"startToken":4449,"endToken":4955,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 12 \n \n \ndefinition satisfies the Order’s intent, creates a clear and easy-to-understand \nclass of loads in the CAISO, and avoids infringing on State jurisdiction. Although \nthe words in the CAISO’s proposed definition are different than the Commission’s \nproposed definition, the CAISO believes those differences are valuable, as \nexplained below. The CAISO also notes that its proposed definition is similar to \nthe proposed definition the Commission recently approved in the PJM \nInterconnection.20 \n \nThe CAISO proposes not to include a description of the types of load (i.e., \ncommercial or industrial customer) in its definition of Large Load. Unless there is \na relevant operational difference between the types of loads, the CAISO believes \nthat specifying type is unnecessary. The CAISO also wants to avoid a definition \nthat results in false positives, false negatives, or disputes about what constitutes \n“commercial” or “industrial.”21 In the future, type-based terms may be necessary \nfor different reliability rules, especially as NERC finalizes its standards for \ncomputational loads. But the CAISO has elected not to specify any type at this \ntime.  \n \nSimilar to generator interconnections, the CAISO proposes to continue to \nadhere to FERC and California regulations on what constitutes a “site,” and thus \ndoes not propose defining “site” in its definition. The CAISO believes the large \nload definition will adequately apply to large loads comprised of distinct loads \neven if they have separate retail meters. Operationally, such loads would still \nhave the same impact on the CAISO transmission system. Moreover, the \nprevalence of behind-the-meter and hybrid configurations in the CAISO has led \nthe CPUC and local regulators to address multi-meter and multi-unit sites. The \nCAISO also does not believe that the CAISO tariff is the proper vehicle to define \na site. In the event of a unique configuration, Commission precedent and local \nregulations are more than sufficient in the large load context.22 Further, under its \n \nCAISO Controlled Grid, a Distribution System, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the \nDay-Ahead Market only, the transmission system of an EDAM Transmission Service Provider \nwho does not resell the power, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the Real-Time \nMarket only, the transmission system of an EIM Transmission Service Provider and who does not \nresell the power.” The CAISO tariff defines the CAISO Controlled Grid as “The system of \ntransmission lines and associated facilities of the Participating TOs that have been placed under \nthe CAISO’s Operational Control.” \n \nThe CAISO purposely did not capitalize point of interconnection because its tariff \ndefinition is designed for generating facilities, whereas the point of interconnection for a large load \nwill be determined by the retail interconnection agreement consistent with local regulatory \nauthority rules. As with many aspects of this definition, the CAISO’s intent is to remain flexible for \nthis new set of rules so as to avoid false positives and false negatives. \n20  \nPJM Interconnection, 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 16 (2026). \n21  \nNor does the CAISO want to compound the issue by formally defining those terms. \n22  \nId."},{"page":13,"startToken":4955,"endToken":5434,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 13 \n \n \ncurrent rules as planning coordinator and balancing authority, the CAISO will \ncontinue to study impacts to the transmission system of any large load that \nconnects to the distribution system or load that falls below the 50 MW peak load \nthreshold but connects to the transmission system. The CAISO will similarly \ncontinue to work with NERC and other regulators to address smaller and \ndistributed loads in the future. \n \nThe CAISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also omits a specific \nvoltage level for the interconnection. The CAISO does not believe this is \nnecessary where the definition specifies the interconnection is to the “CAISO \nControlled Grid,” a term that already requires evaluation under all Commission \ntests for transmission vs. distribution, including voltage. The CAISO’s proposed \ndefinition thus establishes that the large load is transmission-connected, \nobviating the need to specify a voltage that could conflict with the existing \ntransmission registration. Although distribution-grid voltages likely make \ninterconnection difficult for large loads, the CAISO recognizes that it could be \npossible for 50 MW loads to interconnect to the distribution grid. Nevertheless, \nthe CAISO is focused on transmission-connected large loads at this time \nbecause they are the subject of FERC’s Order, and because the transmission \ngrid represents the likely interconnection point for the vast majority of large loads. \nThe CAISO recognizes, however, that the Order represents the frontier of \nCommission jurisdiction, and there is little precedent to better understand how a \nlarge load definition and accompanying rules will operate consistent with the \nFederal Power Act. The CAISO has created its definition recognizing that it does \nnot have a centralized capacity market for all loads, and that the Commission has \nstressed avoiding infringement on the States’ jurisdiction over retail service and \ndistribution. \n \nThe CAISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also does not include \nFERC’s proposal that the definition specify that the large load “is not part of a co-\nlocation arrangement.” The CAISO does not believe it is necessary to exclude \nlarge loads participating in co-location arrangements from the definition of large \nloads. Although such loads will be subject to different tariff provisions than \nstandalone large loads, they would still constitute large loads. \n \nFinally, the CAISO does not propose to include the term “new” in its Large \nLoad definition because that term also would require specification. Instead, the \nCAISO proposes to include in the definition and the tariff a general provision \nstating that the CAISO will not consider any load a large load subject to the \nCAISO tariff where the load is operational or has a complete request with the \nPTO before the CAISO tariff revisions’ effective date of February 16, 2027.23 This \n \n23  \nProposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO has requested a later effective \ndate for two sets of technology-related changes, but this should not impact studies. See Section \nVI, below."},{"page":14,"startToken":5434,"endToken":5927,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 14 \n \n \nprovision will avoid retroactive ratemaking on existing loads, and ensure the \nCAISO’s proposed tariff revisions do not affect existing commercial \narrangements. The CAISO also proposes to include a provision stating that if a \ngrandfathered load increases or modifies its load pursuant to a PTO tariff after \nthe effective date, the load would become a large load and subject to those tariff \nrequirements. This approach is similar to those proposed by other ISO/RTOs for \nlarge loads, and previous generator interconnection rule changes approved by \nthe Commission.24 It ensures that existing loads are grandfathered as they are, \nbut without license to evolve without operating under the same rules as other \nlarge loads. The CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions also recognize that the PTOs \nare the first and primary referees of which loads will be “large loads.” The PTOs \nwill receive the initial energization requests from new loads or modification \nrequests from existing loads, and have far more experience with load \ninterconnection requests than the CAISO. As such, the CAISO purposely defers \nto their tariffs as the proper place to establish criteria for any grandfathered loads \nto become large loads consistent with the filed rate doctrine. \n \nAlthough the CAISO proposes to create a tariff class for large loads, the \nCAISO does not propose to create any new market participation models for large \nloads at this time.25 Rather, the CAISO proposes to enable large loads to \nparticipate (1) simply as typical end users, represented by an LSE, or (2) through \nany existing CAISO participation model, including, for example, proxy demand \nresources, reliability demand response resources, participating loads, or non-\ngenerator resources.26 Large loads participating in the CAISO markets would \nthen be eligible for all rights and subject to all obligations of the CAISO tariff \nunder those participation models. For example, a large load that desires to \nparticipate as a reliability demand response resource could simply adhere to the \ntariff provisions for reliability demand response resources, just as any other end \nuser.27 Large loads may participate alone or in permissible aggregations, \nincluding with co-located generating units.28 Likewise, the CAISO proposes to \ninclude tariff provisions stating that large loads are eligible to provide, without \nlimitation, demand response energy, curtailable demand, resource adequacy \ncapacity, and ancillary services consistent with their participation model and \n \n24  \nSee, e.g., Section 25.4.2 of the CAISO tariff (applying asynchronous generating facility \ntechnical requirements “to the extent the Generating Facility makes modifications that replace its \nGenerating Unit(s) or any inverter(s)”). \n25  \nAs explained below, the CAISO believes it has several existing market participation \nmodels large loads can use, and plans to explore new, tailored models in stakeholder initiatives in \n2027. \n26  \nProposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff.  \n27  \nSection 4.13 of the CAISO tariff. (The large load would still also be required to comply \nwith all tariff provisions regarding large loads.) \n28  \nId."},{"page":15,"startToken":5927,"endToken":6347,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 15 \n \n \nsubject to the requirements of the CAISO tariff.29 Instead of trying to create a \nbespoke model for large loads, the CAISO’s proposed framework enables \ndevelopers to choose what model will work best for them based on their \nconfiguration and business model. Any large load that elects to participate in the \nCAISO markets can do so on day one through existing participation models.30  \n \n2. \nLarge Load Interconnection Study Procedures \n \nThe Order highlighted a lack of clarity and consistency regarding the study \nof the provision of transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large \nloads interconnecting to the transmission system.31 Further, the Commission \nnoted that, while it does not seek to alter the allocation of rights and \nresponsibilities between the CAISO and PTO tariffs, the CAISO and PTO tariffs \nmay not clearly specify which entity will be responsible for studying the provision \nof transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large loads.32 The \nOrder suggested that additional study considerations may be necessary to \naddress the unique operational and reliability challenges presented to the \ntransmission system by providing transmission service to eligible customers on \nbehalf of large loads.33 The Commission noted that clear and consistent study \nprocesses may be necessary to fully capture the transmission system impacts of \nproviding such transmission service, which could result in significant operational \nrisks for the transmission system,34 and suggested that tariff provisions may \nprevent disputes over a variety of issues, e.g., study timelines and delays, how \nthe transmission service needed on behalf of the large load is studied, what \ntypes of network upgrades are considered, and how required network upgrades \nto provide the requested transmission service are determined.35 Finally, the \nCommission suggested that the CAISO and PTO tariffs may fail to deter \nspeculative or duplicative requests for transmission service by eligible customers \non behalf of large loads.36 \n \n \n29  \nProposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff. \n30  \nIn fact, any load can do the same today, hence the CAISO’s inclusion of “Large Loads \nand Loads” in proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO included such language to \navoid the implication that only large loads could avail themselves of such rights, even though \nloads participate significantly in the CAISO markets today.  \n31  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 51. \n32  \nId. at P 51. \n33  \nId. at P 52.  \n34  \nId. at P 53. \n35  \nId. at P 54. \n36  \nId. at P 55."},{"page":16,"startToken":6347,"endToken":6815,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 16 \n \n \nAs explained in the Order37 and Section II.B.3, above, the PTOs receive \nand perform the load interconnection studies today. The CAISO and PTOs do not \npropose to change this division of responsibility: The PTOs will therefore respond \nto the Order’s findings in their PTO filings. The CAISO expects the PTOs to \ndevelop consistent study procedures to be completed within 60 to 90 days, as \nrequired by the Commission. The CAISO also expects the PTOs to address \nnetwork upgrade considerations and deterring speculative requests. For clarity, \nthe CAISO proposes tariff revisions noting that end users, including large loads, \ninterconnect to the CAISO controlled grid pursuant to PTO and retail tariffs.38 The \nCAISO also proposes tariff revisions stating that the CAISO will coordinate with \nthe PTOs and any affected systems to account for large load interconnections to \nthe CAISO in all interconnection studies.39 Consistent with the CAISO’s \ninterconnection procedures and the PTO tariffs, the CAISO and PTOs will identify \nnetwork upgrades and interconnection facilities best reflecting the combined \ntopology of generating facility and large load interconnections.40 \n \nThe PTOs will thus conduct load interconnection studies under their tariffs, \nand the CAISO will review those studies. As planning coordinator and balancing \nauthority,41 the CAISO will review PTO load interconnection studies to confirm \nthat study assumptions, load characteristics, and results are consistent with the \nCAISO’s planning models and long-term plans.42 Most importantly, the CAISO \nwill identify any PTO-proposed solution that could create reliability risk, whether \nbecause it relies on an operating measure that cannot be dependably \nimplemented, it shifts or exacerbates constraints elsewhere on the system, or it is \ninconsistent with the CAISO’s planning and operational needs. The CAISO will \nconduct this process on a monthly basis to ensure the CAISO’s review does not \naffect the PTOs’ obligations to complete their studies within 90 days.43 Where the \nCAISO identifies a risk, it will work with the PTO to develop an alternative, such \nas a different network upgrade, an alternative transmission technology, or \n \n37  \nId. at P 51. \n38  \nProposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO tariff also notes that end users do \nso consistent with local regulatory authority requirements. \n39  \nId. \n40  \nId. This provision is included for general compliance. Specific co-located load and \ngenerating facility interconnection study obligations are discussed in Section III.C, below. \n41  \nThe CAISO also maintains the base cases, transmission plans, and generator \ninterconnection queues. \n42  \nProposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. To avoid the implication that the CAISO \nreviews transmission upgrades for large loads only, the CAISO has included “Loads and Large \nLoads” in this provision. This is consistent with the CAISO’s status quo planning coordinator \nresponsibilities to review all transmission upgrades. \n43  \nId."},{"page":17,"startToken":6815,"endToken":7256,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 17 \n \n \nmodified operating limits, so that the large load can interconnect without \ncompromising reliability. This review complements, rather than replaces, the \nPTOs’ lead role in studying and serving load, and ensures that solutions \ndeveloped at the local level are reliable and coordinated with the broader system. \nThe CAISO also proposes to memorialize in the tariff that the CAISO’s \ntransmission planning process will consider large load growth and any \ntransmission upgrades planned as transmission solutions for public policies \nselected for consideration under Order No. 1000 processes.44  \n \nThe CAISO also proposes to implement new data requirements for large \nload interconnection requests and associated cost data. The CAISO discusses \nthese proposals in Section III.B.2, below.  \n \n3. \nLarge Load Application Process \n \nThe Order suggested that the CAISO and PTOs lack clear and consistent \nprovisions establishing the application process and study procedures that will be \nused when the CAISO and/or the PTOs evaluate the provision of transmission \nservice on behalf of large loads, including an application process, application fee \nand readiness requirements, and information and data requirements.45 The \nOrder also suggested that the CAISO and PTO tariffs lack appropriate study \nprovisions to recognize the unique operational characteristics of large loads that \nare willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals under certain conditions to \nlessen or avoid the need for network upgrades.46 In addition, the Commission \nnoted that accurate models using Electromagnetic Transient (EMT) studies may \nhelp to ensure that transmission service needed on behalf of large loads can be \nprovided without compromising reliability and suggests clarity and consistency in \nthe evaluation of alternative transmission technologies (ATTs) as potential \nsolutions to accommodate an eligible customer’s request for transmission service \non behalf of a large load.47 To the extent that traditional network upgrades are \nselected over ATTs, the Commission recommended demonstration of why ATTs \nwere not selected.48 The Commission directed the CAISO and PTOs to explain \nwhether their tariffs sufficiently address identification of Direct Assignment \nFacilities and Network Upgrades (as the Order defines) necessary to reliably \n \n44  \nAgain, this already occurs where the transmission planning process identifies reliability-\nbased transmission solutions and policy-driven transmission solutions, but pursuant to the intent \nof the Order, the CAISO is highlighting it for large loads to increase transparency. As the CAISO \ndetailed in its 30-day informational report on resource sufficiency, the CAISO, CEC, and CPUC all \nbreak out large loads specifically in forecasts and planning scenarios.  \n45  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 58. \n46  \nId. at P 59. \n47  \nId. (Also known as Grid Enhancing Technologies or GETs). \n48  \nId. at PP 60-61."},{"page":18,"startToken":7256,"endToken":7706,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 18 \n \n \nprovide transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large loads; \ninclude provisions for a 60-to 90-day timeline to study the unique operational \ncharacteristics of large loads; and include a study deadline to assess large \nloads.49 \n \nThe CAISO reiterates that the existing load interconnection process is \nconducted by the PTOs. For this reason, the CAISO proposes enhanced and \nongoing coordination with the PTOs on the load and resource interconnection \nprocesses and expects the PTOs to align their load application processes with \nthe CAISO’s resource interconnection process to ensure the level of visibility \nnecessary for the CAISO to plan for new large loads and maintain reliability once \nthey are interconnected. The CAISO proposes including general provisions \nexplaining this coordination, as discussed in Section III.A.2, above. The CAISO \nalso notes that existing load and generator interconnection study procedures \nalready include ample processes to detect potential impacts on affected systems \nand multiple affected PTOs, and those processes will apply to large loads.50 The \nCAISO expects that the PTOs will address the other interconnection process \nissues in their respective filings. \n \nThe CAISO understands that transmission providers must consider ATTs \nat all times. The CAISO currently evaluates ATTs in its transmission planning \nprocess and generator interconnection process. The CAISO’s evaluation \nincludes static synchronous compensators, static VAR compensators, advanced \npower flow control devices, transmission switching, synchronous condensers, \nvoltage source converters, advanced conductors, and tower lifting. Further, the \nCAISO is expanding its economic consideration of dynamic line ratings to \nmitigate congestion. As a transmission provider, the CAISO must include in the \ngenerator interconnection cluster study report an explanation of the results of the \nevaluation of the enumerated ATTs for feasibility, cost, and time savings as an \nalternative to a traditional network upgrade. Therefore, the CAISO supports and \nhas broadly adopted the practice of duly considering and assigning ATTs to meet \nidentified system needs, including when triggered by new loads interconnecting \nto the CAISO grid. The CAISO also documents consideration of such \ntechnologies in its annual Transmission Plan. This has been the practice in \nCAISO for several years and was recently memorialized in the CAISO’s tariff in \ncompliance with FERC Order Nos. 2023 and 1920 (pending FERC approval).51 \nTo respond to the Order and the large load interconnection context specifically, \nthe CAISO proposes to clarify these considerations through consistent language \nin the CAISO tariff, which the CAISO expects the PTOs will similarly include in \n \n49  \nId. at P 62. \n50  \nSee proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff; Section 3.7 of Appendix KK to the CAISO \ntariff. \n51  \nSee, e.g., Section 6.2 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff."},{"page":19,"startToken":7706,"endToken":8115,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 19 \n \n \ntheir tariffs.52 The CAISO will continue to set out the alternatives that were \nconsidered in the selection of all preferred transmission solutions, whether ATTs \nor other more conventional solutions, to the reasonable depth necessary given \nthe nature of the transmission need. This approach has worked well in the \ngenerator interconnection study process, enabling the consideration and use of \nATTs without slowing down studies. \n \nWith regard to the Commission’s ATTs-related modeling concerns, the \nCAISO coordinates annually with the transmission owners during the \ntransmission planning process on the feasibility of ATTs, particularly evaluating \nthe application of advanced conductors and flow control devices. The CAISO \nalso expects that both the CAISO and the PTOs will be advancing their EMT-\nrelated studies, and expects that the PTO tariffs will address the timely provision \nof EMT models in the large load application process.  \n \n4. \nOperational Requirements \n \nThe Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO and PTO \ntariffs appear to be unjust and unreasonable because they lack provisions \naddressing ongoing operational requirements for eligible customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of large loads.53 The Commission enumerated \nspecific examples, including the lack of provisions governing hourly forecasts, \ntelemetry data, and equipment to enable the CAISO to monitor large loads.54 The \nCommission also suggested the CAISO should impose requirements to remotely \ndisconnect large loads when necessary to maintain reliability; ramp rate or ride-\nthrough requirements; and control technologies and/or protection systems that \nmay be necessary to limit withdrawals from the transmission system.55 \n \nThe CAISO agrees that the operational requirements the Commission \nidentifies in the Order are necessary. The CAISO has been exploring these \nissues through discussions with PTO representatives in the LLTRWG, CPUC \nworkshops, an industry Expert Working Group (EWG), and through engagement \nwith NERC. The LLTRWG was established by the CAISO and utilities \ninterconnecting large loads to develop consistent technical requirements for the \nreliable interconnection and operation of large data center loads connected to the \nCAISO controlled grid. The EWG was likewise formed to gain collaborative \nfeedback from diverse industry representatives focused on developing a \n \n52  \nProposed Sections 24.1 and 24.3.1 of the CAISO tariff. For co-located generating units \nand large loads, the CAISO and PTOs are already obligated to evaluate ATTs/GETs by Section \n6.2 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.  \n53  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 63. \n54  \nId. \n55  \nId."},{"page":20,"startToken":8115,"endToken":8563,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 20 \n \n \ncoordination framework and functional model that advances opportunities in \nTransmission and Distribution coordination, including large loads, while \nmaintaining current roles and responsibilities. As detailed at length in the \nLLTRWG proposal, the LLTRWG developed its operational requirements after \nbroadly surveying operational requirements developed by other utilities with large \nloads.56 This process ensures that the CAISO’s operational requirements will be \nconsistent with national requirements, and thus easier and less expensive to \nimplement for developers. The CAISO also put its proposed operational \nrequirements to stakeholders in the general large load initiative, where \nstakeholders supported the proposals.  \n \nTo maintain reliability, the CAISO proposes several new requirements \nregarding large loads. Because many large loads may not be directly subject to \nthe CAISO tariff,57 the CAISO’s proposed requirements place the onus of \nresponsibility on the PTOs and LSEs.  \n \nPrior to the interconnection of any large load to the CAISO controlled grid, \nthe CAISO proposes to require the PTO to provide the CAISO with the following \ninformation for the large load: Load type, variable or flat load designation, \nexpected hourly operating profile, points of interconnection and withdrawal, MW \ncapacity, minimum and maximum operating levels, expected CAISO market \nparticipation model (if any), curtailment and ramping capabilities, and behind-the-\nmeter generation capacity and characteristics (if any).58 This will provide the \nCAISO with the necessary information to assess any operational impact before \nenergization. The CAISO also proposes to require the PTO to ensure the large \nload has continuous dynamic disturbance recording data and storage on the \nhigh-side of the main power transformer or common point of connection to \ndetermine the following electrical quantities for the large load: (1) Phase-to-\nneutral voltage for each phase, (2) each phase current and the residual or neutral \ncurrent, (3) real power and reactive power flows expressed on a three-phase \nbasis corresponding to all circuits where current measurements are required; and \n(4) frequency.59 This requirement will ensure adequate reliability data for each \nlarge load. The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to ensure it can \n \n56  \nIncluded as Attachment D to this filing, and available at \nhttps://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-\nloads-el26-71.pdf.  \n57  \nIn other words, many large loads may interconnect subject to a PTO tariff alone. As such, \nthe CAISO may not always have contractual privity to subject large loads to its requirements or \nenforce reliability provisions. As such, the CAISO’s compliance obligations are directed toward \nthe PTOs and LSEs already subject (or unavoidably subject) to the CAISO tariff. They can then \nenforce the CAISO tariff requirements through their tariffs, agreements, or procedures.  \n58  \nProposed Section 25.7.1 of the CAISO tariff. \n59  \nId."},{"page":21,"startToken":8563,"endToken":9000,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 21 \n \n \ndisconnect or otherwise isolate the large load in the event of a contingency, \nimminent, or actual system emergency, to maintain system reliability.60 \n \nThe CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to impose ride-through \nrequirements for large loads to remain electrically connected during certain \nfrequency61 and voltage disturbances.62 Similar to generating facility \nrequirements,63 these rules provide the severity and length of disturbance in \nwhich a large load may or may not trip. All requirements were based on the work \nby NERC, regional entities, and utilities facing large load disturbances.64 The \nCAISO also has included a general tariff provision stating that a load shedding \nprogram or remedial action scheme directed or required by the CAISO or PTO \ntakes precedence over these ride-through requirements.65 This provision avoids \nany ambiguity over potentially conflicting ride-through/trip directions. \n \nThe CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to impose ramp-rate \nlimitations in active power consumption during normal operation, start-up, \nshutdown, and restoration processes.66 The average active power ramp rate, \nmeasured at the point of interconnection over a rolling ten (10)-minute interval, \nshould not exceed twenty (20) megawatts per minute (MW/min), applying to both \nincreases and decreases in active power consumption. This ramp-rate limitation \ndoes not apply to the immediate post-disturbance recovery of active power \nconsumption following a system fault or voltage disturbance. The PTO also will \nrequire each large load to restore its active power consumption following a \nsystem fault or voltage disturbance to at least 90 percent of its pre-disturbance \nactive power consumption within three seconds after the post-fault voltage at the \npoint of interconnection recovers to at least 0.90 pu.67 Additionally, the CAISO \nhas included a general requirement that after a disturbance or other reliability \nevent involving a large load, the large load, any associated interconnection \ncustomer, scheduling coordinator, and PTO must comply with any CAISO, \nregional entity (i.e., WECC), or Reliability Coordinator data request related to the \nevent.68 This is already the case today, but the CAISO believes a specific tariff \n \n60  \nId. \n61  \nProposed Section 25.7.1.1 of the CAISO tariff. \n62  \nProposed Section 25.7.1.2 of the CAISO tariff. \n63  \nAttachment H to Appendix LL to the CAISO tariff. \n64  \nSee Attachment D to this filing. \n65  \nThis would include programs or remedial action schemes designed to facilitate FILI as \nwell. \n66  \nProposed Section 25.7.1.4 of the CAISO tariff. \n67  \nProposed Section 25.7.1.3 of the CAISO tariff. \n68  \nProposed Section 25.7.4 of the CAISO tariff."},{"page":22,"startToken":9000,"endToken":9360,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 22 \n \n \nprovision for large loads provides greater transparency. This transparency will \nensure parties involved in a reliability event continue to provide data to help \nunderstand the event and prevent future issues. \n \n \nThe CAISO’s remaining operational requirements apply to the scheduling \ncoordinator representing the large load’s demand. For each large load, the \nscheduling coordinator must provide the CAISO: \n \n1. Daily and hourly forecast data otherwise required for the CAISO demand \nforecast;  \n2. Any real-time, material deviations from provided forecasts, including \nchanges resulting from energization activities, material operational \nchanges, curtailments, outages, derates, operating limits, operating \nenvelopes, or co-located generation impacts that materially affect \nexpected demand; \n3. The forecasts are expected to reflect the resource’s anticipated operating \ncapability, including planned outages or derates that materially affect the \nlarge load’s expected consumption or operating capability; and \n4. Operational status and real-time consumption in accordance with the \nCAISO’s standards for direct telemetry and consistent with CAISO \ntelemetry requirements.69 \n \nThese data requirements will ensure the CAISO has day-ahead and real-time \ninformation sufficient to manage reliability risks from large load demand swings. \nFor those not participating through a market model, demand forecasting and \nsettlement will remain at the LSE level, and the CAISO will have specific data \ninputs to understand the behavior of those large loads that could impact \nreliability. \n \n \nBased on stakeholder feedback, the CAISO believes most large loads will \nelect not to participate directly in the CAISO markets, and will simply be \nrepresented by their LSE like conventional loads today. Nevertheless, the CAISO \nproposes to include tariff language stating that large loads may elect to \nparticipate in the CAISO markets directly, including as stand-alone loads or in \naggregation with other resources.70 Large loads also may elect to participate as \ntheir own LSE, a non-generator resource, or a participating load, if they qualify \nfor those models under CAISO tariff and local regulatory authority \n \n69  \nProposed Section 25.7.3 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO notes that its telemetry \nrequirements are tailored to coordinate with local regulatory authority standards and nationally \navailable telemetry technologies. \n70  \nProposed Section 25.7.3.1 of the CAISO tariff."},{"page":23,"startToken":9360,"endToken":9805,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 23 \n \n \nrequirements.71 Such large loads could then elect to comply with the CAISO tariff \noperational requirements and participate in the CAISO markets through their own \nscheduling coordinator in lieu of their LSE scheduling coordinator. However, the \nCAISO has included a qualification that any such direct participation must be \nconsistent with local regulatory authority requirements.72  \n \n \nAdditionally, the CAISO proposes to include a qualification that the \napplicable LSE, utility distribution company, MSS operator, large load, and \nscheduling coordinator may satisfy the operational requirements through \ncoordinated arrangements that clearly assign each CAISO tariff obligation and \navoid duplicative submissions.73 The applicable arrangement must identify the \nscheduling coordinator responsible for submitting bids, scheduled demand, meter \ndata, forecasts, and real-time operational updates for the large load. The CAISO \nalso must verify the arrangement will comply with the tariff before its use. This \nprovision recognizes that these are novel operational requirements, and \ndevelopers have varying needs based on their configuration and location. It is in \neveryone’s interest for the CAISO to provide flexibility to enable large loads and \ntheir counterparts to identify the best compliance practices. As such, the CAISO \nbelieves this tariff provision will provide significant value without sacrificing \nreliability. \n \n5. \nLarge Load Service Agreements \n \nThe Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO and PTO \ntariffs lack pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement, or other \napplicable agreement, to memorialize the technical and operational terms the \nOrder describes.74 \n \nThe PTOs will propose consistent pro forma agreements to memorialize \nthe technical and operational terms the Order describes. At this time, the CAISO \nand stakeholders do not believe the CAISO should always be a signatory to a \nthree-party agreement for large load interconnections, especially where the large \n \n71  \nIn other words, this provision would not operate to make a large load an LSE or \nparticipating load unless the large load meets the tariff definition and requirements for those \nentities. This provision is intended to encompass rare cases where certain loads participate \ndirectly in the CAISO markets. The CAISO also notes that although a large load also could \nparticipate in a demand response program, it would still require an LSE to account for its general \ndemand (in addition to demand response provider managing the demand response participation).  \n72  \nFor example, the CAISO tariff requires the State or local regulatory authority to allow any \nend user to be an LSE or a Participating Load. See “Load Serving Entity,” Appendix A to the \nCAISO tariff; Appendix B.4 of the CAISO tariff. \n73  \nProposed Section 25.7.3 of the CAISO tariff. \n74  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 64."},{"page":24,"startToken":9805,"endToken":10229,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 24 \n \n \nload is not taking FILI service or participating in the CAISO markets.75 The large \nload developer and PTO can negotiate the terms of construction and cost rules, \nwhile the CAISO would not require any rights or obligations. Rather, such \narrangements will be effectuated through a two-party interconnection agreement \nbetween the PTO and the large load developer, as performed today.76 For a \nlarge load requesting FILI service, the PTO will need the CAISO to help \nmemorialize and agree to the operational procedures necessary to provide that \nservice through new service agreements or having the CAISO co-sign the PTO’s \ninterconnection agreement.  \n \nFor co-located large loads with exporting generation, likewise, the CAISO \nwill need to be a party to a pro forma agreement that bridges the pro forma Large \nGenerator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) with the pro forma large load \ninterconnection agreement or negotiate a non-conforming LGIA to account for \ncertain details of the co-located large load interconnection on an individual basis. \nThe developer also will need to execute a CAISO pro forma Participating \nGenerator Agreement for the generator, but not a Participating Load Agreement \nfor the large load.77 \n \nB. \nCost Shifting Risk among Transmission Customers \n \n1. \nCost Allocation Rules and Agreements \n \nIn the Order, the Commission laid out key objectives regarding cost \nallocation of infrastructure needs attributable to eligible customers taking \ntransmission service on behalf of large loads: improved transparency regarding \nthe assignment of network upgrades and their associated costs; and \ndevelopment of a pro forma cost recovery agreement between the CAISO, the \nrelevant PTO, and the eligible customer taking transmission service on behalf of \nlarge loads. The Commission stated that improved transparency would provide \nimportant information to State public utility commissions and other State \nregulators, enabling them to identify which transmission costs are caused by \nwhich transmission customers to appropriately sub-allocate costs at the retail \nlevel. According to the Commission, a pro forma cost recovery agreement would \nensure that eligible customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for the \ncosts incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of network \nupgrades. \n \n75  \nFor example, the CAISO likely will not have any roles or responsibilities for the financing \nand construction of simple network upgrades needed for large loads receiving firm \ninterconnection service. \n76  \nThe CAISO describes the elements required for a three-party agreement for FILI in \nSection III.D, below. \n77  \nUnless it will participate as a Participating Load, in which case it would. See Proposed \nSection 4.19 of the CAISO tariff."},{"page":25,"startToken":10229,"endToken":10707,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 25 \n \n \n \nThe CAISO shares the objectives of the Order to prevent cost shifting \namong transmission customers and to ensure that large loads equitably bear risk \nand responsibility for costs incurred to interconnect, including the cost of network \nupgrades attributed to the large loads. The CAISO understands the importance \nof maintaining affordability while addressing large load integration. The CAISO \nexpects that in addressing cost shifting concerns, the PTOs will address the \ncollateral issues regarding financial security, revenue stability, and adequate exit \nprovisions for large loads. As explained in Section II.B.3, above, the CAISO \nbelieves it is prudent for cost allocation rules to be set forth in the PTO tariffs \nrather than the CAISO tariff. The PTOs will continue to manage large load \ninterconnections through their tariffs. Many of the PTOs also have a direct \nrelationship with their retail ratepayers and the regulators of those ultimate rates, \nincluding the CPUC. Additionally, it is the PTOs that will construct and own the \nnetwork upgrades if required for the large load interconnection. As such, the \nCAISO does not propose to issue a new “top-down” cost allocation solution \nthrough its own tariff. The CAISO believes that the PTOs may develop their own \nproposals to address any cost shifting, and that the current transmission revenue \nrequirement and credit mechanisms in the transmission access charges can \naccommodate those proposals.78 The CAISO proposes some metering and \nsettlement changes in Section III.C.2 to account for co-located large loads and \ngeneration.  \n \n2. \nData Transparency \n \nIn the Order, the Commission highlighted the need for “the provision of \ndata on CAISO’s website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format \nthat is searchable and allows users to filter the data, on transmission service \nprovided to eligible customers on behalf of large loads, for network upgrades \nevaluated in the local transmission planning process that are needed to \naccommodate transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of those large \nloads, and the costs for those network upgrades.”79 \n \nThe CAISO agrees that cost data should be transparent and can be \nprovided on the CAISO website in a searchable format. This is important both to \naid large load developers in making efficient siting decisions as well as to provide \ninformation critical for State regulators to ensure fair cost allocation at the retail \nlevel. For large load developers, the CAISO notes that for the interconnection \nstudy process, the CAISO already provides each PTO’s per unit cost guide for all \n \n78  \nThe CAISO notes that the orders to show cause represent largely novel issues: There is \nlittle case law to guide what constitutes just and reasonable rates for large loads specifically. \nSuch precedent will likely come from these responses to the Orders to Show Cause, offering \ngreater guidance for future enhancements. \n79  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 46."},{"page":26,"startToken":10707,"endToken":11066,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 26 \n \n \nnetwork upgrade cost components.80 These guides are updated and shared with \nstakeholders annually based on the latest industry cost estimates. As such, the \nCAISO believes its tariff provides detailed, transparent, up-to-date cost \ninformation on potential costs for transmission network upgrades.  \n \nFor State regulators and stakeholders, per the Commission’s direction,81 \nthe CAISO also proposes to clarify in the transmission planning process where \nnetwork upgrades were needed to accommodate both general load growth and \nlarge load interconnection specifically. Large load growth has already been \nincorporated into the CEC, CPUC, and CAISO forecasting and planning \nprocesses, as detailed in the CAISO’s informational report on resource \nsufficiency already submitted to the Commission.82 The CAISO also proposes to \npublicly post:83 \n \n1. Aggregate amounts of proposed large load additions in the CAISO \noperating area, including the aggregate amounts in each transmission \npricing zone; \n2. Planned network upgrades needed to accommodate eligible customers \ntaking transmission service on behalf of large loads, identified by type of \nequipment and network upgrade (e.g., new substation, reconductoring, a \nnew high-voltage transmission line) for each transmission service request; \nand \n3. Cost estimates for each planned network upgrade identified as needed for \nlarge loads, as described in (2).84 \n \nThe CAISO proposes to memorialize these transparency requirements in its \ntariff. The CAISO also has encouraged the PTOs to memorialize tariff \nrequirements to adopt large load queue spreadsheets as they do for wholesale \ngenerator interconnection customers. The CAISO likewise proposes to include in \nits generator interconnection queue report whether the interconnection customer \nproposes to include a large load, and its capacity.85 \n \n \n80  \nSee CAISO current cost guides at https://www.caiso.com/library/current-cost-guides. \n81  \nOrder to Show Cause at PP 70-72. \n82  \nSee CAISO Informational Report on resource sufficiency at \nhttps://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-\nloads-el26-71.pdf. \n83  \nProposed Sections 24.3.1 and 24.19.1 of the CAISO tariff, and proposed Section 3.6 of \nAppendix KK to the CAISO tariff.  \n84  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 75. \n85  \nSee CAISO Generator interconnection at https://www.caiso.com/generation-\ntransmission/generation/generator-interconnection."},{"page":27,"startToken":11066,"endToken":11559,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 27 \n \n \nC. \nCo-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter \nGeneration \n \n1. \nCo-located Interconnection Studies \n \nThe Commission stated in the Order that the CAISO’s tariff does not \ncontain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and consistency the rates, \nterms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving \nco-located load.86 The Commission included, “the scope of the analyses CAISO \nperforms as part of its existing study process to evaluate the impacts of co-\nlocation arrangements, which may need to account for any potential dynamic \nimpacts of co-located load and any potential impacts of requests to modify an \nexisting generating facility’s interconnection service level to serve co-located load \non transmission system reliability.”87 The Commission noted that in one of its \nrecent orders on co-located load in the PJM Interconnection (PJM), it found that it \nwas necessary to clarify that interconnection customers seeking to use new \ngenerating facilities to serve co-located load may: (1) request interconnection \nservice at a level below the generating facility’s maximum facility output; (2) use \nexisting procedures to accelerate interconnection requests that satisfy certain \ntariff criteria; and (3) request provisional interconnection service and surplus \ninterconnection service.88 The Commission additionally noted that \ninterconnection customers should have a means of knowing the appropriate \nmechanism for setting forth the terms and conditions of co-location \narrangements. The Commission also expressed concern that “without an Eligible \nCustomer designated to take transmission service on behalf of a co-located load, \nthere is no mechanism for CAISO to address situations in which a co-located \nload withdraws energy from the transmission system.”89 \n \n \n86  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 93. The Order to Show Cause did not require, and the CAISO \ndoes not believe it is necessary, that the CAISO create formal tariff definitions for co-located load \nor behind-the-meter generation. Both terms already have plain meanings, and behind-the-meter \nis already used frequently throughout the CAISO tariff, including for different configurations based \non whether the meter is a CAISO meter or a retail end-user meter. Thus, providing a definition \nmay have inadvertent consequences to the extent it differs in any meaningful respect from the \nuse of these terms currently. Likewise, the CAISO, PTOs, and developers have not experienced \ncontroversy in determining co-location or what constitutes a single site under FERC precedent \nand State law. The CAISO is thus concerned that trying to create formal definitions at this time \nmay result in false positives or negatives that impair rather than aid development. The CAISO \nmay revisit this issue if controversies arise, or may provide clarifications in its business practice \nmanuals. \n87  \nId. at P 96. \n88  \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 231-235 (2025) (PJM Co-\nLocation Order). PJM’s compliance filing proposing revisions in response to these directives was \naccepted in part on April 16, 2026. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2026).  \n89  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 96."},{"page":28,"startToken":11559,"endToken":12057,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 28 \n \n \nDrawing on its track record for co-located generating technologies, the \nCAISO proposes to clarify how co-located large loads and generation may \ninterconnect to and operate within the CAISO controlled grid.90 Co-location \nfrequently can result in significant operational flexibility, avoided infrastructure, \nand reliability benefits. At the same time, physical proximity between load and \ngeneration does not guarantee reduced transmission requirements or resource \nadequacy obligations: The actual benefits depend on the operating \ncharacteristics of both resources, their ability to operate independently, and their \nbehavior during contingencies. The CAISO and PTOs thus must draw on their \nsignificant experience with co-located and behind-the-meter configurations to \nhelp large load developers maximize efficiencies for them and for ratepayers. \n \nThe CAISO proposes to clarify in its tariff co-location arrangements that \nwould not require a CAISO resource interconnection request and could be \naccommodated through applicable PTO or State-jurisdictional retail \ninterconnection tariffs,91 such as Rule 21.92 These will include large loads with \nback-up generation only to be used during outages or islanding, and large loads \nwith non-exporting behind-the-meter generation.93 The CAISO notes that both \ncategories will require sufficient control technologies to ensure they do not impact \nthe transmission grid.94   \n \nThe CAISO proposes that new or existing large loads seeking to co-locate \nwith new generation that may export energy to the transmission grid95 will require \na CAISO interconnection study under the CAISO’s Resource Interconnection \n \n90  \nProposed Sections 25.1, 25.1.1, 25.5.1, 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; Proposed Sections \n2.4.4 and 6.7.2.9 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff. \n91  \nThe CAISO reiterates that the PTOs will continue to govern and study all load \ninterconnection requests pursuant to their tariffs. The CAISO, likewise, will continue to govern \nand study wholesale generation interconnection requests. \n92  \nSee, e.g., CPUC’s Electric Rule 21: Generating Facility Interconnections, \nhttps://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Rule21/. Other local regulatory authorities and utilities have established \nsimilar interconnection procedures for back-up, non-injecting, and net metering configurations. \n93  \nProposed Sections 25.1 and 25.1.1 of the CAISO tariff. The sequencing likewise will not \nimpact whether a CAISO interconnection study is required. \n94  \nThe CAISO notes that the CAISO’s proposal is fundamentally different than MISO’s Zero \nInjection Generation Resource, at issue in Docket No. ER26-3552. The CAISO’s proposed tariff \nlanguage merely reflects the status quo in California and western States, long in practice between \nlocal regulatory authorities and CAISO. The CAISO already has thousands of megawatts of \ngeneration allowed to interconnect without CAISO study because there is no impact to the CAISO \ncontrolled grid, including generation co-located with large loads on the transmission system. More \ncritically, the CAISO requirements only bypass a CAISO interconnection study where there is \ntruly no impact, rather than a netting construct that could ignore short-circuit duty and other \nreliability impacts. \n95  \nFrequently, constantly, or even rarely, such as in the event the Large Load is offline."},{"page":29,"startToken":12057,"endToken":12569,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 29 \n \n \nStandards, Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.96 This means that such resource \ninterconnection requests will be screened and compete for capacity in the next \ncluster study based on the CAISO’s scoring criteria.97 However, all scoring, \nfinancial requirements, and study results will be based on the requested capacity \nfigures the developer provides, so the developer may significantly limit the \ngeneration potentially to be exported based on how much generation will serve \nthe large load.98 The CAISO tariff will require it to work with the PTOs to produce \nstudy results that reflect the combined impact of the co-located large load and \ngeneration, as requested by the developer. This is a simple extension of current \nrules that allow interconnection customers to be studied for a specific \ninterconnection capacity even if their generating capacity is higher. \nInterconnection requests with co-located large loads may avail themselves of all \nrights under the Resource Interconnection Standards, including surplus \ninterconnection service, grid enhancing technologies, phasing, etc. Rather than \nadd “and Large Load” throughout the CAISO generator interconnection \nprocedures and agreements, the CAISO proposes general provisions enabling \nlarge load studies to be considered in every step of the interconnection process, \nand that all study results will account for the combined operation of the \ngenerating units and large loads.99 Interconnection customers for generating \nunits and co-located large loads will be subject to all applicable commercial \nreadiness and GIA deposit requirements.100 Because their costs generally result \nfrom network upgrade and interconnection facility costs, which will be based on \nthe combined facility configuration, all required deposits will be fair and equitable \nunder Order No. 2023.  \n \nBecause it may be difficult to predict every possible issue with future load \nstudies conducted by the PTO and generator studies conducted by the CAISO, \nthe CAISO proposes to include general conflict provisions stating that (1) for any \nconflict between the CAISO tariff and the PTO tariff pertaining to the \ninterconnection of the generating unit, the CAISO tariff will control; and (2) for \nany conflict between the CAISO tariff and the PTO tariff pertaining to the \n \n96  \nProposed Sections 25.1, 25.1.1, 25.5.1, 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; Proposed Sections \n2.4.4 and 6.7.2.9 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff. \n97  \nAs Energy Only or Deliverable. Energy Only interconnection customers not seeking \nreimbursement for network upgrades are not screened and proceed directly to the cluster study. \n98  \nThis is already the status quo per Section 3.1 and Attachment 1 (4.h) of Appendix KK to \nthe CAISO tariff. The CAISO always has allowed interconnection customers to request to be \nstudied for less interconnection service capacity and/or deliverability than generating capacity, \nand all scoring is calculated on the requested interconnection service capacity or requested \ndeliverability, as applicable.  \n99  \nProposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; proposed Sections 2.4.4 and 3.1 of \nAppendix KK to the CAISO tariff. \n100  \nProposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff."},{"page":30,"startToken":12569,"endToken":12995,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 30 \n \n \ninterconnection of the large load, the PTO tariff will control.101 This provision will \nprovide transparency to developers and may help resolve future issues should \nthey arise.  \n \nThe CAISO notes that despite the ubiquity of co-located resources in \nCalifornia, the CAISO has not received any interconnection requests for co-\nlocated load with CAISO-participating generation. This is in part because the \nCAISO is in a different situation than other regions that needed to impose bring-\nyour-own generation requirements to address capacity market issues. Because \nthe CAISO does not have a bring-your-own generation requirement, developers \nhave been less interested in co-locating load with participating generation. \nAdditionally, to the extent large loads have brought generation to serve onsite \nload, they have elected to do so through tariffs for net energy metering, obviating \nthe need for a CAISO interconnection request. However, developers may want to \nco-locate load with participating generation in the future. Stakeholders expressed \nthat in California, adding load to existing wholesale generators may be an ideal \npath to cost savings and utilizing plants that are dispatched infrequently or \napproaching retirement. As such, the CAISO’s tariff revisions document \ndevelopers’ ability to add load to existing generator sites, and that they may \nmaintain all interconnection rights so long as they continue to comply with the \nCAISO tariff obligations.102 Specifically, the CAISO proposes to clarify that the \naddition of a co-located load or large load will not necessarily affect the qualifying \ncapacity, net qualifying capacity, deliverability status, or eligibility to provide \nenergy, ancillary services, or resource adequacy capacity of a generating unit. \nAny effect of adding a co-located load will be determined under the otherwise \napplicable CAISO tariff provisions for those rights, modification results, and local \nregulatory authority requirements.103 \n \nIn addition to the information required in the CAISO resource \ninterconnection request process, and the large load operational requirements \ndiscussed in Section III.A.4, the CAISO may require the following operational \ninformation for co-located resources, if applicable: \n \n• Expected presence of co-located load;  \n• Range of energy consumption characteristics of the load; \n• Minimum and maximum generator operating capabilities; \n• Generator operating characteristics when the load is at its minimum level; \n• Market participation status, if any; and  \n \n101  \nProposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff and proposed Section 2.4.4 of Appendix KK \nto the CAISO tariff. \n102  \nProposed Sections 25.5.1 of the CAISO tariff.  \n103  \nThe CAISO believes this is an important clarification because local regulatory authorities \ngenerally set resource adequacy capacity and emissions rules, among others."},{"page":31,"startToken":12995,"endToken":13448,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 31 \n \n \n• Any load services requested when the generator is off-line.104 \n \nFor co-located large loads and wholesale energy storage, the CAISO \nnotes that the storage and large loads will need to be separate operationally, and \nall study results will reflect the same.105 Energy storage resources are fully \ndispatchable and have separate wholesale meters and settlement. Their energy \ncannot be commingled with the large load such that the large load could take \npower effectively at a wholesale rate. The large load can otherwise net its \nwithdrawals against behind-the-meter/non-participating generation and \nstorage.106 \n \nThe CAISO also proposes to require co-located load and exporting \ngeneration studies to begin the cluster study process with the large load \nassumptions. The CAISO also proposes to allow interconnection customers to \nrequest to modify or remove large loads during the study process, and for the \nPTOs and the CAISO to evaluate whether the requested change is a material \nmodification. (The removal or modification to the large load would be under the \nPTO tariff.) In other words, after the commencement of the cluster study, the \ninterconnection customer may request to remove the large load as a \nmodification, and the CAISO and PTOs will evaluate whether the requested \nchange can be accommodated. Likewise, interconnection customers already in \nthe queue can request to add large loads as modifications, subject to PTO and \nCAISO evaluation, including through downsizing requests as necessary. The \nCAISO and PTO will assess whether either change would require complete re-\nstudies and could not be accommodated during the study process, or if the \nrequested modifications are material. This is not to say that the CAISO proposes \nto prohibit the addition of large loads to existing generation or in-progress \ninterconnection requests; only that the interconnection customer would need to \ndo so through the PTO tariff, and the generation interconnection study results \nmay not be able to reflect the combined configuration if changed substantially \nwell after studies commence (similar to any other modification request).  \n \nIf an online CAISO generator seeks to add a large load to its site, the \ndeveloper would submit the large load interconnection request to the PTO \npursuant to its tariff. When ready to reflect the large load, the interconnection \ncustomer could request a post-commercial operation date (COD) modification107 \nor use the Master File change process as needed to assess and capture \n \n104  \nProposed Section 25.7.1 of the CAISO tariff. \n105  \nProposed Section 25.7.5 of the CAISO tariff.  \n106  \nIn other words, the CAISO does not propose any change to the status quo for separating \nwholesale generation/storage and retail load or net energy metering generation/storage. \n107  \nSection 25.5 of the CAISO tariff."},{"page":32,"startToken":13448,"endToken":13841,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 32 \n \n \nchanges currently allowed under these processes.108 The CAISO, PTO, and \ninterconnection customer could likewise amend the generator interconnection \nagreement to reflect the large load and any configuration changes. \n \nThe CAISO notes that both loads and generation associated with co-\nlocated loads can be eligible for resource adequacy or demand response \nprograms pursuant to current program rules.109 Therefore, the CAISO does not \npropose changes to the eligibility criteria for participation in any of these \nprograms. \n \n2. \nCost Allocation for Co-located Loads \n \nIn the Order, the Commission stated that the CAISO tariff does not appear \nto include a mechanism to charge large loads, and co-located loads in particular, \nfor ancillary services commensurate with their use of such services, particularly if \nsuch customers do not withdraw energy from the transmission system.110 \nSpecifically, the Commission noted that co-located loads may unjustly benefit \nfrom regulation and black start services.111 \n \nThe CAISO agrees that assessing ancillary service costs on a net $/MWh \nbasis to LSEs’ measured demand could enable a large load co-located with \nbehind-the-meter generation to avoid an appropriate share of its costs for \nregulation and black start services.112 Unlike some other ISO/RTOs, however, \nthe CAISO already has separate, specific rates to assess regulation113 and black \nstart services.114 The issue thus becomes how to appropriately meter and assess \nthose rates onto co-located large loads. The CAISO proposes to address this \nissue by requiring the PTOs to sub-meter each co-located large load \n \n108  \nSee CAISO Master File at https://www.caiso.com/systems-applications/portals-\napplications/master-file.  \n109  \nSection 40 of the CAISO tariff establishes rules about eligible capacity and uses criteria \nprovided by the CPUC and other Local Regulatory Authorities determine what projects are \nresource adequacy eligible. \n110  \nOrder to Show Cause at PP 98-99 (“As noted in the PJM Co-Location Order, this \nintroduces the risk that costs may be allocated entirely to other transmission customers and \npassed through to residential customers, among others”).  \n111  \nId. \n112  \nLikewise, if the rate were assessed on a net meter basis to co-located load and \nparticipating generation, the result would be the same. \n113  \nSection 11.10.2.1 of the CAISO tariff. \n114  \nSection 11.4.2 of the CAISO tariff. The PTOs assess the costs of black start services \nthrough their PTO tariffs."},{"page":33,"startToken":13841,"endToken":14235,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 33 \n \n \nindependent of any onsite generation.115 Scheduling coordinators for the load-\nserving entities serving those loads will then be required to report those meter \nvalues separately for the relevant CAISO charge codes. Going forward, the rates’ \ncalculations will include all separately submitted gross volumes for the large \nloads. Each large load with co-located generation will pay on a gross load basis \nfor regulation and black start services.116 This solution not only results in just and \nreasonable cost allocation, it is also relatively simple to implement because the \nCAISO and PTOs will not be required to calculate and assess new rates, nor will \nthe CAISO need to create new settlement charge codes.  \n \n3. \nTransmission Access Charges \n \nThe Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO tariff may \nbe unjust and unreasonable because it allows load with behind-the-meter \ngeneration to net its generation against its load for purposes of calculating \nRegional Access Charges.117 The Commission explained its thinking based on \nthe PJM co-location proceeding:  \n \nIn the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission found that PJM’s \nBTMG rules, which allowed load-serving entities that provide \nservice to loads with qualifying BTMG to reduce their costs by \nnetting output from BTMG in the calculation of their peak demand \nfor the purpose of determining NITS charges, were unjust and \nunreasonable. The Commission concluded that PJM’s BTMG rules \nwere no longer consistent with cost causation principles because \nlarge loads configured in a BTMG arrangement with significant \ngeneration will raise cost shifting concerns compared to loads \npursuing smaller amounts of netting. The Commission also found \nthat such rules could lead to reliability and resource adequacy risks \nbecause PJM is obligated to serve transmission customers using \nBTMG but does not consider such customers in transmission and \nresource adequacy planning.118 \n \nThe Commission then noted that it is “similarly concerned that CAISO’s Tariff \nallows Eligible Customers that provide service to loads with BTMG to reduce \n \n115  \nProposed Section 11.36 of the CAISO tariff.  \n116  \nPursuant to the CAISO tariff, the CAISO assesses reliability services costs—the \nsettlement charge for black start costs—to the PTOs, who then allocate those costs to their \ncustomers. The CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions thus create specific sub-allocations earmarked \nfor large loads, based on their gross load. \n117  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 102. \n118  \nId."},{"page":34,"startToken":14235,"endToken":14781,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 34 \n \n \ntheir network service charges because the definition of gross load,119 which is \nused to calculate the Regional Access Charge, excludes load of a retail customer \nserved by its own onsite generating unit or energy storage device.” The \nCommission directed the CAISO to explain whether the tariff remains just and \nreasonable even though it allows netting of behind-the-meter generation from \ngross load for purposes of determining Regional Access Charges for loads with \nbehind-the-meter generation, or to propose tariff revisions. The Commission also \nstated that the CAISO may explain why the CAISO believes it remains just and \nreasonable for network customers that fall below a new megawatt materiality \nthreshold for the amount of load at a particular electrical location to net using \nbehind-the-meter generation.120 \n \nThe CAISO believes that its current transmission access charge structure \nis just and reasonable. Respectfully, the concerns underlying the Commission’s \nfindings in the PJM proceeding do not translate to the CAISO. The CAISO and \nPJM have very different forward capacity, resource adequacy, and transmission \nservice constructs. Moreover, behind-the-meter generation is far more abundant \nin California, so the CAISO and California policymakers have considered this \nissue more extensively than other regions. For example, in 2020, the \nCommission approved the CAISO’s proposal to amend its definition of Gross \nLoad—the billing determinant for transmission access charges—to include load \nserved by excess behind-the-meter production, i.e., behind-the-meter energy that \nexceeds the onsite load. The CAISO amended this policy to ensure uniform \nsettlement practices, and to ensure load-serving entities were allocated the \ncorrect costs of their use of the transmission system, which includes use by \nexcess behind-the-meter generation. The CAISO did not propose to assess \ntransmission access charges based on gross load figures that included load \nserved onsite by its own behind-the-meter generation. Neither the CAISO nor \nstakeholders in 2020 believed such loads use the transmission grid in proportion \nto those load figures. To the contrary, a benefit of rooftop solar, onsite storage, \nand other behind-the-meter generation is to reduce the use of the grid and the \ngeneration delivered across it. The CAISO does not believe this rationale has \n \n119  \nAppendix A to the CAISO tariff defines Gross Load as “Demand (adjusted for distribution \nlosses) of End-Use Customer Loads directly connected to the transmission facilities or directly \nconnected to the Distribution System of a Utility Distribution Company or MSS Operator located in \na PTO Service Territory, or End Use Customer Loads directly connected to the Distribution \nSystem or transmission facilities of an EDAM Transmission Service Provider in an EDAM Entity \nBalancing Authority Area. Gross Load includes Load served by Excess Behind the Meter \nProduction. Excess Behind the Meter Production shall not be netted against End-Use Customer \nLoad in determining Gross Load.” The definition also provides a list of certain loads excluded, \nincluding “Load of an individual retail customer served by its own onsite Generating Unit or \nenergy storage device, or as authorized by Section 218 of the California Public Utilities Code;” \nand “Onsite Load served by a qualifying small power production facility or qualifying cogeneration \nfacility, as those terms are defined in the FERC's regulations implementing Section 201 of the \nPublic Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.” \n120  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 102."},{"page":35,"startToken":14781,"endToken":15257,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 35 \n \n \nchanged in light of large loads. Although a customer with behind-the-meter \ngeneration may still depend on transmission capacity and reliability services if its \ngeneration is unavailable, the CAISO and LSEs reflect those costs through the \nreliability services charges described above, and through stand-by service rates \nassessed by the LSEs. Assessing transmission access charges without reflecting \nbehind-the-meter generation also could lessen the incentives to avoid using and \nbuilding out the transmission grid in the first place.  \n \nPerhaps more critically, the CAISO’s transmission access charges are \nfundamentally different from the PJM transmission charges that concerned the \nCommission. PJM calculates and assesses its transmission charges based on \ncertain peak demand figures. A large load with behind-the-meter generation \ncould mask all of its transmission usage simply by producing generation equal to \nits demand during that peak period. In contrast, the CAISO assesses its \ntransmission access charges 24/7/365 to each utility based on its gross load, \nwhich consists of total end-user demand accounting for losses and excess \nbehind-the-meter production. As such, the CAISO will allocate costs to each \nlarge load with behind-the-meter generation to the extent the large load uses the \ntransmission system, as reflected by its metered load. In other words, any energy \nwithdrawal by the large load will be reflected in the gross load. The LSE can then \neasily pass down the costs of that use in the retail bill, just as the millions of \nWestern residents with rooftop solar or battery storage are billed today. Thus, the \nCAISO does not believe that changes to its tariff are needed to address concerns \nraised by the Commission in the Order. \n \nD. \nExtending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers \nTaking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads \n \nIn the Order, the Commission preliminarily found that the CAISO tariff may \nbe unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services \nthat reflect eligible customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible \nlarge loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system \nunder certain conditions, suggesting that “firm use” is essentially the only type of \ntransmission service available in the CAISO. The Commission encouraged new \ntransmission services be made available to reflect the operational reality that \nlarge loads may use the transmission system to differing extents and certain \nlarge loads are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under \ncertain conditions.121 At the same time, the Commission stated, “In the \nalternative, CAISO may explain whether, given that CAISO does not offer the \ntransmission services required by Order No. 888, CAISO’s existing transmission \nservice framework addresses the concerns described herein, or explain what \nspecific changes to its existing transmission service framework would effectively \nprovide the same range of transmission service options for flexible large loads as \n \n121  \nId. at P 104."},{"page":36,"startToken":15257,"endToken":15742,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 36 \n \n \nin the PJM Co-Location Order.”122 The Commission then explained that the \ncustomer “must have necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, \nwhich may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to \nits approved level,” which are typical elements of interconnection service.123 \n \nThe CAISO proposes to create a new flexible interconnection service \noption that will enable large loads and co-located loads to limit their energy \nwithdrawals or injections until their network upgrades are placed into service. The \nCAISO believes this will provide large load developers with the option to \ninterconnect to the transmission system quickly through enforceable physical and \noperational controls. The PTOs will define and implement this interconnection \nservice offering, and the CAISO will ensure that any flexibility provides greater \nreliability to the system. The CAISO does not propose to create new \n“transmission services” or more responsibilities around eligible customers, which \nwould require redesigning transmission and interconnection service entirely. The \nCAISO does not believe such a redesign is warranted, and the Commission \nexpressly invites the CAISO to explain alternative service frameworks that may \nenable similar flexibility.124 \n \nThe CAISO proposes to create a new “Flexible Interim Load \nInterconnection” (FILI) service that will enable faster interconnections while \nmitigating transmission constraints and will be implemented in close coordination \nwith the PTOs.125 The proposed FILI offering will enable large loads to \ninterconnect flexibly and receive service up to a certain level based on grid \nconditions and constraints until network upgrades are complete, at which time \nthe large load will switch over to receiving firm service. This will likely be a \nbespoke option for each large load based on its point of interconnection and the \nconstraints it faces, and will be developed through a contractual agreement with \nthe PTO. For example, some FILIs may require limited curtailability for a limited \ntime because there are few, less probable contingencies. Others may require \nmore because of transmission constraints that require network upgrades with \nlonger timelines. The FILI option provides flexibility to the PTOs, CAISO, and \n \n122  \nId. at P 103. \n123  \nId. Moreover, in real time, LSEs can schedule demand as needed, including for \ncustomers limiting their use of the transmission system. With the operational data and process \ndescribed in Section III.A.4, the CAISO can accommodate flexible loads without creating new \nseparate classes of transmission service. This will also enable the PTOs to provide bespoke \ninterconnection configurations for large loads, saving ratepayers from the costs of network \nupgrades that conform to specific “transmission services.” The CAISO believes this course of \naction is consistent with developers’ desires to interconnect quickly and affordably.  \n124  \nId. at P 101. \n125  \nThe CAISO clarifies that this interconnection service offering is not intended to address \nsupply constraints, which the CAISO does not have at this time, as explained in the CAISO’s 30-\nday informational report on resource sufficiency."},{"page":37,"startToken":15742,"endToken":16134,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 37 \n \n \ndevelopers to customize solutions. For this reason, the CAISO declines to \npropose any kind of temporal or capacity cap on this interconnection service \noffering. \n \nFILI may include a number of tools or measures identified by the PTO with \nthe CAISO’s concurrence. They could include, for example, Remedial Action \nSchemes (RAS), enforceable operating requirements, or managing to a preset \nschedule.126 The PTO may request automated schemes, such as a RAS, for FILI \nthat are limited by the transmission overload under N-1-1, with the CAISO and \nReliability Coordinator (RC) concurrence; or the PTO will perform its own load \ncurtailment for FILI that is limited by transmission overload under N-1-1 after the \nfirst N-1 contingency occurs.  \n \nPrior to the energization of the large load, the CAISO, PTO, and large load \nor its authorized agent will negotiate and execute an agreement describing the \ncircumstances in which the large load receiving FILI may be temporarily curtailed \nand the mechanism used to perform the curtailment. The CAISO will work closely \nwith the PTO and large load developer to ensure the compliance obligations for \neach party adhere to all operating limits and promote reliability. At a minimum, \nthe agreement will specify: \n \na) The circumstances, contingencies, or operating conditions in which \nthe large load would be curtailed \nb) The mechanism used to perform the curtailment \nc) The entity responsible for performing the curtailment \nd) The notification method, response time, duration, restoration, \ntesting, and verification requirements \ne) The interim operating limits both in and out of curtailable events, \nand  \nf) The network upgrades or interconnection facilities required to \nconclude the curtailability requirements. \n \nThe CAISO will post these agreements on the CAISO website. The CAISO base \ncase, full network model, and operating procedures will account for such large \nloads as applicable. This will ensure transparency over FILI arrangements, \nenabling developers and market participants to understand the offering and any \npotential impact. Before energization of large loads, the CAISO will work with the \nlarge load developers and PTOs to test any FILI tools for safety and reliability, \njust as the CAISO and PTOs do the same for generator interconnections today. \n \n \n126  \nThe CAISO and PTOs have had success with preset schedules with energy storage \nresources that elect to forgo upgrades and thus may not charge during peak conditions (e.g., \nsummer afternoons)."},{"page":38,"startToken":16134,"endToken":16568,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 38 \n \n \nThe CAISO’s proposed FILI framework fulfills the Commission’s central \nobjective of making meaningful service options available to large loads whose \nwillingness and ability to limit withdrawals permit earlier, reliable access to the \ntransmission system, without importing three distinct transmission service \nproducts into the CAISO’s unique market structure. The Order expressly allows \nthe CAISO to explain how changes within its existing framework can provide \ncomparable flexibility, rather than requiring it to replicate the service \nclassifications contemplated for PJM. FILI translates that flexibility into \nenforceable interconnection terms: a large load may energize before completion \nof required network upgrades, but only within operating limits supported by \nsystem conditions and subject to specified curtailment triggers, control \nmechanisms, response times, and verification requirements. Agreements \nexecuted before energization identify those obligations and the facilities \nnecessary to conclude interim service, while incorporation into the CAISO’s \nmodels and operating procedures makes the customer’s flexibility operationally \nusable rather than merely aspirational. Public posting of those agreements also \nprovides transparency into the conditions governing access. Although FILI is an \ninterim arrangement rather than a substitute for every feature of the three \ncontemplated services, it addresses the immediate barrier posed by transmission \nconstruction timelines while preserving reliability and applicable cost-\nresponsibility requirements. The relevant distinction is therefore not the number \nor label of service offerings, but whether the framework enables customers to \nobtain earlier service commensurate with their actual, enforceable use of the \ngrid—the result FILI is designed to achieve. \n \n \nAs described in Section III.F, below, the CAISO plans to develop a \npermanent version of FILI in 2027. This would allow large loads to forgo some \nidentified network upgrades altogether if the large loads were curtailable. The \nCAISO recognizes that permanent load flexibility can have significant value even \nin a system with adequate aggregate generating capacity. Although the CAISO \nbelieves its tariff is just and reasonable without a permanent option at this time, \nthe CAISO is committed to exploring the permanent option. The prioritization of \nFILI is consistent with stakeholders’ comments, especially from the large load \ndevelopment community.  \n \nE. \nInterconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate \nLarge Load and Co-Located Load \n \nThe Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO tariff \nappears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not contain provisions \nallowing an interconnection customer to seek the generator interconnection \nservice(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving either: (1) an \nelectrically proximate large load; or (2) a co-located load, as defined in the Order, \nthat has a high peak load (i.e., large co-located loads that are 50 MW or"},{"page":39,"startToken":16568,"endToken":17008,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 39 \n \n \ngreater).127 The Commission defined an “electrically proximate large load” as a \nlarge load “sufficiently electrically close to the interconnection customer’s \nrequested point of interconnection, such that the impact on the transmission \nsystem of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with the \nexception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the \nsame as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is \nlocated no more than two substations from the generating facility).”128 \n \nThe CAISO has committed to examining electrically proximate co-location \nin an upcoming stakeholder initiative to determine whether it may have future \nvalue for the CAISO and developers. Stakeholders, especially data center \ndevelopers, agreed during the CAISO’s stakeholder process in response to the \nOrder that electrically proximate co-location is not a near-term priority. The \nCAISO thus believes its tariff is just and reasonable at this time without \nprovisions allowing an interconnection customer to “co-locate” or otherwise be \nstudied with an electrically proximate large load.  \n \nThe Commission’s contemplated treatment of electrically proximate \ngeneration and large load addresses a potential benefit of studying their \ncombined transmission-system effects, but the need for a separate service \npathway must be evaluated against the CAISO’s existing framework. Unlike an \nEastern framework that conditions a large load’s energization on the \ndevelopment of corresponding generation, the CAISO does not require a large \nload customer to bring its own generation or pair its interconnection request with \na particular generating facility. Supply adequacy remains the responsibility of the \nLSE under applicable resource adequacy and regulatory requirements, while the \nload’s ability to interconnect depends on the applicable studies, available \ntransmission capability, necessary facilities, and operating requirements. \nAccordingly, to the extent an electrically proximate pathway is intended to enable \na customer to satisfy a generation-matching condition or obtain an exception \nfrom such a condition, it solves a problem the CAISO’s framework does not \nimpose. The CAISO’s near-term reforms instead target the barriers its customers \nactually face, including transmission construction timelines, coordinated studies, \nand enforceable operating limits that can permit earlier energization.  \n \nThat distinction does not mean electrically proximate generation and load \ncan never produce transmission benefits. The Order’s premise—that sufficiently \nclose generation and load may have combined effects resembling a co-located \narrangement—presents a legitimate study question. It does not, however, \nestablish that electrical proximity alone eliminates the need to evaluate \nintervening facilities, the consequences of a generator outage or a change in \nload, or the obligations necessary to make any assumed offset dependable. Nor \n \n127  \nOrder to Show Cause at P 113. \n128  \nId. at P 112."},{"page":40,"startToken":17008,"endToken":17397,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 40 \n \n \ndoes the absence of a customer-specific generation requirement, standing alone, \nresolve the Commission’s concern about recognizing combined system impacts. \nThe CAISO therefore distinguishes between considering those impacts and \ncreating an immediate, separate interconnection pathway for paired projects. Its \nproposed sequencing allows the CAISO and stakeholders to address the \nadditional study and operating questions associated with electrically proximate \narrangements without delaying reforms applicable to stand-alone loads and co-\nlocated configurations.  \n \nThe stakeholder process supports that sequencing rather than a \ncategorical rejection of electrically proximate arrangements. As the CAISO \nexplained in its October 22, 2026 Board memorandum, stakeholder feedback led \nit to prioritize the more common stand-alone and co-located load and generator \ninterconnections in this proposal and filing, with electrically proximate \narrangements to follow once the co-location process is underway. The \nappropriate conclusion is therefore not that stakeholders oppose innovation or \nthat developers could derive no benefit from a future pathway, but that the \nCAISO identified more immediate priorities for this filing. Preserving electrically \nproximate arrangements for subsequent policy development permits further \nconsideration of their potential benefits and necessary safeguards while \nadvancing the interconnection, reliability, customer-protection, and flexible \ninterim service reforms that can be implemented now. \n \nF.  \nFuture Issues \n \nThe CAISO remains committed to working with stakeholders, PTOs, and \nState energy agencies, to support the reliable integration of large loads. Building \non the reforms in this initiative, the CAISO has identified several areas for \ncontinued stakeholder engagement, including operational and technical \nrequirements, market participation, flexible interconnection, electrically proximate \nloads, cost allocation, and implementation of recent State legislation. \n \nFirst, the CAISO will continue coordinating with California’s principal \nenergy agencies, the CPUC and CEC, as well as local regulatory authorities and \nother stakeholders, to address statutory requirements arising from recently \nenacted large load legislation.129 As the large load landscape continues to \nevolve, the CAISO recognizes the need to review existing processes and \ndevelop additional tools to support reliable integration. This includes exploring a \nrisk-mitigation framework under which local regulatory authorities, load-serving \nentities, utility distribution companies, metered subsystems, the PTOs, and the \nCAISO could curtail large loads under tight grid conditions before a reliability \nevent. 130 The CAISO expects to explore this framework through a stakeholder \n \n129  \nSee Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal at pg. 8, included as Attachment C. \n130  \nId."},{"page":41,"startToken":17397,"endToken":17793,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 41 \n \n \nprocess beginning in early 2027.131 Unlike other markets that have developed \ncurtailment requirements the Commission has rejected as improper conditions of \nretail service,132 the CAISO currently plans to develop curtailment tools the LSE \nand local regulatory authority can use pursuant to their jurisdiction.  \n \nSecond, the CAISO is committed to continuing to work with NERC and \nWECC on new reliability requirements for computational loads and other large \nloads. The CAISO and PTOs will ensure that their tariffs do not conflict or unduly \noverlap with similar reliability standards. All parties must work to ensure \ncompliance maintains reliability without being unduly burdensome. This work will \ncomplement the CAISO’s ongoing engagement with the PTOs and the LLTRWG.  \n \nThird, the CAISO will continue engaging stakeholders on opportunities for \nlarge load market participation, including participation through demand response, \nprice responsive load, and other market mechanisms. This work will continue in \nthe CAISO’s ongoing Demand and Distributed Energy Market Integration \n(DDEMI) initiative throughout 2027, including EWG efforts on coordination \nframework.133 Similarly, while the CAISO is committed to respecting FERC’s \njurisdictional considerations, the CAISO understands that distribution-connected \nand non-PTO connected loads can impact the transmission system. Although the \nCAISO already considers transmission network upgrades driven by these loads \nthrough the transmission planning process, the CAISO may consider through \nDDEMI whether additional measures are appropriate when these loads affect the \ntransmission system. As additional large loads, including loads co-located with \ngeneration, interconnect to the system, additional resource adequacy or reliability \nissues may also emerge. Any necessary modifications to resource adequacy \nrequirements would be considered through future resource adequacy policy \ninitiatives at the CAISO and in coordination with local regulatory authorities.134  \n \nFourth, the CAISO will further explore flexible load interconnection – \npermanent (FLIP) through a stakeholder initiative that is expected to commence \nin 2027.135 If developed and implemented, FLIP would enable large loads to \n \n131   \nSee 2027-2029 ISO Draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap at \nhttps://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Infrastructure-\nPolicy-Roadmap-Oct-8%202026.xlsx.  \n132  \nPJM Interconnection, 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 77 et seq. (2026). \n133  \nSee 2027-2029 California ISO Market Policy Initiatives Roadmap at \nhttps://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Market-Policy-\nRoadmap-Sep-24-2026.xlsx.  \n134  \nSee Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal at pp.54-55. \n135  \nSee 2027-2029 ISO Draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap at \nhttps://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Infrastructure-\nPolicy-Roadmap-Oct-8%202026.xlsx."},{"page":42,"startToken":17793,"endToken":18211,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 42 \n \n \ninterconnect and avoid the need to fund completion of transmission network \nupgrades that would be required for firm load service by accepting terms of \nflexible interconnection service in perpetuity. As explained above, large load \ndevelopers and stakeholders broadly desired the CAISO to prioritize FILI, and \ndevelop FLIP in 2027.   \n \nFinally, stakeholders also stressed the need for the CAISO to prioritize the \nmore common stand-alone and co-located load and generator interconnections \nin the near-term; however, the CAISO is committed to exploring provisions for \ninterconnection customers to serve electrically proximate loads in a future \nstakeholder initiative. The CAISO has included a stakeholder initiative to address \nthese items on its draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap and expects to begin \npolicy development in early 2027.136  \n \nThese commitments should further demonstrate to the Commission that \nthe CAISO will continue to innovate interconnection and market efficiencies for \nlarge loads without the need for a Section 206 proceeding. \n \nIV. \nBriefing Questions \n \nThe CAISO responds to the Order’s briefing questions as follows: \n \nP 123:137 How CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners, in responding \nto the order to show cause, should protect existing commercial arrangements \nincluding: (1) what would be a reasonable implementation period to ensure \nminimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements; and (2) how to \nallow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are \nnearing completion as of the date such tariff provisions are filed with the \nCommission. \n \nThe CAISO and PTOs have designed their tariff revisions to apply to \nfuture large load interconnection requests, thus protecting existing commercial \narrangements. The CAISO and PTOs have not proposed imposing any of the \nnew large load requirements on operational loads or loads that completed \ninterconnection requests before the proposed effective date of these tariff \nrevisions. As such, the CAISO and PTOs can implement their tariff revisions \n \n136  \nId. \n137  \n“We note that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with transmission \nowners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take interconnection and/or \ntransmission service from, the transmission system and may be at varying stages of that process. \nWe appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that process. We also \nunderstand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large \nloads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to \ninterconnecting to the transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.” Order to \nShow Cause at P 123."},{"page":43,"startToken":18211,"endToken":18670,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 43 \n \n \nexpeditiously without disrupting existing commercial arrangements. Future large \nload developers will have sufficient notice of these new rules while operational \nand in-flight loads can proceed without disruption. \n \nP 124:138 What, if any, potential impacts on regional and local transmission \nplanning would arise from the introduction of the new transmission services \ndiscussed herein? For example, when planning for load growth, how would \ntransmission providers and planners account for flexible large loads’ potential \npreference to take the new transmission services, including potential \nuncertainties around the type, location, and quantity of such expected loads? \n \nThe CAISO and PTOs do not believe that flexible large loads will create \nsignificant new challenges for regional and local transmission planning for two \nreasons. First, flexibility is a tool, not a hindrance: flexible loads create more \nopportunities for lower-cost, bespoke planning solutions. For FILI specifically, the \nservice is interim and tied to identified network upgrades, and the CAISO will \nreflect FILI loads and applicable operating limits in its models and operating \nprocedures.” Second, the CAISO and local regulators are accustomed to \nplanning for flexible, non-traditional loads, including batteries, electric vehicle \ncharging stations, and homes with behind-the-meter solar and storage systems. \nFlexible large loads will join this mélange, but as a contribution rather than a \nchallenge. The CAISO and PTO planning departments are also highly \naccustomed to planning the grid around flexible resources, namely generating \nfacilities. This is especially true in the CAISO, where over 17,000 MW of energy \nstorage resources have interconnected in the past few years.  \n \nP 125:139 We direct respondents to include information regarding potential \nstructures for agreements between the transmission owner/provider and an \nEligible Customer to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifts among \ntransmission customers related to network upgrade costs required for large \nloads. Further, please include information on what an appropriate minimum level \nof cost recovery and financial security from an Eligible Customer would be under \nany such agreements. \n \nThe CAISO responds to this issue in Section III.B, above.  \n \n \n138  \n“Today’s order proposes, as part of a potential replacement rate, to establish new \ntransmission services that recognize flexible large loads’ ability and willingness to limit their use of \nthe transmission system under certain conditions. As we assess this proposal, we also consider \nhow these new transmission services might affect other parts of CAISO’s Tariff and/or \nprocesses.” Order to Show Cause at P 124. \n139  \n“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable without the inclusion of cost shifting protections. We find that there may be a \nvariety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts associated with \nnetwork upgrades triggered by large loads.” Order to Show Cause at P 125."},{"page":44,"startToken":18670,"endToken":19137,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 44 \n \n \nP 126:140 To the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of \nproviding transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads \nwarrant requirements beyond those contemplated here [for ATTs], we seek \nfurther briefing. \n \nThe CAISO’s stakeholder process supported the CAISO’s proposed tariff \nrevisions memorializing its consideration of ATTs in transmission planning and \ninterconnection procedures. The CAISO has a long, proven track record of \nconsidering ATTs and non-transmission solutions, as discussed in Section \nIII.A.3, above. \n \nP 127:141 (a) To what extent would CAISO allow an interconnection customer’s \ngenerating facility serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located \nload to participate in CAISO’s energy and ancillary services market, and if CAISO \nwere to allow them to participate, what restrictions or mitigation would CAISO \napply? \n \nThe CAISO has not proposed excluding any loads or co-located resources \nfrom using any participation model or providing any service for which they can \nmeet the existing tariff requirements. Loads large and small and co-located \ngenerators already participate in the CAISO markets today and provide every \nservice, including capacity and ancillary services. Here again, the CAISO has a \nproven track record of innovation to enable non-conventional resources to \naccess the CAISO markets.  \n \nP 127: (b) To the extent that CAISO plans for the electrically proximate large load \nor large co-located load associated with an interconnection customer’s \n \n140  \n“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of \nalternative transmission technologies. The order directs CAISO to explain whether the Tariff \nremains just and reasonable without provisions that (1) require the evaluation of alternative \ntransmission technologies in studies for the provision of transmission service, using models that \nare capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account for advanced \ntransmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request from the Eligible \nCustomer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load; and (2) if traditional network \nupgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study \nreport to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load of a \nsufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., \nwould not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would \nnot result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request.” \nOrder to Show Cause at P 126. \n141  \n“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and \nunreasonable because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection customer \nserving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to seek generator \ninterconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving such loads.” Order to \nShow Cause at P 127."},{"page":45,"startToken":19137,"endToken":19560,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 45 \n \n \ngenerating facility for resource adequacy purposes, would CAISO account for the \ngenerating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located \nload in the resource adequacy construct?  If applicable, would CAISO allow the \ngenerating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located \nload to participate in CAISO’s capacity market?  If so, would CAISO accredit \nthese generating facilities using the same method as other CAISO generating \nfacilities? \n \nNothing in the current CAISO tariff or the CAISO’s proposed tariff \nrevisions would make co-located generating facilities ineligible to provide \nresource adequacy, nor affect their qualifying capacity. So long as the generating \nfacility continues to meet all portfolio, capacity, and must-offer obligations, and \nrespond to all CAISO dispatches, the CAISO does not have cause to remove or \nreduce their resource adequacy value.  \n \nAs the CAISO explained in its 30-day informational report and in Section \nII.B.1, the CAISO does not administer a centralized forward capacity market. The \nCPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, establishes resource adequacy \nrequirements for CPUC jurisdictional load serving entities. CPUC-jurisdictional \nload serving entities represent the vast majority of the load in the CAISO’s \nservice territory. Other local regulatory authorities within California, like municipal \nutilities, establish these requirements for load serving entities under their \nauthority. The CAISO only sets default resource adequacy requirements if a local \nregulatory authority elects not to establish their own. Moreover, the CPUC \nestablishes resource accreditation methodologies and counting rules used to \ndetermine the qualifying capacity of resource types participating in the resource \nadequacy program. As such, the CPUC and local regulatory authorities will \nevaluate whether co-located or other loads affect generating facilities’ ability to \nprovide resource adequacy capacity.  \n \nV. \nOrder to Show Cause \n \nThe Commission should conclude the Order to Show Cause proceeding. \nOnly a small minority of comments in the Commission’s ANOPR proceeding \nreferenced the CAISO and the West, and fewer, if any, argued that the status \nquo was unjust and unreasonable. As the CAISO describes above, a significant \nportion of the Commission’s findings in the Order to Show Cause are based on \nissues specific to other markets. Although no one in the West would argue that \nthe work is done, the CAISO and PTO filings demonstrate they will continue to \nproactively evolve to meet the demands of large loads. The CAISO and \nstakeholders are committed to the principles the Commission established in the \nOrder, and will continue to bring frequent, rapid enhancements to the \nCommission for approval without the need for a Section 206 proceeding."},{"page":46,"startToken":19560,"endToken":19924,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 46 \n \n \nVI. \nEffective Date, Comment Period, Request for Waiver \n \nWith the exception of the two sections described below, the CAISO \nrequests that the Commission accept the tariff revisions contained in this filing \neffective February 16, 2027 (i.e., 92 days after the date of this filing).142 Although \nthe CAISO is ready to implement its tariff revisions as soon as approved, the \nCAISO is proposing a 92-day notice period to recognize that comments and \nCommission review are largely occurring over the holiday season. Similarly, the \nCAISO requests the Commission establish a 30-day deadline for comments on \nthe CAISO’s filing so stakeholders have additional time for the Thanksgiving \nholiday. \n \nThe CAISO requests that the Commission accept the tariff revisions in \nSections 25.7.3 and 25.7.3.1 (scheduling coordinator requirements) effective \nNovember 1, 2027, and the tariff revisions in Section 11.36 (settlements) \neffective April 30, 2028. The CAISO respectfully requests waiver of the \nCommission’s 120-day notice requirement to permit the requested November 1, \n2027 effective date.143 Good cause exists to grant the requested waiver. The \ntariff revisions will require software development, simulation, and scheduling \ncoordinator training. The CAISO’s proposed effective dates align with their \nannual software releases for scheduling coordinator software in the Fall and \nsettlements software in the Spring. Importantly, the effective dates for these \ntechnology changes should have little or no negative impact because the CAISO \nsoftware will be available before the new large loads subject to those \nrequirements will finish studies and construction.  \n \n \n142  \nFebruary 14, 2027 is a weekend, and February 15, 2027 is a federal holiday, hence 92. \nThe CAISO may have other proceedings revising some of the sections in the instant filing. If \nnecessary, the CAISO will reconcile any overlapping revisions after Commission review.  \n143  \nSpecifically, pursuant to section 35.11 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § \n35.11, the CAISO respectfully requests waiver of the notice requirement in section 35.3(a)(1) of \nthe Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 35.3(a)(1), to allow the tariff revisions to go into effect \nmore than 120 days after submittal of this filing."},{"page":47,"startToken":19924,"endToken":20097,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 47 \n \n \nVII. \nCommunications \n \nPursuant to Rule 203(b)(3) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and \nProcedure,144 the CAISO requests that all correspondence, pleadings, and other \ncommunications regarding this filing should be directed to the following: \n \n \nWilliam H. Weaver \n  Assistant General Counsel  \nCalifornia Independent System \nOperator Corporation  \n250 Outcropping Way \nFolsom, CA 95630  \nTel: (916) 608-1225 \nFax: (916) 608-7296 \nbweaver@caiso.com \nVIII. \nService \n \nThe CAISO has served copies of this filing on the CPUC, the CEC, and all \nparties with scheduling coordinator agreements under the CAISO tariff. In \naddition, the CAISO has posted a copy of the filing on the CAISO website. \n \nIX. \nContents of Filing \n \nIn addition to this transmittal letter, this filing includes the following \nattachments: \n \nAttachment A \nClean CAISO tariff sheets incorporating this tariff \namendment \n \nAttachment B  \nRed-lined document showing the revisions in this tariff \namendment \n \nAttachment C \nFinal Proposal \n \nAttachment D \nTechnical Working Group Proposal \n \nAttachment E \nBoard Memorandum \n \n144  \n18 C.F.R. § 385.203(b)(3)."},{"page":48,"startToken":20097,"endToken":20166,"text":"The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese \nNovember 16, 2026 \nPage 48 \n \n \nX. \nConclusion \n \nFor the reasons set forth above, the CAISO respectfully requests that the \nCommission accept the CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions and conclude the \nOrder to Show Cause proceeding. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n \n/s/ William H. Weaver \n \n \n \n \n \n \nRoger E. Collanton \n  General Counsel \nWilliam H. Weaver \n \n \n \n \n \n \n  Assistant General Counsel \n \nCalifornia Independent System  \n \nOperator Corporation \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCounsel for the California Independent \nSystem Operator Corporation"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":1097,"startToken":0,"endToken":145},{"p":1,"at":1097,"title":"I. Executive Summary","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":1,"endAt":1102,"startToken":145,"endToken":146},{"p":1,"at":1102,"title":"Executive Summary","method":"printed heading","endPage":4,"endAt":67,"startToken":146,"endToken":1110},{"p":4,"at":67,"title":"II. Background","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":4,"endAt":72,"startToken":1110,"endToken":1111},{"p":4,"at":72,"title":"Background","method":"printed heading","endPage":4,"endAt":87,"startToken":1111,"endToken":1112},{"p":4,"at":87,"title":"A. 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