EL26-69-000 · 2026-06-18 · FERC

NYISO show cause order

195 FERC ¶ 61,216 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
Before Commissioners:  Laura V. Swett, Chairman; 
                                        David Rosner, Lindsay S. See, 
                                        Judy W. Chang, and David LaCerte. 
 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
LS Power Grid New York Corporation I 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation  
New York Transco LLC 
NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation   
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
 
 
ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDING  
UNDER SECTION 206 OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT 
 
(Issued June 18, 2026)

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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Paragraph Numbers 
I. Background ..................................................................................................................... 6. 
A. Growth of Large and Co-Located Loads and ANOPR ............................................. 6. 
B. Recent Proceedings Addressing Large and Co-Located Loads .............................. 12. 
1. PJM Co-Location Proceedings ............................................................................ 13. 
2. SPP High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load Generation 
Assessment Processes .............................................................................................. 16. 
3. SPP Conditional High Impact Large Load Service ............................................. 18. 
II. NYISO’s Existing Processes ....................................................................................... 20. 
A. Existing Tariff Processes ......................................................................................... 20. 
1. Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service .......................................................... 21. 
2. NITS .................................................................................................................... 24. 
3. Load Interconnection Process .............................................................................. 27. 
4. Local Transmission Planning Process ................................................................. 30. 
5. Generator Interconnection ................................................................................... 31. 
6. Co-Located Load Interconnection Process .......................................................... 33. 
B. Recent Stakeholder Proceedings in NYISO ............................................................ 35. 
III. Discussion ................................................................................................................... 38. 
A. Transmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large Loads ................ 44. 
1. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................... 48. 
2. Tariff Provisions .................................................................................................. 55. 
B. Cost Shifting Risk Among Transmission Customers .............................................. 72. 
1. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................... 74. 
2. Additional Cost Transparency ............................................................................. 77. 
3. Cost Recovery Agreements ................................................................................. 83. 
C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter Generation ............. 92. 
1. Definition ............................................................................................................. 94. 
2. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................... 99. 
3. Tariff Provisions ................................................................................................ 101. 
D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on 
Behalf of Flexible Large Loads ................................................................................. 111. 
E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-
Located Load .............................................................................................................. 114. 
F. Informational Report .............................................................................................. 128. 
IV. Briefing Questions .................................................................................................... 130. 
1. 
Over the past year, the Commission has taken action in numerous dockets1 to 
address issues related to (a) unprecedented increases in requests for transmission service 
 
1 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 (2025) (PJM Show 
Cause Order); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2025) (PJM Co-
Location Order); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026) (SPP HILL Order);

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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to serve large loads2 and (b) growing interest in the co-location of loads with generating 
facilities (co-location arrangements3).  Separately, the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) 
released an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) in October 2025.  The 
ANOPR, issued pursuant to section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act,4 
directed the Commission to consider taking additional actions to address the addition of 
large and co-located loads to the transmission system.5  The records in these proceedings 
illustrate a host of urgent challenges associated with providing the transmission service 
needed to serve the ongoing influx of large loads while maintaining reliability and 
affordability.  In particular, stakeholders have expressed concerns that large loads are not 
efficiently and appropriately integrated onto the transmission system; have identified a 
number of unique challenges that large load integration poses for the reliable operation  
of that system; and have debated how best to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions 
of transmission service remain just and reasonable as more and more large loads are 
 
 
 
Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2026) (SPP CHILLS Order); see also, e.g., 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025); Commonwealth Edison Co., 
194 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2026). 
2 As explained below, it appears that it would be reasonable to define a large load 
as (1) a new commercial or industrial customer, (2) located at a single site behind one or 
more points of interconnection, (3) that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater, (4) 
interconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, and (5) 
is not part of a co-location arrangement.  See infra P 64. 
3 As explained below, it appears that it would be reasonable to define co-located 
load as a configuration that refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected 
to the facilities of an existing or planned generating facility on the interconnection 
customer’s side of the point of interconnection to the RTO/ISO’s transmission system.  In 
this order, we will use the term co-location arrangement when referring to both the co-
located load and the associated generating facility.  See infra P 95. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 7173. 
5 See Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 23, 2025) 
(ANOPR); see also Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Docket No. 
RM26-4-000 (Oct. 23, 2025).  The ANOPR uses the term “hybrid facilities,” which it 
explains are large loads that “share a point of interconnection with new or existing 
generation facilities.”  ANOPR at P 12.  In this order, as explained below, we use the 
term co-located load.

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onboarded onto that system.6  The records in these proceedings likewise present serious 
concerns about the lack of clarity and consistency in Regional Transmission Organization 
or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) tariffs —including with respect to the rates, 
terms, and conditions of service that apply to flexible large loads, co-location 
arrangements, load with behind the meter generation, and generating facilities with 
electrically proximate large load7 or co-located load. 
2. 
The findings in several recent Commission proceedings establish the foundations 
of a just and reasonable framework for addressing these concerns and ensuring the 
timely, efficient, and reliable integration of large and co-located loads onto the 
transmission system.  For example, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) has recently taken 
a number of innovative and proactive steps to address the challenges of integrating large 
loads, co-located loads, and/or generation and electrically proximate large load onto the 
transmission system while ensuring that its tariff remains just and reasonable and PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) has likewise taken steps toward that goal in response to 
this Commission’s directives.8  By contrast, New York Independent System Operator, 
Inc. (NYISO) has not yet proposed tariff revisions to address the challenges associated 
with the integration of large and co-located loads, despite the fact that NYISO itself has 
recognized challenges to the existing load interconnection process in its Tariff, including, 
among other things, the “limited opportunity” to identify reliability impacts, “limited 
 
6 Throughout this order we rely on comments and answers filed in response to the 
ANOPR in Docket No. RM26-4-000 and all referenced comments in this order were filed 
in that docket, unless otherwise noted.  A full list of commenter names and abbreviations 
is attached to this order as an Appendix.  Additionally, we have relied on the discussions 
held in the Federal and State Current Issues Collaborative in Docket No. AD24-7-000 
(NARUC Collaborative).  All entities who wish to participate in this docket, regardless of 
participation in the ANOPR proceeding or NARUC Collaborative, should file to 
intervene in Docket No. EL26-69-000. 
7 As explained below, for purposes of this order, an “electrically proximate large 
load” is a large load, as defined in this order, that is sufficiently electrically close to the 
interconnection customer’s requested point of interconnection, such that the impact on 
the transmission system of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with 
the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the same 
as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is located no more than 
two substations away from the generating facility).  See infra P 120. 
8 PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115; PJM Co-Location Order,  
193 FERC ¶ 61,217, order on reh’g, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2026) (PJM Co-Location 
Rehearing Order); SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; SPP CHILLS Order,  
195 FERC ¶ 61,196.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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rules for capturing impacts of load interconnection on the broader transmission system,” 
and that the large volume of requests may delay study timelines.9   
3. 
As discussed below, we find that NYISO’s existing Open Access Transmission 
Tariff (Tariff) appears to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.  We thus institute a show cause proceeding pursuant to section 206 of the 
Federal Power Act (FPA),10 and we direct NYISO and the Transmission Owners,11 
within 60 days of the date of this order, to either:   
(1) show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential without provisions addressing:   
(a) the application process, study procedures, and ongoing operational 
requirements that apply to Eligible Customers12 seeking transmission 
service on behalf of large loads;  
 
9 NYISO, Load Interconnection Process: Challenges and Considerations 16 (Feb. 
3, 2026), https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/56802634/04_Load_
interconnection_reform_2-3-26_TPAS_final.pdf/ (NYISO Challenges and 
Considerations). 
10 16 U.S.C. § 824e. 
11 Transmission Owners refers to the entities listed in the caption of this order.  We 
recognize that NYISO’s transmission owners include entities that are not subject to the 
Commission’s jurisdiction because they are not public utilities pursuant to section 201(f) 
of the FPA.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(f); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 180 FERC ¶ 61,022, at PP 44-
45 (2022).  Accordingly, the Commission has not included Long Island Power Authority 
and New York Power Authority here as Transmission Owners that must respond to this 
order to show cause.  Nonetheless, the Commission retains the authority to review each 
entity’s formula rates as a component of NYISO’s Tariff in an order to show cause 
directed towards NYISO, and NYISO must respond to this order regarding the non-
public utilities’ NYISO Tariff provisions on file with the Commission.  See Sw. Power 
Pool, Inc., 180 FERC ¶ 61,022 at P 40. 
12 NYISO defines an Eligible Customer, in relevant part, as:  
(i) An entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the 
wholesale or retail electric power business including any 
electric utility, power marketer, Federal power marketing 
agency, or any person generating Energy for sale for resale. . . 
[or] (ii) Any retail customer taking unbundled transmission 
service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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(b) additional transparency concerning the Network Upgrade13 costs to 
provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, 
a pro forma cost recovery agreement between NYISO, the relevant 
transmission owner, and Eligible Customer taking transmission service on 
behalf of the large load to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among 
transmission customers, and a mechanism to ensure such payments are 
appropriately credited toward transmission owners’ transmission revenue 
requirements consistent with the Commission’s cost-of-service regulations;  
(c) the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to co-location 
arrangements; 
(d) transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking 
transmission service on behalf of co-located loads, load with behind the 
meter generation, and flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit 
their use of the transmission system under certain conditions;14 and 
(e) the rates, terms, and conditions of service applicable to interconnection 
customers serving electrically proximate large load or co-located load; or 
(2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if the 
Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and 
unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to 
establish a replacement Tariff. 
 
 
 
Owner offer the transmission service, or pursuant to a 
voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner, is 
an Eligible Customer under the Tariff.   
NYISO, Open Access Transmission Tariff, § 1.5 (Definitions – E) (16.0.0) 
(NYISO Tariff). 
13 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to 
them in the Tariff. 
14 As explained below, for purpose of this order, “flexible” large loads are a subset 
of large loads, as used in this order, that are not co-located with generation, but are 
willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under 
certain conditions.  See infra note 229.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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4. 
We are also concerned with NYISO’s need to ensure adequate generation to serve 
new large loads.15  We therefore direct NYISO to submit, within 30 days of the date of 
issuance of this order, an informational report on how NYISO intends to ensure that 
adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads, as detailed 
later in this order.   
5. 
We recognize that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with 
transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take service 
from, the transmission system.  We appreciate that different large loads are currently at 
different stages of that process.  We also understand that large loads and Eligible 
Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads are negotiating, entering 
into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the 
transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.  This proceeding is not 
intended to disrupt existing commercial arrangements, but rather to establish prospective 
reforms.  Accordingly, any Tariff revisions offered by NYISO and/or the Transmission 
Owners in response to this proceeding should (a) propose a reasonable implementation 
period to ensure minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements, and (b) 
allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are nearing 
completion as of the date such Tariff provisions are filed with the Commission.  Such 
proposed Tariff revisions should include a reasonable effective date that accommodates 
such considerations regarding these existing commercial arrangements. 
I. 
Background 
A. 
Growth of Large and Co-Located Loads and ANOPR 
6. 
As the Secretary explained in the ANOPR, electricity demand in the United States 
is expected to grow at an extraordinary pace in the near term, largely due to the rapid 
growth of large loads.16  The Secretary highlighted findings from the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that show that demand growth is now higher 
than at any point in the past two decades, driven in part by increasing quantities of large 
commercial and industrial load, most notably data centers, connecting rapidly to the 
 
15 Cf. PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 237-239 (highlighting 
PJM’s ongoing Critical Issue Fast Path stakeholder process to consider proposals to help 
integrate large load additions without causing resource inadequacy and directing an 
informational report on the status of those proposals). 
16 ANOPR at 2 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Resource Adequacy Report: 
Evaluating the Reliability & Security of the United States Electric Grid (July 2025), 
www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-
07/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29.pdf).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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transmission system.17  The Secretary also highlighted NERC’s conclusion that the size 
and speed with which data centers can be connected to the grid present unique challenges 
for demand forecasting and system planning.  The ANOPR proposed that, in light of the 
unprecedented current and expected growth of large loads seeking to interconnect to the 
transmission system, the Commission should standardize interconnection procedures and 
agreements for large loads, including those that seek to share a point of interconnection 
with new or existing generation facilities.18 
7. 
On April 16, 2026, the Commission issued an order regarding its intent to act with 
respect to the ANOPR docket.19  In that order, the Commission explained that it agreed 
with the Secretary “that, ‘[i]n light of the unprecedented current and expected growth of 
large loads’ such as data centers, there is an urgent need for thoughtful reforms to ensure 
that large loads are ‘able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and 
non-discriminatory manner.’”20  After recognizing the Commission’s recent actions in 
proceedings involving issues associated with large loads,21 the Commission concluded 
that it was clear that additional “action is warranted to support further progress where it is 
needed.”22 
8. 
NYISO’s and Transmission Owners’ comments in response to the ANOPR also 
recognize the growth of large loads and highlight the unique challenges that integrating 
 
17 Id. (citing NERC, 2024 Long- Term Reliability Assessment 8 (Dec. 2024, 
updated July 2025), 
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%2
0Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf). 
18 Id. P 12.  For example, the ANOPR proposed that load and hybrid facilities 
should be studied together with generating facilities, observing that “siting a large load 
near or at the same point of interconnection as a new generating facility could reduce the 
network upgrades needed to interconnect only the load or only the generating facility.”  
ANOPR at P 20. 
19 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission Sys., 195 FERC  
¶ 61,045 (2026) (Order Regarding Intent to Act). 
20 Id. P 2. 
21 Id. (citing PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217; SPP HILL Order,  
194 FERC ¶ 61,031; Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,181; Tri-State 
Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 193 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2025); Duke Energy Carolinas, 
LLC, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237). 
22 Id. PP 3-4.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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large loads poses to New York’s operation of the transmission system given their size, 
operational behavior, and unique potential to impact the transmission system.23  
According to NYISO, only six large load projects totaling 1,045 MW were in its 
interconnection queue in 2022.  As of November 2025, by contrast, more than 40 large 
load projects that could add more than 10,000 MW to the transmission system are in the 
queue.  NYISO also notes that it has recently seen a decrease in available resources, 
which, when paired with the rapid growth of large loads and forecasted growth in 
demand, will further diminish resource and reliability margins.24   
9. 
As discussed further below and as several commenters explain, NYISO has load 
interconnection procedures that apply to load interconnection requests for projects that 
are greater than 10 MW connecting at a voltage level of 115 kV or above, or projects 80 
MW or more connecting at a voltage level below 115 kV.25  The New York Commission 
asserts in the ANOPR proceeding that those procedures effectively facilitate the 
interconnection of large loads and that NYISO is already working on potential 
improvements to its large load interconnection processes.26  NYISO and the NYTOs, 
however, state that NYISO’s load addition process should be reviewed and enhanced to 
address issues that have arisen because of the influx of large load proposals.27  NYISO 
 
23 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-3, 6-8; NYTOs November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 2. 
24 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8 (citing NYISO, 2025-2034 
Comprehensive Reliability Plan (Nov. 21, 2025), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/d/guest/2025-2034-comprehensive-reliability-plan 
(NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan); NYISO, 2023-2032 
Comprehensive Reliability Plan (Nov. 28, 2023), https://www.nyiso.com/documents/
20142/2248481/2023-2032-Comprehensive-Reliability-Plan.pdf). 
25 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; see infra PP 27-29.  Proposed 
load interconnections that do not meet these criteria are subject to the procedures of the 
applicable transmission owner.  NYISO, Technical Bulletin No. 266, Load 
Interconnection Projects System Impact Study Procedure 1 (Nov. 7, 2025), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2931465/TB266-LoadInterconnection-
20251107-Final.pdf/ (NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266).  
26 New York Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-5. 
27 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; NYTOs November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 2.  The NYTOs include:  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., New York Power Authority, New 
York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Orange and

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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notes that there are several challenges with its existing load interconnection process, such 
as:  (1) the large volume of requests may delay the completion of the Load System 
Impact Study (Load SIS), which already requires approximately nine months to 
complete;28 (2) resource adequacy is not currently considered in load interconnection 
studies; (3) the “[l]imited opportunity to identify an individual load interconnection’s 
contribution to reliability impacts” when considering several load interconnections 
collectively; (4) the “limited rules for capturing impacts of the load interconnection on 
the broader transmission system,” such as on Affected Systems; (5) the variability of 
facilities-study practices and interconnection agreements requirements among the 
Transmission Owners; (6) the “limited process for evaluating material modifications to 
projects;” and (7)  “[n]o specific process for studying co-located generator and load 
interconnections.”29  
10. 
NYTOs also recognize the benefits of implementing formalized processes for 
studies related to the addition of large loads and that specific timelines can improve 
discipline and predictability.30  Additionally, National Grid states that its experience in 
New York and New England confirms the need to define the “rules of the road” for large 
load interconnections.31  National Grid recognizes the urgency of this effort given that the 
pace at which large loads are seeking interconnection is accelerating.  National Grid 
anticipates that a standardized set of rules for large load interconnections would be 
 
Rockland Utilities, Inc., Long Island Power Authority, and Rochester Gas and Electric 
Corporation. 
28 See NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266 at 3. 
29 NYISO Challenges and Considerations at 16; see NYISO, 2024 Reliability 
Needs Assessment (RNA) 34-37 (Nov. 19, 2024), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2248793/2024-RNA-Report.pdf (noting a 
dramatic increase “over the past several years” in load interconnection requests and that 
the increasing speed and scale with which large loads seek to interconnect in NYISO will 
have “major impacts on future load growth and system risk”); Transcript, Large Loads 
Co-Located at Generating Facilities Technical Conference, Docket No. AD24-11-000, at 
63-64 (Nov. 1, 2024) (Zachary G. Smith, Senior Vice President of System and Resources 
Planning, NYISO) (stating that the load interconnection provisions in NYISO’s Tariff 
“gives no clarity at all in terms of responsibility for facilities that are needed to 
interconnect those loads, [or for] cost responsibility,” which creates confusion between 
utilities). 
30 See NYTOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 19. 
31 National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2.  National Grid’s 
subsidiary, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, is a Transmission Owner in New York.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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critical to addressing the uncertainties that both transmission owners and large loads such 
as data center developers frequently encounter during interconnection planning. 32  
National Grid contends that clear, predictable rules will enable timely and efficient 
integration of these customers, supporting economic growth and innovation while 
maintaining system reliability.  Commenters also note that reforms that encourage the 
pairing of generation with electrically proximate load could streamline the addition of 
large loads and provide broad benefits to the New York transmission system.33 
11. 
Moreover, many commenters in the ANOPR proceeding filed persuasive 
comments documenting the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions to ensure 
regulatory and process certainty, fairness and consistency, and efficiency as large and co-
located loads are added to the transmission system in increasing numbers.34  There is also 
broad support for rules that help to ensure that other transmission customers are not 
unfairly burdened with additional costs or reliability impacts as large and co-located 
loads interconnect to the transmission system.35  In addition, many ANOPR commenters 
 
32 Id. at 7.  
33 See NYTOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12 (noting that NYISO has in 
its 2026 stakeholder process prioritized initiatives that better integrate load with on-site 
generation, which could help shorten study timelines and modernize the current load-
interconnection process); National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18 
(pointing to NYISO’s lengthy generation cluster study process and stating that 
encouraging such pairing can reduce transmission investment and improve resource 
adequacy while also advancing speed to power for large loads).  
34 See, e.g., AI Supply Chain Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; 
Calibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-3; CEBA November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 9-11; Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; DCC November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 3-4; ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-11; EPSA 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4-6; Infrastructure Masons December 5 ANOPR 
Comments at 4-7; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-10; National Grid 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; ODEC December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; R 
Street November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; Switch December 5 ANOPR Comments at 
3; Tract November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Vantage November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 5-6; Vistra December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2. 
35 See, e.g., APPA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Buckeye November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 17; Exelon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; Kansas 
Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; NCSL November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 1; NRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9; NY UIU November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 3; OCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Oklo 
December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; Southeast PIOs December 5 ANOPR Comments

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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highlighted the need to efficiently integrate large loads, particularly data centers, to 
support national security priorities and economic development.36   
B. 
Recent Proceedings Addressing Large and Co-Located Loads 
12. 
Over the past year, the Commission has begun to address, both sua sponte and in 
response to complaints and FPA section 20537 filings, the growing use of co-location 
arrangements.38  The Commission’s orders in those proceedings have addressed the need 
for clear and consistent tariff provisions regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of 
service that apply to co-location arrangements and for transmission services that reflect 
Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads and load 
with behind the meter generation that are willing and able to limit their energy 
withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.  Several other 
Commission proceedings have addressed the challenges of integrating large loads onto 
the transmission system, including the need for clear and consistent tariff provisions 
regarding the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
loads and for interconnection customers serving electrically proximate large load.  As 
explained below, these proceedings provide examples that will help to ensure that 
jurisdictional transmission service is provided in a manner that is just and reasonable and 
maintains reliability as large loads are integrated onto the transmission system and co-
location arrangements become more common.  It is in this context that the Commission 
now considers whether NYISO’s Tariff remains just and reasonable without similar 
provisions. 
 
11-15; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; Tri-State November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 8; UCS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-11; U.S. 
Representatives November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1. 
36 See, e.g., AI Supply Chain Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2; 
DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; ECA November 21 ANOPR Comments  
at 6; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Google November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 2-3; Verrus December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2. 
37 16 U.S.C. § 824d. 
38 See PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115; PJM Co-Location Order,  
193 FERC ¶ 61,217, order on reh’g, PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC  
¶ 61,209; SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC  
¶ 61,196.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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1. 
PJM Co-Location Proceedings 
13. 
On February 20, 2025, the Commission initiated a show cause proceeding against 
PJM and the PJM transmission owners regarding the lack of tariff provisions addressing 
with sufficient clarity or consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply 
to co-location arrangements.39  The Commission explained when initiating that 
proceeding that the absence of such provisions may leave entities unable to determine 
what steps they can or must take to effectuate co-location arrangements of various 
configurations and how to do so in a manner that is just and reasonable.40  On December 
18, 2025, the Commission found that PJM’s tariff was indeed unjust and unreasonable 
because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity or consistency 
the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving 
co-located load and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-
located load.41   
14. 
Specifically, the Commission found that the PJM tariff was unjust and 
unreasonable because there is a lack of sufficient clarity or consistency as to the rates, 
terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving co-
located load.42  The Commission also found that PJM’s tariff was unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not include transmission services that reflect Eligible 
Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads that are willing and 
able to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain 
conditions.43  Additionally, the Commission found that PJM’s behind the meter 
generation rules were no longer just and reasonable.44  The Commission directed PJM to 
file a compliance filing to revise its tariff:  (1) to set forth specific terms and conditions 
that an interconnection customer in PJM seeking to serve co-located load must follow in 
 
39 See PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115. 
40 Id. P 74.  The PJM Show Cause Order defined co-located load as a 
“configuration [that] refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected to the 
facilities of an existing or planned Customer Facility on the Interconnection Customer’s 
side of the Point of Interconnection (‘POI’) to the PJM Transmission System.”  Id. P 3 
n.4.   
41 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217. 
42 Id. P 176.  
43 Id. P 177. 
44 Id. P 179.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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order to effectuate a co-location arrangement;45 (2) to require that the Eligible Customer 
taking transmission service on behalf of co-located load takes one of three transmission 
services:  (a) network integration transmission service (NITS) or a new interim, non-firm 
transmission service while Network Upgrades to provide full NITS service are 
constructed (interim NITS); (b) a new firm contract demand transmission service; or (c) a 
new non-firm contract demand transmission service;46 (3) to revise the behind the meter 
generation rules and implement a transition process for existing behind the meter 
generation participants;47 and (4) to make several clarifications on how certain aspects of 
PJM’s generator interconnection process apply to interconnection customers seeking to 
serve co-located load.48   
15. 
On June 18, 2026, concurrently with the instant order, the Commission issued an 
order modifying the discussion in the PJM Co-Location Order and setting aside the order 
in part; accepting in part and rejecting in part PJM’s compliance filing, and directing a 
further compliance filing; and establishing as just and reasonable certain rates, terms, and 
conditions for the new transmission services (i.e., interim NITS, firm contract demand 
transmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission service).49 
2. 
SPP High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load 
Generation Assessment Processes 
16. 
On January 14, 2026, the Commission accepted revisions to SPP’s tariff to add a 
high impact large load (HILL) study process and High Impact Large Load Generation 
Assessment (HILLGA) process.50  SPP’s tariff revisions established HILLs as a new 
 
45 Id. PP 187-192, 225-230. 
46 Id. PP 193-218.  The Commission also established a paper hearing to determine 
the just and reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for the new transmission services.  Id. 
PP 219-220. 
47 Id. PP 221-224.  
48 Id. PP 161, 231-236. 
49 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 7-9.  PJM’s 
compliance filing proposing revisions in response to the Commission’s directives 
regarding clarification that certain aspects of PJM’s generator interconnection process 
apply to interconnection customers seeking to serve co-located load was accepted in part 
on April 16, 2026.  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2026). 
50 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 61, 64.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 15 - 
category of load;51 imposed enhanced study requirements to enable SPP to assess the 
HILL’s reliability impacts on the transmission system;52 and created additional, ongoing 
operational requirements for transmission customers serving HILLs to ensure continued 
reliability of the transmission system.53  The tariff revisions also established the HILLGA 
process, a new generator interconnection service and related interconnection process to 
facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are specifically identified 
for, and limited to, serving a HILL and are located no more than two substations away 
from the HILL.54   
 
51 SPP defines a HILL as:   
A new commercial or industrial load, or increase in 
commercial or industrial load, at a single site connected 
through one or more shared Points of Interconnection (POIs) 
or delivery points, where such load is either (1) 10 MW or 
more if connected to the Transmission System at a voltage 
level less than or equal to 69 [kilovolts (kV)]; or (2) 50 MW 
or more if connected to the Transmission System at a voltage 
level greater than 69 kV.  An Electric Storage Resource is not 
considered a HILL.  
SPP, Open Access Transmission Tariff, Sixth Revised Vol. No. 1, pt. I, § 1 (Definitions 
H) (1.0.0). 
52 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 13-17 (explaining that the HILL 
process requires up to three additional studies beyond those required of all transmission 
service requests for transmission customers requesting to add or modify a delivery point 
associated with a HILL, including a HILL delivery point study, HILL supplemental load 
connection study, and potential supplemental Electromagnetic Transient study). 
53 Id. P 18 (explaining that market participants registering a HILL must (1) follow 
all nonconforming load requirements (e.g., additional load forecast requirements); (2) 
provide load data via telemetry in real time; (3) have remote capability to disconnect the 
load from the transmission system made available to the transmission operator; (4) have 
an up/down ramp rate not exceeding 20 MW per minute unless otherwise directed; (5) 
include additional information with registration; and (6) not have withdrawals from the 
transmission system without appropriate transmission service); id. P 19 (explaining that 
the transmission owner, at the transmission customer’s expense, must install a phasor 
measurement unit or similar equipment); id. PP 20-21 (explaining that the transmission 
customer will be required to comply with ride-through requirement guidelines). 
54 Id. P 27 (explaining that, under the HILLGA process, SPP proposes to study 
HILLGA requests to determine whether any network upgrades are needed to

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 16 - 
17. 
The Commission stated that SPP demonstrated that the “unprecedented growth in 
large loads in the SPP region presents significant and unique operational and planning 
challenges.”55  The Commission found that SPP demonstrated that its proposed HILL 
process was a just and reasonable approach for integrating transmission customers’ new 
large loads onto SPP’s transmission system in a reliable manner.56  The Commission 
found that it was reasonable to impose additional study requirements and other proposed 
requirements given the unique operating characteristics of HILLs.  The Commission 
further found that the proposed study requirements would ensure the reliable integration 
of the transmission customer’s HILLs onto SPP’s transmission system and would provide 
SPP with information about their impact on SPP’s transmission system, including the 
transmission system’s ability to withstand and control disturbances by the HILL at the 
point of interconnection.57  In addition, the Commission found that the proposed study 
deposits would discourage speculative HILL study requests.58  Finally, the Commission 
concluded that the proposed ongoing reliability requirements would allow SPP to 
maintain reliable operation of its transmission system by increasing SPP’s visibility, 
providing necessary data, and imposing real-time operational safeguards for HILLs.59  In 
accepting HILLGA, the Commission found that “SPP’s HILLGA process reasonably 
provides a flexible, expedited, and separate serial interconnection process that will 
facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are limited to serving a 
HILL in the same local area.”60   
 
accommodate the generating facility’s injection to the local area); id. P 32 (explaining 
that SPP will grant HILLGA customers a new type of interconnection service, load 
limited resource interconnection service, which grants limited interconnection service 
solely to serve the associated HILL).  
55 Id. P 60. 
56 Id. P 61. 
57 Id. P 62. 
58 For the HILL delivery point study, SPP required a $10,000 non-refundable 
application fee and a $100,000 study deposit, with an additional $200,000 study deposit if 
an Electromagnetic Transient study was also required.  Id. P 15.  For the HILL 
supplemental load connection study, SPP allows the host transmission owner to require a 
$25,000 study deposit.  Id. P 16. 
59 Id. P 63. 
60 Id. P 64.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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3. 
SPP Conditional High Impact Large Load Service 
18. 
On June 5, 2026, the Commission accepted revisions to SPP’s tariff to add a new 
type of non-firm transmission service, conditional high impact large load service 
(CHILLS).61  CHILLS allows transmission customers serving HILLs to reliably receive 
transfers of energy until sufficient designated resources and/or network upgrades are in 
place to support long-term, firm transmission service.62  CHILLS is an as-available 
transmission service that will transfer energy to designated points of delivery to serve the 
portion of a HILL eligible to receive CHILLS, subject to curtailment and interruption.63  
CHILLS has a maximum term of seven years, which is intended to incentivize 
transmission customers seeking CHILLS to obtain the designated resources and/or 
complete the network upgrades needed to procure long-term firm transmission service 
through existing tariff processes.64   
19. 
The Commission found that SPP had shown that unprecedented growth in large 
loads presents significant and unique operational and planning challenges.65  The 
Commission also found that SPP’s ability to add HILLs to its transmission system in a 
timely manner may be limited due to delays in obtaining sufficient designated resources 
and completing network upgrades needed to provide long-term firm transmission service 
to such load.66  The Commission concluded that CHILLS is a just and reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential approach to addressing the need to expeditiously 
interconnect and provide transmission service to new HILLs, while maintaining the 
reliable operation of SPP’s transmission system.67 
 
61 SPP CHILLS Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at P 1. 
62 Id. P 7.  
63 Id. PP 9-10. 
64 Id. P 9. 
65 Id. P 84. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 18 - 
II. 
NYISO’s Existing Processes 
A. 
Existing Tariff Processes 
20. 
Eligible Customers may request Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service68 or 
NITS.69  Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service and NITS are available to an Eligible 
Customer that is willing to pay Congestion Rent associated with its service.70  The 
charges for transmission services in NYISO (either Firm Point-To-Point Transmission 
Service or NITS) include the Transmission Service Charge, Transmission Usage Charge, 
and the NYPA Transmission Adjustment Charge, as applicable.  The Transmission 
Service Charge, which is applied to all Actual Energy Withdrawals from the New York 
State (NYS) Power System, will be paid by the transmission customers to transmission 
owners for recovery of the transmission owners’ respective Annual Transmission 
Revenue Requirement.71  The Transmission Usage Charge, which includes Congestion 
Rents and charges for Marginal Losses, is paid to NYISO by transmission customers 
scheduling transmission service, including transmission owners scheduling transmission 
 
68 NYISO Tariff, § 3 (Point-To-Point Transmission Service) (4.0.0).  Non-firm 
Point-To-Point Transmission Service is not available in the markets that the NYISO 
administers.  Id. § 3.2 (Nature of Non Firm Point to Point Transmission Service) (3.0.0).    
69 Id. § 4 (Network Integration Transmission Service) (1.0.0).  NYISO does not 
offer the opportunity for transmission customers to make physical reservations for NITS 
(or Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service), as contemplated in the pro forma OATT.  
Instead, NYISO offers an alternative form of “financial reservation” based transmission 
service where NYISO uses locational marginal pricing to manage congestion and operate 
bid-based spot markets.  Transmission customers schedule transmission service implicitly 
when they submit spot market energy schedules or arrange for bilateral transactions.  See 
N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 123 FERC ¶ 61,134, at PP 10-11 (2008); N.Y. Indep. Sys. 
Operator, 194 FERC ¶ 61,235, at P 13 (2026) (“With limited exceptions, NYISO does 
not provide for express, physical reservations of transmission service.  Moreover . . . it 
has never provided or received a formal request from a transmission customer for 
NITS.”). 
70 NYISO Tariff, §§ 3, 4.  NYISO defines Congestion Rent as:  “The opportunity 
costs of transmission Constraints on the NYS Transmission System.  Congestion Rents 
are collected by the ISO through its facilitation of LBMP Market Transactions and the 
collection of Transmission Usage Charges from Bilateral Transactions.”  Id. § 1.3 
(Definitions - C) (16.0.0).   
71 Id. § 2.7.2.1; id. § 14.1 (Transmission Service Charge) (32.0.0).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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service to supply bundled retail customers.72  Any transmission customer purchasing 
from the Locational Based Marginal Pricing (LBMP) Market will pay the Congestion 
Rent and Marginal Losses charge applicable to its location.73  These Congestion Rent and 
Marginal Losses charges will be included in the calculation of the LBMP charged by 
NYISO for the purchase of energy from the LBMP Market.  For transmission customers 
purchasing energy bilaterally, the Transmission Usage Charge is based on the scheduled 
energy to be withdrawn.  NYISO also charges transmission customers a NYPA 
Transmission Adjustment Charge, which is applied to all energy transactions, including 
NYS Loads, wheels through, and exports out of NYCA to recover NYPA’s Annual 
Transmission Revenue Requirement for costs recovered through project-specific 
transmission revenue requirements.74 
1. 
Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service 
21. 
NYISO offers a standard Firm Point-to-Point Service Agreement to an Eligible 
Customer when it submits a completed application for Firm Point-to-Point 
Service.75  Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service does not require NYISO to 
conduct a System Impact Study (SIS) or Transmission Service Study unless:  (1) the 
Eligible Customer requests a Transmission Service Study for NYISO to conduct a study 
of facilities that could be constructed;76 or (2) the Eligible Customer is a transmission 
 
72 Id. §§ 2.7.2.2.1, 2.7.2.2.2, 2.7.2.2.3. 
73 Id. § 2.7.2.2.4. 
74 Id. § 14.2 (Transmission Service Charge) (32.0.0), 14.2.2. 
75 Id. § 3.1.4; id. § 7 (Attach. A - Form of Service Agreement for Firm Point-to-
Point Service) (1.0.0). 
76 Id. § 3.7 (Additional Study Procedures for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission 
Service) (3.0.0), 3.7.1.  An Eligible Customer may request such studies if, for example, 
the Eligible Customer requesting Firm Transmission Service determines that Congestion 
Rent or the cost of Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC) is too high and the 
customer is considering constructing new facilities to create incremental transfer 
capability resulting in incremental TCCs, or if an Eligible Customer seeks to identify 
possible transmission options to address reliability or other operational concerns).  Id.    
NYISO defines TCCs as:  “The right to collect or obligation to pay Congestion 
Rents in the DayAhead Market for Energy associated with a single MW of transmission 
between a specified [point of interconnection] and [point of withdrawal].  TCCs are 
financial instruments that enable Energy buyers and sellers to hedge fluctuations in the 
price of transmission.”  Id. § 1.20 (Definitions - T) (11.0.0).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 20 - 
owner that proposes a certain type of upgrade or expansion identified in a Local 
Transmission Owner Plan or NYPA transmission plan that is not already subject to the 
Transmission Interconnection Procedures contained in Attachment P of the Tariff, in 
which case, the Eligible Customer that is a transmission owner may request an SIS.77  
The Transmission Service Study or SIS identifies any additional Direct Assignment 
Facilities78 or Network Upgrades required to comply with an Eligible Customer’s 
request.79   
22. 
If the Eligible Customer is a transmission owner that requests an SIS, after 
completion of that study, NYISO, in cooperation with any transmission owners whose 
facilities may be modified in performing the upgrade or addition (the affected 
transmission owner), will conduct a Facilities Study that will include a good faith 
estimate of the cost of any Direct Assignment Facilities and Network Upgrades, and the 
Eligible Customer enters into a construction contract with the affected transmission 
owner(s) and provides a letter of credit or security equivalent to the costs of the new 
facilities or upgrades.80  
23. 
If an Eligible Customer requests a Transmission Service Study, after completion 
of the study, the Eligible Customer may pursue construction of the identified 
transmission upgrades by initiating the Transmission Interconnection Procedures 
pursuant to Attachment P of the NYISO Tariff.81  An Eligible Customer may also 
proceed directly to the Transmission Interconnection Procedures in Attachment P 
 
 
 
77 To the extent a transmission owner proposes any other new transmission facility 
or upgrade (i.e., not an upgrade or expansion identified in a Local Transmission Owner 
Plan or NYPA transmission plan), regardless of whether the transmission owner seeks 
cost allocation under the Tariff or proposes a market-based project, the transmission 
owner must submit a Transmission Interconnection Application and proceed under the 
procedures set forth in Attachment P of the Tariff.  Id. § 3.7. 
78 Direct Assignment Facilities are defined as “[f]acilities or portions of facilities 
that are constructed by the Transmission Owner(s) for the sole use/benefit of a particular 
Transmission Customer requesting service under the [Tariff].”  Id. § 1.4 (Definitions – D) 
(18.0.0). 
79 Id. § 3.7.3.2.2. 
80 Id. § 3.7.4. 
81 Id. § 3.7.3.2.2.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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without first requesting a Transmission Service Study.82  Under Attachment P, the 
Eligible Customer must submit a Transmission Interconnection Application to NYISO,83 
which then conducts Transmission Interconnection Studies that may consist of short 
circuit/fault duty, steady state (thermal and voltage), and stability analyses designed to 
identify the Network Upgrade Facilities84 required for the reliable interconnection of 
Transmission Projects.85  The Eligible Customer may then elect to proceed to an SIS, 
which will evaluate the impact of the proposed interconnection on the reliability of the 
NYS Transmission System.86  The Eligible Customer then may request a Facilities Study, 
which is used to “update and refine” details such as cost and time estimates for Network 
Upgrade Facilities identified in the SIS.87  Should the Eligible Customer seek to proceed 
with construction of transmission upgrades, the Network Upgrade Facilities that will be 
constructed, their construction timeline, the cost of the facilities, and cost allocation for 
those facilities are memorialized in a Transmission Project Interconnection Agreement. 88   
2. 
NITS 
24. 
In order for NYISO to provide NITS to an Eligible Customer, the Eligible 
Customer must:  (1) submit a completed application; (2) complete certain technical 
arrangements with NYISO and the transmission owner; (3) execute a Service Agreement 
 
82 Id.; see also NYISO, Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Manual 23 
24 (2019), https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/7575204/M-23-TEI-Manual-v4.0-
Clean.pdf (NYISO Manual 23). 
83 NYISO Tariff, § 22 (Attachment P - Transmission Interconnection Procedures) 
(12.0.0), 22.4 (Transmission Interconnection Application). 
84 Network Upgrade Facilities are defined, in relevant part, as “the least costly 
configuration of commercially available components of electrical equipment that can be 
used . . . to make the modifications or additions to the [NYS] Transmission System that 
are required for the proposed Transmission Project to connect reliably to the system.”   
Id. § 22.1.  
85 Id. § 22.6.3. 
86 Id. § 22.8.3. 
87 Id. § 22.9.3. 
88 Id. § 22.11.  If a Transmission Developer’s proposed Transmission Project is 
only interconnecting to its own, existing facilities, a Transmission Project Interconnection 
Agreement is not required.  Id. § 22.11.2.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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or request that NYISO file a proposed unexecuted Service Agreement with the 
Commission; and (4) execute a Network Operating Agreement with NYISO.89 
25. 
Regarding the technical arrangements, NYISO cannot provide NITS until all 
required equipment on both sides of the point of delivery or interconnection, as specified 
in the Network Operating Agreement, has been installed.90  The Network Operating 
Agreement contains the terms and conditions to:  (1) operate and maintain equipment 
necessary for integrating the Network Customer (including communications equipment 
and relaying equipment); (2) transfer data between NYISO, transmission owners, and the 
Network Customer; (3) use software programs required for data links and constraint 
dispatching; (4) exchange data on forecasted loads and resources necessary for long-term 
planning; and (5) address any other technical and operational considerations required for 
NITS.91   
26. 
NITS requests do not require a NITS Study unless the Eligible Customer 
specifically requests that NYISO conduct such a study.92  In the event that the Eligible 
Customer requests a NITS Study, NYISO will coordinate with all affected transmission 
owners in performing the NITS Study, which will identify any Direct Assignment 
Facilities or Network Upgrades necessary to comply with the request.93  The Eligible 
Customer must also present the final NITS Study for approval to the Operating 
Committee and Transmission Policy Advisory Subcommittee.  Upon approval of the 
NITS Study, the Eligible Customer may pursue construction of transmission upgrades 
 
89 Id. § 4.2 (Initiating Service) (1.0.0), 4.2.1.  Additionally, Long Island Power 
Authority must pre-approve any use of its transmission facilities as part of a NITS 
request.  Id. § 4.2.1; see id. § 2.5 (Local Furnishing Bonds and Other Tax Exempt 
Financing) (0.0.0), 2.5.7. 
90 Id. §§ 4.2.3, 4.2.4.  
91 Id. § 4.8 (Operating Arrangements) (0.0.0), 4.8.2; see id. § 13 (Attachment G – 
Network Operating Agreement) (0.0.0). 
92 Id. § 4.5 (Additional Study Procedures For Network Integration Service 
Requests) (3.0.0), 4.5.1.  An Eligible Customer might request such a study, for example, 
if it determines that Congestion Rent or the cost of TCCs is too high and the Eligible 
Customer is considering constructing new facilities to create incremental transfer 
capability resulting in incremental TCCs, or if an Eligible Customer requests that 
transmission facilities be constructed to address reliability or other operational concerns. 
93 Id. § 4.5.3.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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through the Transmission Interconnection Process.94  Additionally, for new Network 
Load, the costs of new facilities required to interconnect the new Network Load are 
charged to the Network Customer.95  
3. 
Load Interconnection Process 
27. 
NYISO Tariff Sections 3.9 and 4.5.8 specify additional study procedures for 
Point-to-Point Transmission Service and NITS, respectively, that apply to Eligible 
Customers seeking to interconnect new load to the NYS Power System.  NYISO Manual 
23 clarifies that the load interconnection procedures apply to load interconnections that 
are either:  (1) greater than 10 MW connecting at a voltage level of 115 kV or above; or 
(2) 80 MW or more connecting at a voltage level below 115 kV.96  Proposed load 
interconnections that fall outside these criteria are subject to the procedures of the 
applicable transmission owner.97  NYISO’s primary role in the load interconnection 
process is to determine the reliability impacts of any load additions to the NYS Power 
System by collaborating with transmission owners on conducting the Load SIS.98   
28. 
To start the load interconnection process, an Eligible Customer (or the 
transmission owner on the Eligible Customer’s behalf) must submit a load 
interconnection request proposal to NYISO.99  Project details and modeling information 
are required from the customer prior to the start of the Load SIS, including:  (1) the 
characteristics of the load project (e.g., data center, cryptocurrency mining); (2) the level 
of flexibility of the load, including if the load would opt to reduce output during peak 
load periods and the load’s willingness to participate in NYISO’s Distributed Energy 
Resource program; (3) the load’s daily and seasonal load profile; (4) in-service dates and 
accompanying MW levels; and (5) power flow, dynamics, and short circuit modeling 
 
94 Id. §§ 22.8, 22.9, 22.11. 
95 Id. § 4.4 (Designation of Network Load) (0.0.0), 4.4.2 (“The costs of new 
facilities required to interconnect a new Network Load shall be determined in accordance 
with the procedures provided in Section 4.5 and shall be charged to the Network 
Customer in accordance with Commission policies.”). 
96 NYISO Manual 23, § 3.5.   
97 NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266 at 1. 
98 Id.  
99 NYISO Tariff, § 3.9 (Study Procedures for New Load or Facility 
Interconnections to the NYS Power System) (3.0.0), 3.9.1; NYISO Manual 23, § 3.5.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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data.100  After the Eligible Customer executes a System Impact Study Agreement with the 
transmission owner whose system the Eligible Customer proposes to interconnect 
(Connecting Transmission Owner) and submits a $150,000 study deposit, NYISO, in 
cooperation with the Connecting Transmission Owner, will then perform technical 
studies as part of the Load SIS that evaluates certain criteria.101   
29. 
If the Load SIS indicates adverse reliability impacts, NYISO and the Connecting 
Transmission Owner will identify alternatives to eliminate the impact, which may include 
potential (non-binding) Network Upgrades or changes to the project.102  If NYISO 
determines through the Load SIS that the proposed load will impact affected transmission 
owners or Affected Systems, those parties may review project information, including the 
study base cases.103  NYISO’s role in the load interconnection process concludes after 
performing the Load SIS; NYISO is not a party to interconnection agreements for load 
interconnections.104  Upon approval of the final Load SIS study report and payment to 
NYISO and the Connecting Transmission Owner for the cost of the study, the Eligible 
Customer may then enter into a Facilities Study Agreement and an interconnection 
agreement with the Connecting Transmission Owner.105  The Facilities Study will further 
evaluate and provide non-binding, good-faith cost estimates for any Network Upgrades 
identified in the Load SIS.106  The final costs, cost allocation, and construction schedule 
for the Network Upgrades identified in the load interconnection process are memorialized 
 
100 NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266 at 2. 
101 NYISO Tariff, § 3.9.2; see NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266 at 1.  The 
criteria include:  (1) potential significant impacts of the proposed interconnection on 
system reliability; (2) potential impacts on system voltage, stability, and thermal 
limitations per NYISO’s Reliability Rules; (3) whether the interconnection would require 
modifying the NYS Power System to maintain Interface transfer capability or to comply 
with reliability requirements; (4) an evaluation of alternatives that would eliminate any 
adverse reliability impacts; and (5) an estimate of the increase or decrease in Total 
Transfer Capability.  NYISO Tariff, § 3.9.2.    
102 NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266 at 3.  Additionally, consideration will be 
given to load ramp-up schedules to determine if adverse reliability impacts arise prior to 
the project reaching its full requested load.   
103 Id. at 1. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1, 3; see also NYISO Tariff, § 3.9.4.  
106 NYISO Technical Bulletin No. 266 at 3.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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in the interconnection agreement between the transmission owner and the Eligible 
Customer.107   
4. 
Local Transmission Planning Process 
30. 
With respect to local transmission planning, transmission owners evaluate 
solutions to identified transmission needs, including transmission solutions proposed by 
market participants and other parties, for inclusion in their Local Transmission Plans.108  
Each planning cycle, each transmission owner submits the finalized portions of its current 
Local Transmission Plan to NYISO for inclusion in the Reliability Needs Assessment.109  
NYISO then evaluates transmission owners’ Local Transmission Plans in relation to 
regional and local transmission needs.110  NYISO reports the results of its evaluation 
solely for informational purposes in the relevant NYISO planning report prepared under 
Attachment Y, and the transmission owners are not required to revise their Local 
Transmission Plans based on the results of NYISO’s evaluation.   
5. 
Generator Interconnection 
31. 
NYISO processes generator interconnection requests under Attachment HH of its 
Tariff.111  NYISO administers a single, two-phase cluster study process that assesses the 
local impacts of proposed interconnections in the first phase and the broader systemwide 
impacts of the proposed interconnection in the second phase.  Specifically, in Phase 1 of 
its study process, Connecting Transmission Owners and Affected Transmission Owners 
assess the local impacts of the proposed interconnections of the cluster study projects to 
identify the Connecting Transmission Owner’s attachment facilities, distribution 
upgrades, and local system upgrade facilities and provide cost estimates to construct the 
facilities.112  In Phase 2, NYISO performs a cluster study to identify the system upgrade 
facilities and distribution upgrades required for the reliable interconnection of cluster 
 
 
 
107 Id.; NYISO Tariff, § 3.9.4; NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2. 
108 NYISO Tariff, § 31.2.1.1.2.3.  
109 Id. § 31.2.1.2.5. 
110 Id. § 31.2.1.3. 
111 Id., attach. HH (Standard Interconnection Procedures) (1.0.0). 
112 Id. attach. HH, § 40.10 (Phase 1 Study Process, Development of System 
Models, and Phase 2 Entry Decision Period) (1.0.0), 40.10.4.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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study projects to the transmission system or distribution system.113  For projects 
requesting capacity resource interconnection service (CRIS), NYISO also conducts a 
cluster study deliverability study to assess their requested CRIS and identify any required 
system deliverability upgrades.114  The Connecting Transmission Owner, Affected 
Transmission Owner, or Affected System Operator then determines the cost estimates for 
and a preliminary schedule to construct the identified upgrade facilities and updates, as 
needed, the identification and cost estimates of the upgrade facilities identified in the 
Phase 1 Study.115   
32. 
Pursuant to the Tariff, an interconnection customer may request, and NYISO may 
provide, provisional interconnection service for limited operation prior to the completion 
of the cluster study and prior to completion of requisite attachment facilities, distribution 
upgrades, system upgrade facilities, system distribution upgrades, or system protection 
facilities.116  In evaluating a request for provisional interconnection service, NYISO, in 
conjunction with the Connecting Transmission Owner(s), shall determine, through 
available studies or additional studies as necessary, “whether stability, short circuit, 
thermal, and/or voltage issues would arise if the Interconnection Customer interconnects 
without modifications to the facility or the New York State Transmission System (or 
distribution system as applicable).”117  NYISO does not offer surplus interconnection 
service under its Tariff. 
6. 
Co-Located Load Interconnection Process 
33. 
NYISO does not have a process in place to evaluate large load co-located with 
generating facilities.118  Generator interconnection requests proceed through NYISO’s 
 
113 Id. attach. HH, § 40.11 (Phase 2 Study) (0.0.0).  NYISO’s Phase 2 cluster study 
analysis encompasses both the system impact and facilities studies and therefore NYISO 
does not have a separate facilities study. 
114 Id. attach. HH, §§ 40.11 (Phase 2 Study), 40.11.3; see also id. § 40.13 
(Deliverability Studies and Cost Allocation Methodology for CRIS) (1.0.0). 
115 Id. attach. HH, § 40.11.4. 
116 Id. attach. HH, § 40.22 (Construction of Connecting Transmission Owner’s 
Attachment Facilities, System Upgrade Facilities, and System Deliverability Upgrade) 
(0.0.0.), 40.22.3. 
117 Id. 
118 NYISO’s Tariff contains market participation provisions for Co-Located 
Storage Resources, but the definition of Co-Located Storage Resources excludes

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 27 - 
Cluster Study Process, where they are studied as a group by evaluating their cumulative 
impact on the transmission system, identifying the upgrades required to mitigate the 
collective impact of the group of projects, and allocating the costs of such upgrades 
among the projects contributing to the need for such upgrades.119  The Cluster Study 
Process and the load interconnection process are distinct and separate processes for 
evaluating projects’ impacts on the reliability of the transmission system.  
34. 
NYISO’s current Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource participation model 
allows generation that routinely serves a Host Load to offer any excess generation into 
NYISO’s wholesale markets.120  As noted above, all transmission services are subject to 
the Transmission Service Charge, which is applied to all Actual Energy Withdrawals 
from the NYS Power System. 
B. 
Recent Stakeholder Proceedings in NYISO 
35. 
Given the growth of large and co-located loads, NYISO has begun considering 
revisions and enhancements to the Tariff.  As referenced above, NYISO recently adopted 
Technical Bulletin No. 266 to enhance and clarify its existing load interconnection study 
process, and NYISO explains in response to the ANOPR that it has begun a stakeholder 
process to revise its large load interconnection study process.121  NYISO asserts that it 
plans to introduce reforms that address bulk-system reliability concerns while improving 
the efficiency and predictability of the large load interconnection process and aims to file 
corresponding tariff revisions with the Commission by December 2026.122   
36. 
NYISO has also begun other large load-related project initiatives for 2026.   
The first will focus on incentivizing large loads to participate in NYISO’s markets as 
flexible resources via enhancements to NYISO’s existing Distributed Energy Resource 
 
 
 
generators that are co-located with load.  See id. § 1.3 (Definitions – C) (16.0.0) 
(definition of Co-Located Storage Resource).  
119 See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2025). 
120 See NYISO, NYISO Tariffs, Market Administration and Control Area Services 
Tariff, § 2.8 (Definitions – H) (3.0.0) (definition of Host Load) (NYISO MST).  
121 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3 & n.7 (stating that its 2026 
stakeholder process will prioritize “(1) Flexible Load models for Large Loads and (2) 
Reliability Planning and Large Load Integration.”). 
122 NYISO Challenges and Considerations at 22.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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and Behind-the-Meter Net Generation programs.123  NYISO explains that its current 
Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource participation is premised on a firm Host 
Load that does not participate in wholesale markets and is not easily controllable or 
responsive to market signals, noting that an expansion of the participation model to 
accommodate flexible Host Loads could contribute additional surplus supply to 
wholesale markets.124  As part of this initiative, NYISO plans to discuss a general 
framework for enhanced co-located load plus generation participation options. 125  NYISO 
expects that tariff revisions related to co-located load would not be filed until 2027.126   
37. 
While we are encouraged by NYISO’s stakeholder efforts, and by its initial 
attention to the pressing concerns associated with large and co-located loads127 and to the 
Secretary’s interest in these issues,128 we are initiating this FPA section 206 proceeding 
in order to ensure that NYISO’s ongoing processes generate reforms that are sufficiently 
timely and comprehensive to address the concerns we today identify.  As such, and as the 
Commission explained in the April Order Regarding Intent to Act, we find that the 
Commission must now take further action to ensure that NYISO promptly proposes 
revisions to ensure that its Tariff remains just and reasonable. 
 
123 NYISO, Flexible Load Models – Large Loads (Feb. 24, 2026), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/57218179/flexible%20large%20loads%200224
26%20icap.pdf (NYISO Flexible Load Models); NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive 
Reliability Plan. 
124 NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan at 77-78. 
125 NYISO Flexible Load Models at 14. 
126 Id. at 5. 
127 See NYISO, 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) 34-37 (Nov. 19, 2024), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2248793/2024-RNA-Report.pdf (noting a 
dramatic increase “over the past several years” in load interconnection requests and that 
the increasing speed and scale with which large loads seek to interconnect in NYISO will 
have “major impacts on future load growth and system risk”); Transcript, Large Loads 
Co-Located at Generating Facilities Technical Conference, Docket No. AD24-11-000, at 
63-64 (Nov. 1, 2024) (Zachary G. Smith, Senior Vice President of System and Resources 
Planning, NYISO) (stating that the load interconnection provisions in NYISO’s Tariff 
“gives no clarity at all in terms of responsibility for facilities that are needed to 
interconnect those loads, [or for] cost responsibility,” which creates confusion between 
utilities).  
128 See supra PP 6-7.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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III. 
Discussion 
38. 
Based on the discussion below, pursuant section 206 of the FPA, we direct NYISO 
and the Transmission Owners, within 60 days of the date of this order, to either:   
(1) show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential without provisions addressing:   
(a) the application process, study procedures, and ongoing operational 
requirements that apply to Eligible Customers seeking transmission service 
on behalf of large loads;  
(b) additional transparency concerning the Network Upgrade costs to 
provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, 
a pro forma cost recovery agreement between NYISO, the relevant 
transmission owner and Eligible Customer taking transmission service on 
behalf of the large load to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among 
transmission customers, and a mechanism to ensure such payments are 
appropriately credited towards transmission owners’ transmission revenue 
requirements consistent with the Commission’s cost-of-service regulations;   
(c) the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to co-location 
arrangements;   
(d) transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking 
transmission service on behalf of co-located loads, load with behind the 
meter generation, and flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit 
their use of the transmission system under certain conditions; and 
(e) the rates, terms, and conditions of service applicable to interconnection 
customers serving electrically proximate large load or co-located load; or   
(2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if the 
Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and 
unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to 
establish a replacement Tariff.   
39. 
We also direct NYISO to submit, within 30 days of the date of issuance of this 
order, an informational report on how NYISO intends to ensure that adequate generation 
will be available to serve existing and new large loads.   
40. 
Interested entities may respond within 30 days of NYISO’s and the Transmission 
Owners’ filings, addressing either or both of:  (1) whether the existing Tariff remains just

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 30 - 
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and (2) if not, what changes 
to the Tariff should be implemented as replacement rates.   
41. 
We recognize that NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners, (to the extent the 
matters addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing 
rights) may elect to address some or all of the issues discussed in this order by proposing 
revisions to the Tariff pursuant to their applicable FPA section 205 filing rights.  We 
strongly encourage this.  Although both the Secretary’s ANOPR and our own Order 
Regarding Intent to Act expressly recognized (and indeed encouraged) that possibility,129 
no such filings were received from NYISO by the Commission prior to the issuance of 
this order.  Should NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners elect to make such filings in 
response to this order, those filings should state explicitly that the proposals are being 
submitted under FPA section 205.  Should NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners 
submit a filing under FPA section 205, they should also explain which of the 
Commission’s above directives their filing addresses and how it resolves them.  
Additionally, any such filing should provide a reasoned explanation for how the proposal 
will avoid disrupting existing commercial arrangements and clearly identify a reasonable 
effective date that accommodates such existing commercial arrangements. 
42. 
The Commission will consider requests from NYISO and/or the Transmission 
Owners to hold, for up to 90 days, all or certain aspects of this FPA section 206 
proceeding in abeyance, including the deadline to respond to this order.  Any such 
abeyance, which will begin as of the deadline to respond to this order, would be 
considered to provide NYISO and the Transmission Owners time while they work 
through the stakeholder processes to develop FPA section 205 filings to revise the Tariff 
to address the issues raised in this order.  Requests for a full or partial abeyance130 should 
be submitted prior to the deadline to respond to this order, specifically within 45 days of 
issuance of this order, to allow time for the Commission to act on the abeyance request.  
We emphasize that we will not grant such abeyances reflexively, that any abeyance will 
be limited to 90 days, and that we will look with great disfavor toward requests to extend 
the abeyance period.  We anticipate that successful abeyance requests, if any, will include 
both (1) a robust description of the content of a potential future filing under FPA section 
205 and (2) a reasoned and specific explanation of when such a filing is expected to be 
made. 
 
129 See ANOPR at P 32; Order Regarding Intent to Act, 195 FERC ¶ 61,045 at P 5. 
130 A partial abeyance may be appropriate to the extent NYISO is developing FPA 
section 205 filings in response to only a subset of the directives in this order.  For any 
remaining directives, we expect a response to this order within the 60-day deadline set 
forth herein.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 31 - 
43. 
In cases where, as here, the Commission institutes a section 206 investigation on 
its own motion, section 206(b) of the FPA requires that the Commission establish a 
refund effective date that is no earlier than the date of the publication by the Commission 
of notice of its intention to initiate such proceeding nor later than five months after the 
publication date.  In such cases, in order to give maximum protection to customers, and 
consistent with our precedent, we have historically tended to establish the section 206 
refund effective date at the earliest date allowed by section 206, and we do so here as 
well.131  That date is the date of publication of notice of initiation of this proceeding in 
the Federal Register. 
A. 
Transmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large Loads 
44. 
We today make a preliminary finding that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust 
and unreasonable because it lacks provisions that address, with sufficient clarity and 
consistency, how NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners will timely study (i.e., within 
60-90 days of receiving the request) the provision of transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads.132   
45. 
Throughout this order, we use the phrase “the provision of transmission service to 
Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads” to encompass the provision of new, 
modified, or additional jurisdictional transmission service to Eligible Customers on 
behalf of large loads.  We note that this phrase is not limited to instances where an 
Eligible Customer submits an application to request new transmission service.  It also 
includes instances where an Eligible Customer requests a new or modified point of 
delivery to serve a large load, where a large load seeks a new or modified delivery point 
as an unbundled retail transmission service customer, or where large loads are otherwise 
included in an Eligible Customer’s reported load growth and that Eligible Customer is 
taking NITS.    
46. 
We recognize that NYISO’s Tariff includes certain transmission and load 
interconnection studies.  However, as noted above, with respect to transmission service 
requests, NYISO will only conduct an SIS, Transmission Service Study, or NITS Study  
if the Eligible Customer requests such a study or if the Eligible Customer chooses to 
proceed under the Transmission Interconnection Procedures in Attachment P of the 
 
131 See, e.g., Idaho Power Co., 145 FERC ¶ 61,122 (2013); Canal Elec. Co.,  
46 FERC ¶ 61,153, order on reh’g, 47 FERC ¶ 61,275 (1989). 
132 As discussed below, our findings here also apply to the study process for 
unbundled retail transmission service requests by end-use large load customers, as 
allowed by state law or voluntary utility rules.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 32 - 
NYISO Tariff.133  Furthermore, although the Tariff contains the basic procedures for 
NYISO’s Load SIS process for new load interconnection, greater detail and significant 
requirements pertaining to this process are housed in non-Tariff documents, including 
information requirements, study deposits, and study assumptions and procedures.134   
In addition, as NYISO has already noted, facilities study procedures vary among the 
transmission owners.135  We therefore are concerned that the Tariff is unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks provisions that address, with sufficient clarity and 
consistency, the study process for the provision of transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads. 
47. 
We direct NYISO and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters 
addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to 
explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without an application process, 
study procedures, and ongoing operational requirements that address the unique 
characteristics and challenges of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on 
behalf of large loads, or to propose appropriate Tariff revisions.  We recognize that 
NYISO is currently considering potential reforms to enhance its processes related to large 
load additions in its stakeholder process and we encourage NYISO to consider whether 
these efforts would, either fully or in part, address the Commission’s concerns that the 
Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable.   
1. 
Jurisdiction 
48. 
At the outset, we clarify the principles relating to the Commission’s jurisdiction 
over the matters relevant to the integration of large loads onto the transmission system 
and the impacts of large loads on the transmission system.  We recognize that rates, 
terms, and conditions associated with the addition of and service to large loads implicate 
both federal and state interests.  We also recognize that resolution of issues related to 
large load additions will require the involvement of both federal and state actors, 
including the Commission, state public utility commissions, and other state and local 
entities.  We are encouraged by efforts made at the state level to address issues related to 
large load additions that fall within state jurisdiction.136 
 
133 See supra PP 21-26.  
134 See supra PP 27-29. 
135 See supra P 9. 
136 See generally NARUC April 14 ANOPR Comments (highlighting action taken 
by state public utility commissions related to large loads).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 33 - 
49. 
  As discussed below, however, certain aspects of the process for integrating large 
loads onto the transmission system fall squarely within the Commission’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.   
50. 
Specifically, we find that it is within the Commission’s exclusive authority to 
ensure that transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs include sufficiently 
clear and consistent provisions governing how transmission service to Eligible Customers 
on behalf of large loads interconnecting to the transmission system will be studied, 
including whether new or upgraded transmission facilities are necessary to provide the 
requested transmission service.  The Commission has jurisdiction over the study process 
for transmission service to both Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and 
unbundled retail transmission service to end-use large load customers, where pursuant to 
state law or a public utility’s voluntary offer of such service, the large load is an Eligible 
Customer under the transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs.137 
51. 
The Commission is a creature of statute and has jurisdiction over only those 
matters that Congress has given it the authority to regulate.138  That authority includes 
jurisdiction over the wholesale sale and transmission of electricity in interstate 
commerce, including all facilities used for such sale and transmission.139  As relevant 
here, the Commission must ensure that the rates, charges, and classifications for such 
transmission of electricity—as well as the practices directly affecting such transmission 
of electricity—are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.140  
The Supreme Court has held that the Commission’s authority over interstate transmission 
is not limited to wholesale transmission service and that the Commission has authority 
over unbundled retail transmission service.141  As part of its transmission authority, the 
Commission has exercised jurisdiction over the terms of certain interconnections to the 
 
137 Under the pro forma OATT, Eligible Customers include end-use customers 
seeking unbundled retail transmission service, pursuant to state law or public utility’s 
voluntary offer of such service.  Pro forma OATT, § 1.12 (Definitions – Eligible 
Customer); see also NYISO Tariff, § 1.5 (Definitions – E) (16.0.0). 
138 Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
139 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
140 Id. §§ 824d, 824e; see FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 278 
(2016) (EPSA) (approving “a common-sense construction of the FPA’s language, 
limiting FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that ‘directly affect the 
wholesale rate’” (cleaned up)).    
141 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17, 19-20 (2002) (upholding the Commission’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission service).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 34 - 
transmission system as an element of transmission service,142 including the 
interconnection of wholesale load to the transmission system.143  
52. 
As applied to large load additions to the transmission system, these principles 
mean that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions 
of interstate transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads 
connecting to the transmission system, and the practices directly affecting the provision 
of such interstate transmission of electricity.  An essential component of providing such 
transmission service is the process by which the transmission provider and/or 
transmission owner evaluates (1) whether it can provide the requested transmission 
service and (2) the impact that providing such transmission service will have on the 
jurisdictional transmission system, including determining whether any new or upgraded 
transmission facilities are needed to provide transmission service while maintaining 
reliable operation of the transmission system.  This transmission service study process 
determines what Network Upgrades are needed to provide transmission service to 
Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, the costs of which are included in 
transmission rates.  As such, this study process directly affects Commission-jurisdictional 
transmission rates.144  The Commission has exclusive authority to ensure that the process 
to study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers is just and reasonable 
and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  We therefore find that we have authority 
to ensure that tariffs include provisions that clearly and consistently address the study 
process for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
loads, including the unique impacts that providing transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads may have on the transmission system. 
53. 
At the same time, we continue to recognize that the FPA expressly reserves to 
states the authority over any other sale of electric energy, including retail sales and 
 
142 Tenn. Power Co., 90 FERC ¶ 61,238, at 61,761 (2000) (Tennessee Power), 
order denying reh’g, 91 FERC ¶ 61,271 (2000); Standardization of Generator 
Interconnection Agreements & Procs., Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, at P 9 
(2003); see also Laguna Irrigation Dist., 91 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,152 (2000). 
143 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 109 FERC ¶ 61,392, at P 37 (2004); Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 115 FERC ¶ 61,193, at PP 36-38 (2006). 
144 Cf. Transmission Plan. & Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & 
Operating Pub. Utils., Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, at P 112 (2011) (“It is 
through the transmission planning process that public utility transmission providers 
determine which transmission facilities will more efficiently or cost-effectively meet the 
needs of the region, the development of which directly impacts the rates, terms and 
conditions of jurisdictional service.”).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 35 - 
wholesale sales not in interstate commerce (such as wholesale sales within the Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas region), as well as facilities used for the generation and 
distribution of electricity.145  As such, we recognize that states will continue to regulate:  
(1) the specific terms of retail sales to large load;146 (2) which entities may make retail 
sales within their borders, including which entities are legally permitted to provide 
electricity to retail large load customers;147 and (3) any siting decisions and construction 
associated with the large load project.148  Nothing in this order is intended to intrude upon 
state authority over retail service to large loads.   
54. 
In sum, we today exercise our authority to ensure that the process by which 
jurisdictional transmission providers and/or transmission owners will study the provision 
of jurisdictional transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads 
interconnecting to the transmission system, including where, as allowed by state law or 
public utility’s voluntary offer of such service, an end-use large load seeks unbundled 
retail transmission service, is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.  Pursuant to that authority, we find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust 
and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it lacks sufficiently 
clear and consistent provisions regarding the study process related to the provision of 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.  We need not 
comprehensively address the Commission’s jurisdiction over other aspects of the addition 
of large loads to the transmission system at this time.  
2. 
Tariff Provisions 
55. 
In the following section, we begin by considering NYISO’s Tariff as it relates to 
how NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners will study the provision of transmission 
service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and explain our concerns that the 
lack of sufficiently clear and consistent provisions regarding the study process for the 
provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads is unjust 
 
145 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); see Dayton Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 126 F.4th 
1107, 1129 (6th Cir. 2025). 
146 See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279-80 (recognizing state authority over retail electricity 
sales); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 28 (same). 
147 PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at PP 68-69. 
148 See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 229, 238 (D.C. 
Cir. 2025) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)) (recognizing state authority over generation 
resource mix, including through their siting authority); Order No. 1000, 136 FERC  
¶ 61,051 at P 107 (acknowledging state authority over siting, permitting, and construction 
of transmission facilities).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 36 - 
and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential.  We then consider whether the 
Tariff is unjust and unreasonable without certain elements.  First, we consider whether 
the Tariff lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions establishing an 
appropriate definition of large load, as a separate category of load.  Second, we consider 
whether the Tariff lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions establishing an 
application process and requirements for Eligible Customers requesting transmission 
service on behalf of large loads and a study process that considers the unique operational 
challenges of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
loads.  Third, we consider whether the Tariff lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff 
provisions establishing ongoing operational requirements necessary to ensure that 
NYISO can reliably provide transmission service given the unique operational impacts on 
the transmission system of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on 
behalf of large loads.  Finally, we consider whether the Tariff requires such ongoing 
operational requirements for Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of 
large loads to be memorialized in service agreements. 
56. 
We preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable 
or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions addressing 
with sufficient clarity and consistency how NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners will 
study the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
loads.  We recognize that NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners may have existing 
load integration processes, including studies that may be performed in evaluating the 
provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.149  
However, we are concerned that those processes and any required studies with regard to 
the provision of transmission service are not described in the Tariff with the degree of 
clarity and specificity necessary to ensure that the transmission provider can mitigate 
operational risks of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of 
large loads, given their impact on the transmission system, avoid disputes regarding how 
studies are conducted, deter speculative or duplicative requests for transmission service 
by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and help avoid excessive and unnecessary 
Network Upgrades.   
57. 
Moreover, we are concerned that the existing Tariff does not contain other 
elements akin to those described below, which we preliminarily find may be necessary to 
ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of jurisdictional transmission service are just 
and reasonable.   
58. 
At the outset, we recognize that the Transmission Owners may be partially 
responsible for conducting the studies that (1) evaluate whether a large load may be 
interconnected to the transmission system and served by the Eligible Customer and (2) 
 
149 See supra PP 21-29.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 37 - 
determine whether Network Upgrades are necessary to provide transmission service.  We 
appreciate that this role may stem from how NYISO and the Transmission Owners 
allocated rights and responsibilities in the governing documents establishing NYISO.  We 
do not seek to alter that allocation of rights and responsibilities. 
59. 
We are nonetheless concerned that NYISO’s Tariff lacks a mandatory study 
process that addresses the unique operational and reliability challenges that providing 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads presents to the 
transmission system.  Large loads can be more energy intensive and geographically 
concentrated than traditional load, and exhibit different load profiles and operational 
characteristics.150  NYISO itself, along with other stakeholders in New York, has 
recognized that large loads can have a disproportionate impact on system reliability due 
to their size and unique characteristics, and so too has NYISO acknowledged that the 
scale, pace, and characteristics of large load growth present significant operational and 
planning challenges.151  As a result, providing transmission service to Eligible Customers 
on behalf of large loads may be more complex and could raise greater reliability concerns 
for the transmission system, relative to a situation where Eligible Customers seek 
transmission service on behalf of traditional load.   
60. 
Without a clear and consistent process to study the provision of transmission 
service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, NYISO and/or the Transmission 
Owners may not fully capture the transmission system impacts of providing such 
transmission service, which could result in significant operational risks for the 
transmission system.  Furthermore, we are concerned that, without sufficiently clear and 
consistent Tariff provisions, NYISO will not have the ongoing visibility and operational 
control necessary to provide reliable transmission service. 
61. 
We are also concerned that the absence of sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff 
provisions for how NYISO and/or the Transmission Owners will study the provision of 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads will lead to disputes 
 
 
150 See, e.g., SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at PP 7-8; NERC, 
Characteristics and Risks of Emerging Large Loads (July 2025), 
https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/standing-committees/rstc/whitepaper-
characteristics-and-risks-of-emerging-large-loads.pdf (NERC Characteristics and Risks 
of Large Loads). 
151 See NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; NYISO Challenges and 
Considerations at 5; see also NY State Reliability Council November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 3; NYTOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 38 - 
over a variety of issues—e.g., study timelines and delays,152 how the transmission service 
needed on behalf of the large load is studied,153 what types of Network Upgrades are 
considered and how required Network Upgrades to provide the requested transmission 
service are determined.154  Such disputes may arise from the lack of transparency in how 
studies are performed and how decisions will be made.155  We are thus concerned that the 
 
152 See, e.g., CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12-13; Eolian November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 14-16; Institute for Progress November 21 ANOPR Comments 
at 7-8; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; National Grid November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 7 (asserting that the absence of standardized rules relating to large 
load integration can cause “inefficiencies, increased project timelines, and difficulties 
developing cost estimates”); NYTOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12 (noting 
recent efforts by transmission owners, the New York Commission, and NYISO to 
improve the load interconnection process to shorten study timelines); ODEC December 5 
ANOPR Comments at 4. 
153 Commenters raised concern that large loads are not studied with consideration 
of their known operating characteristics, including their willingness to be flexible or 
curtailable.  See, e.g., ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Constellation 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23-24; Critical Loop November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 3; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; L. Lynne Kiesling 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments 
at 19-20. 
154 Specifically, commenters raised concern that transmission providers/owners 
may only consider traditional transmission infrastructure or that there is a lack of 
consideration of alternative transmission solutions.  See, e.g., ACORE November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 3-4, 6-7; American Terawatt November 21 ANOPR Comments at 
4-5; Calibrant November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2, 3; CEBA November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 9-10; Chamber of Commerce November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; CTC 
Global Corporation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-3; DCC November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 10-11; GridCARE December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4; Industrial 
Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 27-28; Infrastructure Masons December 
5 ANOPR Comments at 18; Iron Mountain Data Centers, LLC November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 3-4; Land Trust Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; PIOs 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 22; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 44-45; WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 5-8. 
155 See, e.g., CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; ECA December 5 
ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18; EPSA 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Infrastructure Masons December 5 ANOPR 
Comments at 4, 6-7; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 39-40; Switch

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 39 - 
lack of clear and consistent provisions in NYISO’s Tariff related to the study process for 
the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads 
appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential.   
62. 
Lastly, we are concerned that NYISO’s existing Tariff fails to deter speculative or 
duplicative requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
loads.  Many ANOPR comments assert that clear and consistent provisions establishing 
study timelines and costs, readiness requirements, and/or penalties will deter speculative 
or duplicative requests related to large load additions.156  Commenters explain that 
speculative requests may bog down and delay the study process, wasting time and 
resources for transmission providers;157 result in inaccurate study results or delays for 
other Eligible Customers seeking transmission service on behalf of load;158 create a 
substantial risk of cost shifts if the large load additions do not materialize as planned;159 
 
December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3; Tract November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; 
Vantage November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Verrus November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 6, 12; Vistra December 5 ANOPR Comments at 27. 
156 See, e.g., ACORE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; AEU November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 17-18; Amazon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Crusoe 
December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; EDF Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 
12-13; EEI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20; Fervo November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 3; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5; Invenergy November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 6; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; NY UIU 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3 
(noting the Technical Bulletin No. 266’s inclusion of load interconnection study deposits 
and timelines); NYTOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20 (asserting that 
withdrawals of large loads from the transmission system can negatively impact market 
efficiency and reliability); Ohio FEA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4. 
157 See, e.g., Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 17-18; GridCare 
December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5; Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9-
10; Institute for Progress November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Ohio FEA November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 4; Vistra November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23. 
158 See, e.g., Amazon November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; CEBA November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 8; ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Geronimo 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 12; TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-
15. 
159 See, e.g., Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Exelon November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 3; NRECA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; OCC 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Southeast PIOs November 21 ANOPR

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 40 - 
and distort load forecasts.160  Clear and consistent study procedures that include readiness 
requirements (i.e. meaningful milestones and/or financial commitments) can help ensure 
that Eligible Customers’ requests for transmission service on behalf of large loads are 
more viable and more likely to materialize as planned, given that they must meet specific 
milestones and/or pay costs to proceed.   
63. 
More specifically, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust 
and unreasonable because it lacks sufficiently clear and consistent Tariff provisions that 
address certain aspects of the process to provide transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads, including:   
(1) a definition of large load sufficient to capture loads that present the unique 
challenges described herein;  
(2) the application process for requesting transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads and the study procedures, including readiness 
requirements, for studying the provision of transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads;  
(3) ongoing operational requirements for transmission customers161 serving large 
loads necessary to ensure reliable operation of the transmission system; and  
(4) pro forma provisions in transmission service agreements to memorialize these 
terms. 
 
Comments at 20; State Entities November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; TAPS 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 15, 22-24; Tri-State November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 6, 8; Vistra November 21 ANOPR Comments at 23; see also NY UIU 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-3, 9-10. 
160 See, e.g., CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; EEI November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 20; ELCON November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Invenergy 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; GridCare December 5 ANOPR Comments at 5; 
NY UIU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; OCC November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 9; PIOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Southeast PIOs November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 41; Talen November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9. 
161 We note that such ongoing operational requirements should apply to 
transmission customers, rather than Eligible Customers, as these requirements apply after 
the Eligible Customer has an executed (or a filed unexecuted) service agreement for 
transmission service and have become transmission customers under the Tariff.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 41 - 
64. 
First, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks a definition of large load, as a new category of load.  
Currently, NYISO has load interconnection procedures that apply to load interconnection 
requests for projects that are greater than 10 MW connecting at a voltage level of 115 kV 
or above, or projects 80 MW or more connecting at a voltage level below 115 kV.  
However, these procedures are only partially in NYISO’s Tariff.  As NYISO 
acknowledges, integrating large loads poses specific challenges to transmission system 
operation given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential to impact the 
transmission system.162  An appropriate definition, including a load size and 
interconnection voltage threshold, should be based on the characteristics of NYISO’s 
transmission system. That said, based on the record in the ANOPR proceeding,163 it 
appears that it would be reasonable to define a large load as a new commercial or 
industrial customer, located at a single site behind one or more points of interconnection, 
and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater and interconnects to the transmission 
system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, and is not part of a co-location 
arrangement.  In its response to this order, NYISO should explain whether the Tariff 
remains just and reasonable without such a definition or propose Tariff revisions 
establishing its own definition of large load. 
65. 
Second, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks sufficiently clear and consistent provisions establishing the 
application process and study procedures that will be used when NYISO and/or the 
Transmission Owners evaluate the provision of transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads.164  NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains 
just and reasonable, for example, without: (1) an application process that accepts Eligible 
Customers’ applications for transmission service on behalf of large loads on a rolling 
 
162 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2.  
163 See, e.g., Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13 (supporting a 
voltage threshold); DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3, 17-19 (recommending a 
threshold of an amount between 50 MW to 100 MW); Eolian November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 8-9 (recommending a voltage threshold greater than or equal to an amount 
between 60 kV to 100 kV); Illinois AG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7 
(supporting a 20 MW or 50 MW threshold and consideration of other factors, such as 
voltage level); ITC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3 (recommending a threshold of 
between 50 MW to 100 MW); Nebraska Board November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4 
(proposing a 50 MW threshold); National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11 
(asserting appropriate thresholds of 50 or 80 MW depending on the region); New Mexico 
Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5 (proposing a 50 MW threshold). 
164 See supra P 46.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 42 - 
basis, (2) a non-refundable application fee, and sufficient readiness requirements that 
escalate at distinct phases of the study process to deter duplicative or speculative requests 
for transmission service (e.g. meaningful milestones and/or financial commitments); and 
(3) information and data requirements that Eligible Customers must submit to NYISO 
and/or the Transmission Owners regarding the characteristics of the large load on behalf 
of which the Eligible Customer is taking transmission service, including disclosure to 
NYISO of any substantially similar pending transmission service requests on behalf of 
the same large load customer.165  NYISO may also elect to propose Tariff revisions 
establishing such an application process, fee, and requirements.   
66. 
Further, NYISO’s Tariff appears to lack sufficiently clear and consistent 
provisions establishing a study process for evaluating the provision of transmission 
service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that considers the unique 
characteristics and impacts of large loads on the transmission system.  For example, we 
are concerned that NYISO’s Tariff may not clearly and consistently require NYISO or 
the Transmission Owners to conduct studies that evaluate the transmission system’s 
ability to withstand risks observed from analyzed large load behavior created by the large 
load at the point of interconnection, or any other necessary supplemental studies to 
evaluate the impact of providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of 
large loads.166  Additionally, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears unjust 
and unreasonable because it lacks appropriate provisions recognizing within the 
transmission service request study process the unique operational characteristics of large 
loads that are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals under certain conditions, 
which may thereby lessen or potentially avoid the need for certain Network Upgrades.  
While flexible large loads can reduce the demand on the transmission system, and 
therefore potentially reduce the need for additional transmission capacity, additional 
informational and study requirements may be necessary to account for the dynamic 
nature of these types of loads while maintaining reliability.167  Additionally, we note that 
 
165 The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) has proposed a similar 
disclosure requirement in its Batch Zero process for large load interconnections.  ERCOT 
Planning Guide, § 9.7.1(1)(b) (proposed Mar. 4, 2026). 
166 See generally NERC, Industry Recommendation:  Large Load Interconnection, 
Study, Commissioning, and Operations (Sep. 2025), 
https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/programs/bpsa/alerts/2025/nerc-alert-level-2--large-
loads.pdf (finding that unique operational characteristics of large loads necessitate 
enhancements to studies). 
167 See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Thermal Battery 
Alliance November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Verrus November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 10.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 43 - 
accurate models using Electromagnetic Transient studies may help to ensure that 
transmission service needed on behalf of large loads can be provided without 
compromising reliability.168 
67. 
Additionally, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of 
alternative transmission technologies169 as potential solutions to accommodate an 
Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large load.  
Alternative transmission technologies can add more capacity on existing transmission 
lines quickly, often within one to three years.170  Unlike with traditional load growth,171 
large load customers often have development timelines requiring interconnection to the 
transmission system faster than traditional Network Upgrades can be built, necessitating a 
sufficient evaluation of alternative transmission technologies that can more quickly 
accommodate transmission service requests from Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
 
168 See, e.g., NERC, Draft Reliability Guideline: Risk Mitigation for Emerging 
Large Loads 6-7 (May 2026), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/standing-
committees/rstc/reliabilityguideline_riskmitigationforemerginglargeloads.pdf; NERC, 
Assessment of Gaps in Existing Practices, Requirements, and Reliability Standards for 
Emerging Large Loads 31 (Mar. 2026), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/our-
work/guidelines/reliability/white-paper---assessment-of-gaps.pdf; see also SPP HILL 
Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 62. 
169 For purposes of this order, alternative transmission technologies include static 
synchronous compensators, static VAR compensators, advanced power flow control 
devices, transmission switching, synchronous condensers, voltage source converters, 
advanced conductors, tower lifting, and dynamic line ratings.  We note that the 
Commission has also referred to these types of technologies as Grid Enhancing 
Technologies (GET). 
170 WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR Comments 
at 5-6. 
171 See, e.g., SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 7 (explaining that the 
HILL proposal was needed in part due to large load customers frequently requesting 
transmission service within months rather than years of their intended commercial 
operation, straining legacy regulatory frameworks and planning processes originally 
designed for slow, incremental, and predictable load growth); see also Commission Staff, 
2025 State of the Market Report 8 (Mar. 2026) (“[D]ata centers have characteristics 
unlike more traditional loads [including] size, strong desire for faster interconnection, and 
potential flexibility.”).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 44 - 
loads.172  The Commission has previously recognized that alternative transmission 
technologies have the potential to mitigate or defer the need for traditional Network 
Upgrades and often can be deployed both more quickly and at lower cost than traditional 
Network Upgrades, and therefore failing to consider whether alternative transmission 
technologies can meet transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than 
traditional Network Upgrades has the potential to render Commission-jurisdictional rates 
unjust and unreasonable.173  Further, to the extent Network Upgrade costs to 
accommodate an Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large 
load are rolled into a transmission owner’s transmission revenue requirement, 
transmission customers other than the Eligible Customer may bear a portion of those 
Network Upgrade costs, highlighting the need for clear and consistent provisions 
requiring the evaluation of least-cost options like alternative transmission technologies to 
mitigate the rate impact on all transmission customers.    
68. 
NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without 
provisions that (1) require the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies in 
 
172 Exec. Off. of the President, Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan 1-2, 
15 (July 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-
Action-Plan.pdf (explaining that accelerated deployment of AI data centers is a critical 
matter of national security and international economic competitiveness, and 
recommending federal policy action to optimize the existing grid through advanced grid 
technologies); WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 5-8 (“[Alternative transmission technologies’] deployment timelines are 
more aligned with the interconnection needs of new large loads, which may only take 1-2 
years to construct.”); Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR Comments at 28 
(“Achieving speed-to-power in the near-term, while also protecting customers, will 
require the use of GETs, advanced reconductoring, and unlocking all available system 
capacity.”); Energy Systems Integration Group, Historical and Modern Large Loads: 
Characteristics, Context, and Industry Action to Meet Grid and Customer Needs 4 (Mar. 
2026), https://www.esig.energy/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ESIG-Historical-vs-
Modern-Large-Loads-white-paper-2026.pdf (describing the timing mismatch between 
how long it takes to build a new data center and how long it takes to plan, permit, and 
build transmission). 
173 Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order  
No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 1583, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), 
order on reh’g, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, errata notice, 188 FERC  
¶ 61,134 (2024); see also Bldg. for the Future Through Elec. Reg’l Transmission Plan. & 
Cost Allocation, Order No. 1920, 187 FERC ¶ 61,068 at P 1201, order on reh’g, Order 
No. 1920-A, 189 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2024), order on reh’g, Order No. 1920-B, 191 FERC  
¶ 61,026 (2025).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 45 - 
transmission service request studies, using models that are capable of evaluating the 
transmission system to accurately account for advanced transmission technologies, in all 
instances, without the need for a request from the Eligible Customer seeking transmission 
service on behalf of a large load; and (2) if traditional Network Upgrades are selected 
instead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study report to the 
Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of a large load of a sufficiently 
clear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., 
would not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) 
or would not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission 
service request; or propose Tariff revisions establishing such provisions.  This 
transparency and informational requirement is warranted for the regulatory scheme we 
are establishing for transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of 
large loads given demand from and the expedited development timelines for large load 
customers.  We underscore that we are not mandating the use of alternative transmission 
technologies.  To the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of providing 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads warrant requirements 
beyond those contemplated here, we seek further briefing. 
69. 
Finally, based on the record, it appears reasonable that such study processes, 
culminating in a report to the Eligible Customer with the results of the studies, including 
any Direct Assignment Facilities and Network Upgrades necessary to accommodate the 
transmission service request as well as a non-binding good-faith estimate of the cost and 
the time to construct such facilities, should take no more than 60-90 days calendar days to 
complete.174  To the extent NYISO or the Transmission Owners already have such 
procedures and conduct such studies, but those processes are not included in the Tariff, 
NYISO and the Transmission Owners should explain their existing processes and 
consider whether amendments are necessary to the Tariff to memorialize those processes 
and also address the concerns expressed herein.  Otherwise, NYISO should explain 
whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without:  (1) sufficiently clear and 
consistent provisions to evaluate the impact of providing the requested transmission 
service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, including identifying the Direct 
Assignment Facilities and Network Upgrades necessary to provide such service reliably; 
(2) provisions to appropriately recognize within the transmission service study process 
 
174 Several commenters support a 60-day timeline.  See, e.g., Constellation 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26; Critical Loop December 5 ANOPR Comments 
at 8; EDF Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16; Tract November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 9.  Other commenters note that SPP’s HILL process has a 90-day timeline, 
or otherwise support a 90-day timeline.  See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 3; Eolian December 5 ANOPR Comments at 27; Industrial Customers 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20; PJM November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; 
SPP November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 46 - 
the unique operational characteristics of large loads; (3) a study deadline of no more than 
60-90 calendar days; or propose Tariff revisions establishing them. 
70. 
Third, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks provisions addressing ongoing operational requirements for 
transmission customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads.  We are 
concerned that without such requirements the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission 
service may be unjust and unreasonable.  The unique nature of these large loads creates 
challenges for operation of the transmission system and necessitates greater visibility and 
operational control when providing transmission service to transmission customers on 
behalf of large loads, without which the reliability of the transmission system could be at 
risk.175  For example, we are concerned that NYISO’s Tariff does not require 
transmission customers to provide NYISO hourly forecasts, telemetry data, and other 
data to ensure sufficient visibility or specify requirements for maintaining communication 
channels between NYISO and the transmission customer on behalf of the large load.  
Additionally, we are concerned that the Tariff does not require transmission owners to 
install, and transmission customers to pay for, equipment to enable NYISO to monitor 
large loads for impacts of, for example, fast-ramping load that may impact the 
transmission system too quickly to be captured by conventional data acquisition systems 
(e.g., the need for phasor measurement units or similar equipment).  We are also 
concerned that the Tariff does not require the transmission customer to enable NYISO to 
remotely disconnect large loads when necessary to maintain reliability of the 
transmission system, with the costs of such equipment directly assigned to the 
transmission customer, as well as the terms and conditions under which NYISO may 
remotely disconnect the large load (e.g., emergency conditions, so that transmission 
equipment is not harmed).  Further, we are concerned that the Tariff does not specify 
ramp rate or ride-through requirements with which the transmission customer taking 
transmission service on behalf of the large load must comply.  Lastly, we are concerned 
that the Tariff does not specify requirements for necessary control technologies and/or 
protection systems that may be necessary to limit a transmission customer’s withdrawals 
from the transmission system as appropriate.176  NYISO should explain whether the 
Tariff remains just and reasonable without these or other ongoing operational 
 
175 E.g., ATC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14; CAISO November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 10 (citing NERC Characteristics and Risks of Large Loads); Herb 
Schrayshuen November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-5. 
176 Specifically, as discussed below, the Commission has found that such 
necessary control technologies and/or protection schemes may be appropriate where 
Eligible Customers are taking one of the new transmission services.  See infra PP 109, 
113.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 47 - 
requirements as part of the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission service or propose 
Tariff revisions establishing necessary ongoing operational requirements. 
71. 
Fourth, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement 
between NYISO and the transmission customer taking transmission service on behalf of a 
large load to memorialize the above terms (e.g., equipment requirements, data 
requirements, remote disconnect capability).  We are concerned that, without such pro 
forma provisions in a transmission service agreement between NYISO and the 
transmission customer, NYISO may be unable to enforce ongoing operational 
requirements for transmission customers taking transmission service on behalf of large 
loads.  NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without 
such pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement or propose revisions to 
include pro forma provisions memorializing the ongoing operational requirements in a 
transmission service agreement between NYISO and the transmission customer. 
B. 
Cost Shifting Risk Among Transmission Customers 
72. 
We next preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost  
shifting among transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable 
rates for transmission service.  In particular, we are concerned about the apparent lack 
of (1) transparency regarding the assignment of Network Upgrades, and their associated 
costs, that are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of 
large loads; and (2) a pro forma cost recovery agreement between NYISO, the relevant 
transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of 
large loads that help ensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately 
responsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of 
Network Upgrades. 
73. 
We direct NYISO and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters 
addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to 
explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without:  (1) robust, accurate, and 
systematic provision of data on NYISO’s website in a single location, and in an easily 
accessible format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, regarding the cost 
for Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on 
behalf of large loads; and (2) a pro forma cost recovery agreement between NYISO, the 
relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on 
behalf of a large load, or to propose Tariff revisions to provide additional transparency 
and establish such a pro forma cost recovery agreement.  We encourage state regulators 
responsible for setting retail rates to provide input to NYISO regarding their transparency 
needs.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 48 - 
1. 
Jurisdiction 
74. 
The Commission has a duty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission 
customers that may result in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates.  As explained 
above, the Commission is obligated to ensure that the rates charged for jurisdictional 
transmission service—as well as any practice directly affecting such rates—are just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  With respect to the addition of 
large loads to the transmission system, the Commission has exclusive authority to ensure 
that transmission rates are just and reasonable.  The costs of those upgrades to the 
transmission system (i.e., Network Upgrades) necessary to provide transmission service 
to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads are inputs to jurisdictional transmission 
rates, and thus directly affect the Commission-jurisdictional rates paid by transmission 
customers.  To fulfill its responsibility to ensure that transmission rates are just and 
reasonable, the Commission must act to address the risk of cost shifting among 
transmission customers due to (1) the process transmission providers and/or transmission 
owners use to evaluate the facilities needed, and the associated costs, for the provision of 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and (2) speculative 
transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that could 
result in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates. 
75. 
In response to the ANOPR, many commenters raise concerns about the impact that 
large load additions can have on retail ratepayers, particularly the concern that other retail 
ratepayers may be forced to subsidize Network Upgrades needed to add large loads to the 
transmission system.177  While we appreciate and are similarly concerned about this 
issue, the Commission is limited to addressing jurisdictional transmission rates and as 
such, we do so herein.  As the Commission has explained, states determine how 
Commission-approved rates are collected among the relevant retail consumers along with 
the rates for state-jurisdictional matters.178  Specifically, states have authority over how 
the wholesale costs of providing electricity, including transmission of such electricity, to 
those retail customers are recovered through retail rates.179  We are encouraged by efforts 
taken by states to reform retail tariffs to address the potential for retail cost shifting as 
large loads come online,180 as well as voluntary efforts by transmission owners to protect 
 
177 See, e.g., National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4, 13-16; New 
York Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-8; NY UIU November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 2, 9-11; NYTOs November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15. 
178 PJM Show Cause Order, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at P 167. 
179 Id. P 68. 
180 See, e.g., National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; NYTOs 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16; see also EEI March 12 ANOPR Comments,

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 49 - 
retail ratepayers through cost recovery agreements with large loads.181  We are also 
encouraged by the execution of the President’s Ratepayer Protection Pledge, through 
which data center developers have committed to shield retail ratepayers from increased 
electricity prices.182   
76. 
We expect that the additional cost transparency measures proposed in the 
following section will give state public utility commissions and other state regulators the 
information necessary to allow them to understand which transmission costs are caused 
by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate these costs to the 
appropriate retail customers.  Indeed, the Commission’s objective in this proceeding is to 
respect the cooperative federalism approach established under the FPA.  Specifically, one 
of the benefits of providing transparency on the costs of Network Upgrades necessary to 
provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads is so that state 
regulators can use that information to protect residential and small commercial customers 
by incorporating those costs into the retail rates as they see fit given their authority to set 
rates for different classes of retail customers.  We encourage state public utility 
commissions, state regulators, and state consumer advocates to submit comments 
explaining whether this information is sufficient and granular enough or to submit 
comments explaining precisely which additional information on transmission cost 
allocation may be needed to inform proper state-jurisdictional cost allocation. 
2. 
Additional Cost Transparency 
77. 
We preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable 
or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions requiring 
the provision of data on NYISO’s website in a single location, and in an easily accessible 
format that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, on transmission service 
requested by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, for Network Upgrades 
evaluated in the local transmission planning process that are needed to provide 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of those large loads, and the costs 
 
attach. 1 at 9-13; NARUC April 13 ANOPR Comments; New York Commission 
November 21 ANOPR comments at 7 (stating that it could reform New York retail 
electricity tariffs to ensure that large loads do not “impose unjust and unreasonable costs 
upon other retail consumers”). 
181 See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. 194 FERC ¶ 61,106 (2026); 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2026); Commonwealth Edison Co.,  
194 FERC ¶ 61,110 (2026); Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2026); 
PECO Energy Co., 193 FERC ¶ 61,148 (2025); Dayton Power & Light Co., 192 FERC  
¶ 61,103 (2025); Dayton Power & Light Co., 189 FERC ¶ 61,220 (2024). 
182 Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 50 - 
for those Network Upgrades.  We preliminarily find that cost transparency measures are 
needed to provide stakeholders with sufficient information and visibility regarding the 
Network Upgrades, and their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service to 
Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.    
78. 
We recognize that NYISO requires transmission owners to provide NYISO 
quarterly updates for load interconnections that have completed a Load SIS; however, 
these SIS reports do not include information on the scope or costs of Network Upgrades, 
nor does NYISO appear to publicly post individual reports or an aggregate of the 
information it obtains.183   
79. 
However, NYISO’s Tariff does not appear to require that information identifying 
the Network Upgrades needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on 
behalf of large loads and the costs of those Network Upgrades determined through these 
local transmission planning processes be readily available on NYISO’s website in a 
single location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to 
filter the data.  The speed and scale with which Eligible Customers are seeking 
transmission service on behalf of large loads makes it difficult for interested parties, 
including transmission customers and state regulators, to accurately assess which 
transmission costs are driven by requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers 
to serve large loads.  As NYISO itself indicates, load interconnection requests in its 
interconnection queue have grown from six projects totaling 1,045 MW in 2022 to more 
than 40 projects totaling more than 10,000 MW as of November 2025.184  We are 
concerned that the potentially speculative nature of requests for transmission service by 
Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads,185 the speed and scale with which large loads 
are seeking to be added to the transmission system, the projected need for significant 
Network Upgrades to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of 
large loads,186 and the lack of centralized information on the associated transmission 
costs in NYISO hamper the ability of the Commission and stakeholders (including 
 
183 NYISO, Manual 6 ‘Load Forecasting Manual’, Appendix A ‘Load Forecast 
Reporting for Large Load Facility Interconnections’ (Oct. 2025), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2924447/load_fcst_mnl.pdf/a694b1c4-7d1b-
9382-d171-ff2fbd7ccd0c. 
184 NYISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2. 
185 See supra P 62.  
186 See National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17 (noting that the 
“unprecedented additions of large loads to the transmission system” underscores the need 
to apply the “beneficiary pays” approach to Network Upgrades costs).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 51 - 
transmission customers and state regulators187) to understand and accurately assess the 
relationship between the addition of large loads to the transmission system and wholesale 
transmission costs.   
80. 
We are concerned that without sufficient transparency regarding the Network 
Upgrades, and their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads, stakeholders may lack information and visibility 
regarding the costs driven by large load additions.  We preliminarily find that, for 
Network Upgrades evaluated in the local transmission planning process188 that are 
needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.  
NYISO must provide clear, timely, and detailed information regarding the extent to 
which requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads 
necessitate Network Upgrades to accommodate the transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads, as well as the costs of those Network Upgrades. 
 
187 See Transcript, NARUC Collaborative, Docket No. AD24-7-000, at 16-17 
(Feb. 11, 2026) (Chair Bagot, Virginia) (asserting that additional transparency at the RTO 
level would help the states get the information they need to “identify . . . that bucket of 
costs” related to large load-driven transmission costs), 19 (Commissioner Chattopadhyay, 
New Hampshire) (noting the need for “all parties to be able to see things transparently” 
with respect to wholesale transmission costs), 35-37 (Chair Martz, Iowa) (raising concern 
that RTOS/ISO do not have to clearly explain when a “‘bucket of costs is specifically for 
this large load” and noting that “if we, at the state level, can’t see the driver [of 
transmission costs], we can’t assign the cost to the causer[,] [a]nd so we need that 
clarity”), 69-70 (Chair Myers, Arizona) (“[B]eing able to allocate the large load costs to 
the correct bucket when it gets to the states is kind of a top priority.”).   
188 Our concern with transparency regarding Network Upgrades needed to provide 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, as well as the costs of 
such upgrades, is limited to Network Upgrades planned through the local transmission 
planning process.  While we acknowledge that in Order No. 890, the Commission 
adopted requirements for RTOs/ISOs, as well as for transmission owners to the extent 
that they perform transmission planning within an RTO/ISO, to have open and 
transparent transmission planning processes, there are additional requirements that apply 
to regional transmission planning processes (that do not apply to local transmission 
facilities) and thus is relevant to the distinction here.  Specifically, under Order No. 1000, 
public utility transmission providers, including RTOs/ISOs, must evaluate as part of their 
regional transmission planning process whether there are transmission facilities that more 
efficiently or cost-effectively meet the transmission planning region’s identified 
transmission needs.  See Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 11.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 52 - 
81. 
We note that centralized information regarding Network Upgrades needed to 
accommodate requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large 
loads would also help inform stakeholders at the state and local level to address 
affordability and other challenges posed by the integration of large loads.  Indeed, 
commenters state that the opaque nature of requests for transmission service by Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads, and the associated Network Upgrades required to 
provide that transmission service, prevent wholesale and retail customers, states, and 
other stakeholders from understanding such costs.189        
82. 
Accordingly, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not require the provision of data on NYISO’s website in a 
single location, and in an easily accessible format that is searchable and allows users to 
filter the data, that identifies the Network Upgrades that are needed to accommodate 
requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the 
costs of those Network Upgrades.  NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains just 
and reasonable without provisions that would require NYISO and the Transmission 
Owners to publicly post and regularly update data that details:  (1) the aggregate amounts 
of proposed large load additions in NYISO’s footprint, including the aggregate amounts 
in each transmission pricing zone; (2) the planned Network Upgrades needed to provide 
transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, identified by type of 
equipment and Network Upgrade (e.g., new substation, reconductoring, a new high-
voltage transmission line) for each transmission service request; and (3) cost estimates for 
those Network Upgrades, or propose such Tariff revisions.  NYISO and the Transmission 
Owners should also consider what other data related to transmission costs resulting from 
the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads 
would be useful to include on NYISO’s website.  To the extent there are concerns about 
data confidentiality, NYISO and the Transmission Owners should consider whether there 
are ways to mitigate those concerns while still providing the necessary transparency. 
 
189 See NY UIU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12 (noting a general need 
for cost transparency with respect to large loads); see also OCC November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 3 (“Consumers, state advocates and state regulatory commissions have a 
right to know which entities are seeking large-load interconnections, the nature of the 
requested service, and how related costs could flow through to transmission and 
distribution rates.”); U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce 
Ranking Members November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2 (urging the Commission to 
“require sufficient transparency from grid operators so it can determine which specific 
large load facilities are responsible for grid upgrade needs”); CPUC November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 16-17 (asserting that the public posting of large load cost 
responsibility determinations would improve transparency, to the benefit of businesses 
and ratepayers).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 53 - 
3. 
Cost Recovery Agreements 
83. 
We next preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting 
among transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates for 
transmission service.  In particular, we are concerned about the apparent lack of a pro 
forma cost recovery agreement between NYISO, the relevant transmission owner, and the 
Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of large loads that help ensure 
that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to 
provide transmission service, including the cost of Network Upgrades.  
84. 
Several commenters discuss the risk of cost shifting among transmission 
customers that could result from transmission service requests by Eligible Customers on 
behalf of large loads.190  Commenters also argue that retail-level large load tariffs do not 
protect wholesale transmission customers from cost shifting.191  Specifically, commenters 
in the record contend that, while a retail-level large load tariff protects the load serving 
entity taking wholesale transmission service and its retail customers, it fails “to provide 
any mechanism to protect other wholesale transmission customers” from stranded 
transmission costs.192  The Kansas Commission states that while its Large Load Power 
Services rate plan that requires large loads to make minimum payments toward 
transmission costs protects retail ratepayers from large-load driven transmission costs, it 
cannot protect against cost shifting associated with regional transmission buildout where 
“the large loads that formed the basis for the [regional] transmission plans do not 
materialize, leaving only existing customers to pay for generational expansions of the 
 
190 See, e.g., Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-13; APPA November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 6 (“Wholesale transmission customers in particular could be 
left shouldering massive costs if new large loads do not ultimately attain or maintain the 
level of electricity demand that is being forecasted.”); NRECA November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 21 (noting the risk that other transmission customers could bear stranded 
upgrade costs caused by large loads that they cannot absorb); TAPS November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 22-24; California DWR November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. 
191 TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 26 (“[A] number of state 
commissions are moving forward with retail large load tariffs, which provide for varying 
protections, but may not require the revenues and minimum demand levels to be included 
in wholesale transmission rates.”); Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-16; 
Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 15-16. 
192 Buckeye November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15; see TAPS November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 26-27 & nn.50-51.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 54 - 
transmission grid.”193  TAPS contends, moreover, that it is not sufficient for the 
Commission to rely on transmission owners to voluntarily file cost recovery agreements 
to protect transmission customers from cost shifting for Network Upgrades.194   
85. 
We are likewise concerned that there may be speculative transmission service 
requests by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads that could result in cost shifting 
among transmission customers, which may lead to unjust and unreasonable increases in 
jurisdictional transmission rates.  When a transmission owner constructs Network 
Upgrades to accommodate an Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on 
behalf of a large load, those transmission costs will be included in the transmission 
owner’s transmission revenue requirement.  If, however, the Eligible Customer takes less 
transmission service than anticipated because the large load operates at a lower demand 
than anticipated or fails to materialize at all, other transmission customers may see an 
increase in transmission rates.  In such a situation, those other transmission customers 
may have to pay for potentially unnecessary Network Upgrades that they neither caused 
the need for nor benefit commensurately from.  In other words, this introduces the risk 
that costs may be unfairly shifted to other transmission customers, which may result in 
those costs then being passed through to residential customers, among others.   
86. 
NYISO’s Tariff does not require cost recovery agreements between NYISO, the 
relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on 
behalf of a large load.  Such agreements would help ensure that the Eligible Customer 
makes a minimum contribution to the transmission owner’s transmission revenue 
requirement commensurate with the costs incurred to provide the requested transmission 
service, including the costs of any needed Network Upgrades.  Absent such cost recovery 
agreements, we are concerned that there is no mechanism to help ensure that Eligible 
Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads (as opposed to other 
transmission customers) bear the risk of, and are ultimately responsible for, the costs 
incurred to provide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of 
any needed Network Upgrades.   
87. 
Accordingly, we preliminarily find that, in order to prevent unjust and 
unreasonable cost shifting among transmission customers, it appears necessary for 
NYISO, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission 
service on behalf of a large load to enter into a cost recovery agreement that requires the 
 
193 Kansas Commission November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12.  
194 TAPS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 25-26 (noting that AES Ohio 
“committed to reflecting the payments it received from the data center in its Commission-
jurisdictional transmission revenue requirement so that other customers are protected,” in 
a Construction Service Agreement with Amazon).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 55 - 
Eligible Customer to make a minimum contribution toward the transmission owner’s 
transmission revenue requirement if the Eligible Customer ultimately takes less 
transmission service than anticipated because the large load does not materialize as 
planned or is not developed at all.  We preliminarily find that such cost recovery 
agreements are necessary to help ensure that the Eligible Customer is responsible for 
timely paying the costs of large load-driven transmission (i.e., the costs incurred to 
provide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of any needed 
Network Upgrades), rather than having those costs paid by other transmission customers 
that neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from those Network 
Upgrades.195  Our preliminary finding is not intended to alter or call into question 
existing regional cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades, but instead is focused 
on helping to prevent cost shifting among transmission customers.   
88. 
We note that several transmission owners and large load customers have filed cost 
recovery agreements (Transmission Security Agreements or Construction Service 
Agreements) with the Commission that guarantee minimum contributions from a large 
load customer (rather than from the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on 
behalf of the large load customer) to the transmission owner’s transmission revenue 
requirement.196  Although we decline to preliminarily find that cost recovery agreements 
between the transmission owner and the large load customer (rather than the Eligible 
Customer) are necessary to ensure just and reasonable transmission rates, we continue to 
find that such agreements directly affect Commission-jurisdictional transmission rates.  
Therefore, to the extent a transmission owner and a large load customer enter into a cost 
recovery agreement (whether voluntarily or pursuant to state law) through which the 
large load customer guarantees contributions to the transmission owner’s Commission-
jurisdictional transmission revenue requirement, we find that such an agreement should 
be filed with the Commission.197  To reduce duplicative credit requirements and 
transaction costs, we direct further briefing on whether it would be appropriate for such 
an agreement to substitute for the requirement on the Eligible Customer to enter into a 
cost recovery agreement with the transmission owner, if the agreement with the large 
load customer provided comparable or greater protection against cost shifting among 
 
195 See, e.g., Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009). 
196 See supra note 181. 
197 We emphasize that this finding is in no way intended to preempt or interfere 
with the ability of states to implement ratepayer protection measures designed to mitigate 
cost shifting among retail customers, such as through state-jurisdictional large load 
tariffs.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 56 - 
transmission customers than an agreement between the transmission owner and the 
Eligible Customer would.   
89. 
In addition to our preliminary finding that NYISO’s Tariff is unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks a pro forma cost recovery agreement of this type, we also 
preliminarily find that the minimum contribution required pursuant to such an agreement 
should be based on the level of jurisdictional transmission service (in MW) requested by 
the Eligible Customer on behalf of the large load.  That figure is in turn tied to how 
NYISO and/or Transmission Owners will study the requested transmission service and 
determine any necessary Network Upgrades that must be developed to provide the 
requested transmission service.  We note, however, that there may be other just and 
reasonable methods for determining this minimum contribution, including methods that 
account for potential timing differences between when costs are incurred to develop 
needed Network Upgrades and the pace at which the large load ramps toward energizing 
at its full level of requested service.  We further preliminarily find that the cost recovery 
agreement should include a credit support (or other financial security) requirement 
sufficient to secure the obligations of the Eligible Customer taking transmission service 
on behalf of a large load to pay the amounts owed pursuant to the cost recovery 
agreement.  We find that a cost recovery agreement with a specified minimum financial 
contribution and financial security sufficient to secure such contribution is necessary to 
mitigate cost shifting if the Eligible Customer ultimately takes less transmission service 
than anticipated because the large load does not materialize as planned or is not 
developed at all.  We preliminarily find that an Eligible Customer may include a credit 
support or other financial security posted by a large load as part of a retail agreement to 
avoid creating duplicative credit support requirements.  NYISO should explain why such 
a pro forma cost recovery agreement is not necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates, 
or propose such a pro forma cost recovery agreement.  To the extent that stakeholders 
believe that other mechanisms could address our cost shifting concerns, we seek further 
briefing as discussed below.198  
90. 
Although the Commission’s concerns surrounding cost shifting described above 
may not present the same in NYISO as in other RTOs/ISOs, we remain concerned that 
cost shifting may occur.  We acknowledge that NYISO has a wholesale load 
interconnection process and that Eligible Customers may request that optional studies be 
conducted during the transmission service request process.  We note that portions of the 
wholesale load interconnection process are not in NYISO’s Tariff, including the 
transmission owners’ Facilities Study for Network Upgrades, as well as the 
interconnection agreement between the transmission owner and the Eligible Customer, 
which memorializes the final costs of and cost allocation for the Network Upgrades 
identified in the load interconnection process.  We also note that the optional studies 
 
198 See infra P 133.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 57 - 
conducted at the request of Eligible Customers during the transmission service request 
process may result in Network Upgrades or Transmission Projects for which the terms of 
construction and cost allocation are memorialized in an interconnection agreement (e.g., a 
Transmission Project Interconnection Agreement).  We remain concerned that cost 
shifting may occur through the recovery of the transmission revenue requirement in the 
Transmission Service Charge, including for transmission projects planned through the 
Local Transmission Planning Process to accommodate speculative requests for 
transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, i.e., where large 
loads do not materialize or where the MW quantity of such large loads is lower than 
proposed, or because of the study process used to evaluate the facilities needed, and the 
associated costs, to accommodate the provision of transmission service to Eligible 
Customers on behalf of large loads.    
91. 
Lastly, we expect that any payments made by an Eligible Customer to a 
transmission owner pursuant to such a cost recovery agreement (or by a large load to a 
transmission owner pursuant to other voluntary agreement) will be appropriately credited 
toward transmission owners’ transmission revenue requirements consistent with the 
Commission’s cost-of-service regulations.199  We preliminarily find that it appears 
reasonable for filers of formula rates to provide a separate workpaper in the annual 
informational filing describing how any payments made pursuant to a cost recovery 
agreement are reflected in the transmission owner’s transmission formula rate. 
C. 
Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter 
Generation 
92. 
The Commission recently addressed in the PJM region the need for sufficiently 
clear and consistent tariff provisions addressing the rates, terms, and conditions that  
apply to co-location arrangements and for transmission services that reflect an Eligible 
Customer taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load200 that is willing and 
able to limit its energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain 
conditions.201  As discussed below, NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks such provisions.  
 
199 See 18 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2025). 
200 As discussed below, for purposes of this order, we will use the term Eligible 
Load to refer to co-located load and/or load with behind the meter generation.  See infra 
P 98. 
201 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 2; PJM Co-Location 
Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at PP 91, 102.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 58 - 
93. 
We direct NYISO and the Transmission Owners, to the extent the matters 
addressed herein implicate aspects of the Tariff over which they have the filing rights, to 
explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions addressing the 
rates, terms and conditions that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located 
load and for Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load, 
or propose Tariff revisions establishing the rates, terms, and conditions that apply to co-
location arrangements.  We recognize that NYISO is currently considering reforms 
related to co-location arrangements in its stakeholder process and we again encourage 
NYISO to consider whether these efforts would, either fully or in part, address the 
Commission’s concerns that the Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable.   
1. 
Definition 
94. 
The PJM Co-Location Order adopted the following definition of co-located load:  
a “configuration [that] refers to end-use customer load that is physically connected to the 
facilities of an existing or planned Customer Facility on the Interconnection Customer’s 
side of the Point of Interconnection to the PJM Transmission System.”202  The PJM Co-
Location Order used the term co-location arrangement when referring to both the co-
located load and the associated generator.203   
95. 
For purposes of this order, it appears that it would be reasonable to define co-
located load as a configuration that refers to end-use customer load that is physically 
connected to the facilities of an existing or planned generating facility on the generator 
interconnection customer’s side of the point of interconnection to the RTO/ISO’s 
transmission system.  In this order, we will also use the term co-location arrangement 
when referring to both the co-located load and the associated generating facility. 
96. 
NYISO defines Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource (BTM:NG Resource), 
in relevant part, as:  
A facility within a defined electrical boundary comprised of a 
Generator and a Host Load located at a single point identifier 
(PTID), where the Generator routinely serves, and is assigned 
to, the Host Load and has excess generation capability after 
serving that Host Load.  The Generator of the BTM:NG 
Resource must be electrically located in the NYCA, have a 
minimum nameplate rating of 2 MW and a minimum net 
injection to the NYS Transmission System or distribution 
system of 1 MW.  The Host Load of the BTM:NG Resource 
 
202 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 164 (alterations in original). 
203 Id. P 3.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 59 - 
must also have a minimum [Average Coincident Host Load] 
of 1 MW.  A facility that otherwise meets these eligibility 
requirements, but either (i) is an Intermittent Power Resource 
or Energy Storage Resource, (ii) whose Host Load consists 
only of Station Power, or (iii) has made an election pursuant 
to Section 5.12.1.12, does not qualify to be a BTM:NG 
Resource.204 
97. 
NYISO defines Host Load as:  
The Load that is electrically interconnected within the defined 
electrical boundary of a BTM:NG Resource that is routinely 
served by, and assigned to, the Generator of a BTM:NG 
Resource.  Station Power will be included in the calculation 
of the BTM:NG Resource’s Host Load if it is self-supplied by 
the Generator of the BTM:NG Resource, and it is not 
separately metered pursuant to Section 5.12.6.1.1 and ISO 
Procedures.205 
98. 
For purposes of this order, we will use the term Eligible Load to refer to co-
located load and/or load with a BTM:NG Resource.206 
2. 
Jurisdiction 
99. 
As explained in the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction to oversee the interconnection of generating facilities to the interstate 
transmission system, including where generators serve co-located load.207  The 
Commission retains exclusive authority to regulate the procedures and agreements that 
apply to the interconnection of a generator that will make wholesale sales, both where the 
generator interconnects directly to the interstate transmission system and where a 
 
204 NYISO MST, § 2.2 (Definitions – B) (18.0.0).  While we believe this definition 
is sufficient for purposes of this order, responses may explain whether changes to the 
definition of BTM:NG may be needed in order to comply with any future directives, 
should the Commission find that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable. 
205 Id. § 2.8 (Definitions – H) (3.0.0). 
206 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 91. 
207 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 171 (citing 16 U.S.C.  
§§ 824d, 824e; EPSA, 577 U.S. at 278).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 60 - 
generator interconnects to dual-use distribution facilities.208  Further, the Commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the provision of transmission service to an Eligible Customer 
on behalf of Eligible Load, provided that transmission of electricity is in interstate 
commerce.209  As the Commission found in the PJM Co-Location Order, we continue to 
acknowledge that the application of these principles depends on the specific facts and 
circumstances presented in particular situations.210   
100. Additionally, we reiterate that certain other aspects of co-location arrangements 
fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the states.  As we explained in the PJM Co-
Location Order, states retain exclusive authority over the specific terms of retail sales and 
retail rate design, including retail cost allocation to the co-located load; which entities are 
legally permitted to provide electricity to retail customers in co-location arrangements; 
and which generating facilities are sited and allowed to serve co-located load.211 
3. 
Tariff Provisions 
101. We preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable 
or unduly discriminatory or preferential because it does not contain provisions addressing 
with sufficient clarity and consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that 
apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load.  We also preliminarily find 
that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or 
preferential because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and 
consistency transmission services that reflect that an Eligible Customer taking 
transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load is willing and able to limit its energy 
withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.   
102. The absence of such provisions may leave entities unable to determine what steps 
they can or must take to effectuate co-location arrangements of various configurations.  
One step includes determining how interconnection customers serving co-located load 
may use generator interconnection processes in NYISO’s Tariff to facilitate their co-
location arrangements.  A further step includes requiring interconnection customers 
serving co-located load to specify the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on 
behalf of the co-located load under the Tariff for purposes of assessing charges, including 
the appropriate charges for wholesale services that should apply to such Eligible 
 
208 Id. P 172 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, 
1282 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
209 Id. P 173. 
210 Id. P 174. 
211 Id. PP 167-169.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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Customers.  Without such a common and consistent understanding of entities’ 
responsibilities relevant to co-location arrangements, many of which may significantly 
affect rates and are realistically susceptible of specification,212 we are concerned that 
these arrangements may be developed in a manner that is itself unjust and unreasonable 
or that may result in unjust and unreasonable rates for other customers.   
103. Moreover, as discussed further below, we are especially concerned that the 
absence of Tariff provisions addressing transmission and ancillary service rates for 
Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load creates the 
potential that Eligible Customers, on behalf of Eligible Load, may not be required to pay 
for wholesale transmission services that they receive, as required by the cost causation 
principle.  That principle provides that all Commission-jurisdictional rates and charges 
must “reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay for 
them,”213 and that costs must be allocated in a manner that is at least roughly 
commensurate with the benefits that entity receives.214 
104. We preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable 
because it lacks sufficient clarity and consistency as to the rates, terms, and conditions of 
service that apply to interconnection customers serving co-located load, including the 
scope of the analyses NYISO performs as part of its existing study process to evaluate the 
impacts of co-location arrangements, which may need to account for any potential 
dynamic impacts of co-located load and any potential impacts of requests to modify an 
existing generating facility’s interconnection service level to serve co-located load on 
transmission system reliability.  Additionally, in the PJM Co-Location Order, the 
Commission found that it was necessary to clarify that interconnection customers seeking 
to use new generating facilities to serve co-located load may (1) request interconnection 
service at a level below the generating facility’s maximum facility output; (2) use 
existing procedures to accelerate interconnection requests that satisfy certain tariff 
criteria; and (3) request provisional interconnection service and surplus interconnection 
service.215  As such, interconnection customers seeking to use their generating facilities 
to serve co-located load have no means of knowing the appropriate mechanism for setting 
forth the terms and conditions of co-location arrangements.  We are concerned that the 
 
212 Hecate Energy Greene Cnty. 3 LLC v. FERC, 72 F.4th 1307, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 
2023). 
213 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d at 1368. 
214 See, e.g., Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d at 476. 
215 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 231-235.  PJM’s 
compliance filing proposing revisions in response to these directives was accepted in part 
on April 16, 2026.  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 62 - 
details a process—including the existing rules and studies applicable to such generator 
interconnection arrangements—are not sufficiently detailed in the Tariff to ensure clarity 
for how interconnection customers may seek to serve co-located load.  Moreover, without 
an Eligible Customer designated to take transmission service on behalf of a co-located 
load, there is no mechanism for NYISO to address situations in which a co-located load 
withdraws energy from the transmission system.   
105. Therefore, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and 
consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection 
customers serving co-located load.  NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains 
just and reasonable without such provisions or propose Tariff revisions.  
106. We have similar concerns regarding NYISO’s existing rate designs for 
transmission and ancillary services that are used by Eligible Customers taking 
transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load.  The Commission has previously found 
that co-located loads that are synchronized with the transmission system use and benefit 
from at least some ancillary services and may be reasonably charged for such benefits.216  
Specifically, the Commission has found that, regardless of whether a co-located load 
withdraws energy from the transmission system, co-located load relies on and benefits 
from regulation service and black start service, and concluded that Eligible Customers 
taking one of the new transmission services (discussed below) on behalf of co-located 
loads must pay for these ancillary services on a gross demand basis.217  In the PJM Co-
Location Rehearing Order, the Commission applied these findings to Eligible Customers 
taking transmission service on behalf of load with behind the meter generation.218  
However, NYISO’s Tariff does not appear to include a mechanism by which an Eligible 
Customer, on behalf of Eligible Load, would be charged for ancillary services 
commensurate with its usage of such services, particularly if such customer did not 
withdraw energy from the transmission system.   
107. Therefore, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not address whether and how Eligible Customers taking one 
of the new transmission services on behalf of Eligible Loads will be charged for their use 
of regulation and black start services, which introduces the risk that Eligible Load may 
benefit from regulation and black start services without contributing to cost recovery for 
such services.  As noted in the PJM Co-Location Order, this introduces the risk that costs 
may be allocated entirely to other transmission customers and passed through to 
 
216 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 183. 
217 Id. PP 184-185. 
218 See PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 400.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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residential customers, among others.219  NYISO should explain whether the Tariff 
remains just and reasonable without requiring Eligible Customers taking one of the new 
transmission services on behalf of Eligible Loads to pay for regulation and black start 
services on a gross demand basis, or propose Tariff revisions that require them to do so. 
108. The Commission also found in the PJM Co-Location Order that Eligible 
Customers taking transmission service on behalf of co-located loads are willing and able 
to limit their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.  
As such, the Commission found that Eligible Customers taking transmission service on 
behalf of co-located loads should be allowed to choose a transmission service that aligns 
with their use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for service with 
the benefits received.220  On rehearing, the Commission found that it is just and 
reasonable for these services to be available to Eligible Customers taking transmission 
service on behalf of loads with behind the meter generation.221  We are concerned that 
NYISO’s Tariff lacks transmission services that would reflect the ability of Eligible 
Customers on behalf of Eligible Load to take transmission services that align with their 
use of the transmission system, which may result in inefficient and costly transmission 
buildout and costs paid by transmission customers.222    
109. Therefore, we also preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not include transmission services that reflect Eligible 
Customers taking transmission service on behalf of Eligible Load that are willing and 
able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.  NYISO 
should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without the transmission 
services described by the Commission in the PJM Co-Location Order, with regional 
variation as appropriate, being available to Eligible Customers taking transmission 
service on behalf of Eligible Load, or propose appropriate Tariff revisions.  Specifically, 
NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) an 
interim non-firm network transmission service while Network Upgrades are being 
constructed (i.e., interim NITS) and (2) permanent firm and non-firm contract demand 
 
219 See PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 159. 
220 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 199. 
221 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 101-103. 
222 See, e.g., PSEG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 20 (“The Commission’s 
long-standing policy is to encourage reduced use of the transmission system, which 
would in turn reduce upgrades to the transmission system, to the benefit of all 
transmission customers.  For instance, if a co-located load’s use of the transmission 
system is limited (or to a lesser degree) than other traditional in front of the meter loads, 
it should be responsible for costs based on its limited use.”).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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transmission services (transmission service up to a specified MW quantity, i.e., the 
contract level, on a firm or non-firm basis).  Finally, we note that the Commission has 
found it just and reasonable that, in order for an Eligible Customer to take interim NITS, 
firm contract demand transmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission 
service, an Eligible Customer must have necessary control technologies and/or protection 
systems, which may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals 
to its approved level.223 
110. Finally, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff is unjust and unreasonable 
because it allows load with behind the meter generation to net its behind the meter 
generation against its load for purposes of calculating Transmission Service Charges for 
Host Loads configured in a BTM:NG Resource arrangement.  In the PJM Co-Location 
Order, the Commission found that PJM’s behind the meter generation rules, which 
allowed load serving entities that provide service to loads with qualifying behind the 
meter generation to reduce their costs by netting output from behind the meter generation 
in the calculation of their peak demand for the purpose of determining NITS charges, 
were unjust and unreasonable.224  The Commission concluded that PJM’s behind the 
meter generation rules were no longer consistent with cost causation principles because 
large loads configured in a behind the meter generation arrangement with significant 
generation will raise cost shifting concerns compared to loads pursuing smaller amounts 
of netting.225  The Commission also found that such rules could lead to reliability and 
resource adequacy risks because PJM is obligated to serve transmission customers using 
behind the meter generation, but does not consider such customers in transmission and 
resource adequacy planning.226  The Commission directed PJM to revise its retail behind 
the meter generation rules, including establishing a MW threshold for the amount of load 
at a particular electrical location that network customers may net by using behind the 
meter generation .227  We are similarly concerned that NYISO’s Tariff allows Eligible 
Customers that take transmission service on behalf of Host Loads configured in a 
BTM:NG Resource arrangement to be charged based on actual energy withdrawals rather 
than gross load for the applicable Transmission Service Charge.228  NYISO should 
explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable even though it allows netting of 
 
223 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480 
224 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 7, 186. 
225 Id. P 186. 
226 Id.  
227 Id. P 221. 
228 NYISO Tariff, § 2.7.2.; id. § 6.9 (Schedule 9) (2.0).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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behind the meter generation from gross load for purposes of determining applicable 
Transmission Service Charges for Host Loads configured in a BTM:NG Resource 
arrangement or propose Tariff revisions.  Recognizing potential impacts on existing 
customers, we note that NYISO may explain whether current BTM:NG rules for 
customers that fall below a new MW materiality threshold for the amount of load at a 
particular electrical location that transmission customers may net using BTM:NG 
Resources remain just and reasonable. 
D. 
Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking 
Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads 
111. In response to the ANOPR, a number of commenters argue that certain large loads 
are able to limit their withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions.  
Namely, commenters observe that flexible large loads229 can quickly and verifiably adjust 
their consumption in response to system conditions or price signals.230  Commenters in 
the ANOPR also observe that, where load studies and system planning consider the 
flexible nature of large loads, flexible large loads can potentially defer or reduce the need 
for Network Upgrades, among other potential benefits.231  In recognition of this 
flexibility, many commenters support new transmission services that reflect the 
operational capabilities of flexible large loads, including interim NITS while Network 
Upgrades are constructed and non-firm transmission service.232 
 
229 For purposes of this order, “flexible” large loads are a subset of large loads, as 
used in this order, that are not co-located with generation, but are willing and able to limit 
their energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions. 
230 See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Land Trust Alliance 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; California DWR November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 5; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 14-15; ClearPath November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; Digital Energy Council November 21 ANOPR Comments 
at 1; EDF Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Emerald November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 2; Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4. 
231 See, e.g., AEMA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; ELCON November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 9; Emerald November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7; Institute 
for Progress November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11; Land Trust Alliance November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 10; LS Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Microsoft 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11; National Grid November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 19-20; OMS November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13-14; Southeast PIOs 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 50. 
232 See, e.g., Constellation November 21 ANOPR Comments at 24-25; Calibrant 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2-4; Critical Loop November 21 ANOPR

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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112. We preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable 
because it does not include transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking 
transmission service on behalf of flexible large loads that are willing and able to limit 
their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.  The transmission services 
available to Eligible Customers, including on behalf of flexible large loads, in NYISO are 
NITS and firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.233  While these remain just and 
reasonable options for an Eligible Customer to take on behalf of a flexible large load, 
based on the record before us, we preliminarily find that new transmission services 
should be available to reflect the operational reality that large loads may use the 
transmission system to differing extents and certain large loads are willing and able to 
limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.234  As explained 
above, the Commission found that Eligible Customers taking transmission service on 
behalf of Eligible Load should be allowed to choose a transmission service that aligns 
with their use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for service with 
the benefits received.235  As the record suggests, Eligible Customers taking transmission 
service on behalf of flexible large load also may be willing and able to limit their use of 
the transmission system under certain conditions.  As recognized in the ANOPR record, 
load flexibility can avoid inefficient and costly transmission system build-out.236  In 
addition, transmission services that reflect that flexible large loads are willing and able to 
limit their withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions could help 
 
Comments at 2; Digital Power Network November 21 ANOPR Comments at 3; PIOs 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 27-28; Splight November 21 ANOPR Comments at 
3-4. 
233 See supra P 20 (describing existing transmission services in NYISO). 
234 See supra P 111. 
235 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 199; PJM Co-Location 
Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 103. 
236 See supra P 111; see also PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 
160, 177, 199 (finding that new transmission service options reflect a co-located load’s 
ability to limit withdrawals from the transmission system and potentially avoid costly and 
inefficient transmission system buildout that may not be necessary).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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timely interconnect flexible large loads.237  Entities in the NYISO footprint acknowledge 
the importance of facilitating load flexibility.238 
113. Therefore, we are concerned that NYISO’s Tariff does not include transmission 
services that reflect the use of the transmission system by Eligible Customers on behalf of 
flexible large load, on both an interim and permanent basis.  NYISO should explain 
whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without the transmission services 
described by the Commission in the PJM Co-Location Order, with regional variation as 
appropriate, being available to Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf 
of flexible large loads, or propose appropriate Tariff revisions.  Specifically, NYISO 
should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without (1) an interim non-
firm network transmission service while Network Upgrades are being constructed (i.e., 
interim NITS) and (2) permanent firm and non-firm contract demand transmission 
services (transmission service up to a specified MW quantity, i.e., the contract level, on a 
firm or non-firm basis).  Finally, we note that the Commission has found it just and 
reasonable that, in order for an Eligible Customer to take interim NITS, firm contract 
demand transmission service, and non-firm contract demand transmission service, an 
Eligible Customer must have necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, 
which may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to its 
approved level.239 
E. 
Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load 
and Co-Located Load 
114. In response to the ANOPR, a number of commenters agree that the ability to  
study new load and new generation together, when physically or electrically proximate, 
presents system benefits and can help address the challenges posed by large load 
 
 
237 See supra P 111; see also PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 
201 (finding that the interim, non-firm transmission service will facilitate the “timely” 
provision of transmission service and that “[t]his willingness to curtail would potentially 
allow them to obtain service more quickly”), 205 (recognizing that parties argue that co-
located loads may be able to receive transmission service faster with use of a new, limited 
transmission service product than they would if they selected NITS, to the extent that 
providing NITS would require Network Upgrades that the limited transmission service 
would not). 
238 National Grid November 21 ANOPR Comments at 19-20; NYISO November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9; NY UIU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-8.  
239 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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additions.240  Commenters argue that studies that consider large load and generation 
together present a more complete picture of the grid and can enable the identification of 
more accurate, efficient, and cost-effective transmission solutions by minimizing system 
impacts.241  As a result, this can speed up the interconnection process for both large loads 
and generation, and shorten energization timelines,242 which commenters contend 
reduces uncertainty for both parties243 and “is necessary to match the pace of AI 
innovation in the United States.”244  CEBA also highlights that cost and timeline factors 
drive developers to submit multiple requests for price and timing discovery, which 
inflates queue volumes, distorts demand and supply forecasts, and causes significant 
delays when projects withdraw late after finding costs or energization timelines 
uneconomic.245  Other benefits to a joint study identified by commenters include 
improving load forecasting and siting decisions246 and reducing the need for critical 
supply chain components.247   
 
240 See e.g., DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; DTE November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 11; Google November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; International 
Energy Credit Association November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10; Terraflux November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 1. 
241 AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13; ClearPath November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 4; DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; DTE November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 8-11; ENGIE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6; Entergy 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Geronimo November 21 ANOPR Comments at 
17-18; Information Technology Industry Council November 21 ANOPR Comments at 2. 
242 DCC November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; DTE November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 8-11; Information Technology Industry Council November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 2; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9; Verrus December 5 
ANOPR Comments at 9. 
243 ClearPath November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; CEBA November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 8. 
244 Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9. 
245 CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. 
246 ELCON November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; Maryland Commission 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 6-7.  
247 AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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115. Commenters contend that current generator interconnection study processes may 
not adequately capture generation and load, including by failing to model known 
electrically proximate large load in base case assumptions, which may result in inaccurate 
studies and inefficient system build-out.248  For example, Eolian states that in its 
experience developing a project in PJM, the failure of the generator interconnection study 
process to reflect reasonably expected load conditions on the grid models triggered overly 
costly Network Upgrades and caused the cancellation of generation project that could 
have reliably served adjacent load growth.249   
116. Commenters in the ANOPR proceeding argue that the current state of the 
generator interconnection queue is not meeting the expeditious time frame needed to 
match the pace of large load additions and ensure the safe and reliable interconnection of 
these loads.250  For example, Oracle states that one of the most significant and 
widespread delays it encounters when siting data centers in the U.S. is access to sufficient 
energy.251  Similarly, Helion contends that more than half of U.S. developers now 
identify interconnection delays as the single biggest barrier to adding new generation 
capacity.252  Commenters contend that if large load interconnection proceeds more 
quickly than new generation can come online, the result could be price increases for 
consumers.253   
117. A number of commenters support expedited interconnection studies for new 
generation paired with load.254  Some commenters argue that one solution to generator 
 
248 Base Power November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; Eolian November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 18-19; Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 2; Longroad 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. 
249 Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 10. 
250 See, e.g., AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1; DCC November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 8; esVolta November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11-12; Oracle 
May 1 ANOPR Comments at 4.  
251 Oracle November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1. 
252 Helion November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1 (citing Third Way, Picking Up 
the PACE: A Comprehensive Analysis of Available Pathways to Accelerating Clean 
Energy (PACE) (Nov. 2025)). 
253 AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; OPSI November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 6-7, 11.  
254 See, e.g., DTE November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; ENGIE November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 4; International Energy Credit Association November 21 ANOPR

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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interconnection delays may be the creation of time-limited or conditional interconnection 
service for generators serving large loads, which could require less time for initial 
generator interconnection studies and improve speed to power.255  For example, several 
commenters express support for SPP’s HILLGA proposal as a model and urge the 
Commission to establish nationwide rules similar to that approach.256  Other commenters 
suggest reforms to expedite studies for new generation paired with large loads at existing 
points of interconnection that have already been studied, arguing it is unjust and 
unreasonable not to fully utilize existing infrastructure and proven reliability paths while 
new load waits for service.257   
1. 
Jurisdiction 
118. The Commission’s statutory authority includes jurisdiction over the wholesale sale 
and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, including the facilities used for 
such sale and transmission.258  The Commission also has exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate the procedures and agreements applicable to generating facilities seeking to 
interconnect to a Commission-jurisdictional distribution facility or transmission 
facility.259  In the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission observed that a generator’s 
 
Comments at 8; Meta November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5-6; Ohio FEA November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 5.  
255 AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 12; AEU November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 13; Google December 5 ANOPR Comments at 15; see also Duke 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21-22.  
256 AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 4; Crusoe December 5 ANOPR 
Comments at 7; Enchanted Rock November 21 ANOPR Comments at 4; Google 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7; GridStor November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5; 
Verrus November 21 ANOPR Comments at 9. 
257 Constellation June 5 ANOPR Comments at 8-9. 
258 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
259 Id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d at 1280-82 
(affirming Order No. 2003 and observing that “interconnections appear to be 
relationships between parties with respect to electricity flowing over facilities. . . . By 
establishing standard agreements [the Commission] has exercised its jurisdiction over 
the terms of those relationships.”); see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 115 FERC ¶ 61,193 at P 36 
(“[I]interconnection is part and parcel of transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce, and thus interconnection service is part and parcel of jurisdictional 
transmission service.”).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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interconnection to the interstate transmission system “does not fall outside of the 
Commission’s jurisdiction merely because there is [c]o-[l]ocated [l]oad behind the 
generator’s point of interconnection.”260  By the same token, the Commission retains 
jurisdiction over a generator’s interconnection even where the generator plans to serve an 
electrically proximate large load.   
119. We recognize that states have exclusive authority over resource planning and the 
generation mix within their boundaries.261  Nothing about our preliminary finding here, 
however, intrudes or is intended to intrude on that exclusive authority.  Rather, we 
preliminarily find that it is necessary and appropriate to exercise our exclusive 
jurisdiction over generator interconnection to ensure the availability of generator 
interconnection processes specifically tailored to the unique operational characteristics of 
generating facilities dedicated to serving electrically proximate large loads and co-located 
loads, as defined below.  The Commission has exercised this jurisdiction previously in 
requiring generator interconnection services that allow certain generating facilities to 
interconnect more quickly through the use of provisional interconnection service and 
surplus interconnection service,262 and has approved interconnection processes that allow 
certain generating facilities to interconnect more quickly by replacing a retiring existing 
generating facility.263   
2. 
Definitions 
120. For purposes of this order, it appears to be reasonable to use the term “electrically 
proximate large load” to mean a large load, as defined in this order,264 that is sufficiently 
electrically close to the interconnection customer’s requested point of interconnection, 
such that the impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating 
facility and the load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, 
 
260 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 171. 
261 See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. FERC, 125 F.4th at 238 (citing 
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)).  
262 Reform of Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order No. 845, 
163 FERC ¶ 61,043, at PP 438, 467 (2018), order on reh’g & clarification, Order  
No. 845-A, 166 FERC ¶ 61,137, order on reh’g & clarification, Order No. 845-B,  
168 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2019); Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 1436; PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,083 (2025). 
263 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 194 FERC ¶ 61,079 (2026); 
Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator Inc., 167 FERC ¶ 61,146 (2019).  
264 See supra P 64.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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will be effectively the same as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load 
that is located no more than two substations away from the generating facility).  We will 
consider proposed revisions to this definition that ensure it is appropriately tailored to 
NYISO transmission system 
3. 
Tariff Provisions 
121. We preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable 
because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection customer to seek the 
generator interconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving 
either:  (1) an electrically proximate large load; or (2) a co-located load, as defined in this 
order,265 that has a high peak load (i.e., large co-located loads that are 50 MW or 
greater).266  Specifically, we preliminarily find that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust 
and unreasonable because it lacks a generator interconnection study process and/or 
generator interconnection service to reflect an interconnection customer’s commitment in 
an interconnection agreement to limit the generating facility’s output to minimize the 
impact on the transmission system while serving an electrically proximate large load or 
large co-located load.  We are concerned that NYISO’s Tariff lacks, for example, 
generator interconnection study procedures and generator interconnection services that 
reflect (a) an interconnection customer’s commitment in an interconnection agreement to 
limit a generating facility’s output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically 
proximate large load or large co-located load; and/or (b) a generating facility with 
necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special 
protection scheme,267 that ensure that the injection does not exceed the limit in the 
existing or new interconnection agreement.  Where a generating facility’s output is 
matched to the demand of the electrically proximate large load or large co-located load or 
if the generating facility’s output is limited to ensure no new injection, the impacts to the 
transmission system of interconnecting the generating facility to serve that electrically 
proximate large load or large co-located load may be limited,268 thereby potentially 
 
265 See supra P 95. 
266 We note that generator interconnection service in and of itself does not convey 
transmission service. 
267 PJM Co-Location Rehearing Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 480. 
268 In other words, because the generating facility and load are located so closely 
on the transmission system, if the generating facility’s output matches the load’s demand, 
then the transmission provider would need to study only the local impacts because the 
impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating facility and the 
load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively 
the same as if they were located at the same substation.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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reducing the need for Network Upgrades, which can accelerate the generator 
interconnection process.269  In the absence of Tariff provisions accounting for these 
operational dynamics when an interconnection customer’s generating facility is serving 
electrically proximate large loads or large co-located loads, new shovel-ready generating 
facilities may face unnecessary delays in reaching commercial operation under current 
generator interconnection processes and will be unable to serve the immediate demand of 
new large loads or large co-located loads.270   
122. As commenters in the ANOPR proceeding have recognized, the status quo may 
result in inefficient and unnecessary development of infrastructure, which leads to 
unnecessarily higher Network Upgrade costs that may result in unjust and unreasonable 
rates.271  The Commission has already determined in the PJM Co-Location Order that 
without the new transmission services that reflect the operational dynamics of co-location 
arrangements, there could be unnecessary, costly, and inefficient Network Upgrades, 
 
 
269 See, e.g., AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13 (“To the extent that a 
new large load and new generation or storage resource are geographically and electrically 
proximate, studying them together would reduce network upgrades, lower costs, and 
reduce the need for critical supply chain components.”); DTE November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 10 (integrating the study of load and its supporting generation “reduces the 
need for network upgrades, optimizes the use of existing infrastructure, and accelerates 
the timeline for bringing both load and generation online”); Eolian November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 18 (“It is obvious from basic engineering principles that generation located 
near load requires less transmission infrastructure to serve that load than generation 
located distant from load.”); GridStor November 21 ANOPR Comments at 5 (“Siting a 
large load near or at the same point of interconnection as a new generating facility could 
reduce the network upgrades needed to interconnect only the load or only the generating 
facility.”).  
270 See AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1; Base Power November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 7; CEBA November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; DCC November 
21 ANOPR Comments at 6 (asserting that a clear framework to study large loads paired 
with generation would resolve development bottlenecks); Eolian November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 18-19; Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 2; Google November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 7 (calling for nationwide rules enabling proximate load-generation 
interconnection to “accelerate the pace at which new generation comes online”); 
Longroad November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8. 
271 See, e.g., AEU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13, AEP December 5 
ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Longroad November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; OPSI 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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increasing Network Upgrade costs.272  The same result may occur in the absence of new 
generator interconnection study procedures and generator interconnection services 
tailored to a new generating facility coming online for the express purpose of serving an 
electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.273   
123. SPP recognized this problem and submitted an FPA section 205 filing to 
implement a new, interim, generator interconnection service and related generator 
interconnection process, HILLGA, to facilitate the prompt interconnection of generating 
facilities that are specifically identified for and limited to serving a HILL, which the 
Commission accepted.274  The Commission found that HILLGA “reasonably provides a 
flexible, expedited, and separate serial interconnection process that will facilitate the 
prompt interconnection of generating facilities that are limited to serving a HILL in the 
same local area.”275  We do not expect or propose that NYISO adopt an identical process 
to SPP’s HILLGA process, nor do we preliminarily find that the absence of Tariff 
provisions specifically mirroring SPP’s Tariff renders NYISO’s Tariff unjust and 
unreasonable.  Nevertheless, we remain concerned that the Tariff may be unjust and 
unreasonable without any uniquely tailored interconnection study process and/or 
generator interconnection service to recognize the reduced transmission system impacts 
that may result from the interconnection of a generating facility where the 
interconnection customer has committed, in an interconnection agreement, to limit the 
generating facility’s output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large 
load or large co-located load.276  To the extent that the interconnection customer’s 
 
272 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 177 (“[F]or Eligible 
Customers taking service on behalf of Co-Located Loads that do not reserve 
transmission . . . requiring such Eligible Customers to take NITS on behalf of these Co-
Located Loads may in some circumstances result in costly and inefficient transmission 
system buildout that may not be necessary if such Eligible Customers are willing and able 
to take a transmission service that requires fewer Network Upgrades to provide, and 
therefore may result in lower Network Upgrade costs, than would NITS.”). 
273 See AEP December 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2 (stating that current processes 
produce insufficient/inefficient infrastructure and “potentially unsustainable price 
increases”); Eolian May 19 ANOPR Comments at 2, 10 (contending that a lack of 
coordinated study leads to unjust and unreasonable outcomes).  
274 SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031. 
275 Id. P 64. 
276 While, as discussed above, we view such a process that permits generation to 
serve electrically proximate loads no more than two substations away from the generators 
to be reasonable, we understand the unique features of NYISO’s transmission system

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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generating facility is serving an electrically proximate large load, we believe that the 
generator interconnection service should be of an interim nature until the interconnection 
customer obtains Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) or Network Resource 
Interconnection Service (NRIS).  To the extent that the interconnection customer’s 
generating facility is serving a large co-located load, it may be reasonable for the 
generator interconnection service to be permanent because there will be no injections 
onto the transmission system and therefore it does not present operational or planning 
risks for reliability.   
124. Another potentially reasonable approach to address our concerns could be to 
develop a generator interconnection study process that would allow the use of existing 
ERIS or NRIS of an existing generator to connect a new generating facility and a new 
large load behind the same point of interconnection of the existing generator with 
necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special 
protection scheme, that ensure that the net injection does not exceed the amount in the 
existing generator interconnection agreement.277  Such an approach could expedite the 
interconnection study process for a generator planning to serve an electrically proximate 
(in this case at the same point of interconnection) large load.278  An additional potentially 
reasonable approach could be a new load-limited generator interconnection service that 
allows a new generating facility and new large co-located load seeking to interconnect 
behind the same new point of interconnection, with necessary control technologies and/or 
protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, to ensure that there is 
no injection to the transmission system.279  It may be reasonable for such a load-limited 
generator interconnection service to be or not to be of an interim nature.  We invite 
NYISO and/or Transmission Owners, in responding to this order or in an FPA section 
 
may warrant consideration of a more limited definition of electrically proximate.  See 
Duke November 21 ANOPR Comments at 21-22; DTE November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 8-11 (asserting that studying large loads with electrically proximate 
generation streamlines interconnection and reduces upgrades); AEU November 21 
ANOPR Comments at 13-15. 
277 See Constellation June 5 ANOPR Comments at 1-2, 10-13. 
278 See id. at 5 (explaining that when new generation load pairings “are sited at an 
existing generator’s Point of Interconnection and fall within the same study parameters 
reflected by that existing generator’s interconnection, they benefit from studies and 
upgrades already completed for that existing generator and can come on more rapidly 
without jeopardizing reliability”). 
279 See MISO November 21 ANOPR Comments at 13; see also MISO TOs April 3 
ANOPR Comments at 13-14.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 76 - 
205 filing, to submit original proposals designed to address the concerns expressed herein 
and tailored to their unique circumstances.  
125. We are concerned that the absence of generator interconnection study procedures 
and generator interconnection services facilitating the interconnection of a new 
generating facility that is being brought onto the transmission system in order to serve an 
electrically proximate large load or large co-located load will result in NYISO’s current 
generator interconnection process failing to keep pace with the new large loads seeking to 
be integrated onto NYISO’s transmission system.280  We preliminarily find that this 
outcome may be unjust and unreasonable because reliance on NYISO’s current generator 
interconnection processes for generating facilities serving electrically proximate large 
loads or large co-located loads could result in unnecessary interconnection delays, 
unnecessary Network Upgrades, and an otherwise inefficient expansion of the 
transmission system, imposing unnecessary delays and costs on transmission customers. 
126. NYISO should explain whether the Tariff remains just and reasonable without, for 
example, provisions that establish:  (1) a new generator interconnection study process and 
new interim generator interconnection service that reflect an interconnection customer’s 
commitment, in a generator interconnection agreement, to limit a generating facility’s 
output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large load or large co-
located load; or (2) a generator interconnection study process that allows the use of the 
existing ERIS or NRIS of an existing generator to connect a new generating facility and a 
new large load behind the same point of interconnection of the existing generator with 
necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special 
protection scheme, that ensures that the net injection does not exceed the amount in the 
existing generator interconnection agreement; or (3) a new generator interconnection 
service that allows a new generating facility and new large co-located load seeking to 
interconnect behind the same new point of interconnection with necessary control 
technologies and/or protection systems, which may include a special protection scheme, 
to ensure that there is no injection to the transmission system.  We note that, with respect 
to numbers (2) or (3), these approaches could be either interim or permanent.  These 
approaches may not be mutually exclusive. 
127. Given that generator interconnection service in and of itself does not convey 
transmission service, we encourage NYISO to consider, in responding to these concerns, 
 
280 See Helion November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1 (noting interconnection 
delays are the biggest barrier to adding new generation); Oracle November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 1 (noting significant delays in access to sufficient energy for data centers); 
OPSI November 21 ANOPR Comments at 11 (explaining that expedited study 
encourages loads to bring their own generation); Enchanted Rock November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 4; Microsoft November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8-9.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
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what type of transmission service an Eligible Customer will need to take on behalf of the 
electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.281  We note that, in the PJM 
Co-Location Order, the Commission found that the Eligible Customer must take 
transmission service on behalf of co-located load that will not withdraw energy from the 
transmission system, even if it is 0 MW.282 
F. 
Informational Report 
128. The rapid addition and proliferation of large loads without commensurate 
additions of supply or demand-side resources presents resource adequacy concerns.  As 
discussed above and highlighted in the ANOPR, the growth of demand, and the speed of 
such growth, is driven in large part by the interconnection of large loads.  While not 
expressly contemplated in the ANOPR, commenters highlight the strain rapid demand 
growth is putting on resource adequacy in many regions.283  Indeed, the relative speed 
and concentration at which large loads are seeking to interconnect appears to be 
outpacing the addition of new generation, which in turn heightens reliability risks and 
drives up costs to ratepayers.284  We are concerned that NYISO and load serving entities 
are unable to plan adequate generation to serve all load at the pace such load seeks to 
connect.   
129. Accordingly, we direct NYISO to submit in Docket No. EL26-69-000, within 30 
days of the date of issuance of this order, a detailed informational report on any proposals 
under consideration in its stakeholder process to address the issue of resource adequacy 
to serve new large loads.  We also strongly encourage new proposals to the extent 
necessary to address these concerns.  The informational report must include a detailed 
schedule of key milestones, such as stakeholder or NYISO Board votes, that includes the 
estimated date on which NYISO expects to file any such proposals with the Commission.  
 
281 See SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 at P 34. 
282 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 206. 
283 See, e.g., Entergy November 21 ANOPR Comments at 29-30; Eolian 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17; Industrial Customers November 21 ANOPR 
Comments at 24-26; NY UIU November 21 ANOPR Comments at 10-11; NYISO 
November 21 ANOPR Comments at 7-9; R Street November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1; 
South Dakota Commission November 13 ANOPR Comments at 5; Talen December 5 
ANOPR Reply Comments at 7.  
284 See, e.g., Eolian November 21 ANOPR Comments at 16-17; David Gardiner & 
Associates November 21 ANOPR Comments at 1-2; Joint Consumer Advocates 
December 5 ANOPR Comments at 2; PSEG November 21 ANOPR Comments at 8; 
Southern California Edison December 5 ANOPR Comments at 3.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 78 - 
Additionally, as part of this informational report, we direct NYISO to identify any 
ongoing stakeholder processes that aim to increase the pace of adding generating capacity 
in the NYISO region.  The informational report must include a detailed schedule of such 
initiatives, including timing of the stakeholder process and dates of any anticipated filings 
with the Commission.   
IV. 
Briefing Questions 
130. We note that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with 
transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take 
interconnection and/or transmission service from, the transmission system and may be at 
varying stages of that process.  We appreciate that different large loads are currently at 
different stages of that process.  We also understand that large loads and Eligible 
Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads are negotiating, entering 
into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the 
transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.  We direct further 
briefing regarding how NYISO and the Transmission Owners, in responding to the order 
to show cause, should protect existing commercial arrangements including:  (1) what 
would be a reasonable implementation period to ensure minimal disruption to such 
existing commercial arrangements, and (2) how to allow a reasonable amount of time to 
finalize ongoing agreements that are nearing completion as of the date such Tariff 
provisions are filed with the Commission. 
131. Today’s order proposes, as part of a potential replacement rate, to establish new 
transmission services that recognize flexible large loads’ ability and willingness to limit 
their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.  As we assess this proposal, 
we also consider how these new transmission services might affect other parts of 
NYISO’s Tariff and/or processes.  Specifically, what, if any, potential impacts on 
regional and local transmission planning would arise from the introduction of the new 
transmission services discussed herein?  For example, when planning for load growth, 
how would transmission providers and planners account for flexible large loads’ potential 
preference to take the new transmission services, including potential uncertainties around 
the type, location, and quantity of such expected loads?     
132. Today’s order preliminarily finds that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable without the inclusion of cost shifting protections.  We find that there may 
be a variety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts 
associated with Network Upgrades triggered by large loads.  To that end, we direct 
respondents to include information regarding potential structures for agreements between 
the transmission owner/provider and an Eligible Customer to prevent unjust and 
unreasonable cost shifts among transmission customers related to Network Upgrade costs 
required for large loads.  Further, please include information on what an appropriate

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 79 - 
minimum level of cost recovery and financial security from an Eligible Customer would 
be under any such agreements. 
133. Today’s order preliminarily finds that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of 
alternative transmission technologies.  The order directs NYISO to explain whether the 
Tariff remains just and reasonable without provisions that (1) require the evaluation of 
alternative transmission technologies in transmission service request studies, using 
models that are capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account for 
advanced transmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request from 
the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load; and (2) if 
traditional Network Upgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission 
technologies, inclusion in the study report to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission 
service on behalf of large load of a sufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative 
transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., would not resolve reliability violations 
identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would not result in lower costs or a 
faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request.  As noted above, to 
the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of providing transmission 
service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads warrant requirements beyond those 
contemplated here, we seek further briefing.  
134. Today’s order preliminarily finds that NYISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection 
customer serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to seek 
generator interconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving such 
loads.  Any filings or tariff changes submitted in response to this order should address the 
following questions:  
a. To what extent would NYISO allow an interconnection customer’s 
generating facility serving electrically proximate large load or large co-
located load to participate in NYISO’s energy and ancillary services 
market, and if NYISO were to allow them to participate, what restrictions 
or mitigation would NYISO apply? 
b. To the extent that NYISO plans for the electrically proximate large load or 
large co-located load associated with an interconnection customer’s 
generating facility for resource adequacy purposes, would NYISO account 
for the generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or 
large co-located load in the resource adequacy construct?  If applicable, 
would NYISO allow the generating facilities serving electrically proximate 
large load or large co-located load to participate in NYISO’s capacity

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 80 - 
market?  If so, would NYISO accredit these generating facilities using the 
same method as other NYISO generating facilities? 
The Commission orders: 
 
(A) 
Pursuant to the authority contained in and subject to the jurisdiction 
conferred upon the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by section 402(a) of the 
Department of Energy Organization Act and by the FPA, particularly section 206 thereof, 
and pursuant to the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and the regulations 
under the FPA (18 C.F.R. Chapter I), the Commission hereby institutes a proceeding in 
Docket No. EL26-69-000 as discussed in the body of this order. 
(B) 
NYISO and the Transmission Owners are hereby directed, within 60 days 
of the date of the order, either:  (1) to show cause as to why the Tariff remains just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; or (2) to explain what changes 
to the Tariff they believe would remedy the identified concerns if the Commission were 
to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable or unduly 
discriminatory or preferential and, therefore, proceeds to establish a replacement Tariff. 
(C) 
NYISO is directed to submit an informational report within 30 days of the 
date of issuance of this order, as discussed in the body of this order. 
(D) 
Any interested person desiring to be heard in Docket No. EL26-69-000 
must file a notice of intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate, with the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC  20426, in 
accordance with Rule 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2025), within 21 days of the date of issuance of this order.  The 
Commission encourages electronic submission of interventions in lieu of paper using the 
“eFiling” link at http://www.ferc.gov.  Persons unable to file electronically may file by 
U.S. mail addressed to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 
Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC  20426, or by hand (including 
courier) delivery to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 12225  Wilkins Avenue, 
Rockville, MD  20852. 
(E) 
Interested entities may respond within 30 days of NYISO’s and the 
Transmission Owners’ filing, addressing either or both of:  (1) whether the Tariff remains 
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential; and (2) if not, what 
changes to the Tariff should be implemented as a replacement rate. 
(F) 
The Secretary shall promptly publish in the Federal Register a notice of the 
Commission’s initiation of the proceeding under section 206 of the FPA in Docket No. 
EL26-69-000.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 81 - 
(G) 
The refund effective date in Docket No. EL26-69-000 pursuant to section 
206 of the FPA shall be the date of publication in the Federal Register of the notice 
discussed in Ordering Paragraph (F) above. 
By the Commission.  Chairman Swett is concurring with a separate statement attached. 
 
Commissioner Rosner is concurring with a separate statement 
attached. 
 
Commissioner See is concurring with a separate statement attached. 
 
Commissioner Chang is concurring with a separate attached. 
 
Commissioner LaCerte is concurring with a separate statement 
attached. 
 
( S E A L ) 
 
 
 
 
Carlos D. Clay, 
Deputy Secretary.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 82 - 
Appendix - Commenters in Docket No. RM26-4-000 
 
Advanced Energy Management Alliance (AEMA) 
Advanced Energy United (AEU) 
Advancing Modern Powerlines Coalition (together with Working for Advanced 
Transmission Technologies Coalition, WATT and Advancing Modern Powerlines) 
Advocates for Consumer Regulated Electricity 
AES Corporation  
AI Supply Chain Alliance 
Alexandre Figueras, on behalf of Monza Tech 
Alliance for Tribal Clean Energy 
Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.  
Amazon Energy LLC (Amazon) 
America’s Power  
American Chemistry Council  
American Clean Power Association  
American Conservation Coalition 
American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) 
American Electric Power Service Corporation285 
American Public Gas Association 
American Public Power Association (APPA) 
American Terawatt, Inc. (American Terawatt) 
American Transmission Company LLC (ATC)286 
Americans for a Clean Energy Grid  
Antora Energy, Inc. 
Arevia Power 
Arizona Public Service Company 
Arkansas Public Service Commission  
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma 
 
285 American Electric Power Service Corporation submitted comments on behalf 
of its affiliates Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, 
Kentucky Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, Ohio Power Company, 
Wheeling Power Company, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Southwestern 
Electric Power Company, AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Indiana 
Michigan Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc., 
AEP Ohio Transmission Company, Inc., AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, 
Inc., AEP Oklahoma Transmission Company, Inc., and AEP Southwestern Transmission 
Company, Inc. 
286 ATC submitted comments on behalf of itself and its corporate manager ATC 
Management Inc.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 83 - 
Base Power Company, Inc. (Base Power) 
Bloom Energy Corporation 
Buckeye Power, Inc. (Buckeye) 
Calibrant Energy Holdings, LLC (Calibrant) 
California Department of Water Resources State Water Project (California DWR) 
California Independent System Operator Corporation 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 
Center for Biological Diversity 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
Clean Energy Buyers Association (CEBA) 
ClearPath, Inc. (ClearPath) 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation 
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (Constellation) 
Consumer Energy Alliance 
Consumers Energy Company 
Critical Loop, Inc. (Critical Loop) 
Crusoe Energy Systems, Inc. (Crusoe) 
CTC Global Corporation 
Data Center Coalition (DCC) 
David Gardiner & Associates  
Delaware Division of the Public Advocate (together with Pennsylvania Office of  
Consumer Advocate, Joint Consumer Advocates)287 
Digital Energy Council  
Digital Power Network 
Distributed Capacity Parties288 
Dr. Elisa Nelson 
DTE Electric Company (DTE) 
Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) 
EDF Power Solutions, Inc. (EDF Power) 
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) 
Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) 
Electricity Customers Alliance (ECA) 
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) 
Emerald AI (Emerald) 
Enchanted Rock, LLC 
Energy New England, LLC 
 
287 The Illinois Attorney General joined the Joint Consumer Advocates in filing 
reply comments. 
288 Distributed Capacity Parties include:  Clovereleaf Infrastructure; Spark 
Community Investment d/b/a Sparkfund; and Voltus, Inc.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 84 - 
Energy Trading Institute 
ENGIE North America, Inc. (ENGIE) 
Entergy Services, LLC (Entergy)289 
Environmental Law & Policy Center 
Eolian L.P. (Eolian) 
Equinix, Inc. 
esVolta, LP 
ETX Upstream, LLC 
Eversource Energy290 
Exelon Corporation (Exelon)291 
Fervo Energy Company (Fervo) 
FirstEnergy Service Company292 
Fluence 
Front Door Technologies LLC 
FuelCell Energy, Inc. 
Georgia Public Service Commission  
Geronimo Power, LLC (Geronimo) 
Google LLC (Google) 
Governors Josh Shapiro and Glenn Youngkin 
GridCARE 
GridStor LLC (GridStor) 
Harvard Electricity Law Initiative 
 
289 Entergy submitted comments on behalf of the Entergy Operating Companies, 
which include Entergy Arkansas, LLC, Entergy Louisiana, LLC, Entergy Mississippi, 
LLC, Entergy New Orleans, LLC, and Entergy Texas, Inc. 
290 Eversource Energy submitted comments on behalf of its affiliates The 
Connecticut Light and Power Company, NSTAR Electric Company, and Public Service 
Company of New Hampshire, and through its agent Eversource Energy Service 
Company. 
291 Exelon submitted comments on behalf of itself and its affiliates Atlantic City 
Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison 
Company, Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc., Delmarva Power and Light 
Company, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac Electric Power Company. 
292 FirstEnergy Service Company submitted comments on behalf of itself and its 
affiliates American Transmission Systems, Inc., Jersey Central Power & Light Company, 
Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission LLC, Keystone Appalachian Transmission 
Company, The Potomac Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company, and Trans-
Allegheny Interstate Line Company.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 85 - 
Helion Energy (Helion) 
Herbert Schrayschuen 
Heron Power Electronics Company 
Indiana Energy Association 
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners293 
Industrial Customer Organizations (Industrial Customers)294 
Information Technology Industry Council 
Infrastructure Masons, Inc. (Infrastructure Masons) 
Institute for Progress 
International Energy Credit Association 
Invenergy295 
 
293 Indicated PJM Transmission Owners include:  AEP on behalf of Appalachian 
Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, Kentucky Power Company, 
Kingsport Power Company, Ohio Power Company, Wheeling Power Company, AEP 
Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Indiana Michigan Transmission 
Company, Inc., AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc., AEP Ohio Transmission 
Company, Inc., and AEP West Virginia Transmission Company, Inc.; AMP 
Transmission, LLC; City of Cleveland, Department of Public Utilities, Division of 
Cleveland Public Power; City of Hamilton, OH; Dominion Energy Services, Inc. on 
behalf of Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia; Duke 
Energy Corporation on behalf of its affiliates Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., Duke Energy 
Kentucky, Inc., and Duke Energy Business Services LLC; Duquesne Light Company; 
East Kentucky Power Cooperative; Exelon Corporation, on behalf of Atlantic City 
Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison 
Company, Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc., Delmarva Power & Light 
Company, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac Electric Power Company; FirstEnergy 
Service Company, as agent for its affiliates American Transmission Systems, 
Incorporated, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic Interstate 
Transmission LLC, Keystone Appalachian Transmission Company, The Potomac Edison 
Company, Monongahela Power Company and Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line 
Company; Old Dominion Electric Cooperative; PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; 
Rockland Electric Company; Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.; UGI Utilities 
Inc; and Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. 
294 Industrial Customers include:  The Industrial Energy Consumers of America, 
the American Forest & Paper Association, the PJM Industrial Customer Coalition, and 
the Coalition of MISO Transmission Customers 
295 Invenergy includes:  Invenergy Wind Development North America LLC, 
Invenergy Solar Development North America LLC, and Invenergy Thermal Development 
Holdings LLC.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 86 - 
Iron Mountain Data Centers, LLC 
ISO New England, Inc. 
ITC Holdings Corp. (ITC) 
Jason Miller, on behalf of VEIR Inc. 
Kansas Corporation Commission (Kansas Commission) 
L. Lynne Kiesling  
L.M. Marlowe 
Land Trust Alliance 
Large Public Power Council 
Lauren Hopkins 
LEAN Energy US 
Load Flexibility Parties296 
Long Island Power Authority 
Longroad Energy Holdings, LLC (Longroad) 
Louisiana Public Service Commission 
LS Power Development, LLC (LS Power) 
Maine Office of the Public Advocate 
Maryland Energy Administration  
Maryland Public Service Commission 
Maven Solutions 
MCC Economics and Finance  
Meta Platforms, Inc. 
Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel 
Microsoft, Inc. (Microsoft) 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. 
MISO Transmission Owners (MISO TOs)297  
 
296 Load Flexibility Parties include:  Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC d/b/a 
CPower, Enel North America, Inc., and Voltus, Inc. 
297 MISO TOs include:  Ameren Services Company, as agent for Union Electric 
Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri, Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois and 
Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois; American Transmission Company LLC; Big 
Rivers Electric Corporation; Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Citizens 
Electric Corporation; City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power LLC; 
Cooperative Energy; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Duke Energy Business Services, 
LLC for Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; East Texas Electric Cooperative; Entergy Arkansas, 
LLC; Entergy Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi, LLC; Entergy New Orleans, LLC; 
Entergy Texas, Inc.; Great River Energy; GridLiance Heartland LLC; Hoosier Energy 
Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis Power 
& Light Company d/b/a AES Indiana; Lafayette Utilities System; MidAmerican Energy 
Company; Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Montana-Dakota 
Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC; Northern States Power

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 87 - 
Mississippi Public Service Commission 
Missouri Public Service Commission 
Monitoring Analytics, LLC, acting in its capacity as the Independent Market Monitor for 
PJM 
Nathan Peterson 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
National Congress of American Indians 
National Grid PLC (National Grid)298 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) 
Nebraska Power Review Board (Nebraska Board) 
New England States Committee on Electricity 
New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners 
New England Consumer-Owned Systems299  
New England Public Systems300 
 
Company, a Minnesota corporation, and Northern States Power Company, a Wisconsin 
corporation, subsidiaries of Xcel Energy Inc.; Northwestern Wisconsin Electric 
Company; Otter Tail Power Company; Prairie Power, Inc.; Republic Transmission, LLC; 
Southern Illinois Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (d/b/a 
CenterPoint Energy Indiana South); Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; 
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc 
298 National Grid submitted comments behalf of its affiliates Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corporation; New England Power Company; New England Electric Transmission 
Corporation; New England Hydro-Transmission Corporation; New England Hydro-
Transmission Electric Company, Inc.; and Massachusetts Electric Company. 
299 New England Consumer-Owned Systems include:  Belmont Municipal Light 
Department, Block Island Utility District, Braintree Electric Light Department, Concord 
Municipal Light Plant, Danvers Electric Division, Georgetown Municipal Light 
Department, Groveland Electric Light Department, Hingham Municipal Lighting Plant, 
Hudson Light & Power Department, Littleton Electric Light & Water Department, 
Merrimac Municipal Light Department, Middleborough Gas & Electric Department, 
Middleton Electric Light Department, North Attleborough Electric Department, Norwood 
Municipal Light Department, Clear River Electric & Water District, Rowley Municipal 
Lighting Plant, Stowe Electric Department, Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant, Town of 
Wallingford, Connecticut Department of Public Utilities Electric Division, Westfield Gas 
and Electric Light Department, and Mid-Coast Regional Redevelopment Authority. 
300 New England Public Systems include:  Connecticut Municipal Electric 
Cooperative, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, and Vermont

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 88 - 
New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (New Mexico Commission) 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO) 
New York State Department of State Utility Intervention Unit (NY UIU) 
New York Public Service Commission (New York Commission) 
New York State Reliability Council (NY State Reliability Council) 
New York Transmission Owners (NYTOs)301 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
North Carolina Utilities Commission 
North Carolina Utilities Commission Public Staff 
North Dakota Public Service Commission 
Northeastern Rural Electric Membership Corporation 
NRG Energy, Inc. 
Office of the Illinois Attorney General (Illinois AG) 
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
Oklo Inc. (Oklo) 
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (ODEC) 
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC 
ON Energy Storage, Inc. 
OpenAI Inc. 
Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle) 
Organization of MISO States, Inc. (OMS) 
Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI) 
Paces AI Inc. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
Paige Lambermont, on behalf of Competitive Enterprise Institute 
Paul Statchen 
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
Pew Charitable Trusts Energy Modernization Project 
PJM Interconnection, LLC 
Power for Tomorrow 
PPL Corporation302 
 
Public Power Supply Authority. 
301 New York Transmission Owners include:  Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corporation, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., New York Power 
Authority, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 
(d/b/a National Grid), Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Long Island Power Authority, 
and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. 
302 PPL Corporation submitted comments on behalf of the PPL Companies, which

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 89 - 
Prime Mover Institute 
PSEG Companies (PSEG)303 
Public Citizen, Inc. 
Public Interest Organizations (PIOs)304 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s Office of the Federal Energy Advocate (Ohio  
FEA) 
R Street Institute (R Street) 
Rewiring America 
MCC Economics Ltd. 
RWE Clean Energy, LLC 
Sarah McKinley 
Shell Energy North America (US), L.P. 
Sierra Club 
SMA Solar Technology AG 
Solar Energy Industries Association 
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff 
South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (South Dakota Commission) 
Southeast Public Interest Organizations (Southeast PIOs)305 
Southern California Edison Company (Southern California Edison) 
Southern Companies306 
Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Southwest Power Pool, Inc. 
 
include PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, Louisville Gas & Electric Company and 
Kentucky Utilities, and The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a Rhode Island Energy. 
303 PSEG Companies include:  Public Service and Gas Company, PSEG Power 
LLC, and PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, which are each wholly-owned, direct 
or indirect subsidiaries of Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated. 
304 PIOs include:  Clean Air Task Force, Inc., Coalition for Affordable Utility 
Services and Energy Efficiency in Pennsylvania, Earthjustice, Environmental Defense 
Fund, Montana Environmental Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Sustainable FERC Project, Sierra Club, and Southern Environmental Law Center. 
305 Southeast PIOs include:  Southern Environmental Law Center, Appalachian 
Voices, North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, South Carolina Coastal 
Conservation League, and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy. 
306 Southern Companies include:  Georgia Power Company, Alabama Power 
Company, and Mississippi Power Company.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 90 - 
Southwest Power Pool Transmission Owner Group307 
Splight Inc. (Splight) 
State Entities308 
Steel Manufacturers Association 
Switch, Ltd. (Switch) 
Talen Energy Corporation (Talen) 
Terraflux LLC (Terraflux) 
Tesla, Inc. 
Texas Blockchain Council 
Thermal Battery Alliance 
Tract Holding Company I, LLC (Tract) 
Transmission Access Policy Study Group (TAPS) 
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. (Tri-State) 
Travis Fisher, on behalf of Cato Institute 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Chamber of Commerce) 
U.S. Energy Storage Coalition 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking  
Members309 
U.S. Representatives310 
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
U.S. Senators311 
 
307 Southwest Power Pool Transmission Owner Group includes:  American 
Electric Power Service Corporation, Evergy Kansas Central, Inc., Evergy Metro, Inc., 
Evergy Missouri West, Inc., Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company, and Xcel Energy 
Services Inc., on behalf of Southwestern Public Service Company. 
308 State Entities include:  Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, the Arizona 
Attorney General’s Office, the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, the Connecticut 
Office of Consumer Counsel, the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, the Minnesota 
Attorney General’s Office, the Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, the New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate, the Oregon 
Attorney General, and the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. 
309 Submitted by Frank Pallone, Jr. (Ranking Member) and Kathy Castor (Ranking 
Member, Subcommittee on Energy). 
310 The U.S. Representatives that submitted comments include:  Suhas 
Subramanyam, John W. Mannion, Mike Quigley, and Donald S. Beyer Jr. 
311 The U.S. Senators that submitted comments include:  Edward J. Markey,

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 91 - 
U.S. Senator Jon Ossoff 
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
Vantage Data Centers (Vantage) 
Verrus 
Virginia State Corporation Commission 
Vistra Corp. (Vistra) 
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission 
WIRES 
Wisconsin Electric Company  
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation  
 
Chris Van Hollen, Elizabeth Warren, Peter Welch, Raphael Warnock, Richard 
Blumenthal, and Adam B. Schiff.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.  
 
  Docket No. EL26-69-000 
 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
LS Power Grid New York Corporation I 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation  
New York Transco LLC 
NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation    
 
(Issued June 18, 2026) 
 
SWETT, Chairman, concurring 
 
1. 
Today, we take historic action to push our country’s electric markets and economy 
into the future—a future of fair cost allocation, unprecedented transparency for the 
American ratepayer, respect for states’ rights, efficient markets and speed to power.  Last 
October, Secretary Wright articulated the monumental, generational and “urgent” 
challenge FERC must solve for our country when he directed us to develop “reforms to 
ensure the timely and orderly interconnection of large loads to the transmission system.”1  
I strongly agree.  And now, through this suite of six orders, we deliver.     
2. 
Simply put, the show cause orders the Commission issues today to each of the six 
electric markets subject to its jurisdiction find that the status quo across much of the 
country is not good enough.2  Nowhere close.  The record prompted by the Secretary’s 
 
1 Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) Interconnection of Large 
Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); see Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy 
(Oct. 23, 2025) (Secretary’s Letter). 
2 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026) (CAISO); ISO New 
Eng. Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61.215 (2026) (ISO-NE); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 
195 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2026) (MISO); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,216 
(2026) (NYISO); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) (PJM); Sw. 
Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2026) (SPP) (collectively, Orders to Show 
Cause).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 2 - 
ANOPR leaves no doubt that most of the markets (and their existing rules) are inherently 
slow and prohibitive of the dexterity necessary to adapt to and power societal evolution—
whether brought about by technological innovation or sustaining the great industrial 
economy that anchors America.     
3. 
I wholeheartedly, fully concur with these orders, which we carefully crafted to 
execute upon the problems the Secretary identified in a manner that is quick, efficient, 
and legally durable.  I write separately to highlight certain considerations underlying the 
Commission’s procedural approach to delivering on the ANOPR and to today’s orders.   
4. 
Based on my analysis of the extensive record and numerous ongoing substantive 
stakeholder interactions, I have determined that the most productive way to “build upon 
the[] principles”3 in the ANOPR and “work expeditiously”4 towards a solution is to issue 
individualized orders to show cause to each market.5  That is so for two main reasons. 
5. 
First, the record the Commission collected in response to the challenges identified 
in the ANOPR and subsequent resulting developments indicate that an approach that 
honors the ANOPR principles but accounts for widening regional variation may now be 
more efficient than a one-size-fits-all rule.6  The world has changed a great deal since last 
October.  The ANOPR itself, including the articulated principles, appears to have shifted 
the playing field and prompted great progress across several electric markets.  This 
change (and the Commission’s alignment with the Secretary) is well illustrated by a 
 
3 Secretary’s Letter at 2. 
4 Id. 
5 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (“[A]n administrative 
agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or individual order.  To insist upon 
one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. . . . [T]he 
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one 
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Wis. Gas 
Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is a well-settled principle of 
administrative law that the decision whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication 
lies within the broad discretion of the agency.”). 
6 “[T]he Commission may rely on ‘generic’ or ‘general’ findings of a systemic 
problem to support imposition of an industry-wide solution.”  Interstate Nat. Gas Ass’n 
of Am. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).  However, 
the Commission “has long allowed different regional transmission organizations to 
follow different rules, in recognition of regional variations including potential differences 
in ‘geographic size and location.’”  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FERC, 138 F.4th 
531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 3 - 
number of landmark orders approving several market new constructs that we issued since 
October, which together operationalize the Secretary’s principles and laid groundwork 
for meaningful reform and today’s actions.7  While working to develop those orders, the 
Commission has simultaneously devoted significant attention to evaluating the various 
procedural paths through which we might comprehensively deliver. 
6. 
Individual show cause proceedings will allow the Commission to ensure that 
solutions to the problems the Secretary identified are tailored to the specific, varied 
circumstances and market constructs of each region.  Indeed, a careful review of today’s 
six orders reveals the many ways in which those orders are customized for each market’s 
unique circumstances and progress (or lack thereof) towards serving large load.  To name 
just a few examples, the orders recognize ongoing stakeholder processes in various 
regions and are adapted to existing tariff provisions concerning large and co-located 
loads; account for regional variances in allocating rights and responsibilities among 
RTOs/ISOs and the transmission owners; leave room for each market to tailor operational 
requirements for large loads that are particular to their region; and otherwise account for 
incumbent regional differences on topics such as cost allocation and cost transparency, 
study processes, and network upgrade procedures. 
7. 
Proceeding via show cause proceedings will also allow the markets (and their 
respective transmission owners) to explain, in the first instance, how to address the 
Commission’s concerns.  These entities have the deepest understanding of their 
respective regions and are best positioned to implement solutions we identified, in the 
most expeditious manner.  The Commission will promptly evaluate their responses to 
today’s orders, and, with input from stakeholders, swiftly establish appropriate reforms.   
8. 
Second, proceeding via individual show cause orders will allow the Commission 
to act more quickly than through traditional rulemaking.  Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking may not capitalize upon individual market progress prompted since October 
and would be unduly time-consuming,8 as it also inevitably would require the additional 
steps of accommodating the regional variations of the approach we take today.  
Rulemaking efforts can be particularly inefficient when, as here, they risk incubating 
uncertainty after progress has begun, and diverting scarce stakeholder resources away 
from other endeavors, such as the development of market-specific reforms submitted to 
the Commission under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA).  (To be clear, we 
very much encourage 205 submissions encapsulating the principles we articulate in the 
206s, and with all due deliberate haste.) 
 
7 See id. P 2 & nn.6-11. 
8 See, e.g., Comments of Talen Energy Corporation, Docket No. RM26-4, at 5-6 
(filed Nov. 21, 2025).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 4 - 
9. 
Furthermore, rulemaking requires a lengthy series of steps before the proposed 
reforms would actually take effect—e.g., a NOPR, then a final rule, then potential orders 
on rehearing, and then a “compliance” process in which affected parties make filings (or, 
more likely, multiple rounds of filings) explaining how they intend to implement the rule. 
By their nature, these procedures take time.  For example, the compliance process for the 
Commission’s Order No. 20239 (which matured out of an ANOPR issued in July 2021 
and a NOPR issued in June 2022) still is not fully complete as of June 2026.  The 
compliance process for Order No. 222210 (NOPR issued in November 2016) could be 
considered completed in May 2026; however, even with that timing, not all of the 
RTOs/ISOs have yet fully implemented their Commission-accepted market rules.  I 
provide these examples not to suggest that the completion of a rulemaking process on the 
interconnection of large loads would take this long,11 but rather to make clear the scope 
of the years-long delays in implementation that might be expected if the Commission 
elected to proceed via a NOPR.  By contrast, we expect that individual show cause 
proceedings for each of the RTO/ISOs will enable the Commission to spearhead lasting 
reform much more expeditiously.   
10. 
The six markets together cover nearly two-thirds of load subject to Commission-
jurisdictional rates, and therefore focusing initially on those regions is a prudent first step.  
But I am under no illusion that the challenges discussed in today’s orders are somehow 
unique to the RTO/ISO regions.  Our actions today do not foreclose the possibility of a 
future rulemaking, and nor do they prevent us from acting on filings made under sections 
205 and 206 of the FPA.  I encourage transmission providers and other stakeholders 
outside RTO/ISO regions to make individual filings to address the issues we discuss 
today. 
 
9 Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order No. 
2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), order on reh’g, 
Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, errata notice, 188 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2024). 
10 Participation of Distributed Energy Res. Aggregations in Mkts. Operated by 
Reg’l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators, Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 
(2020), order on reh’g, Order No. 2222-A, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197, order on reh’g, Order 
No. 2222-B, 175 FERC ¶ 61,227 (2021). 
11 I do not mean to suggest that the public utilities subject to compliance under 
these rulemakings—or the Commission itself—have been derelict.  The time-consuming 
nature of the compliance process is a natural consequence of complex, nuanced efforts 
toward tariff reform.  As Chairman, I will continue to evaluate Commission directives to 
ensure that obligations on regulated entities are not unduly burdensome and to make 
certain that Commission action during the compliance process is as timely as possible.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 5 - 
11. 
FERC is no longer the sleepy, responsive agency of the past—our country cannot 
afford for it to be.  This is a time for the best thinkers we have to collaborate on solving 
our biggest problems, and thus it is my great honor to deliver a solution that honors the 
Secretary’s goals.  For these reasons, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
________________________ 
Laura V. Swett 
Chairman

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
  
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 
 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
LS Power Grid New York Corporation I 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation  
New York Transco LLC 
NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation   
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
 
 
(Issued June 18, 2026) 
 
ROSNER, Commissioner, concurring:  
 
1. 
The electric industry is in the midst of changes not seen in a generation.  
Compared to more traditional load growth, the large loads seeking to connect to the grid 
today are larger, sometimes by orders of magnitude, and more concentrated.  They also 
exhibit different operational characteristics, such as the ability to quickly change their 
energy consumption, sometimes in seconds.  Often, these large loads seek to connect to 
the grid as quickly as possible.  And because of these dynamics, large loads are rapidly 
driving the need for new transmission infrastructure and energy supply.  This creates new 
challenges that, if unaddressed, could jeopardize the reliability and affordability of the 
grid on which we all depend. 
2. 
Today, we are taking an important step toward addressing these challenges.  We 
are opening a dialogue with each of the six RTO/ISOs on a series of reforms that are 
tailored to address the unique reliability and affordability challenges posed by large load 
growth and the infrastructure buildout needed to serve dramatically growing demand.  
Informed by the record developed in response to the Secretary of Energy’s October 2025 
ANOPR,1 and by innovative proposals that stakeholders have filed with the Commission 
under FPA section 205, today’s orders are aimed at ensuring that the grid remains reliable 
and affordable for all customers, especially residential customers.  It is also crucial that 
 
1 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, Direction that the 
Commission Initiate Rulemaking Procedures and Proposal Regarding the Interconnection 
of Large Loads Pursuant to the Secretary’s Authority Under Section 403 of the 
Department of Energy Organization Act (Oct. 23, 2025).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 2 - 
we unlock the immense economic opportunity that once-in-a-generation growth 
represents.  While each order’s specific focus varies according to the progress that each 
RTO/ISO has made, our actions today fit broadly into four key pillars that, taken 
together, provide a foundation for durable reform.  Today, we are: (1) Protecting 
Consumers, (2) Safeguarding Reliability, (3) Enhancing Transparency, and (4) Fostering 
Innovation (see Figure 1).  I write separately to explain how. 
***** 
3. 
Protecting Consumers:  Today’s orders include key protections that promote 
affordability.  First, today’s orders require “Cost Recovery Agreements”, which are 
designed to ensure that large loads pay their fair share of the costs incurred to serve them, 
regardless of whether the large load comes online as planned.  Thus, if new infrastructure 
is built to accommodate a data center, and that data center doesn’t show up, residential 
customers are not left on the hook to pay the costs.  Cost Recovery Agreements prevent 
those costs from being shifted to residential customers.  Depending on how they are 
structured, Cost Recovery Agreements can also address the potentially uneven pacing of 
new infrastructure costs, where grid upgrade costs may hit customer bills before the large 
load is fully online and energized.  Data centers have committed to paying their own 
way.2  Today, with “Cost Recovery Agreements,” we are taking steps to ensure that those 
commitments are honored.  I note, however, that the door remains open to other creative, 
regionally-specific ideas to protect consumers.  If there are other ways to accomplish that 
goal, I welcome those proposals. 
4. 
Another win for consumers is requiring RTO/ISOs to consider grid enhancing 
technologies (GETs), including dynamic line ratings, when adding new large loads to the 
grid.  GETs are technologies that squeeze more juice out of the existing grid, reducing the 
need for expensive upgrades and speeding up the time connect.  Ensuring that RTO/ISOs 
consider GETs in the planning process—and if GETs are not used, explain why—not 
only helps new large loads get connected more quickly, but is also a commonsense step 
towards saving all consumers money.  Put differently, today’s orders will help us 
understand if we are leaving efficiencies on the table, an outcome we cannot afford. 
5. 
Safeguarding Reliability:  Today’s orders safeguard reliability.  They help ensure 
that RTO/ISOs use study procedures and operational requirements that reflect large 
loads’ unique characteristics and the reliability impacts of connecting them to the grid.  
Those novel characteristics and reliability impacts are well-documented, and it is not 
clear if existing study procedures or operational requirements account for them.  Clear, 
comprehensive, and specifically tailored study procedures and operational requirements 
 
2 See Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 3 - 
are needed, such as enhanced data reporting and telemetry to increase visibility into how 
these loads interact with the grid, and today’s orders represent progress towards this goal. 
6. 
Finally, although not part of today’s orders, I want to highlight NERC’s ongoing 
efforts to establish registration criteria for large computational loads and to develop 
reliability standards.3  NERC’s goal is to finish the first phase of this critical work this 
year.  It is essential that NERC meet this deadline.  I encourage all stakeholders to 
participate in NERC’s process. 
7. 
Enhancing Transparency:  Today’s orders provide regulators—the Commission 
and, critically, our state partners—and customers with data on how connecting large 
loads to the grid affects bills.  Today’s orders embody a commonsense approach: if a  
Network Upgrade is built to connect a large load to the grid, consumers should know who 
that upgrade was built for and what it cost. 
8. 
Transparency is important because “who pays?” has been and continues to be a 
fraught and contentious question for large load interconnection.  Stakeholders, including 
state regulators and the ratepayers that they represent, must know the costs, for whom 
they are being incurred, and how they are being allocated, to know that everyone is 
paying their fair share.  Today’s orders ensure that this information is public, accessible, 
and clear.  State regulators in more than half of the country have enacted large load 
tariffs.4  Our action today helps them as they continue their critically important work. 
9. 
The Commission’s action today also addresses speculative load interconnection 
requests, which clog up load interconnection queues, divert resources, and distort 
forecasts.  Under current rules, data centers can (and are incentivized to) “shop around” 
their prospective projects with different utilities to identify the fastest and cheapest 
location to connect.  This wastes time and resources studying projects that are not real.  
Worse yet, it can inflate expected load growth by modeling projects that do not 
materialize, leading to double counting, inaccurate market signals, and unnecessarily high 
prices for consumers.  Today, we target speculative projects by establishing escalating 
readiness requirements for distinct phases of the study process to deter duplicative or 
speculative requests for transmission service.  I strongly encourage RTO/ISOs to pursue 
other improvements to load forecasts, such as using objective screening criteria like 
 
3 NERC, Large Loads Action Plan Q1 2026 Update (Apr. 2026), 
https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/initiatives/large-loads-action-plan/llap-quarterly-
update-q1-2026.pdf. 
4 See, e.g., National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
Supplemental Comments at 2-6; Edison Electric Institute Supplemental Comments at 
App. 9-13.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 4 - 
physical site control, to ensure that the data used to plan the grid is as accurate as 
possible.5   
10. 
Fostering Innovation:  As I have said, to meet the moment, “a business-as-usual 
approach . . . will not suffice.”6  Building new infrastructure is difficult and costly, which 
delays efforts to connect large loads to the grid quickly, reliably, and cost effectively.  
This is doubly true when generation and load are planned and studied separately.  
Today’s orders push beyond this status quo. 
11. 
First, today’s orders promote flexible transmission services—that is, non-firm 
service to a co-located load that is willing and able to limit withdrawals from the grid—in 
every RTO/ISO (see Figure 2).  As we explained when we first created these 
transmission services in PJM for co-located loads, customers willing to embrace 
flexibility can reduce the need for Network Upgrades and generating capacity to serve a 
co-located load, which speeds up connecting to the grid and reduces costs for the co-
located load as well as other retail customers. 
12. 
Second, today’s orders recognize that extending these same transmission services 
to large loads that are not co-located but that may also be willing to limit their 
withdrawals from the grid can unlock even more efficiency.  Just as for co-located loads, 
legalizing flexible transmission service options for more large load customers can speed 
interconnection, avoid constructing unnecessary transmission upgrades, reduce strain on 
the grid, and make power bills cheaper for everyone. 
13. 
Finally, today’s orders embrace yet another innovation.  Load and generation need 
not be co-located to reduce the number of Network Upgrades; in other words, literal co-
location is not the only way to facilitate faster, more efficient, and more cost-effective 
connections to the grid.  Rather, where a large load and an associated generator are 
electrically proximate (i.e., close together) and studied together, the reliability impacts on 
the grid may be more limited than if the load and generator are studied separately.  Just 
like with co-location, more limited impacts on the grid mean, all else equal, fewer 
Network Upgrades, which makes connecting to the grid faster, more efficient, and 
cheaper for both the large load and the associated generator.  That last point is key.  To 
add new supply to the grid, we must create incentives for “Bring Your Own New 
Generation.”  Today’s orders make BYONG faster and more efficient.  
 
5 See Comm’r David Rosner, Letter to the RTOs/ISOs on Large Load Forecasting 
(Sept. 18, 2025), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/chairman-rosners-letter-
rtosisos-large-load-forecasting.  
6 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2026), (Rosner, Comm’r, 
concurring) at P 3.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 5 - 
14. 
SPP has been a leader in showing how to push beyond the status quo.  With its 
innovative HILLGA proposal, approved by the Commission in January,7 SPP leveraged 
the opportunity for speed and efficiency by studying load and generation together, and by 
creating a limited, expedited interconnection service to connect faster.  By matching the 
generator’s output to the electrically proximate large load’s demand, the impacts to the 
grid are less than they otherwise would be, minimizing the need for time-consuming and 
costly Network Upgrades needed to connect.  HILLGA is one solution that works for 
SPP, but today’s orders direct other regions to follow SPP’s lead in ways that work for 
them.  Today’s orders add a key tool by ensuring that all RTO/ISOs can study load and 
generation together.  
***** 
15. 
The Commission’s action today is an important step forward, but the Commission 
cannot accomplish this work alone.  States are essential partners in this work.  The 
Commission’s actions here respect the long-standing jurisdictional line between federal 
and state authority provided by Congress and repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court.  
States retain exclusive jurisdiction to allocate the costs of FERC-jurisdictional 
transmission charges among their retail ratepayers, including co-located loads.  States 
also hold the keys to energy infrastructure permits, so we rely on their decisions to ensure 
that needed transmission and generation get built.  At a time when some large loads are 
retail customers that can consume as much energy as a small city, it is imperative that we 
work within our respective jurisdictions, but that we collaborate. I look forward to 
continued collaboration. 
16. 
Today’s orders begin an important dialogue with RTO/ISOs.  As a potential next 
step, today’s orders invite RTO/ISOs to respond by submitting proposals under FPA 
section 205.  I cannot encourage this enough.  I also encourage public utilities outside of 
RTO/ISOs across the country to do the same.  The electric industry is rapidly evolving 
with regions experiencing and addressing these challenges in different ways.  Many of 
the examples on which the actions in today’s orders are based on stakeholders thinking 
creatively to develop solutions, and I welcome other new, innovative, and regionally 
tailored proposals that build on the four key pillars set forth today:  (1) Protecting 
Consumers, (2) Safeguarding Reliability, (3) Enhancing Transparency, and (4) Fostering 
Innovation.  Only by working together can we rise to the occasion and meet this once-in-
a-generation moment to deliver the reliable and affordable energy on which we all 
depend.  It will not be easy, but I remain optimistic and look forward to the path ahead. 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
7 See Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2026).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 6 - 
 
________________________ 
David Rosner 
Commissioner

Figure 1

Figure 2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
LS Power Grid New York Corporation I 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation  
New York Transco LLC 
NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation   
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
 
 
(Issued June 18, 2026) 
 
SEE, Commissioner, concurring:  
 
1. 
Growing electricity demand underscores America’s economic strength and the 
opportunities that come with it.  And with new opportunities come new challenges.  The 
pace and scale of emerging large loads create new circumstances that require us to adapt 
in how we build and manage the grid.  Large and flexible loads can materially change 
system operations, for instance, as well as near-term planning needs, upgrade 
requirements, and how we allocate costs.  Most existing systems were not designed to 
accommodate those changes—especially not at the pace needed to support AI growth and 
advanced manufacturing that are central to America’s economic competitiveness.  As a 
result, uncertainty over the operative rules and delays in interconnecting large loads can 
undermine reliability and investment and add unacceptable and avoidable costs.  
2. 
Today, the Commission takes strong action within our jurisdictional sweep to 
address these and other challenges that large load growth poses to the interstate 
transmission system.  Today’s orders support both just and reasonable rates and speed to 
(reliable) power.  I’m deeply grateful for the many commenters who shared their insight 
and ideas in this action.  They let us build a record that highlights the need for clearer 
processes, better information, and faster analysis while our country moves new large load 
additions online.  As we press forward in these dockets, I will be looking to continue 
building on the momentum already underway across the country to craft more practical, 
region-specific solutions that support timely action while protecting consumers.  Our 
continued ability to deliver reliable and affordable electricity requires nothing less.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 2 - 
3. 
Today’s orders speak for themselves.  I write separately to briefly highlight two 
principles baked throughout them and that I believe must remain central as the 
Commission evaluates further steps.   
4. 
First, these issues extend beyond the Commission.  Creating efficient, predictable 
large load interconnection processes is a joint and overlapping task for us, other federal 
agencies, the States, and the RTOs/ISOs and utilities.  My animating principle here is that 
we must use FERC’s statutory authority to bring clarity to the parts of this national issue 
we own, and to complement and aid others as they tackle theirs.  The very procedure the 
Commission deploys today reflects that goal: Recognizing the value in region-specific 
approaches, we are directing individual action in each of the RTO/ISO regions and 
encouraging—strongly—proposals under section 205 of the Federal Power Act from 
transmission providers or other entities that are molded to their unique system needs. 
5. 
Most critically, exercising our authority fully without hamstringing our regulatory 
and industry partners means respecting the States.  States make many of the key decisions 
that affect how we manage large loads.  States bring indispensable expertise over local 
conditions, siting needs, retail structures, and the resource decisions within their borders.  
And they have been hard at work pursuing the retail implications and other State-specific 
concerns that large load interconnection presents.1  All this effort flows from the States’ 
statutorily preserved role in regulating the power system.  Today’s order understands that 
limit—our power “extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by 
the States.”2  It also embraces the value in a statutory lens that views large load issues as 
an area of shared federal-State responsibility.  As we require clear study and operational 
parameters for large load interconnection, we should remember that the nation’s energy 
landscape is not monolithic.  State and regional diversity is a strength, and today’s orders 
know that the best solutions reflect differing system characteristics.  Our action today is 
designed to support further State efforts in this urgent and fast-moving space, not 
override them. 
6. 
Second, affordability must be at the forefront as we protect consumers from 
unnecessary costs in a time of rising demand.  True, the Commission lacks authority over 
all the factors that drive electricity costs at the retail level.  Today’s orders recognize that.  
In response, the orders strive to aid the States in their front-line affordability duties by 
getting into their hands all relevant information about Commission-jurisdictional costs.  
As these matters move forward, I am particularly interested in continued feedback from 
the States on what information they most need to assess cost implications as new loads 
 
1 See EEI Supplemental Comments at Appendix 9 – 13 (listing pending and 
approved State large load tariffs).  
2 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 3 - 
come online.  Are the cost transparency measures we identify today sufficient, or are 
additional or more granular data needed for States to appropriately suballocate 
transmission costs among retail customers?  Tools like alternative cost allocation 
structures, greater clarity in transmission service agreements, accounting for States’ 
large-load-specific tariffs, and direct assignment in appropriate cases may help States 
ensure that retail consumers do not bear costs incommensurate with the benefits they 
receive. 
7. 
Moving to areas where the Commission has a more direct role in ensuring cost 
responsibility, we need to pull all the levers we have to keep rates fair and transparent.  
Today we reaffirm our responsibility to assign jurisdictional costs to the customers who 
drive or benefit from grid upgrades, not shift them onto families and small businesses.  
For instance, today’s orders seek to reduce large-load driven network upgrade costs 
through alternative transmission technologies, or ATTs (also commonly called Grid 
Enhancing Technologies).  In determining how best to meet the needs of this historic 
large load growth, technologies that can improve system capability faster than traditional 
upgrades and at lower costs deserve a hard look.  ATTs may not be the best tool in every 
circumstance, but where they are they can support timely interconnections and avoid 
potentially tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in unnecessary network upgrade costs 
that would otherwise flow into transmission customers’ bills.    
8. 
So our approach today supports continuing the Commission’s policy to roll most 
network upgrade costs—including those in the large load space—into the embedded-cost 
rate most transmission customers pay.  But it includes an asterisk that this policy works 
for ratepayers only so long as we remain committed to pursuing technological 
innovations that keep those costs at a responsible and accountable level.  Today’s order 
thus calls for transmission providers to sufficiently evaluate ATTs to assess if and how 
they can meet large loads’ interconnection needs.  The answer may be yes or no in a 
given case.  But if the transmission provider opts for traditional network upgrades, they 
must demonstrate why ATTs are not feasible or would not result in lower costs or a faster 
timeline for the large load interconnection customer.  In short, the goal is to respect 
transmission providers’ engineering judgments while protecting against upgrade costs 
when ATTs could solve transmission needs faster and with a lower bill.    
9. 
I am also sensitive to novel questions about cost shifting that interconnecting large 
load may present.  Today’s findings on cost recovery agreements between transmission 
owners and Eligible Customers are an important step in mitigating the risks of stranded 
assets if large loads prove speculative.  We are also reducing unnecessary redundancy by 
allowing an Eligible Customer to meet its financial security requirements by relying on 
credit support or other financial security a large load customer may have posted under a 
retail agreement.  As we gain more experience studying transmission service requests on 
behalf of large loads, it may become appropriate to further streamline financial security 
arrangements.  Perhaps, for instance, cost -recovery agreements between a transmission

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 4 - 
owner and a large load customer itself could satisfy an Eligible Customer’s financial 
security requirements.  As we move forward, I’ll be looking to ensure cost-recovery 
agreements contain fair and transparent measures to ensure the right costs get on the right 
bills.  (Relatedly, the discussion about the full nature of transmission-related charges in 
our concurrent PJM Order on Rehearing, Clarification, Compliance, and Paper Hearing 3 
may prove relevant here: Real-world experience with new transmission services for co-
located load may clarify if future action becomes needed to address potential cost shifts 
as Eligible Customers take new transmission services on behalf of large loads.4)   
10. 
More generally, as we gain more experience as an industry and a country in 
getting large loads connected to the grid, I welcome bold proposals to keep affordability 
central.  Large load growth presents a real opportunity to build a stronger, more capable, 
and more reliable electric system that can benefit all ratepayers.  Meeting that opportunity 
at the pace we need and at an acceptable cost requires innovative thinking and fast action.  
I commend the States in their continued work in these areas.  I urge the RTOs and ISOs 
to continue their good work as they respond quickly to today’s orders.  I also remain 
committed to moving forward within the Commission’s statutory zone with clarity and 
decisiveness.  I am proud to support the Commission’s important steps today.  And we all 
have more work ahead.    
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.  
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Lindsay S. See 
Commissioner 
 
3 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2026). 
4 See id. P 456.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
LS Power Grid New York Corporation I 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation  
New York Transco LLC 
NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation   
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
 
 
(Issued June 18, 2026) 
 
CHANG, Commissioner, concurring: 
 
1. 
In a series of orders today, the Commission initiates separate proceedings under 
Federal Power Act (FPA) section 206 to explore the impact of the increasing growth of 
large loads in Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) and Independent System 
Operator (ISO) regions.  The preliminary findings in these orders, and the associated 
proposed reforms to RTO/ISO and transmission owner tariffs, could significantly change 
how loads procure, use, and pay for transmission service, with ramifications for 
RTO/ISO operations, planning, and markets.  I write separately to emphasize the 
importance of building actionable records in these proceedings, particularly with respect 
to our consideration of customer protection, transmission service, and alternative 
transmission technology reforms. 
I. 
Overview of Today’s Orders 
2. 
In each of today’s orders to show cause, the Commission identifies a series of 
issues raised by the ongoing growth of large loads, directs briefing on whether existing 
tariffs remain just and reasonable in light of those developments, and describes possible 
solutions to those issues if the Commission ultimately concludes that the relevant tariffs 
are unjust and unreasonable.  Each order is directed to a specific RTO/ISO and relevant 
transmission owners that play a role in interconnecting large loads to the Commission-
jurisdictional transmission system.  The Commission does not pursue the broad assertion 
of jurisdictional authority contemplated in the Advanced Notice of Proposed

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 2 - 
Rulemaking, which I hope assuages concerns raised by our state colleagues that the 
Commission ought not encroach upon matters properly left to their jurisdiction.1   
3. 
Broadly summarized, each order seeks regional input on a specific list of issues: 
(1) the clarity and consistency of existing rules governing how each RTO/ISO and its 
relevant transmission owners analyze the impact of providing transmission service to 
Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads; (2) whether each RTO/ISO tariff requires 
reforms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among wholesale transmission customers; (3) 
whether each RTO/ISO tariff (other than PJM) requires additional clarity regarding the 
provisions addressing co-located generation and load arrangements; (4) the potential 
extension of new firm and non-firm transmission services to co-located load, load with 
behind the meter generation, and other flexible loads; and (5) the need for reforms, 
modeled on Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s High Impact Large Load Generation 
Assessment concept, to facilitate a process through which a generator may temporarily 
serve a co-located or electrically proximate load until interconnection and transmission 
service is available.  The Commission also invites each region to submit FPA section 205 
filings that can address each issue identified in the orders, thereby resolving the 
Commission’s concerns.   
II. 
The Commission Needs Good Records to Ensure Reasoned Decision-Making   
4. 
I first want to emphasize that the Commission needs active participation from 
interested stakeholders to develop thorough records in each region.  The Commission 
cannot make reasoned decisions about whether reforms might be needed without an 
accurate understanding of the existing processes, which differ by region.  Because the 
Commission is acting via FPA section 206 rather than generically through a rulemaking, 
the issues addressed by these orders will be subject to ex parte restrictions across the 
RTOs/ISO regions, including with our state colleagues whose regulation can and will 
directly affect the individual transmission owners that need to comply with the orders 
issued today.  This will limit the Commission’s ability to engage in informal fact-finding 
and discussions with regional stakeholders, and thus, it is even more essential that the 
record in each region fully reflects the views of all interested parties.   
5. 
Second, I highlight three issues below that will be especially important to the 
success of this effort, and I hope that interested parties will take particular care in helping 
the Commission address those issues.  Importantly, I recognize that the record established 
 
1 I will do my part to ensure that the Commission continues to be a collaborative 
partner to our state counterparts, other federal agencies, and the industry as we seek to 
address this wide-ranging challenge.  Accordingly, I welcome feedback from our state 
colleagues and others if they believe the Commission’s preliminary findings raise 
jurisdictional concerns.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 3 - 
in each RTO/ISO region will (and should) differ, which will allow the Commission to 
ensure any required changes to an RTO/ISO’s tariff are appropriately tailored to that 
region’s needs. 
III. 
The Commission Needs to Pursue Meaningful Customer Protection  
6. 
The FPA is fundamentally a customer protection statute,2 and the Commission has 
an obligation to ensure that the rates that wholesale and transmission customers pay are 
just and reasonable.  Rapid large load growth has strained planning and resource 
procurement processes around the country, as transmission owners, load serving entities, 
and generators accelerate the building of new infrastructure needed to serve these new 
loads.  As we develop the new infrastructure, many have raised concerns about whether 
these costs are being fairly assigned to new and existing customers, whose benefits must 
be commensurate with the costs they pay.  While individual states have been exploring or 
using various approaches to protect retail customers against unjustified cost shifts, the 
Commission to date has not initiated any proactive exploration of how to protect 
wholesale customers against unjustified cost shifts. I am laser-focused on this issue 
because we should not create unjustified costs for consumers in our efforts to connect and 
serve large loads.  
7. 
In today’s orders, the Commission launches an inquiry into whether existing 
RTO/ISO tariffs include adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk of undue cost shifting 
among transmission customers.  To address this risk, the Commission preliminarily 
identifies a two-part solution: (1) that each RTO/ISO post public information about the 
amount of new large loads seeking to connect to the RTO’s/ISO’s transmission system, 
any Network Upgrades identified in the local transmission planning process to serve 
those loads, and the costs of those Network Upgrades; and (2) that each RTO/ISO adopt a 
pro forma cost recovery agreement to help ensure that Eligible Customers serving large 
loads bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide 
transmission service.  I strongly support this effort to provide additional transparency 
regarding jurisdictional transmission service requests and the costs associated with 
providing transmission service to the requesting parties, as the Commission cannot 
effectively execute its statutory responsibilities without sufficient understanding of the 
costs that feed into jurisdictional rates.   
8. 
Exploring how agreements between transmission owners and Eligible Customers 
can protect wholesale customers against cost shifts is important.  However, as I have 
previously explained, bilateral agreements that simply provide transmission revenue 
 
2 See, e.g., Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, 
1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the FPA’s “primary aim is the protection of 
consumers from excessive rates and charges”).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 4 - 
contributions untethered from any assessment of the actual cost of providing transmission 
service induced by individual large loads may be insufficient to adequately protect other 
customers against unjustified cost shifts.3  It is therefore important that the resulting 
regulatory and rate design are not limited to a pre-defined solution set, and that parties 
provide the Commission with comprehensive records outlining various and innovative 
approaches to protect customers.  I am encouraged by the continued development of the 
ANOPR record on this subject,4 innovative solutions being developed at the state level,5 
and a growing body of thoughtful analyses and proposed approaches to provide customer 
protection for costs driven by large load growth.6  Without prejudging any particular 
proposed solution, the Commission needs a robust record in each docket and each region 
to ensure we establish the right cost shift protections for wholesale customers, including 
but not limited to the commitments outlined in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.7   
9. 
I support initiating our own review of customer protection approaches, rather than 
simply relying on voluntary commitments that may fall short of optimal protection, 
because the Commission has the opportunity and obligation to get this issue right.  I 
therefore encourage interested parties to assist the Commission in that effort by clearly 
and comprehensively explaining the benefits and tradeoffs of alternative customer 
protection approaches.  How power infrastructure costs will be assigned across Eligible 
 
3 E.g., PECO Energy Co., 193 FERC ¶ 61,148 (2025) (Comm’r 
Chang, concurring); Commonwealth Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2026) (Comm’r 
Chang, concurring). 
4 E.g., Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Trans. Sys., Supplemental 
Comments of FirstEnergy Svc. Co., Docket No. RM26-4-000 (filed June 5, 2026); id., 
Comment of the Harvard Electricity Law Initiative, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Apr. 15, 
2026); id., Supplemental Comments of WIRES, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Mar. 30, 
2026). 
5 E.g., Utility Dive, Microsoft seeks Nevada tariff to shield ratepayers from data 
center costs (June 8, 2026), available at https://www.utilitydive.com/news/microsoft-
seeks-nevada-tariff-to-shield-ratepayers-from-data-center-costs/822250/. 
6 E.g., Travis Kavulla, How Will Data Centers Pay for Power?, American Affairs 
(may 2026), available at https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2026/05/how-will-data-
centers-pay-for-power/ ; Electricity Customer Alliance, A Customer-Centric Agenda for 
the Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n (Jan. 2026), available at https://lnkd.in/em-apfuQ; 
Grid Strategies, Federal Transmission Pricing Vol. 2, Options for Ensuring Affordability 
in an Era of High Load Growth (June 2026), available at 
https://gridstrategiesllc.com/project/federal-transmission-pricing.  
7 Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 5 - 
Customers that serve large loads and other customers is at the core of the efforts we 
initiate today.       
IV. 
The Commission Needs to Understand the Implications of Extending New 
Transmission Services to Additional Loads and Regions 
10. 
The orders also preliminarily find that the Commission should extend the 
transmission services developed in the PJM co-location proceeding – Interim NITS, Firm 
Contract Demand, and Non-Firm Contract Demand – to new types of load and new 
regions.  These new transmission services represent a fundamental paradigm shift from 
the traditional network service and point-to-point transmission service models established 
in Order No. 888 that have been used across the country for the last three decades.  While 
these services have the potential to facilitate more efficient use and build out of the 
transmission system, they also contemplate running the system “tighter” than we have 
done in the past, potentially with more loads on the system served by co-located or 
behind-the-meter generation, and potentially more use of batteries, load control systems, 
and backup resources to manage demand during system peaks or other stressed 
conditions.  While it is important to identify innovative solutions that can adapt to the 
needs of the system, the Commission and grid operators must also be careful not to 
implement changes that create unforeseen reliability risks.  Ultimately, we must find the 
proper balance (and I would argue we are exploring a new balance) between costs of 
investments versus reliability.   
11. 
The Commission’s experience in the PJM co-location proceeding highlights the 
complexities and challenges of introducing these new transmission services, which have 
significant ramifications for system operations, transmission planning, grid reliability, 
market dispatch, resource adequacy, and cost allocation.  As the Commission considers 
whether to expand these transmission services to new types of load and new regions, I 
encourage commenters to address what impacts the introduction of new firm and non-
firm transmission products would have in their regions, as well as any relevant 
characteristics that might distinguish their regions from the Commission’s findings in the 
PJM co-location docket.  Ultimately, this topic will have direct long-term impacts on how 
future transmission systems will be planned and configured, how efficiently future power 
markets will operate, and how customers will respond to prices and system needs.  
Therefore, I am specifically interested in understanding how extending the new 
transmission services might affect individual suppliers or customers, as well as how 
existing systems or processes might be affected by these new services.  I am open to 
understanding how these services might be helpful to a region or that they may create 
problems not yet anticipated.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 6 - 
V. 
The Orders Recognize the Importance of Evaluating Advanced Transmission 
Technologies 
12. 
Lastly, today we preliminarily find that each RTO/ISO’s tariff is unjust and 
unreasonable because the tariff lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the 
evaluation of alternative transmission technologies as potential solutions to accommodate 
an Eligible Customer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large load.  
Specifically, it is important for RTO/ISOs and transmission owners to evaluate whether 
alternative transmission technologies are feasible in reducing the cost of transmission 
system upgrades or allow for a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission 
service request.  As many transmission owners have explored various alternative 
technologies in pilot projects,8 it is time to roll out all available technologies to reduce 
risks and costs for customers, as well as help the industry continue to develop new 
technologies that can increase the robustness of our transmission system while protecting 
customers from higher costs. 
VI. 
Conclusion 
13. 
Today’s orders address some of the most consequential issues currently in the 
industry and before the Commission.  I hope that these proceedings provide vehicles 
through which the Commission can provide much-needed clarity and direction, and it is 
imperative that we build strong and comprehensive records on each issue in each region 
 
8 See, e.g., Increasing Mkt. and Planning Efficiency Through Improved Software, 
Effective Congestion Mitigation with Transmission Topology Optimization at Alliant 
Energy and ATC, Docket No. AD10-12-016, available at 
https://www.ferc.gov/media/effective-congestion-mitigation-transmission-topology-
optimization-alliant-energy-and-atc (Alliant and ATC were able to save customers 
approximately $24 million over a 12-month period through the use of topology 
optimization); Pablo Ruiz and Derek Brown, “Reliable and Efficient Congestion 
Mitigation Using Transmission Reconfigurations,” NewGrid and Evergy presentation 
(Oct. 2022)¸ available at https://www.spp.org/Documents/67968/SAG%20Meeting%20 
Materials%2020221007.zip (identifying reconfigurations, had they been implemented, 
which could eliminate 98% of overloads and reduce congestion costs by 85% for 
congestion patterns associated with 10 significant constraints on Evergy’s system); 
Pacific Gas & Electric Press Release, PG&E and Smart Wires Enhance Grid Reliability, 
Capacity for Data Centers in San Jose (May 28, 2025), available at 
https://investor.pgecorp.com/news-events/press-releases/press-release-details/2025/PGE-
and-Smart-Wires-Enhance-Grid-Reliability-Capacity-for-Data-Centers-in-San-
Jose/default.aspx (describing PG&E’s deployment of advanced power flow control 
devices were able to mitigate thermal overloads by up to 34%, enabling an additional 100 
MW of firm power delivery over existing lines at a congested substation).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 7 - 
to inform our decision-making.  I therefore encourage all interested parties to fully 
engage and help the Commission navigate these complex, multi-faceted challenges.  Our 
success will ultimately be measured by our shared ability to deliver reliable and 
affordable power to all customers, to ensure new loads can interconnect in a timely 
fashion while paying their fair share of system costs, and to protect existing customers 
against adverse reliability or economic impacts.   
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.  
 
 
________________________ 
Judy W. Chang 
Commissioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
LS Power Grid New York Corporation I 
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation  
New York Transco LLC 
NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation   
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
 
 
(Issued June 18, 2026) 
 
LACERTE, Commissioner, concurring: 
 
1. 
I support today’s fleet of show cause orders.  We are at an inflection point in the 
history of American energy infrastructure.  The extraordinary and rapid growth of large 
loads in RTOs and ISOs is faster than the current system can handle.  This order charts a 
course for addressing the potential gaps and shortcomings in NYISO’s Tariff that need to 
be resolved to appropriately respond to this growth, as informed by careful review of the 
thousands of pages of comments received in response to the advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANOPR).1  I write separately to underscore my expectation for RTOs and 
ISOs, including NYISO, to timely submit their robust, thoughtful, and region-specific 
proposals to address the concerns that we have preliminarily identified in their respective 
tariffs and agreements.  By harnessing your region-specific expertise and creativity to 
bring tailored solutions to the table, together we can efficiently, reliably, and affordably 
integrate large load, co-located load and generation and/or storage, as well as electrically 
proximate large load onto the transmission system.  I also support the use of alternative 
transmission technologies to unlock every megawatt of existing capacity from our current 
transmission system.  We have the technology.  We should use it now to enable faster 
interconnection of large loads, lower costs to customers, and help prevent cost shifting. 
 
1 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000, (Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); 
see also Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Oct. 23, 2025) 
(Secretary’s Letter).

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 2 - 
2. 
To that end, and in light of our action in today’s orders, I also ask the state public 
utility commissions—whether they have already approved large load retail tariffs, are in 
the process of crafting large load retail tariffs, or have yet to embark on this essential 
tariff design process—to take a hard look and ensure their large load retail tariff 
provisions insulate ratepayers from the negative impacts of data center growth.  
Additionally, I expect NYISO to design proposals in response to this show cause order 
that dovetail with the efforts on the retail side to implement the Ratepayer Protection 
Pledge, protect customers, and ensure that large loads cover the costs they incur to 
integrate with the grid.   
3.  
The stakes here could not be higher and every gambler knows that the secret to 
surviving is knowing what to throw away and knowing what to keep.2  Today’s orders do 
exactly that—adopting thoughtful proposals that position our nation for success, driving 
meaningful change, and rejecting the gridlock, half-measures, and failure to plan that 
have gone on for far too long.  The data center odyssey that we embarked upon first with 
PJM, then SPP, we now aggressively extend to all the RTO/ISO regions.3  Enabling the 
swift and efficient interconnection of large loads to the transmission system while 
maintaining affordability, reliability, commitment to open access, competitive principles 
and cooperative federalism, will only be achieved through consistent, coordinated action 
and persistence.  But without that first step,4 there is no direction, no forward momentum, 
no journey, and no way to arrive at our future destination.  In the show cause orders we 
issue today, the Commission takes a series of long strides towards our ultimate large load 
interconnection destination:  we make preliminary findings that the RTO/ISO tariffs, 
including NYISO, may be unjust and unreasonable and/or unduly discriminatory or 
preferential because they lack features necessary to timely, reliably, and safely 
interconnect and serve new large loads in a way that produces just and reasonable rates. 
4. 
I commend each commentor for their robust and ongoing responses to the 
concerns that Secretary Wright and the Commission raised in the ANOPR proceeding.  
The comments helped us identify the common issues, common solutions, and individual 
differences among the RTOs/ISOs.  We heard a plea for broad flexibility and regionally 
 
2 Kenny Rogers, The Gambler (United Artists Records 1978). 
3 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, 195 
FERC ¶ 61,045 at P 2 (2026) (Order Regarding Intent to Act) (citing PJM Co-Location 
Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217; SPP HILL Order, 194 FERC ¶ 61,031; Commonwealth 
Edison Co., 194 FERC ¶ 61,181 (2026); Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n, 
193 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2025); Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 193 FERC ¶ 61,237 (2025)). 
4 Admittedly, we are further down the road in some regions as compared with 
others.

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 3 - 
tailored solutions.  And we will strive to work towards those solutions, not through top-
down, one-size-fits-all mandates, but through consideration of region-specific proposals.  
And we endeavor to support an appeal for federal policies that build upon rather than 
disrupt current and planned developments, reflecting state and local processes and 
stakeholder efforts.  Through these individually tailored and region-specific show cause 
orders, we are delivering to ensure that our transmission system can accommodate new 
large loads in a timely, safe, and reliable manner.  And, importantly, in a manner that 
ensures benefits and protection for all customers.  Affordability remains a top concern as 
we proceed forward.   
5. 
The collective voices in the ANOPR comments have shaped our decision to issue 
six separate individually tailored and region-specific show cause orders, rather than a 
proposed final rule at this time.  But the success of the next phase of this journey rests 
with you, NYISO, and your stakeholders.  We are directing you to expeditiously bring 
forward for our consideration your novel, region-specific solution(s).  Time is of the 
essence.  By inviting you to proceed under FPA section 205, we are giving you 
significant perks:  the benefits of first wielder of the pen and the relatively capacious 
standard under FPA section 205 that allows us to accept a potentially broad range of 
proposals provided they are shown to be just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.5  We are even giving you flexibility to propose the 
implementation date for your innovative proposals.  But such freedom comes with great 
and concomitant responsibility.   
6. 
This is not a time to be cavalier and dodge the urgent need to meet the moment.  
While this is a long journey, even so, we must continue to move at breakneck pace to win  
the AI race.  So let me be direct.  If you choose not to submit timely, reasonable, non-
discriminatory or preferential, comprehensive, and substantiated proposal(s), as directed 
and as required under our applicable statutes, your deficient response will not go 
unnoticed.  I am prepared to play jurisdictional hardball, if needed.6  This Commission 
 
5 See, e.g., NRG Power Mktg, LLC v. FERC, 862 FERC 108, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(FERC may not employ a rate design that follows “a completely different strategy” than, 
or is “methodologically distinct” from, a proposed rate) (internal quotations omitted); 
Oxy USA, Inc. v. FERC, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that a proposal under 
FPA section 205 “need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most 
accurate”); City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, at 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(comparing the respective authorities of the Commission and public utilities under 
sections 205 and 206). 
6 16 U.S.C. § 824(b); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 17 (2002) (“There is no 
language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale 
market[.]”)) (emphasis in original); id. at 20 (stating that “the FPA authorizes FERC's

Docket No. EL26-69-000 
- 4 - 
has appropriately exercised considerable restraint in asserting the full scope of our 
jurisdiction in these orders.  However, the Commission has very broad jurisdiction over 
transmission that we will not hesitate to utilize as necessary to ensure that we meet our 
objectives in all show cause proceedings, including this NYISO proceeding we initiate 
here.  If we find your Tariff is in fact unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory 
or preferential, any failure on your end to provide a sufficient FPA filing or filings to 
address the large-load-related concerns that we have identified will result in the 
Commission dictating the solutions for you.  I say this not as a threat, but as a statement 
of duty.  While you may not like our remedies—I have often said that the federal 
government generally does not come up with the best solutions—this is an outcome we 
are prepared to pursue given the gravity of the moment and our statutory obligation.  
Notwithstanding our readiness to step in, it greatly benefits everyone for you to come up 
with an approach tailored to your region.  
7. 
I will end my concurrence where I began:  We have heard your concerns, and, let 
me underscore, now is the time for you to heed ours.  This is an extraordinarily 
consequential proceeding.  The stakes for reliability, for affordability, and for the 
American ratepayer could not be higher.  We owe it to the public to get this right.  I look 
forward to reviewing and acting as expeditiously as possible on your responses to this 
show cause order, which I expect will include an FPA section 205 proposal or proposals. 
8. 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
______________________________ 
David LaCerte 
Commissioner 
 
 
 
jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are 
sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer[.]”).