EL26-67-000 · 2026-07-08 · Global Capacity Alliance
Motion to Intervene and Initial Comments of Global Capacity Alliance in response to FERC's 06/18/2026 Show Cause Order
Back to sections and commentaryPDF page 1
Ref: FTM-Arch. FERC-001 Version 1.1
0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System | Docket No. RM26-4-000
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. | Docket No. EL26-67-000
Southwest Power Pool, Inc. | Docket No. EL26-68-000
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. | Docket No. EL26-69-000
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. | Docket No. EL26-70-000
California Independent System Operator Corp. | Docket No. EL26-71-000
ISO New England Inc. | Docket No. EL26-72-000
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTION TO INTERVENE
Pursuant to Rules 211 and 214 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC or Commission) Rules of
Practice and Procedure (18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211 and 385.214), the Global Capacity Alliance (GCA) hereby submits
this Motion to Intervene and Initial Comments in response to the Commission’s June 18, 2026, Section 206 Show
Cause Orders regarding large load integration.
The GCA is a newly organized nonprofit association currently undergoing formal incorporation under Section
501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.1 As stated in its organizational documents, GCA’s purpose is to promote
the common business interests of companies, organizations, and individuals dedicated to resolving the
infrastructure bottlenecks between large electrical loads and grid connections, and to serve as a global standard-
setting and certification organization with respect to the regulation of capacity attribution and front-of-the-meter
(FTM) netting. Membership in the GCA is open to all electricity market stakeholders.
Because no other single party in these proceedings offers this specific standard-setting framework to solve the
large load integration challenge, GCA’s unique perspective is not currently represented on the record, and its
participation is in the public interest. Accordingly, the GCA respectfully requests the Commission grant it
intervenor party status in these proceedings.
II. FRONT-OF-THE-METER NETTING AND THE ATTRIBUTABILITY GAP
While early-energization on non-firm, transitional service is a developing option (e.g. NITS or CHILLS), purely
curtailable connections are commercially challenging for data centers. To mitigate this, developers are exploring
Behind-The-Meter (BTM) configurations, which inadvertently divorce new generation from grid planning, obscures
real-time operations and introduces cost-shifting concerns.
Front-of-The-Meter (FTM) Netting can unlock this market, allowing interim flexible load to firm their service
privately by bringing-your-own-capacity (BYOC, e.g. gas or BESS) while upgrades are built. Both assets are
integrated into grid planning and operating constructs as flexible/non-firm. Co-located but separately metered,
these assets net their capacity benefit to each other through a Transitional Deliverability construct until upgrades
are built, after which, both assets are firm grid participants.
The Required “Netting” Evolution:
When an FTM load and resource are co-located, the grid engine (SCED) does not link them. Because they are
treated independently, the resource’s provided mitigation is socialized to the grid, leaving the load still exposed to
curtailment even while the paired resource is offsetting its impact, MW for MW.
The Problem in Practice: A 100 MW data center and a 100 MW BESS sit at the same substation on separate
meters. During localized congestion, SCED can simultaneously dispatch the BESS to support the grid and curtail
the data center — because it has no mechanism to recognize that one was built specifically to offset the other.
The developer's investment in mitigation is socialized to the grid.
FTM-Netting closes this "attributability gap" using existing market tools, allowing a flexible load to mitigate its
curtailment risk within normal SCED operations through three connected, core principles:
1 V-Wire Inc. is acting as the initial corporate promoter of the GCA.
PDF page 2
Ref: FTM-Arch. FERC-001 Version 1.1
1
•
The Telemetry Shield: Each dispatch interval, the Market Participant (MP) dynamically adjusts the load's
consumption floor via market telemetry to match the paired resource's availability, shielding it from
curtailment if the paired resource is offered. If the resource exhausts or trips, the shield drops.
•
The Post-Operating Day Compliance Ledger: Because the telemetry shield protects the load in real-
time, the regulatory burden shifts to settlement where the MP will be flagged for telemetry deviation. To
settle, the MP submits a standardized three-stream compliance ledger — telemetry, economic, and
performance data — subject to independent third-party verification to eliminate conflicts of interest.
•
Deterministic Scarcity Yielding: The Telemetry Shield manages localized congestion — it is not a
reliability exemption. During system-wide emergencies, the Market Participant deterministically drops the
shield, returning both assets to standard SCED dispatch and curtailment.
Through this framework, FTM-Netting can provide the administrative insulation an RTO requires, translating
complex private commercial sequencing into a standardized, fully auditable asset class that aligns with existing
transmission planning and Open Access Transmission Tariff service rules.
III. THE TECHNICAL AND COMMERCIAL CORE OF FTM-NETTING
While FTM-Netting provides operational telemetry, its commercial engine is the private Capacity Attribution
Contract (CAC), which bridges the gap between initial non-firm energization and completed network upgrades.
This mitigation is essential because non-firm loads face unpredictable 5-minute curtailments. Most large loads
cannot drop load on 5-minute notice. While rare, controlled shedding during system emergencies is possible due
to on-site backup generation, but frequent rapid curtailment events are technically and commercially unviable.
The CAC pairs the load with a co-located resource to solve this operational mismatch, converting an unbankable
risk into a deterministic, project-financeable profile in three distinct ways:
•
Operational Buffering & SLA Protection (The Load): The resource absorbs real-time (5-minute)
curtailment obligations, acting as an operational buffer. This increases uptime, and—if an outage outlasts
the battery's State of Charge (SoC)—provides the load with a predictable "ramp window" to curtail.
•
Creditworthy Counter-Parties: Flexible loads need firmness. Flexible generators need offtake.
•
Insurability: Insurers will not underwrite constant 5-minute RTO curtailment risk. The CAC provides a
multi-hour (e.g., 2-hour) operational buffer for a controlled facility shutdown, converting unpredictable
grid volatility into a quantifiable risk that can be wrapped.
Once network upgrades are complete and the load transitions to firm grid service, the CAC sunsets, freeing the
generator’s capacity to participate fully in the broader wholesale market.
IV. TRANSMISSION PLANNING ALIGNMENT AND GRID RELIABILITY
FTM-Netting requires no changes to existing transmission planning processes. Because the load and the paired
resource are separately metered, they are studied as standard, independent interconnections—fully visible to RTO
planning models and subject to existing constraint analyses. This is demonstrably better than BTM configurations,
where resources can disappear from planning models.
While waiting for network upgrades to be built, both assets operate on a non-firm, flexible construct. Their co-
dependence on these future upgrades is the commercial basis and term length for the CAC. Because this is a
transitional window, both assets operate in an energy-only phase consistent with their interconnection status,
asking nothing of capacity markets they cannot yet fully serve.
Reliability Assurance: The Scarcity Release
During system-wide emergency conditions, RTOs may require FTM-Netting participants to execute a Scarcity
Release, lowering the telemetry shield so both assets see full market dispatch / curtailment. This is not planned
capacity, rather, it is a positive externality of FTM-Netting, activated when the grid’s need is highest.
PDF page 3
Ref: FTM-Arch. FERC-001 Version 1.1
2
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND BENEFITS
FTM-Netting offers a modular framework with universal physics that integrates into current regional market
designs, mapping to existing market mechanisms in each RTO — through demand response registration
frameworks, tariff-mandated consumption ceilings, and load telemetry constructs — without operational IT
updates. Should RTOs wish to pursue FTM-Netting, stakeholder engagement can focus on 3 key areas:
•
Scarcity Yield & Coordinated Curtailment: Standardizing the technical parameters and response time
for a facility to execute a controlled curtailment to onsite backup generation.
•
Co-Optimization of Market Products: Determining how and if a resource can participate in ancillary
service or capacity markets while maintaining shielding obligations.
•
Settlement & Compliance: There are two paths for integration, either RTO-driven verification of software
and ongoing compliance obligations or delegation to an independent Standard-Setting Organization that
develops and manages the standard.
By establishing this separation between universal operational physics and regional market design, FTM-Netting
provides FERC and the RTOs with a pathway for flexible large compute load energization.
The Externalities of FTM-Netting: A System-Level Assessment
By aligning the commercial imperatives of developers with macro-grid operational needs, FTM-Netting delivers
compounding system benefits:
•
Grid Visibility & Reliability: Halts the "BTM Exodus" by keeping new generation visible to RTOs.
•
Ratepayer Benefits: Flexible loads avoid the need to commit expensive generation (e.g., RUCs or MWPs)
and early energization ahead of upgrades increases utilization, lowering average rates.
•
Maximizing utilization of existing infrastructure spreads fixed legacy costs across more MWh, lowering
volumetric rates for all ratepayers.
•
Phantom Load Avoidance: Utilities can safely build long-lead upgrades knowing the triggering load is
already built and operating, reducing stranded-cost risk and simplifying planning.
•
Privately Funded Reliability Infrastructure: To firm their load developers must fund new resources
without ratepayer subsidy that eventually integrate into the market. FTM-Netting requires the tech sector
to privately underwrite the dispatchable capacity the grid needs most.
VI. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the GCA respectfully requests that the Commission grant its Motion to Intervene in
these consolidated proceedings and accord it full party status with all attendant rights.
Furthermore, the GCA urges the Commission to direct the RTOs and ISOs, in responding to the June 18, 2026,
Show Cause Orders, to actively evaluate and incorporate Front-of-the-Meter (FTM) Netting frameworks and
independent standard-setting coordination pathways into their respective compliance strategies. Doing so
ensures that the integration of large, flexible loads supports grid visibility, protects regional ratepayers, and
unlocks privately funded reliability infrastructure.
To assist the Commission and market stakeholders in this effort, the GCA will submit a technical, operational, and
settlement architecture for the FTM-Netting and CAC framework in these dockets in the coming days.
Respectfully submitted,
Jesse Gossett, Interim Executive Director
Dated July 8, 2026
www.globalcapacityalliance.org
Jesse@globalcapacityalliance.org
PDF page 4
Ref: FTM-Arch. FERC-001 Version 1.1
1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official
service list compiled by the Secretary in these proceedings, via the Commission's eFiling system.
Dated at Austin, Texas this 8th day of July, 2026.
______________________________
Jesse Gossett
Jesse Gossett, Interim Executive Director
Global Capacity Alliance