EL26-67-001 · 2026-07-17 · Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate

The Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate submits Request for Clarification or, in the alternative, Rehearing of the 06/18/2026 Order

1 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
) 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.  
) 
 
) 
AEP Appalachian Transmission Company, Inc. 
) 
 
Docket No. EL26-67 
et al.  
) 
 
) 
 
 
 
Request for Clarification 
Or—in the Alternative—Rehearing 
of the 
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate 
 
Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission or FERC), the 
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate (PA OCA)1 respectfully requests clarification—or, in 
the alternative, rehearing—of the Commission’s June 18 Order Instituting Proceeding (Order) 
under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) in Docket No. EL26-67.2 
I. 
Summary of Request for Clarification or Rehearing 
Clarification: 
1. 
The Order proposes pro forma transmission cost recovery agreements. These 
agreements will help solve some—but not all—of the FERC-recognized unjust and 
unreasonable transmission cost shifting caused by large loads. FERC should clarify 
that wholesale cost shifting will occur in a manner that FERC’s proposed cost 
recovery agreements do not fully address because FERC’s proposed agreements 
will simply guarantee collection of revenue contributions under existing cost 
 
1 The PA OCA is an independent state office within the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. Pennsylvania statute 
empowers the PA OCA to represent the interest of utility consumers before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 
FERC, and state and federal courts. 71 P.S. § 309-1 et seq. 
2 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (providing for FPA rehearing requests); 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (providing FERC rules for 
rehearing requests).

2 
allocation methods. However, the unjust and unreasonable cost shifting also results 
from costs being allocated under existing regional cost allocation methods to 
transmission customers not serving large loads. Agreements guaranteeing the 
collection of a revenue contribution from Eligible Customers for Network 
Upgrades needed to serve large loads is untethered from review or consideration of 
the actual cost of providing transmission service induced by individual large loads. 
FERC should clarify that existing regional cost allocation methods result in unjust 
and unreasonable rates when they produce rates where transmission customers not 
serving large loads are paying for Network Upgrades that they do not cause or 
commensurately benefit from.  
2. 
To address the entire wholesale cost-shifting problem, FERC should clarify that 
parties in EL26-67 may develop an actionable record on regional wholesale cost 
allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads. That record should 
not be limited to the cost recovery agreements proposed in the Order but instead 
should encompass all aspects of wholesale transmission cost shifting caused by 
large loads in PJM, including but not limited to the use of expansion rates 
(described further below) and crediting mechanisms. 
In the Alternative, Rehearing: 
3. 
To the extent that FERC denies clarification, the PA OCA respectfully requests 
rehearing because the Order violates the Federal Power Act and Administrative 
Procedure Act. It does so because the Commission—without reasoned 
explanation—fails to remedy a significant part of the unjust and unreasonable cost-

3 
shifting that FERC expressly identified in the Order, by refusing to address regional 
cost allocation. 
4. 
To the extent that FERC denies clarification, or interprets the Order to preclude 
parties from developing an actionable record on regional wholesale cost allocation 
methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads, the PA OCA requests 
rehearing because the Order violates the Federal Power Act and Administrative 
Procedure Act because the Commission, without reasoned explanation, fails to 
permit record development to remedy a significant part of the unjust and 
unreasonable cost-shifting that FERC expressly identified in the Order. 
To effectuate the Order’s express purpose to protect consumers from unjust and 
unreasonable cost shifts,3 FERC should examine regional wholesale cost allocation methods for 
Network Upgrades.4 And to examine regional wholesale cost allocation properly, FERC needs to 
develop a record on that subject.5 By doing so, FERC would further the consumer protection 
 
3 Order, PP 66, 77, 107 (preliminarily finding PJM’s Tariff unjust and unreasonable based on transmission cost shifts 
caused by large loads). 
4 Id. (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at PP 6, 8) (identifying that FERC should examine unjustified cost shifts at the 
wholesale level that result from large loads); Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 25, Interconnection of 
Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Docket No. RM26-4 (Oct. 27, 2025) (proposing that load and 
hybrid facilities should be responsible for 100 percent of the network upgrades assigned to them through 
interconnection studies); Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/ 
(“Companies will pay for all new power delivery infrastructure upgrades required to service their data centers, 
including adequate network upgrade costs to ensure that these expenses are not passed on to the ordinary 
household.”); Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that 
the FPA’s “primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and charges”). 
5 Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8) (“[T]he Commission needs a robust record in each docket and each region 
to ensure we establish the right cost shift protections for wholesale customers, including but not limited to the 
commitments outlined in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge”).

4 
purposes expressed in the Order,6 the ANOPR,7 the FPA,8 and the White House’s Ratepayer 
Protection Pledge.9  
II. 
Statement of Issues 
Requests for Clarification: 
1. 
The PA OCA requests FERC’s clarification that the Order’s pro forma cost recovery 
agreements are partial and nonexclusive solutions to the wholesale transmission 
cost allocation problem. The agreements will help solve some—but not all—of the 
Order’s stated transmission cost shifting problem caused by large loads. This 
clarification should specify the other aspects of wholesale transmission cost shifting 
that are—or may be—caused by Eligible Customers serving large loads. FERC’s 
clarification should specify an additional preliminary conclusion that existing 
regional cost allocation methods may result in unjust and unreasonable wholesale 
transmission cost shifting between Eligible Customers serving large loads and other 
transmission customers because under existing methods other transmission 
customers pay for Network Upgrade costs that they do not cause or 
commensurately benefit from. FERC made a preliminary finding “that PJM’s Tariff 
appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to 
mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, which may result 
 
6 Order, PP 66, 77, 107 (preliminarily finding PJM’s Tariff unjust and unreasonable based on transmission cost shifting 
concerns). 
7 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 25, Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission 
System, Docket No. RM26-4 (Oct. 27, 2025) (proposing that load and hybrid facilities should be responsible for 100 
percent of the network upgrades assigned to them through interconnection studies). 
8 See, e.g., Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the 
FPA’s “primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and charges”). 
9 Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 
4, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/ (“Companies will pay for all 
new power delivery infrastructure upgrades required to service their data centers, including adequate network upgrade 
costs to ensure that these expenses are not passed on to the ordinary household.”).

5 
in unjust and unreasonable rates for transmission service.” Order, P 66. The cost 
recovery agreements address part of this problem, but other aspects of the problem 
remain unaddressed: regional cost allocation methods. As Commissioner Chang 
identified in her concurrence, “bilateral agreements that simply provide 
transmission revenue contributions untethered from any assessment of the actual 
cost of providing transmission service induced by individual large loads may be 
insufficient to adequately protect other customers against unjustified cost shifts.” 
Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8). Thus, FERC should clarify and define 
the unjust and unreasonable wholesale cost-shifting that exists in regional cost 
allocation methods, which may be beyond the scope of the proposed cost recovery 
agreements. 
2. 
The PA OCA requests FERC’s clarification that parties in EL26-67 may develop an 
actionable record on regional wholesale cost allocation methods for Network 
Upgrades caused by large loads. FERC made a preliminary finding “that PJM’s 
Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms 
to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, which may result 
in unjust and unreasonable rates for transmission service.” Order, P 66. FERC 
recognized that the PJM Tariff allocates the costs of Network Upgrades driven by 
large-load interconnections to transmission customers that “neither caused the need 
for nor benefit commensurately from” those upgrades in violation of the Federal 
Power Act (FPA). Order at PP 79, 81. FERC further noted “that there may be a 
variety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts 
associated with Network Upgrades triggered by large loads.” Id. P 107. But the

6 
Order creates ambiguity whether parties can develop an actionable record on PJM’s 
wholesale cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads. 
FERC stated that its “preliminary finding [to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost 
shifting among transmission customers] is not intended to alter or call into question 
existing regional cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades, but instead is 
focused on helping to prevent cost shifting among transmission customers.” Order, 
P 81. Parties could read FERC’s statement in two relevant ways: (1) the 
“preliminary finding is not intended to alter or call into question existing regional 
cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades,” but parties may develop a record 
on this subject—and the Commission may act on it; or (2) the “preliminary finding 
is not intended to alter or call into question existing regional cost allocation methods 
for Network Upgrades,” and FERC has thus foreclosed parties from developing a 
record on this subject. The PA OCA requests clarification that the first reading—
that parties in EL26-67 may develop an actionable record on regional wholesale 
cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads—is correct. 
The PA OCA further requests that FERC disavow the second reading because that 
reading would result in unjust and unreasonable cost allocation among transmission 
customers by ignoring wholesale cost shifts for Network Upgrades that these 
customers neither caused nor commensurately benefit from. 
 
Requests for Rehearing: 
1. 
To the extent FERC does not clarify that the Order’s cost recovery agreements are 
partial and nonexclusive solutions to the wholesale transmission cost allocation

7 
problem—or interprets the Order in a manner that does not sufficiently address the 
unjust and unreasonable transmission cost-shifting problem caused by Eligible 
Customers serving large loads—the PA OCA requests rehearing. In that case, and 
to the extent the Commission’s determinations are final, the Commission’s 
determinations in the Order would violate the Federal Power Act and 
Administrative Procedure Act because they would fail to solve a significant part of 
the unjust and unreasonable cost-shifting that FERC expressly identified, and  
would do so without a reasoned explanation. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over 
wholesale transmission cost allocation. And PJM’s existing rules for wholesale 
transmission cost allocation impose cost shifts from Eligible Customers serving 
large loads to other transmission customers not serving large loads. Thus, 
consumers in Pennsylvania and other states could be stuck with the burdensome 
results stemming from unjust and unreasonable transmission rates if FERC chooses 
to ignore regional cost allocation under the FPA. FERC made a preliminary finding 
“that PJM’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate 
mechanisms to mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, 
which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates for transmission service.” Order, 
P 66. The cost recovery agreements address part of this problem, but other aspects 
of the problem remain unaddressed: regional cost allocation. As Commissioner 
Chang identified in her concurrence, “bilateral agreements that simply provide 
transmission revenue contributions untethered from any assessment of the actual 
cost of providing transmission service induced by individual large loads may be 
insufficient to adequately protect other customers against unjustified cost shifts.”

8 
Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8). It would be arbitrary, capricious, and 
contrary to the FPA for the Commission to find that transmission customers “neither 
caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from” Network Upgrades for large 
loads but fail to remedy the PJM Tariff to correct and prevent the full extent of those 
unjust and unreasonable cost shifts. Thus, the PA OCA requests rehearing to ensure 
that FERC addresses the entire wholesale cost-shifting problem. See Order, PP 79, 
81. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. 
FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 84-87 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (in the electric transmission context, 
“the Commission has ‘clear’ authority to reallocate capacity and production 
costs.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (agency must “examine the relevant 
data and articulate a . . . rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made”); Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(summarizing cost causation and beneficiary pays principles); Mississippi Power 
& Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“States may 
not alter FERC-ordered allocations . . . by substituting their own determinations of 
what would be just and fair.”); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 
165 (2016) (explaining that states may not “second-guess the reasonableness of 
interstate wholesale rates” under FPA). 
 
2. 
To the extent that FERC does not clarify, or denies, that parties in EL26-67 may 
develop an actionable record on regional wholesale cost allocation methods for 
Network Upgrades caused by large loads—the PA OCA requests rehearing. FERC

9 
has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale transmission cost allocation. And PJM’s 
existing rules for wholesale transmission cost allocation impose cost shifts from 
Eligible Customers serving large loads to other transmission customers not serving 
large loads. Thus, consumers in Pennsylvania could be stuck with the burdensome 
results stemming from unjust and unreasonable transmission rates if FERC chooses 
to ignore regional cost allocation for Network Upgrades under the FPA. If FERC’s 
Order does not allow parties to develop an actionable record on unjust and 
unreasonable regional wholesale cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades 
caused by large loads, FERC will have sidestepped its statutory duty and failed to 
provide a reasoned explanation for contradicting the express intent of its Order. It 
would be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the FPA for the Commission to find 
that transmission customers “neither caused the need for nor benefit 
commensurately from” Network Upgrades for large loads but fail to remedy the 
PJM Tariff to correct and prevent the full extent of those unjust and unreasonable 
cost shifts. Thus, the PA OCA requests rehearing to ensure that FERC addresses the 
entire wholesale cost-shifting problem. See Order, PP 79, 81. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b); 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 84-
87 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (in the electric transmission context, “the Commission has 
‘clear’ authority to reallocate capacity and production costs.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (agency must “examine the relevant data and articulate a . . . rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made”); Ill. Commerce Comm’n 
v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009) (summarizing cost causation and

10 
beneficiary pays principles); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. 
Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“States may not alter FERC-ordered allocations 
. . . by substituting their own determinations of what would be just and fair.”); 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 165 (2016) (explaining that 
states may not “second-guess the reasonableness of interstate wholesale rates” 
under FPA). 
III. 
Request for Clarification 
A. 
FERC should clarify that PJM’s existing regional cost allocation results in 
unjust and unreasonable transmission cost shifting for Network Upgrades 
caused by service to large loads and that FERC’s proposed cost recovery 
agreements address a different aspect of unjust and unreasonable cost shifting. 
The PA OCA requests FERC’s clarification that the Order’s pro forma cost recovery 
agreements will help solve some—but not all—of the Order’s stated unjust and unreasonable 
transmission cost shifting caused by the influx of large loads to the grid. Specifically, FERC’s 
proposed cost recovery agreements secure the collection of revenue contributions from Eligible 
Customers serving large loads under existing regional cost allocation methods. FERC’s 
clarification should specify an additional preliminary conclusion that existing regional cost 
allocation methods may result in unjust and unreasonable wholesale transmission cost shifting 
between Eligible Customers serving large loads and other transmission customers, because—under 
existing methods—other transmission customers pay for Network Upgrade costs that they do not 
cause or commensurately benefit from. FERC made a preliminary finding “that PJM’s Tariff 
appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to mitigate the risk 
of cost shifting among transmission customers, which may result in unjust and unreasonable rates 
for transmission service.”10 FERC further identified that these unjust and unreasonable rates burden 
 
10 Order, P 66.

11 
transmission customers that “neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from” 
Network Upgrades for large loads.11 The cost recovery agreements address part of this problem, 
but other aspects of the problem remain unaddressed. 
As Commissioner Chang identified in her concurrence, “bilateral agreements that simply 
provide transmission revenue contributions untethered from any assessment of the actual cost of 
providing transmission service induced by individual large loads may be insufficient to adequately 
protect other customers against unjustified cost shifts.”12 
Unjust and unreasonable wholesale transmission cost shifts from large loads in PJM can 
manifest through unjust and unreasonable cost allocation of both RTEP projects and Supplemental 
Projects, not just by speculative large loads failing to pay their existing share under existing cost 
allocation methods. Indeed, wholesale Network Upgrade cost allocation happens at the regional 
level, under PJM’s Tariff Schedule 12 and Appendix A, and PJM’s Tariff, Section 34.1 and 
Attachment H, as explained below. These PJM Tariff provisions establish cost responsibility 
methods for Network Upgrades for RTEP projects and Supplemental Projects, respectively. 
Accordingly, FERC should examine regional cost allocation for both RTEP projects and 
Supplemental Projects in this proceeding.  
For Network Upgrades designated as Supplemental Projects, PJM’s Tariff, Section 34.1, 
and Attachment H establish rates and cost responsibility for Network Integration Transmission 
Service (NITS). Supplemental Project costs are allocated or assigned within the PJM zone in which 
they are built. Pursuant to the FERC formula rate, the eligible costs of Supplemental Projects are 
included in the transmission owner’s revenue requirement. Attachment H calculates the NITS rate 
(expressed in dollars per megawatt), which is charged to all transmission customers within the 
 
11 Order, PP 79, 81. 
12 Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8).

12 
zone, by dividing the allowable revenue requirement by the zone’s coincident peak demand.13 Each 
network customer taking NITS service is charged the zonal NITS rates by PJM. Pursuant to PJM 
Tariff, Section 34.1, a network customer’s monthly demand rate under the PJM tariff is calculated, 
in part, based on the NITS rates times the customer’s NSPL. 
A state cannot reach beyond its borders to sub-allocate charges that the PJM Tariff assigns 
to transmission customers in other states.14 Similarly, a state cannot protect ratepayers from costs 
of Network Upgrades designated as Supplemental Projects in a PJM Transmission Zone that spans 
more than one state. It appears that the following seven zones include substantial territories in at 
least two states: American Electric Power (AEP), Allegheny Power Systems (AP), American 
Transmission Systems, Inc. (ATSI), Delmarva Power & Light (DP&L), Dominion, Duke Energy 
Ohio and Kentucky (DEO&K), and Potomac Electric Power (PEPCO). These seven multi-state 
Zones comprise 52 percent of PJM’s peak load.15 Two other Zones (EKPC and JCP&L) have small 
protrusions into a second state. Because large loads occupy small geographic footprints, even these 
modest extensions into a second state could enable significant cost shifts that a state commission 
would be incapable of remedying. Thus, across more than half of PJM, retail sub-allocation cannot 
undo cost shifts that have already occurred among transmission customers through the PJM Tariff. 
For Network Upgrades selected through the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan 
(RTEP) process, PJM’s Tariff Schedule 12 and Appendix A include the cost allocation and cost 
responsibility assignments. Under PJM’s Tariff Schedule 12, PJM determines cost responsibility 
for Network Upgrades in a two-step process. First, PJM determines a transmission owner’s zonal 
 
13 Transmission Rate Cases in PJM, David Gardiner and Associates (Feb. 2024), https://www.dgardiner.com/wp-
content/uploads/2024/04/CAPS-DGA_PJM-Transmission-Handbook-Vol-7.pdf.  
14 Cf. Order, PP 70-72 (encouraging state “sub-allocation” without recognizing states’ limits regarding wholesale 
transmission costs). 
15 See PJM Network Service Peak Loads for 2026, PJM (last visited July 17, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/markets-ops/settlements/network-service-peak-loads-2026.pdf.

13 
cost responsibility. To determine a zone’s cost responsibility, PJM sorts RTEP facilities into two 
categories: Regional Facilities or Lower Voltage Facilities. For Regional Facilities, PJM 
determines zonal cost responsibility for RTEP facilities using a hybrid methodology involving a 
50/50 split of each zone’s load factor and distribution factor (DFAX). For Lower Voltage Facilities, 
PJM determines the zonal cost responsibility based solely on the DFAX method. After PJM 
establishes the zonal cost responsibility for the RTEP facilities, PJM then engages in further cost 
allocation to recover the costs from network customers. Specifically, PJM recovers the zonal 
revenue requirement by charging a Transmission Enhancement Charge (TEC) to each network 
customer based on the customer’s network service peak load (NSPL) in the zone. The TEC appears 
as a separate line item on the network customer’s PJM bill. The revenue that PJM collects from 
the network customers is then credited to the transmission owner in the amount equal to the 
transmission owner’s established formula revenue requirement for the subject RTEP facilities.16 
Further, regarding RTEP projects, the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel has filed a 
Complaint under FPA section 206 addressing alleged wholesale cost shifting.17 That Complaint 
alleges that PJM’s Tariff is currently shifting wholesale RTEP costs in an unjust and unreasonable 
manner. Dozens of parties have intervened in that docket, which illustrates the timeliness and 
relevance of wholesale transmission cost allocation in PJM that extends beyond the cost recovery 
agreements’ reach. 
Thus, FERC should clarify and define the unjust and unreasonable wholesale cost-shifting 
that exists beyond the reach of the proposed cost recovery agreements. FERC should clarify in a 
 
16 PJM OATT Sch. 12. In the transmission owner’s formula rates, the transmission owner determines the revenue 
requirement associated with each RTEP project included in its transmission rate base and gives that to PJM to 
determine cost allocation and billing.  The TEC-eligible revenue requirement is excluded from the zonal revenue 
requirement used by the transmission owner to determine the NITS rate. 
17 Amended Complaint, Maryland Office of People’s Counsel v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. EL26-63 
(May 22, 2026), https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_number=20260522-5245.

14 
way that permit parties in this proceeding to develop a record that would support requiring PJM 
and the PJM Transmission Owners to change their cost allocation provisions to account for 
Network Upgrades, including both regional and supplemental projects. 
B. 
FERC should clarify that the Order allows parties to develop a robust, 
actionable record on the entire unjust and unreasonable cost-shifting problem 
within FERC’s authority under the FPA—including regional cost allocation 
methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads. 
The PA OCA requests FERC to clarify that parties can build an actionable record on the 
entire unjust and unreasonable cost shifting problem within FERC’s statutory domain, not just part 
of it. In the Order, the Commission recognized that Network Upgrades driven by large-load 
interconnections to transmission customers can include Supplemental Projects or RTEP projects.18 
FERC has preliminarily identified transmission cost shifts—caused by large loads—as unjust and 
unreasonable,19 given that the costs of Network Upgrades driven by large-load interconnections 
are shifted to transmission customers that “they neither caused the need for nor benefit 
commensurately from.”20  To address the entirety of the unjust and unreasonable cost shifting 
problem, the Commission must examine and remedy the regional allocation methods for Network 
Upgrades caused by large loads—in addition to the cost shifting protections addressed in the 
Commission’s Order. As explained above, wholesale Network Upgrade cost allocation happens at 
the regional, PJM level. 
But there is a source of confusion: in the Order, FERC stated that its “preliminary finding 
[to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifting among transmission customers] is not intended 
to alter or call into question existing regional cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades, but 
 
18 Id. at P 72. 
19 Order, PP 66, 77, 107. 
20 Order at PP 79, 81.

15 
instead is focused on helping to prevent cost shifting among transmission customers.”21 Parties 
seeking to impose large loads’ costs onto everyday ratepayers may try to use FERC’s statement to 
preclude advocates from developing a record on necessary modifications to “existing regional cost 
allocation methods for Network Upgrades.”  
Parties could read FERC’s statement in two relevant ways: (1) the “preliminary finding is 
not intended to alter or call into question existing regional cost allocation methods for Network 
Upgrades,” but parties may develop a record on this subject—and the Commission may act on it; 
or (2) the “preliminary finding is not intended to alter or call into question existing regional cost 
allocation methods for Network Upgrades,” and FERC has thus foreclosed parties from developing 
a record on this subject. FERC should clarify that the first reading is correct. 
Further, FERC should disavow the second reading because that reading would result in 
unjust and unreasonable cost shifting among transmission customers by ignoring wholesale cost 
shifts, as explained below. By rejecting the second reading, FERC would uphold the Order’s 
express consumer protection purposes.22 
Thus, to effectuate the Order’s express purpose to protect consumers from unjust and 
unreasonable cost shifts,23 FERC should examine and remedy PJM’s regional cost allocation 
methods for Network Upgrades.24 And to examine and remedy regional wholesale cost allocation 
 
21 Id. at P 81. 
22 Order, PP 66, 77, 107 (preliminarily finding PJM’s Tariff unjust and unreasonable based on transmission cost 
shifting concerns). 
23 Order, PP 66, 77, 107 (preliminarily finding PJM’s Tariff unjust and unreasonable based on transmission cost shifts 
caused by large loads). 
24 Id. (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at PP 6, 8) (identifying that FERC should examine unjustified cost shifts at the 
wholesale level that result from large loads); Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 25, Interconnection of 
Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 27, 2025) (proposing that load and 
hybrid facilities should be responsible for 100 percent of the network upgrades assigned to them through 
interconnection studies); Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/ 
(“Companies will pay for all new power delivery infrastructure upgrades required to service their data centers, 
including adequate network upgrade costs to ensure that these expenses are not passed on to the ordinary

16 
properly, FERC needs to develop a record on that subject.25 By doing so, FERC would further the 
consumer protection purposes expressed in the Order,26 the ANOPR,27 the FPA,28 and the White 
House’s Ratepayer Protection Pledge.29 
Public participation and reasoned decision-making are cornerstones of federal rulemaking 
in the United States, including within administrative agencies such as FERC.30 Throughout this 
process, FERC should continue to value “the importance of public involvement and transparency 
in its decision-making processes.”31 FERC should do so by allowing parties to develop a robust, 
actionable record on regional cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads. 
And this record should support requiring PJM and the PJM Transmission Owners to change their 
 
household.”); Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that 
the FPA’s “primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and charges”). 
25 See, e.g., New Eng. Power Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 881 F.3d 202, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 2018); La. PSC. V. FERC, 
20 F.4th 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also 
Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8) ([T]he Commission needs a robust record in each docket and each region 
to ensure we establish the right cost shift protections for wholesale customers, including but not limited to the 
commitments outlined in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge”). 
26 Order, PP 66, 77, 107 (preliminarily finding PJM’s Tariff unjust and unreasonable based on transmission cost shifting 
concerns). 
27 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 25, Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission 
System, Docket No. RM26-4-000 (Oct. 27, 2025) (proposing that load and hybrid facilities should be responsible for 
100 percent of the network upgrades assigned to them through interconnection studies). 
28 See, e.g., Mun. Light Bds. Of Reading and Wakefield v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the 
FPA’s “primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and charges”). 
29 Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 2026); Ratepayer Protection Pledge, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/ (“Companies will pay for 
all new power delivery infrastructure upgrades required to service their data centers, including adequate network 
upgrade costs to ensure that these expenses are not passed on to the ordinary household.”). 
30 See, e.g., Liquid Energy Pipeline Ass’n v. FERC, 109 F.4th 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (noting importance of public 
participation and reasoned decision-making in APA notice-and-comment rulemaking). Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 221-25 (1st ed. 1971) (describing principle of equal participation in canonical work of American political 
philosophy). 
If the public forum is to be free and open to all, and in continuous session, everyone should be able 
to make use of it. All citizens should have the means to be informed about political issues. They 
should be in a position to assess how proposals affect their well-being and which policies advance 
their conception of the public good. Moreover, they should have a fair chance to add alternative 
proposals to the agenda for political discussion. The liberties protected by the principle of 
participation lose much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted 
to use their advantages to control the course of public debate. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). 
31 Sierra Club v. FERC, 97 F.4th 16, 21 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Nat’l Fuel Extension Order, 179 FERC ¶ 
61,226, at P 9 (June 29, 2022), reh’g denied by Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 180 FERC ¶ 62099 (Aug. 30, 2022)).

17 
cost allocation provisions to account for Network Upgrades, including both regional and 
supplemental projects. 
In the ANOPR docket, RM26-4, the Department of Energy proposed that FERC should 
allocate 100 percent of Network Upgrade costs to large load customers.32 It would be arbitrary and 
capricious for the Commission to now limit the record development in this proceeding to a discrete 
subset of cost shifting without reasoned decision-making as to why other aspects of wholesale cost 
allocation are precluded from record development.  
Several parties in the ANOPR docket raised the existing cost allocation issues and 
presented just and reasonable solutions to remedy it, in supplemental comments submitted 
following the reply comment period. This demonstrates consensus among various parties that 
wholesale cost allocation is unjust and unreasonable, relevant, and unresolved. Specifically, parties 
in RM26-4 filed the following Supplemental Comments on the topic: 
• March 30, 2026: WIRES’ Supplemental Comments with attached Whitepaper titled 
“The Risks of Cost Shifts in Serving Large Loads Under a Framework with Direct 
Allocation of Transmission Costs” (WIRES Whitepaper);33 
• April 15, 2026: Harvard Electricity Law Initiative’s (ELI’s) Supplemental 
Comments;34 
• May 12, 2026: Transmission Access Policy Study Group’s (TAPS’) Supplemental 
Comments;35 
• June 6, 2026: FirstEnergy Service Company’s (FirstEnergy’s) Supplemental 
Comments with attached Whitepaper titled “A Provent Framework for a New 
American Problem” (FirstEnergy Whitepaper);36 
• June 8, 2026: Maven Solutions’ Supplemental Comments ;37 and 
 
32 ANOPR at P 25 (see Principal Eight proposing that load and hybrid facilities should be responsible for 
100 percent of the network upgrades assigned to them through the interconnection studies). 
33 WIRES Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Mar. 30, 2026). 
34 Harvard ELI Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Apr. 15, 2026). 
35 TAPS Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (May 12, 2026). 
36 FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 6, 2026). 
37 Maven Solutions Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 8, 2026).

18 
• June 15, 2026 : Joint Supplemental Comments of the PA OCA, Delaware Division 
of the Public Advocate (DE DPA), and State of New Jersey, Division of the Rate 
Counsel.38 
 
For Supplemental Projects, the unjust and unreasonable wholesale cost allocation and cost 
shifting problem results from a gap between the rolled-in NITS costs recovered from large loads 
under PJM’s existing Tariff, and the incremental costs that this method fails to properly allocate to 
Eligible Customers serving large loads for Network Upgrades caused by the large loads’ 
integration to the grid. In response to this problem, FirstEnergy filed supplemental comments in 
RM26-4 proposing a just and reasonable rate solution,39 which the PA OCA supported through 
supplemental comments, referred to hereafter as the “Expansion Rate Policy”.40 FirstEnergy noted 
that “[t]he electric transmission cost-shift now emerging across the United States is structurally 
identical to a problem the natural gas industry confronted three decades ago—and one FERC 
already solved.”41 Moreover, FirstEnergy and the PA OCA emphasized agreement among the large 
“hyperscaler” firms and the White House that those firms will “bear the costs of the power-delivery 
infrastructure required to support their facilities.”42 
The Expansion Rate Policy proposal would require Eligible Customers serving large loads 
to pay an embedded cost rate and separate expansion rate. All transmission customers within the 
zone, including Eligible Customers, would be charged a NITS rate for the embedded costs of the 
system that excludes Network Upgrades driven by large load interconnections. In addition, Eligible 
Customers serving large loads would be charged a separate expansion rate to recover the Network 
Upgrades driven by large load interconnections. The separate expansion rate would be expressed 
 
38 Joint Consumer Advocates Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 15, 2026). 
39 See generally FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments. 
40 See Joint Consumer Advocates Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 15, 2026), 
https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/docinfo?accession_number=20260615-5141. 
41 FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments, App’x at 2. 
42 Id., App’x at 3 (citing Ratepayer Protection Pledge, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 4, 2026), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/).

19 
through a pro forma cost recovery agreement between PJM, the relevant transmission owner, and 
the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of large loads that recover the costs 
of the Network Upgrades. 
The agreement would specify the depreciation of the capital costs over the term of 
agreement and use of the transmission owner’s return on equity, capital structure, and debt 
assumptions to mirror those already embedded in the incumbent zonal transmission rate, to avoid 
preferential treatment or punitive pricing. Further, the agreement would require the Eligible 
Customer to maintain creditworthy collateral support equal to the remaining unrecovered balance 
of the expansion facilities over the life of agreement to protect existing transmission customers 
from residual exposure. At the end of term of agreement, after the expansion facilities have been 
fully recovered through the expansion rate, the expansion facilities would transition into the 
transmission owner’s integrated system rate base. 
As the Joint Consumer Advocates explained in Supplemental Comments, the Expansion 
Rate Policy articulated the FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments is consistent with the 
Commission’s Transmission Pricing Policy.43 The Commission’s Transmission Pricing Policy 
clearly provides that the use of a disaggregated approach is “or” pricing because it does not charge 
the same customer for the same facilities twice.44 Because a line-by-line incremental rate would 
exclude the expansion transmission facilities from the embedded network rate base recovered in 
NITS, the Eligible Customer serving the large load would be charged once for using the expansion 
 
43 Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Pricing Policy for Transmission Services Provided by Public Utilities 
Under the Federal Power Act, 69 FERC ¶ 61,086, n. 34 (1994) (Transmission Pricing Policy). The Commission 
clarified: “Under a line-by-line pricing method, the costs of each transmission line, or segment, are allocated to 
individual transmission transactions, based on the usage each transaction makes of each line or segment.” Id. at n.30. 
44 NorthWestern Corp., 147 FERC ¶ 61,171, P 53 (2014) (“[A] public utility may charge the higher of: (1) an 
average-cost transmission rate reflecting the average cost of the transmission grid, including the costs of expanding 
the grid, or (2) an incremental-cost transmission rate reflecting the costs of the particular service involved”).

20 
facilities (via the incremental rate) and once for using the existing transmission network (via the 
embedded rate).45 Hence, there is no violation of the prohibition against “and” pricing. 
The Expansion Rate Policy proposal is a practical solution that would help in part to 
remedy unjust and unreasonable cost shifts for other transmission customers for Supplemental 
Projects, in addition to the other cost shifting protections discussed in the Commission’s Order. 
And it serves as an excellent example of the record-development necessary to enable reasoned 
decision-making addressing all aspects of wholesale transmission cost shifting. Accordingly, 
FERC should clarify that the Order allows parties to develop a robust, actionable record on regional 
cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads—including methods for 
RTEP Projects and Supplemental Projects. 
IV. 
Request for Rehearing 
A. 
FERC’s Order violates the Federal Power Act and Administrative Procedure 
Act to the extent FERC interprets the Order to sufficiently address the 
wholesale transmission cost-shifting problem caused by large loads. 
The Order’s pro forma cost recovery agreements will help solve some—but not all—of the 
Order’s stated transmission cost shifting problem caused by large loads. Other aspects of wholesale 
transmission cost shifting are, or may be, caused by large loads. FERC made a preliminary finding 
“that PJM’s Tariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it lacks adequate mechanisms to 
mitigate the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers, which may result in unjust and 
unreasonable rates for transmission service.”46 FERC further identified that these unjust and 
unreasonable rates burden transmission customers that “neither caused the need for nor benefit 
commensurately from” Network Upgrades for large loads.47 The cost recovery agreements address 
 
45 Id.  
46 Order, P 66. 
47 Order, PP 79, 81.

21 
part of this problem, but other aspects of the problem remain unaddressed: regional cost allocation 
methods. 
Accordingly, Commissioner Chang identified in her concurrence that “bilateral agreements 
that simply provide transmission revenue contributions untethered from any assessment of the 
actual cost of providing transmission service induced by individual large loads may be insufficient 
to adequately protect other customers against unjustified cost shifts.”48 As explained in Section 
III.A, PJM’s existing rules for wholesale transmission cost allocation impose unjust and 
unreasonable rates on transmission customers because (1) transmission customers not serving large 
loads are required to pay for Network Upgrade costs that they do not cause or commensurately 
benefit from, and (2) Eligible Customers serving large loads are not required to pay 100 percent 
of the Network Upgrades needed to accommodate the integration of the large loads to the grid. For 
example, FirstEnergy—a utility company that serves as a PJM Transmission Owner—identified 
that: 
Under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s current rules, when a utility 
constructs new high-voltage transmission lines and substations to connect a single 
new data center, the cost of that infrastructure is spread across all customers in the 
surrounding region. Ordinary families and small businesses see their electric bills 
rise to support facilities that were built to serve the new data center facilities.49 
 
The existing, unjust and unreasonable wholesale cost allocation means that existing consumers in 
Pennsylvania and other states could be stuck with the burdensome results of paying for increased 
costs caused by large load integration. This will occur if FERC derogates its duty under the FPA. 
Further, states may not re-allocate FERC’s wholesale cost allocations.50 States can only 
exercise their retail authority to re-allocate costs at the retail level. 
 
48 Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8). 
49 FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments, App’x at 2. 
50 Cf. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 165 (2016) (explaining that states may not “second-guess 
the reasonableness of interstate wholesale rates” under FPA); see also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi

22 
FERC is the only regulatory agency that can solve the entirety of the unjust and 
unreasonable cost-shifting problem, because FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale 
transmission cost allocation.51 Wholesale Network Upgrade cost allocation happens at the regional 
level, under PJM’s Tariff Schedule 12 and Appendix A, and PJM’s Tariff, Section 34.1 and 
Attachment H. These Tariff provisions establish cost allocation and assignment methods for 
Network Upgrades, as the PA OCA described above in Section III.A. FERC regulates PJM’s Tariff 
and the wholesale costs that transmission customers pay—the states cannot regulate PJM’s Tariff. 
And FERC has the power to reallocate wholesale transmission costs to ensure just and reasonable 
transmission rates. In fact—in the transmission context—“the Commission has ‘clear’ authority to 
reallocate capacity and production costs.”52 
If FERC’s interprets the Order to sufficiently address the wholesale transmission cost-
shifting problem caused by large loads, FERC will have sidestepped its statutory duty and 
contradicting the express purpose of its Order. It would be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 
the FPA for the Commission to find that transmission customers “neither caused the need for nor 
benefit commensurately from” Network Upgrades for large loads, and then restrict the remedy to 
address merely a portion of the unreasonable cost shifts.53 Thus, to address the unjust and 
unreasonable wholesale cost-shifting that exists beyond the reach of the states and the proposed 
cost recovery agreements, FERC should grant the OCA’s rehearing request. 
 
ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“States may not alter FERC-ordered allocations . . . by substituting their 
own determinations of what would be just and fair.”). 
51 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)) (providing that the FPA “shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce 
and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”). 
52 South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (first citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. 
FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 2008); then citing Miss. Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
and then citing FirstEnergy Serv. Co. v. FERC, 758 F.3d 346, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
53 See Order, PP 79, 81; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding federal administrative agency must “examine the relevant data 
and articulate a . . . rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n 
v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009) (summarizing cost causation and beneficiary pays principles).

23 
B. 
FERC’s Order violates the Federal Power Act and Administrative Procedure 
Act to the extent that it precludes development of a robust, actionable record 
on regional wholesale cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused 
by large loads. 
To the extent that FERC does not clarify, or denies, that parties in EL26-67 may develop 
an actionable record on regional wholesale cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused 
by large loads—the Order violates the Federal Power Act and Administrative Procedure Act.54 
FERC should grant rehearing and must not foreclose parties from developing an actionable record 
on regional wholesale cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads. 
PJM’s existing rules for wholesale transmission cost allocation impose unjust and 
unreasonable rates on transmission customers because (1) transmission customers not serving large 
loads are required to pay for Network Upgrade costs that they do not cause or commensurately 
benefit from, and (2) Eligible Customers serving large loads are not required to pay 100 percent 
of the Network Upgrades needed to accommodate the integration of the large loads to the grid. For 
example, FirstEnergy—a utility company that serves as a PJM Transmission Owner—identified 
that: 
Under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s current rules, when a utility 
constructs new high-voltage transmission lines and substations to connect a single 
new data center, the cost of that infrastructure is spread across all customers in the 
surrounding region. Ordinary families and small businesses see their electric bills 
rise to support facilities that were built to serve the new data center facilities.55 
 
 
54 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (public utility rates and charges for transmission must be just and reasonable); 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (holding federal administrative agency must “examine the relevant data and articulate a . . . rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made”); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (summarizing cost causation and beneficiary pays principles); New Eng. Power Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 
881 F.3d 202, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (identifying FERC must reach conclusions that are “reasoned, principled, and 
based upon the record”); La. PSC. V. FERC, 20 F.4th 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43) (stating that if FERC “does not provide a rational explanation for its action based 
on relevant data, then that action is arbitrary and capricious.”); Order (Chang, Comm’r, concurring at P 8) ([T]he 
Commission needs a robust record in each docket and each region to ensure we establish the right cost shift protections 
for wholesale customers, including but not limited to the commitments outlined in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge”). 
55 FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments, App’x at 2.

24 
This is no tangential matter. To the contrary, Network Upgrade cost allocation has been 
central to the public discourse in and around this proceeding and the related ANOPR docket. In 
the ANOPR that initiated this regulatory effort on large load interconnections, U.S. Secretary of 
Energy Chris Wright proposed that load and hybrid facilities should be responsible for 100 percent 
of the network upgrades assigned to them through interconnection studies.56 And the White House 
agreed with “hyperscaler” AI data center developers Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, 
Oracle, and xAI that “companies will pay for all new power delivery infrastructure upgrades 
required to service their data centers, including adequate network upgrade costs to ensure that 
these expenses are not passed on to the ordinary household.”57 Moreover, wholesale transmission 
cost allocation became the central topic of supplemental comments in the latter part of RM26-4, 
leading into this proceeding. 
Specifically, parties in RM26-4 filed the following Supplemental Comments on the topic: 
• March 30, 2026: WIRES’ Supplemental Comments with attached Whitepaper titled 
“The Risks of Cost Shifts in Serving Large Loads Under a Framework with Direct 
Allocation of Transmission Costs” (WIRES Whitepaper);58 
• April 15, 2026: Harvard Electricity Law Initiative’s (ELI’s) Supplemental 
Comments;59 
• May 12, 2026: Transmission Access Policy Study Group’s (TAPS’) Supplemental 
Comments;60 
• June 6, 2026: FirstEnergy Service Company’s (FirstEnergy’s) Supplemental 
Comments with attached Whitepaper titled “A Provent Framework for a New 
American Problem” (FirstEnergy Whitepaper);61 
 
56 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 25, Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission 
System, Docket No. RM26-4 (Oct. 27, 2025). 
57 
Ratepayer 
Protection 
Pledge, 
THE 
WHITE 
HOUSE 
(Mar. 
4, 
2026), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/; Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 
11439 (Mar. 4, 2026). 
58 WIRES Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Mar. 30, 2026). 
59 Harvard ELI Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Apr. 15, 2026). 
60 TAPS Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (May 12, 2026). 
61 FirstEnergy Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 6, 2026).

25 
• June 8, 2026: Maven Solutions’ Supplemental Comments ;62 and 
• June 15, 2026 : Joint Supplemental Comments of the PA OCA, Delaware Division 
of the Public Advocate (DE DPA), and State of New Jersey, Division of the Rate 
Counsel.63 
 
 It would be arbitrary and capricious if the Commission limits the record development in 
this proceeding to an incomplete segment of cost shifting without reasoned decision-making as to 
why parties cannot develop a record on the rest of the cost-allocation problem. 
FERC is the only regulatory agency that can solve the entirety of the unjust and 
unreasonable cost-shifting problem, because FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale 
transmission cost allocation.64 Wholesale Network Upgrade cost allocation happens at the regional 
level, under PJM’s Tariff Schedule 12 and Appendix A, and PJM’s Tariff, Section 34.1 and 
Attachment H. These Tariff provisions establish cost allocation and assignment methods for 
Network Upgrades, as the PA OCA described above in Section III.A. FERC regulates PJM’s Tariff 
and the wholesale costs that transmission customers pay—the states cannot. And FERC has the 
power to reallocate wholesale transmission costs to ensure just and reasonable transmission rates. 
In fact—in the transmission context—“the Commission has ‘clear’ authority to reallocate capacity 
and production costs.”65 
If FERC’s Order does not allow parties to develop an actionable record on regional 
wholesale cost allocation methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads, FERC will have 
 
62 Maven Solutions Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 8, 2026). 
63 Joint Consumer Advocates Supplemental Comments, RM26-4 (Jun. 15, 2026). 
64 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)) (providing that the FPA “shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce 
and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”). Cf. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 
U.S. 150, 165 (2016) (explaining that states may not “second-guess the reasonableness of interstate wholesale rates” 
under FPA); see also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“States 
may not alter FERC-ordered allocations . . . by substituting their own determinations of what would be just and fair.”). 
65 South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (first citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. 
FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 2008); then citing Miss. Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
and then citing FirstEnergy Serv. Co. v. FERC, 758 F.3d 346, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

26 
sidestepped its statutory duty and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for contradicting the 
express purpose of its Order. It would be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the FPA for the 
Commission to find that transmission customers “neither caused the need for nor benefit 
commensurately from” Network Upgrades for large loads, and then fail to build the record 
necessary to remedy the PJM Tariff and prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifts.66 FERC 
offered no reasonable explanation for this decision. FERC should grant rehearing and must not 
foreclose parties from developing an actionable record on regional wholesale cost allocation 
methods for Network Upgrades caused by large loads. 
V. 
Conclusion 
The Order correctly finds that the PJM Tariff shifts the costs of Network Upgrades for large 
loads to transmission customers that neither caused nor benefit from them. The OCA respectfully 
request that the Commission clarify its Order, or in the alternative grant rehearing, to permit record 
development on regional cost allocation to protect transmission customers from paying costs for 
Network Upgrades that they do not cause or commensurately benefit from. 
 
66 See Order, PP 79, 81; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding federal administrative agency must “examine the relevant data 
and articulate a . . . rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n 
v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009) (summarizing cost causation and beneficiary pays principles).

27 
Counsel for: 
Darryl Lawrence 
Consumer Advocate 
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate 
555 Walnut Street 
5th Floor, Forum Place 
Harrisburg, PA 17101-1923 
717-783-5048 
Dated: July 17, 2026 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
/s/ Josiah Harmar 
Josiah Harmar 
Assistant Consumer Advocate 
PA Attorney ID # 338426 
JHarmar@paoca.org 
Melanie Joy El Atieh 
Deputy Consumer Advocate 
PA Attorney ID # 209323 
MElAtieh@paoca.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that today I served this document on this proceeding’s official service list. 
 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; July 17, 2026. 
 
/s/ Josiah Harmar 
 
Josiah Harmar 
Assistant Consumer Advocate 
PA Attorney ID # 338426 
JHarmar@paoca.org