EL26-67-001 · 2026-07-20 · Eolian, L.P.

Eolian, L.P. submits Limited Request for Clarification or, In the Alternative, Rehearing of the 06/18/2026 Order Instituting Proceedings Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act

1 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al. 
Docket No. EL26-67-000 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc., et al. 
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., et 
al. 
Docket No. EL26-70-000 
California Independent System Operator 
Corporation, et al. 
Docket No. EL26-71-000 
ISO New England Inc., et al. 
Docket No. EL26-72-000 
 
 
 
LIMITED REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
REHEARING BY EOLIAN, L.P. OF THE COMMISSION’S ORDERS 
INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 206 OF THE FEDERAL 
POWER ACT 
 
Pursuant to section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 825l (2024), 
and Rule 713 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“Commission” or “FERC”), 1 Eolian, L.P. (“Eolian”), requests clarification or,  in 
the alterative, rehearing of the Commission’s June 18 Orders in the above-captioned proceedings 
(“Large Load Show Cause Orders” or “Orders”).  
The Large Load Show Cause Orders take critical steps to facilitate more timely 
interconnection for large load customers while ensuring the affordability and reliability of the 
electric system for existing customers. Eolian strongly supports the steps taken in these orders, 
which demonstrate exactly the bold leadership this moment demands. We request rehearing of 
one aspect of the Orders that would severely limit the scope of any subsequent replacement rates 
and prevent the Orders from achieving the robust benefits to just and reasonable rates and 
 
1 18 C.F.R. § 385.713.

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reliability that they aim to achieve. Specifically, while the Orders preliminarily find it unjust and 
unreasonable for RTO/ISO tariffs to fail to recognize the ability of large loads to limit their 
withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions and propose that transmission 
services that reflect their use of the transmission system be available on both an interim and 
permanent basis,2 the Orders appear to practically limit the availability of the new transmission 
services by failing to provide for matching availability of permanent large load-limited generator 
interconnection services.  
Because the Commission appears to categorically limit the availability of permanent 
generator interconnection services to co-located generation,3 while requiring any load-limited 
generation interconnection service for electrically proximate generation serving large loads to be 
temporary, electrically proximate generators that are equally capable of serving large loads and 
enabling them to limit their withdrawals from the transmission system face a significant barrier 
to development. 4 In short, large loads’ ability to make use of the new transmission services will 
be severely limited if new front-of-the-meter generation projects that would be willing and able 
to serve a large load on a long-term basis are unable to support use of the new permanent 
contract demand transmission service and interim network integration transmission service 
(“Interim NITS”). Limited uptake of the new transmission services will, in turn, greatly limit the 
ability of the Commission’s Orders to ensure just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory 
rates.   
 
2 See, e.g., Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at PP 99-105 
(2026) (“MISO Order to Show Cause”). 
3 Throughout this filing, we use the term “generation” to include both generation and energy 
storage resources. 
4 MISO Order to Show Cause, at P 115.

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First, we request that the Commission clarify, or grant rehearing if necessary, to provide 
that electrically proximate generation may access permanent load-limited generator 
interconnection service where it is equally capable of enabling the large load to limit its 
withdrawals from the transmission system on a long-term basis without creating system 
reliability risks. Failure to do so will greatly limit the potential solutions that RTO/ISOs may 
propose in response to the Orders, and therefore greatly limit the real-world impact and benefits 
of the Orders. At minimum, we request that the Commission make clear that RTO/ISOs are not 
limited in their ability to provide permanent load-limited generator interconnection service where 
the generator is capable of enabling the large load to limit its withdrawals from the transmission 
system on a long-term basis without reliability concerns, and that the Commission strongly 
encourage RTO/ISOs to make such service broadly available.  
Second, and relatedly, we seek rehearing or clarification of the Orders because they 
appear to leave too much flexibility to RTO/ISOs to provide only very limited reforms to their 
generator interconnection study processes and services. While we do not believe the Commission 
intended to afford so much flexibility to RTO/ISOs that they could adopt minimal reforms that 
do not achieve the objective of ensuring just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates, 
the Orders include some language that could be interpreted as such. The Commission must 
clarify this discussion, so that it does not inadvertently create a loophole that would undermine 
the critical benefits of its Orders to reliability, affordability, limiting cost shifts, and speed to 
power.   
I. 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS 
(1) The Commission’s Orders arbitrarily and capriciously limit RTO/ISOs’ ability to put 
in place a replacement rate that will ensure just and reasonable and not unduly

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discriminatory rates by not requiring and/or by limiting their ability to adopt a 
permanent load-limited generator interconnection service for front-of-the-meter 
resources that are capable of enabling large loads to limit their withdrawals from the 
transmission system under certain conditions on a long-term basis without resulting in 
reliability concerns. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b); Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. 
FERC, 45 F.4th 265, 282 (2022); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
(2) The Commission’s Orders arbitrarily and capriciously provide that minimal reforms 
to RTO/ISO generator interconnection processes may suffice despite a broader 
preliminary finding of unjust and unreasonable rates. Without commensurate reforms 
to the generator interconnection process to enable generating resources to timely 
serve large loads, the Commission’s Orders cannot achieve its stated aims and ensure 
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 
U.S. at 43. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
The Commission’s Orders Seek to Address Urgent Problems Due to Large 
Load Growth, but Cannot Achieve Sufficient Scale Impact Without a Key 
Modification.    
Eolian fully supports the Commission’s preliminary findings that a series of actions is 
necessary to ensure just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates in RTO/ISOs in light 
of the significant acceleration of large loads seeking to interconnect, which poses the potential 
for impacts to reliability and affordability, cost shifts among transmission customers, and delays 
in interconnection and service of large loads. Eolian seeks rehearing or clarification of the 
Commission’s Orders solely to address one unreasonable limitation on the scope of actions that 
RTO/ISOs would be required to take under the Orders, because that limitation would create a

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significant barrier to large loads’ ability to use the new transmission services directed under the 
Orders, and therefore would significantly impair the ability of the Orders to ensure just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates. To be able to use the new transmission services 
on a widespread basis rather than in limited circumstances, large loads must be able to 
commercially transact with new generation resources to serve them, so that they can limit their 
withdrawals from the transmission system. Large loads will not be able to transact with new 
front-of-the-meter resources if resource developers face significant commercial barriers to 
interconnection, including the cost and timing uncertainty of the traditional generator 
interconnection queue procedures. Because the Commission’s Orders limit the availability of a 
permanent large load-limited generator interconnection to only a small subset of front-of-the-
meter configurations that would be capable of serving large loads on a long-term basis, the 
Orders unduly constrain the ability of these generators to serve large loads.    
1. 
The Commission has preliminarily determined that new transmission 
services must be made available for large loads that limit their withdrawals 
from the transmission system.  
The Commission’s Orders seek to address a series of critical challenges that arise due to 
the rapid growth of large loads seeking to interconnect and be served through the transmission 
system.5 Absent action to address these challenges, the Commission has determined that the 
 
5 See, e.g., MISO Order to Show Cause, at P 1 (“[L]arge loads are not efficiently and 
appropriately integrated onto the transmission system; have identified a number of unique 
challenges that large load integration poses for the reliable operation of that system; and have 
debated how best to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission service remain 
just and reasonable as more and more large loads are onboarded onto that system . . . The records 
in these proceedings likewise present serious concerns about the lack of clarity and consistency 
in Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) tariffs—
including with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to flexible large 
loads, co-location arrangements, load with behind the meter generation, and generating facilities 
with electrically proximate large load or co-located load”); id. at P 12 (“many commenters in the 
ANOPR proceeding filed persuasive comments documenting, generally, the need for clear and

6 
status quo may not ensure just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates. One of the 
deficiencies the Commission seeks to address through its Orders is to ensure RTO/ISO tariffs 
“include transmission services that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on 
behalf of Eligible Load that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system 
under certain conditions.”6 The Commission considers availability of such new transmission 
services necessary because “certain large loads are able to limit their withdrawals from the 
transmission system under certain conditions. Namely, commenters observe that flexible large 
loads can quickly and verifiably adjust their consumption in response to system conditions or 
price signals.”7 The Commission further explained that, “Eligible Customers taking transmission 
service on behalf of Eligible Load should be allowed to choose a transmission service that aligns 
with their use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for service with the 
benefits received.”8 Enabling access to the new transmission services for loads that are willing 
and able to limit their use of the transmission system “can avoid inefficient and costly 
transmission system build-out” and “could help timely interconnect flexible large loads.”9 
It is evident that the Commission believes that making these new transmission services 
available to large loads is necessary because it expects a significant number of large loads 
interconnecting to and seeking services from the transmission system would make use of the new 
transmission services if they are available, thereby avoiding unneeded transmission infrastructure 
 
consistent tariff provisions to ensure regulatory and process certainty, fairness and consistency, 
and efficiency as large and co-located loads are added to the transmission system in increasing 
numbers.  There is also broad support for rules that help to ensure that other transmission 
customers are not unfairly burdened with additional costs or reliability impacts as large and co-
located loads interconnect to the transmission system.”) 
6 Id. P 102. 
7 Id. P 103. 
8 Id. P 104 
9 Id.

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build-out, providing reliability benefits by limiting strain on the transmission system, reducing 
the cost impacts to bulk power sales by encouraging loads to commercially transact with new 
generation resources to be able to access the new transmission services, and enhancing speed-to-
power. We agree with these conclusions, which are well-supported by the record.   
2. 
The Commission’s Orders will not achieve widespread benefits if few 
large loads are able to avail themselves of the new transmission services. 
The uptake of the new transmission services will be limited, however, if large loads 
cannot identify sufficient new generation resources to support their ability to limit their 
withdrawals from the transmission system during certain conditions. Large loads vary in their 
ability to curtail their operations depending on their business model. Large loads that cannot 
commit to curtail their operations may, nonetheless, be able to commit to limit their use of the 
transmission system by transacting with generation resources that will continue to serve their 
load at times when withdrawals from the broader network must be limited. The more diverse the 
configurations of resources that are eligible to serve a large load and enable it to limit its 
withdrawals from the transmission system—i.e., the ability to rely on behind-the-meter 
generation, front-of-the-meter generation that is co-located, or front-of-the-meter generation that 
is electrically proximate—the more likely it is that a large load will be able to identify an 
arrangement that works for its business model. If few new generating resources are able to 
transact to serve large loads because resource developers face insurmountable or significant 
commercial barriers to offering such services, large loads will not be able to procure such 
services at reasonable cost and there will be much more limited uptake of the new transmission 
services. This, in turn, will mean that making the new transmission services available has little 
real-world impact.

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In summary, for the Commission’s Orders to ensure just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory rates, not only must large loads have the theoretical capability to use the new 
transmission services, but generating resources must also be available on a timely basis to serve 
these new large loads and enable the large loads to reduce their use of the bulk power system.     
3. 
Significant limitations on the front-of-the-meter resource 
configurations that may use permanent large load-limited generator 
interconnection service create a barrier to commercial development and 
constrain the resources available to serve large loads.  
 
While the Orders recognize the need for reforms to RTO/ISO generator interconnection 
processes that would afford some resources the opportunity to more timely serve large loads, the 
Orders contain a key limitation on the scope of the generator interconnection service and study 
process that RTO/ISOs must provide. Because the Orders appear to unreasonably limit 
permanent load-limited generator interconnection service to only co-located resources, many 
new generating resources that are capable and willing to commit to reliably serving a large load 
on a long-term basis will be unable to do so.   
The Orders preliminarily find that RTO/ISOs’ generator interconnection processes require 
reforms to “reflect an interconnection customer’s commitment in an interconnection agreement 
to limit the generating facility’s output to minimize the impact on the transmission system while 
serving an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.”10 The Commission 
recognizes that “[w]here a generating facility’s output is matched to the demand of the 
electrically proximate large load or large co-located load or if the generating facility’s output is 
limited to ensure no new injection, the impacts to the transmission system of interconnecting the 
generating facility to serve that electrically proximate large load or large co-located load may be 
limited, thereby potentially reducing the need for Network Upgrades, which can accelerate the 
 
10 Id. P 113.

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generator interconnection process.”11 The Commission further notes that where a generating 
facility and load are located closely on the transmission system and the generating facility’s 
output matches the load’s demand,  “the transmission provider would need to study only the local 
impacts because the impact on the transmission system of the combination of the generating 
facility and the load, with the exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be 
effectively the same as if they were located at the same substation.”12 
Yet even as the Commission recognizes the value of an interconnection service and study 
process tailored to more limited service to a specific load, the Commission imposes practical 
limits on the availability of such a load-limited interconnection study process and service. The 
Orders specify that while “it may be reasonable for the generator interconnection service to be 
permanent” “[t]o the extent that the interconnection customer’s generating facility is serving a 
large co-located load,” where “the interconnection customer’s generating facility is serving an 
electrically proximate large load, we believe that the generator interconnection service should be 
of an interim nature until the interconnection customer obtains Energy Resource Interconnection 
Service (ERIS) or Network Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS).”13 This potential 
restriction, unless clarified, threatens to greatly limit the use of load-limited generator 
interconnection service.  
As a practical matter, to be able to provide limited service to a large load and enable that 
large load to avoid or reduce its reliance on the transmission system, a generating resource must 
have (i) access to an interconnection process that enables it to interconnect and commence 
operation in time to serve the large load and (ii) reasonable cost certainty to understand if the 
 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at n. 48. 
13 Id. P 115.

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project is commercially viable. In Eolian’s commercial experience, co-location is a much more 
challenging resource configuration to achieve, because limits on space at the load site may 
prevent such a configuration; and because it is more commercially complex to coordinate the 
development timelines of both the load and the new generating facility at the same site. In 
contrast, the ability for a resource to locate in an electrically proximate or electrically equivalent 
site, rather than only on the same site as the load, increases the likelihood that a commercially 
viable arrangement can be found to serve a specific large load. 
But, based on Eolian’s experience as a developer of generating facilities that seek to serve 
large loads, few developers will be able to develop resources that are electrically proximate if the 
only available load-limited interconnection service is temporary and requires the resource to 
make its way through the standard generator interconnection process to obtain permanent 
interconnection service. The standard generator interconnection process remains plagued by long 
delays and the potential for high-cost, project-killing network upgrades. A developer that is 
provided access to only a temporary interconnection service must make the decision to invest in 
the full cost of developing its generating facility years before it will learn the total all-in cost of 
the project, because it will face a decision whether to proceed to commercial operation under a 
temporary load-limited generator interconnection service long before it will be studied and learn 
its actual network upgrade costs to obtain permanent NRIS or ERIS interconnection service. Cost 
uncertainty that can range in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars for additional network 
upgrades, or even more in particularly constrained parts of the transmission system, typically 
results in a potential project being unfinanceable and non-viable. It is therefore Eolian’s

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expectation based on its commercial experience that few developers will be able to make use of a 
solely temporary load-limited interconnection service.14  
This challenge of cost uncertainty for temporary interconnection service means that, even 
for Interim NITS customers, generation developers can much more readily provide 
corresponding load-limited service if that service is permanent. A permanent interconnection 
pathway provides the resource with the financial certainty necessary to support development, 
even if in the future that resource likely will elect to proceed through the standard queue 
(pending study results that show a commercially workable level of network upgrade costs). 
While a load-limited interconnection would restrict the generation to serving the load, which 
would itself graduate to full network service, the generation resource could continue to provide 
its service to the load. Permanent service could, for instance, facilitate a long-term power 
purchase agreement between the load and generator, whereas temporary service would likely 
render such an arrangement non-viable (because the generator’s ability to serve the load over the 
long-run would remain highly uncertain given the potential for project-killing cost assessments 
associated with obtaining permanent service).  
And for transmission customers taking contract demand service, temporary load-limited 
generation interconnection is an even worse match. Where a transmission customer plans to 
reduce its long-term reliance on the transmission system by leveraging the capability of a 
generation resource, the obligation to transition to NRIS or ERIS will result in unnecessary 
 
14 In Eolian’s experience, this challenge of uncertain costs for permanent service will prevent the 
development of new resources even in SPP, where the region is providing for up-front 
interconnection charges, because the size of those up-front charges is not known at the time a 
resource may pursue Load Limited Resource Interconnection Service through the region’s High 
Impact Load Generation Assessment process. But in regions without such up-front charges, this 
challenge is even more magnified.

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transmission upgrades, introducing excessive and uncertain costs and therefore stymying the 
commercial arrangements necessary to facilitate the pairing.   
Between the practical barriers to co-location arrangements, and the commercial barriers 
to electrically proximate front-of-the-meter arrangements, the Commission’s Orders are unlikely 
to unlock the rapid development of sufficient resources to match the rapid pace of large load 
additions.        
B. 
Absent modification or clarification, the Commission’s Orders unreasonably 
limit RTO/ISOs’ ability to use a significant tool in the toolkit to address the impacts 
of large loads. 
The Commission’s justification for limiting permanent load-limited generator 
interconnection service to co-located resources appears to be that, for such configurations, “there 
will be no injections onto the transmission system and therefore” permanent load-limited 
interconnection service “does not present operational or planning risks for reliability.”15 But as 
explained in the affidavit of Andrew Levitt, imposing a “co-location requirement for permanent 
LLGIS would disqualify many configurations that present the same simplified reliability picture 
as co-located arrangements.”16 Such broad disqualification is not necessary because many 
resources that are not “co-located” as that term is defined in the Commission’s orders, 
nevertheless could connect on a permanent load-limited basis while imposing essentially the 
same lack of reliability impacts to the broader system. RTOs have identified locations that are 
“electrically equivalent”, which means load and generation could be at locations that, while not 
the same, are electrically equivalent in terms of their impacts on the grid.  This would allow for a 
broader set of load-generation agreements than “co-location” as currently defined by the 
Commission.  SPP, for example, defines electrical equivalence as “[a] relationship between 
 
15 Id. P 115. 
16 Levitt Affidavit at 6.

13 
Points of Interconnection (POI) that are (1) at the same substation and nominal voltage level, (2) 
on the same branch or on a collection of in series two-terminal branches and associated buses 
and facilities, or (3) on the same radial branch and associated facilities.”17 
This broader category of generation-load pairings nevertheless imposes the same lack of 
system impact risks as co-located resources because “[e]lectrically equivalent interconnection 
points are defined to be functionally identical for reliability purposes.”18 Numerous RTOs have 
implemented services and study processes based on this general concept because, as MISO 
states, electrical equivalence criteria “‘limit potential impacts to flow in the transmission 
system’, ‘will not cause new constraints in the contingency analysis’, will ‘minimize impacts to 
flow and therefore other projects in the interconnection queue’, all ‘without subjecting other 
projects to an unreasonable risk of causing network upgrades’.”19  
As Levitt explains, regions also implement this same sort of analysis when conducting 
generator replacement analysis: “In generator replacement, the test asks whether moving the 
point of injection from Point A to Point B materially changes transmission impacts. For 
permanent LLGIS, it asks the same question about locating new generation at Point A (behind 
the load’s point of interconnection) or at Point B. In each case, the central planning question is 
whether the alternate generation connection point produces material grid impacts: new 
constraints, materially different power flows, or harm to queued projects.”20 While it is true that 
“[w]ith permanent LLGIS, electricity may flow across a short segment of public transmission 
between the generator and load, . . . that fact alone does not establish the kinds of regional 
 
17 Id. at 7 (citing  SPP, Generator Interconnection (DSIS) Manual, Version 4.4 (March 31, 2026) 
at 7). 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 8.

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impacts addressed by the full interconnection queue. Rather,” the relevant consideration “is 
whether the arrangement creates material grid impacts. MISO’s and SPP’s generator replacement 
tests for electrical equivalence reflect that impact-based approach, and it can be applied with 
equal effectiveness to similarly-situated load-limited generators connecting close to their paired 
loads.”21 
A resource that is in an “electrically equivalent” location as load but not co-located with 
it is similarly situated in its ability to limit the load’s withdrawal from the transmission system, 
because a transmission customer may rely on the resources in an “electrically equivalent” 
location, offsetting load when the broader system is constrained without creating adverse 
reliability impacts for other customers. In fact, “electrically equivalent generation/load pairings 
may improve reliability outcomes compared to the behind-the-meter frameworks that the 
Commission has already required to be permanent, as a result of the improved metering, 
telemetry, scheduling, and control required of the various front-of-the-meter components of the 
paired LLGIS facilities.”22  
C. 
The Orders fail to require broad enough reforms to the generator 
interconnection study process and services to ensure the Orders achieve their 
critical objectives. 
Finally, the Commission’s Orders contain contradictory discussion of RTO/ISOs’ 
obligation to implement reforms to the generator interconnection processes that could lead to 
confusion and may limit the Commission’s ability to require reforms that are sufficient to ensure 
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates. On the one hand, the Orders 
preliminarily find most RTO/ISOs’ tariffs unjust and unreasonable because they do not contain 
provisions to allow “an interconnection to seek the generator interconnection service(s) that 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 8-9.

15 
reflects the operational dynamics of serving either: (1) an electrically proximate large load; or (2) 
a co-located load, as defined in this order, that has a high peak load (i.e., large co-located loads 
that are 50 MW or greater).”23 Such a deficiency would only be addressed by ensuring that 
resources that are similarly situated in their interest and ability to serve a specific large load have 
access to an interconnection study process and generator interconnection service that enables 
them to provide more limited service to a particular load, and that specifies any conditions to 
such access. If the new generator interconnection study process and services are broadly 
available to resources willing and able to provide such limited service, the reforms will be 
expansive enough to achieve the Commission’s aims, as discussed above, by avoiding unneeded 
transmission infrastructure build-out, providing reliability benefits, reducing the cost impacts, 
and enhancing speed-to-power. The reforms would be right-sized to the scale of the problem, 
because sufficient generation can be interconnected through the generator interconnection 
reforms to enable significant numbers of large loads to utilize the new transmission services, 
which in turn, mitigates the impacts of large load interconnections.  
Yet later in the Orders, the Commission appears to suggest that a much more limited set 
of generator interconnection reforms may be sufficient to address the deficiency. The 
Commission suggests that “another potentially reasonable approach to address our concerns” 
could include (i) allowing new generating facilities to interconnect with a new load behind an 
existing generator’s point of interconnection or (ii) allowing a new generating facility and a new 
load to interconnect behind the same new point of interconnection.24 While Eolian is not opposed 
to these as potential additional pathways to enable a generating facility to receive limited 
 
23 MISO Order to Show Cause, at P 113. 
24 Id. P 116.

16 
interconnection service in order to serve a particular load, the Commission’s suggestion that 
these very constrained pathways may be sufficient to ensure just and reasonable rates in light of 
the extreme pace of large load additions in regions across the country is illogical. There is no 
basis to believe that providing such reforms would eliminate the need for an appropriate 
interconnection study process for co-located or electrically proximate generation and load pairs. 
Any flexibility to tailor the generator interconnection reforms to the unique 
circumstances of the region must be paired with an obligation on the RTO/ISO to show that the 
set of reforms it proposes will enable a pathway for significant generating capacity to provide 
load-limited interconnection, in light of the pace of large load additions and their projected 
growth in the region. Without such a limitation to ensure that the scope of the reforms matches 
the scope of the problem in the region, the Commission’s Orders will not ensure just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory rates.    
 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Eolian respectfully requests that the Commission grant the 
requested clarifications or, in the alternative, grant rehearing. 
 
 
Respectfully submitted,

17 
Kim Smaczniak 
Miles Farmer 
Avi Zevin 
Roselle LLP 
300 New Jersey Ave. NW, Suite 300 
Washington, DC 20001 
kim.smaczniak@rosellellp.com 
miles.farmer@rosellellp.com 
avi.zevin@rosellellp.com 
 
Counsel for Eolian L.P.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person 
designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary of the Commission in these 
proceedings. 
 
Dated: July 20, 2026 
/s/ Nathan Lobel 
Nathan Lobel 
Roselle LLP 
300 New Jersey Ave. NW, Suite 300 
Washington, DC 20001 
nathan.lobel@rosellellp.com

ATTACHMENT A 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al. 
Docket No. EL26-67-000 
New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 
et al. 
Docket No. EL26-69-000 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, 
Inc., et al. 
Docket No. EL26-70-000 
California Independent System Operator 
Corporation, et al. 
Docket No. EL26-71-000 
ISO New England Inc., et al. 
Docket No. EL26-72-000 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ANDREW LEVITT  
ON BEHALF OF 
EOLIAN, L.P. 
July 20, 2026

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 2 of 10 
I. 
QUALIFICATIONS 
1 
My name is Andrew Levitt. I am a Senior Consultant at The Brattle Group (Brattle).  
2 
I am an expert on wholesale market design and reliability implications of changes in the power 
3 
system. I have consulted for Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission 
4 
Organizations (ISO/RTOs) such as the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), the 
5 
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), the Alberta Electric System Operator 
6 
(AESO), and the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) of Ontario, and helped other 
7 
clients navigate ISO/RTO changes nationwide. Prior to joining Brattle in 2022, I was on staff at 
8 
PJM for seven years (most recently as Lead Market Designer), where I developed reforms to 
9 
reliably integrate new resource types. I hold an MMP from the University of Delaware and a BSc 
10 
in physics from the University of Toronto. 
11 
I have worked extensively on the benefits of co-located loads and generation and how such 
12 
arrangements can be facilitated to reduce costs, achieve faster connection of new loads and 
13 
generation, and ensure reliability. This includes co-authored affidavits and reports in prior filings 
14 
before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) on co-location, 
15 
including an affidavit on behalf of Eolian filed in FERC Docket No. RM26-4-000 
16 
on Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System and a report on behalf 
17 
of Bloom Energy filed in Docket EL25-49-000 on Accelerating the Integration of New Co-
18 
located Generation and Loads.1 
19 
II. 
ASSIGNMENT 
20 
I was asked by Eolian, L.P. to assess the five recent Commission Orders on co-located and 
21 
electrically proximate generation and load pairings, issued June 18, 2026 in the above-captioned 
22 
dockets. In particular, I was asked to assess how Load-Limited Generator Interconnection 
23 
Service (LLGIS) can facilitate the efficiency, speed, and reliability benefits of new generation 
24 
 
1  
Affidavit of Andrew Levitt, Aniruddh Mohan, Ryan Quint, and Sirisha Tanneeru on Behalf of Eolian Energy, 
Inc., before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the matter of Interconnection of Large Loads to the 
Interstate Transmission System, Docket No. RM26-4-000, November 21, 2025; A. Levitt, J. Pfeifenberger, and 
A. Mohan, Accelerating the Integration of New Co-located Generation and Loads, prepared for Bloom Energy 
as part of Docket No. EL25-49-000, April 23, 2025.

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 3 of 10 
co-located with new load (“co-location arrangements”), consistent with the Commission’s 
1 
objectives.  
2 
III. 
BACKGROUND 
3 
In a set of six orders issued June 18, 2026, the Commission initiated separate show-cause 
4 
proceedings for each wholesale market region, requiring each ISO/RTO and its transmission 
5 
owners to submit tariff revisions to address (or demonstrate how current tariff provisions already 
6 
address): 1) the application process, study procedures, and ongoing operational requirements 
7 
associated with transmission service on behalf of large loads; 2) transparency associated with the 
8 
costs of Network Upgrades necessary to provide transmission service to large loads; 3) new firm 
9 
and non-firm transmission services for large loads co-located with generation, and for flexible 
10 
large loads. Five of the regions (all but SPP) addressed an additional tariff reform need: 4) new 
11 
resource interconnection service for generation serving electrically proximate large load or co-
12 
located load. My focus is this last item.  
13 
IV. 
PERMANENT LOAD-LIMITED GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION SERVICE  
14 
IV.A. Lack of a Permanent Load-Limited Generator 
15 
Interconnection Service Option Would Work Against the 
16 
Purpose of Non-Firm Transmission Service 
17 
In these show-cause orders, the Commission identifies the opportunity to achieve speed-to-power 
18 
by offering a new type of accelerated interconnection for a new generator that is dedicated to 
19 
providing power to a large load, and is co-located with or electrically proximate to it. This Load-
20 
Limited Generator Interconnection Service (LLGIS) is premised on the generator’s commitment 
21 
to limiting its output to match the consumption of the load it is supporting. The Commission 
22 
finds that “[w]here a generating facility’s output is matched to the demand of the electrically 
23 
proximate large load or large co-located load or if the generating facility’s output is limited to 
24 
ensure no new injection, the impacts to the transmission system of interconnecting the generating 
25 
facility to serve that electrically proximate large load or large co-located load may be limited, 
26

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 4 of 10 
thereby potentially reducing the need for Network Upgrades, which can accelerate the generator 
1 
interconnection process.”2 I concur with the finding that this service achieves expedited 
2 
connection of new supply and new large loads. It also improves the cost-effectiveness of the 
3 
interconnection process by avoiding unneeded network upgrades associated with the 
4 
interconnection process for the new load-limited generation. This is true because a) no 
5 
deliverability is needed for injections from the generator to the broader grid, and b) the large load 
6 
is presumably included in the model used for studying the new generation, thus limiting net 
7 
flows on the broader grid.  
8 
However, these benefits of LLGIS would be limited if it were structured only as an interim 
9 
service. While FERC has not categorically ruled out that this service is available both on an 
10 
interim and permanent basis (and indeed embraces a permanent approach in the case of co-
11 
located supporting generation taking LLGIS), FERC may expect that service to be mostly 
12 
interim in the case of electrically proximate generation taking LLGIS.3 The issues with interim-
13 
only LLGIS would be two-fold.  
14 
First, if a developer taking LLGIS is obligated to obtain network resource interconnection 
15 
service (NRIS) or energy resource interconnection service (ERIS) later, it will be obligated to 
16 
pay the interconnection costs associated with that NRIS or ERIS. However, this obligation 
17 
introduces a sequencing problem because of the accelerated timeline made possible by the 
18 
simplified LLGIS process, such as the 90-day timeline for SPP’s High Impact Large Load 
19 
Generation Assessment (HILLGA) process. Specifically, the potentially high cost of the 
20 
obligatory NRIS or ERIS network upgrades is unlikely to be known at the time that LLGIS is 
21 
 
2  
PJM Interconnection L.L.C., et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) at P 95 (internal citations omitted) (PJM Show-
Cause Order).  
3  
PJM Show-Cause Order at P 97 (“To the extent that the interconnection customer’s generating facility is 
serving an electrically proximate large load, we believe that the generator interconnection service should be of 
an interim nature until the interconnection customer obtains Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) or 
Network Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS). To the extent that the interconnection customer’s 
generating facility is serving a large co-located load, it may be reasonable for the generator interconnection 
service to be permanent because there will be no injections onto the transmission system and therefore it does 
not present operational or planning risks for reliability”); Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.,195 
FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 115 (2026); California Independent System Operator Corp., 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 at P 115 
(2026); New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,216 at P 123 (2026); ISO New England 
Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 113 (2026).

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 5 of 10 
granted and the developer must commit to building its generator. This is a substantial cost 
1 
uncertainty that would likely materially reduce the commercial viability of LLGIS.  
2 
Second, the network upgrades associated with mandatory NRIS or ERIS would be unnecessary 
3 
and inefficient if the lower-cost LLGIS arrangement can reliably accommodate the load-limited 
4 
generation and its associated load on a permanent basis, and if permanent non-firm service is 
5 
acceptable to the customer. Indeed, if the load is taking permanent non-firm transmission service 
6 
(such as Non-Firm Contract Demand Service) as enabled by the LLGIS generation, the 
7 
requirement for NRIS or ERIS is inconsistent with the large load’s permanent reliance on the 
8 
load-limited generation. Therefore, offering LLGIS only as an interim service works against the 
9 
purpose of non-firm transmission services for loads that rely on load-limited generation, and 
10 
results in construction of unnecessary transmission facilities, which is inefficient and 
11 
unnecessarily costly.  
12 
To avoid these inefficiencies, the LLGIS that an ISO/RTO proposes must include both interim 
13 
and permanent options. 
14 
IV.B. 
Requiring an Option for Permanent Load-Limited Generator 
15 
Interconnection Service Improves Efficiency and Speed-to-
16 
Power without Impacting Grid Reliability 
17 
Ensuring that regions provide a permanent LLGIS option will improve the efficiency and 
18 
attractiveness of non-firm transmission service for co-located loads.  Doing so will remove a 
19 
substantial and unnecessary risk for investment in new supply, yielding the benefits the 
20 
Commission cited in supporting its determination in the show-cause orders.4 In fact, a scenario in 
21 
which the Commission requires full deliverability (NRIS) or injection (ERIS) rights for load-
22 
limited generators runs counter to the Commission’s own holding by not reflecting the 
23 
 
4  
PJM Show-Cause Order at P 96 (“As commenters in the ANOPR proceeding have recognized, the status quo 
may result in inefficient and unnecessary development of infrastructure, which leads to unnecessarily higher 
Network Upgrade costs that may result in unjust and unreasonable rates. The Commission has already 
determined in the PJM Co-Location Order that without the new transmission services that reflect the operational 
dynamics of co-location arrangements, there could be unnecessary, costly, and inefficient Network Upgrades, 
increasing Network Upgrade costs”)(internal citations omitted).

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 6 of 10 
“operational dynamics” of the paired arrangements, leading to “unnecessary, costly, and 
1 
inefficient Network Upgrades.” Mandating that LLGIS service be temporary would require the 
2 
generator to ultimately pay for the construction of network upgrades for permanent service, even 
3 
though the Commission has identified such upgrades as “inefficient.”5 
4 
When describing the potential for permanent LLGIS, the Commission distinguishes between 
5 
generators supporting co-located large loads versus those supporting electrically proximate 
6 
loads. In the case of co-located loads, the Commission finds that these arrangements do not 
7 
“present operational or planning risks for reliability,” as there “will be no injections onto the 
8 
transmission system.”6 The Commission describes several arrangements that would fit under this 
9 
framework while using a series of special protection schemes to limit injections on the broader 
10 
grid and thereby maintain reliability.7  
11 
The co-location requirement for permanent LLGIS would disqualify many configurations that 
12 
present the same simplified reliability profile as co-located arrangements, but offer better 
13 
commercial viability because they avoid any commercial complexity associated with a shared 
14 
point of interconnection. FERC could substantially improve the commercial viability of LLGIS 
15 
(expanding its benefits) without materially changing its reliability features by taking a slightly 
16 
less restrictive approach to the locational eligibility for permanent service. To avoid 
17 
unnecessarily narrowing eligibility for permanent LLGIS, it should include generators at 
18 
interconnection locations that are “electrically equivalent” to the load’s point of interconnection, 
19 
rather than limiting it only to generators that are located behind the same point of interconnection 
20 
 
5  
PJM Show-Cause Order at P 96 (“As commenters in the ANOPR proceeding have recognized, the status quo 
may result in inefficient and unnecessary development of infrastructure, which leads to unnecessarily higher 
Network Upgrade costs that may result in unjust and unreasonable rates. The Commission has already 
determined in the PJM Co-Location Order that without the new transmission services that reflect the operational 
dynamics of co-location arrangements, there could be unnecessary, costly, and inefficient Network Upgrades, 
increasing Network Upgrade costs”)(internal citations omitted). 
6  
PJM Show-Cause Order at P 97.  
7  
PJM Show-Cause Order at P 98.

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 7 of 10 
as the load.8 Electrically equivalent interconnection points are defined to be functionally 
1 
identical for reliability purposes, as demonstrated by use of this concept in several ISO/RTOs 
2 
today. Even a narrow electrical-equivalence test—such as same substation and same voltage 
3 
level—would materially improve commercial workability by allowing the generation and load 
4 
sites to be developed separately, without requiring shared property or a common physical POI. 
5 
For example, PJM applies the electrical equivalence concept in its generation replacement 
6 
process, requiring an interconnection at either the same electrical bus or an “electrically 
7 
equivalent bus” as the deactivating generating facility.9 Similarly, MISO’s process allows a 
8 
replacement generator to utilize a different point of interconnection when it meets test criteria 
9 
demonstrating that the new connection point is electrically equivalent to the original location.10 
10 
As FERC recognized in it order approving the MISO process, these test criteria “limit potential 
11 
impacts to flow in the transmission system,” “will not cause new constraints in the contingency 
12 
analysis,” will “minimize impacts to flow and therefore other projects in the interconnection 
13 
queue,” all “without subjecting other projects to an unreasonable risk of causing network 
14 
upgrades.”11  SPP similarly defines electrical equivalence as “a relationship between Points of 
15 
Interconnection (POI) that are (1) at the same substation and nominal voltage level, (2) on the 
16 
same branch or on a collection of in series two-terminal branches and associated buses and 
17 
facilities, or (3) on the same radial branch and associated facilities.”12  
18 
 
8  
The Commission could broaden permanent LLGIS further to include electrically proximate arrangements. 
These would not create further reliability issues as compared to temporary LLGIS. Given the inherent front-of-
the-meter structure of (non-co-located) proximate generation and load pairings, the grid operator would retain 
the ability to manage the system in operations, including by curtailing individual load and/or generation as 
needed to preserve reliability where intervening transmission facilities are impaired. In that respect, permanence 
does not remove the operational tools that grid operators already use to address transmission constraints or other 
system conditions on an interim basis. That said, electrically proximate arrangements may present some 
additional considerations relative to co-located arrangements, because they rely on facilities between the load 
and generation rather than being located entirely behind a single point of interconnection. 
9  
See PJM Tariff Part VIII, Subpart J § 437(A)(4). 
10  FERC states that MISO considers a point of interconnection electrically equivalent to that of an existing 
generating facility when it will: “(1) interconnect at the same voltage level as the Existing Generating Facility 
unless that voltage level is not available by the commercial operation date; (2) not cause new constraints, as 
demonstrated by a contingency analysis performed in accordance with the Generator Interconnection Business 
Practices Manual 015 (BPM); and (3) not change the power distribution factor (DFAX) by more than 5% on 
any branch unless it is a zero impedance element or a line of the shortest path without queued interconnection 
requests from the existing point of interconnection to the new point of interconnection.” Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2025); MISO Tariff Attachment X, Section 3.7.1(i)(a).  
11  Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2025). 
12  SPP, Generator Interconnection (DSIS) Manual, Version 4.4 (March 31, 2026) at 7.

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 8 of 10 
Generators seeking replacement treatment and those requesting permanent LLGIS are similarly 
1 
situated with respect to the electrical-equivalence test. In generator replacement, the test asks 
2 
whether moving the point of injection from Point A to Point B materially changes transmission 
3 
impacts. For permanent LLGIS, it asks the same question about locating new generation at Point 
4 
A (behind the load’s point of interconnection) or at Point B. In each case, the central planning 
5 
question is whether the alternate generation connection point produces material grid impacts: 
6 
new constraints, materially different power flows, or harm to queued projects. Therefore, if the 
7 
test fails in either case, the generator must go through the standard interconnection queue 
8 
process. With permanent LLGIS, electricity may flow across a short segment of public 
9 
transmission between the generator and load, but that fact alone does not establish the kinds of 
10 
regional impacts addressed by the full interconnection queue.13 Rather, as with generator 
11 
replacement, the test of interest is whether the arrangement creates material grid impacts. 
12 
MISO’s and SPP’s generator replacement tests for electrical equivalence reflect that impact-
13 
based approach, and it can be applied with equal effectiveness to similarly-situated load-limited 
14 
generators connecting close to their paired loads. 
15 
Expanding permanent LLGIS eligibility to generators with paired loads at electrically equivalent 
16 
interconnection points will not, by definition, create incremental adverse reliability impacts. As 
17 
in the case of the mandated temporary service,14 the tariff should set out the principles guiding 
18 
the need for operational net load reductions, including restatement of the authority grid operators 
19 
have to take actions necessary to maintain reliability when operational circumstances dictate. As 
20 
compared to co-located arrangements, electrically equivalent generation/load pairings may 
21 
 
13  A separate point of interconnection for the resource taking LLGIS may require review of intervening-facility 
outages, protection coordination, stability, short-circuit impacts, and the response to a load trip. Those are 
localized issues suitable for targeted LLGIS studies and operating requirements—not grounds for studying the 
generator as though it had unrestricted ERIS or NRIS injection rights. Where the substation is newly built for 
the load and generator, the transmission owner can design the topology, breakers, relays, telemetry, and controls 
to limit contingency impacts. Eligibility for permanent LLGIS could require that, following relevant 
contingencies, the pair remain coupled, isolate together, or automatically reduce generation or load. Indeed, 
similar controls may also be required for a generator that is co-located behind the load’s point of 
interconnection to prevent unintended injection following a load trip. 
14  PJM Show-Cause Order at P 97 (“we remain concerned that the Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable without 
any uniquely tailored interconnection study process and/or generator interconnection service to recognize the 
reduced transmission system impacts that may result from the interconnection of a generating facility where the 
interconnection customer has committed, in an interconnection agreement, to limit the generating facility’s 
output to match the hourly forecast of an electrically proximate large load or large co-located load.”)

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 9 of 10 
improve reliability outcomes compared to the behind-the-meter frameworks that the Commission 
1 
has already required to be permanent, as a result of the improved metering, telemetry, 
2 
scheduling, and control required of the various front-of-the-meter components of the paired 
3 
LLGIS facilities. 
4 
Accordingly, I recommend that the Commission require the broader locational eligibility for 
5 
permanent LLGIS (to accommodate a larger set of commercially feasible arrangements to 
6 
support faster connection of new load-limited supply) to include loads and generation at 
7 
electrically equivalent locations as an available option. 
8 
IV.C. 
Reliable and Resource-Neutral Load-Limited Generator 
9 
Interconnection Service Must Include Studies of Storage 
10 
Charging 
11 
To ensure LLGIS maintains resource and technology neutrality, the service must be accessible to 
12 
storage resources. Consistent with NRIS and ERIS today, the LLGIS application process will 
13 
therefore need to include study provisions associated with reliable energy withdrawals for 
14 
charging of a potential storage resource (analogous to the ESR-LA process for storage in SPP, 
15 
which is included in the HILLGA process15). This study would need to be included in the LLGIS 
16 
interconnection process even if the storage resource does not reserve transmission service (i.e., 
17 
because it is charging pursuant to the provision of a grid service).  
18 
These charging studies—which reflect the dispatch capability of storage—are already conducted 
19 
as part of the ISO/RTO generator interconnection processes for storage requesting NRIS and 
20 
ERIS. It is important that they be extended to storage requesting LLGIS. 
21 
 
22 
 
15  See e.g., SPP, Generator Interconnection (DSIS) Manual, Version 4.4 (March 31, 2026) at § 5.

Affidavit of Andrew Levitt 
Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 etc. | Page 10 of 10 
 
1 
 
2 
Affidavit of Andrew Levitt  
 
I, Andrew Levitt, do hereby swear that I have authored this Affidavit, and that the 
statements contained therein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.  
 
Andrew Levitt  
 
 
Date: July 20, 2026