ER26-3515-000 · 2026-09-03 · Data Center Coalition

Motion to Intervene and Protest of the Data Center Coalition to PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s proposal to establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load Registry

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
) 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
 ) 
 Docket No. ER26-3515-000
) 
 
MOTION TO INTERVENE  
AND PROTEST OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION 
 
Pursuant to Rules 211, 212, and 214 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”)1 and the Commission’s August 
13, 2026 Combined Notice of Filings #2,2 the Data Center Coalition (“DCC”) hereby moves to 
intervene and submits this protest of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) proposal to establish 
Interim Resource Adequacy Service (“IRAS”) and a Large Load Registry.3 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
DCC is the membership organization for the U.S. data center industry, representing leading 
data center owners and operators that develop, operate, and maintain data center infrastructure and 
teams across the country.  DCC members operate data centers that constitute significant loads 
within the PJM region and DCC has been an active stakeholder in regional efforts to ensure 
reliability, enable new generation, and discipline load forecasts.   
DCC and its members have been at the forefront of efforts to advance reforms in PJM and 
at the state level to accommodate the growth of data centers and other large load customers within 
the PJM region while maintaining reliability and protecting existing retail customers.  DCC agrees 
 
1 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211, 385.212, and 385.214. 
2 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al., Docket No. ER26-3515-000, et al., Combined Notice of Filings #2 
(Aug. 13, 2026). 
3 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3515-000, Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to 
Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load Registry to Address System Reliability (Aug. 13, 
2026) (“Filing”).

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with PJM that steps must be taken to maintain reliability, protect existing customers from 
inappropriate cost shifts, and ensure that data centers and other large load customers take 
appropriate responsibility for supporting the development of new generation and infrastructure 
necessary to serve their demand.   
Indeed, DCC was a leading voice in the PJM Critical Issue Fast Path (“CIFP”) processes 
that led to PJM’s Filing in this docket.  From the outset of these processes, DCC championed 
reforms to enable data centers to bring their own generation capacity to insulate existing customers 
from the costs of serving demand from large load customers, as well as legally-durable pathways 
to enable states to implement interruptible retail tariffs to support grid-wide reliability and 
resilience.  Looking beyond the positions DCC took in PJM’s stakeholder process, DCC members 
have proudly joined over 200 governors, utilities, electric cooperatives, and data center developers 
in support of the White House’s “Ratepayer Protection Pledge,”4 which, through historic levels of 
industry investment in long-needed new capacity, is already helping to resolve many of the 
fundamental issues PJM aims to address through this proceeding. 
DCC also strongly supports state efforts to establish interruptible service tariffs that 
facilitate the integration of new large loads while maintaining reliability and protecting existing 
customers.  In fact, DCC has, alongside the Virginia State Corporation Commission (“VA SCC”), 
called for other state regulators to develop model retail interruptible tariffs and emergency load-
reduction programs that would allow large loads to take interruptible service, establish 
standardized curtailment obligations and operating rules, and allow state-jurisdictional utilities to 
curtail participating large commercial and industrial customers during system emergencies to 
 
4 Ratepayer Protection Pledge, THE WHITE HOUSE, Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, 
2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/.

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protect existing customers.5   
 
Notwithstanding DCC’s support for bring-your-own-generation-capacity solutions and the 
other initiatives described above, DCC believes that the IRAS proposal is legally defective and 
must be rejected.  The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) grants states—not PJM or FERC—exclusive 
authority over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service.  Yet, PJM asks the Commission to 
grant it authorization to impose a new curtailment program that aims to interrupt retail service to 
large load customers that PJM determines have failed to comply with new bring your own new 
capacity (“BYONC”) requirements prescribed in the PJM tariff (“Eligible New Large Loads”).  
Rather than accommodating state efforts to modify retail curtailment policies to account for the 
growth of large loads, IRAS instead seeks to compel states within the PJM footprint to conform 
their retail curtailment frameworks to PJM tariff requirements.  DCC believes that this top-down 
approach to addressing the curtailment of retail customers is inconsistent with principles of 
cooperative federalism and disregards the carefully calibrated division of authority between FERC 
and the states.   
 
DCC acknowledges that successfully addressing the challenges of large load integration in 
the region will require collaboration and cooperation among PJM, state regulators, large loads, 
electric distribution companies, and other stakeholders.  But Congress’s decision to reserve to the 
states authority over retail service means that it is the states that must take the lead in developing 
the retail service frameworks through which new large loads are integrated into the electric system, 
including the rules governing the priority of customer classes, the terms for interrupting service to 
retail customers, and the requirements that customers must meet to obtain firm service.  While  
 
5 See Exh. A; Letter to Ms. Paula Conboy and Mr. David Mills from VA SCC Chair, Kelsey Bagot and DCC 
President & CEO, Josh Levi (June 30, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-
rbp/2026/20260630/20260630-written-comments---va-scc-and-data-center-coalition.pdf.

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PJM has a critical role to play in ensuring that large loads are integrated into the system reliably, 
it should not seek to displace the role of the states by imposing a uniform retail curtailment policy 
across the PJM region. 
 
This does not mean that PJM and the Commission are powerless to take actions to protect 
customers from service interruptions when grid conditions are tight.  During the CIFP process, 
DCC outlined a framework for a state “opt-in framework” that would couple state-led 
implementation of interruptible service with changes to PJM’s operational practices to ensure that 
retail curtailments are implemented in a manner that recognizes the respective roles of wholesale 
and retail regulators.6  Under that proposal, states would be responsible for establishing 
interruptible customer classes for large load customers while PJM would continue to monitor 
system conditions and, when conditions warrant, would issue a signal to utilities in participating 
states that would trigger curtailments in accordance with state-established tariffs and service 
priorities.  To provide immediate relief to customers while states work to update their retail tariffs, 
DCC also proposed that PJM update its manual load-shed procedures to establish a framework 
under which data centers and other large loads would be contacted during emergencies and 
provided an opportunity to voluntarily curtail prior to PJM’s implementation of broader load dump 
procedures.   
DCC’s proposal illustrates that there are approaches that can achieve the same reliability 
outcomes as IRAS while respecting the traditional division of responsibility between FERC and 
the states.  But the benefits of a state-led approach are not limited to merely avoiding the significant 
 
6 See Exh. B; DCC Connect & Manage Alternative: State-Led Implementation with Immediate Residential 
Customer Protection (June 30, 2026), available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-
groups/committees/mc/2026/20260630-special/item-01c---data-center-coalition---cm---executive-summary.pdf.  See 
also Exh. C; DCC, A Path to Reliable Large-Load Integration: Creating Certainty for Investment, Customers, and the 
Grid 
(June 
10, 
2026), 
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-
rbp/2026/20260611/20260611-item-03a---data-center-coalition-presentation.pdf.

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legal issues presented by IRAS.  Allowing states to take the lead in establishing retail curtailment 
priorities avoids one of the other major shortcomings of IRAS: there is no assurance that a PJM-
led framework will be effective or achieve the objectives that PJM seeks.  If states are truly free to 
establish different curtailment priorities as PJM claims, PJM cannot ensure that the customers it 
seeks to target through IRAS will be curtailed, that retail customers that comply with PJM’s 
BYONC requirements will avoid service interruptions, or that the proposal will deliver the 
reliability benefits PJM claims.  
IRAS is also unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory on its own terms.  IRAS 
would create a sub-class of Network Integration Transmission Service (“NITS”) customers that 
would be defined by the characteristics of the retail customers that they serve.  NITS customers 
serving Eligible New Large Loads would be required to pay the same transmission and capacity 
charges as other NITS customers, but would be curtailed ahead of other NITS customers and firm 
point-to-point customers.  In fact, while NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads still 
would be required to pay charges reflecting the cost of capacity committed through PJM’s capacity 
market, PJM proposes to curtail these customers prior to deploying Demand Resources that have 
been committed to provide capacity to maintain reliability and avoid interruptions to firm 
customers.  The result would be to force these NITS customers to bear the costs of capacity that 
would not be available to meet their needs. 
Compounding these problems is the fact that the Filing offers no transition mechanism and 
effectively provides New Large Loads a window of less than ten months to procure new capacity 
or face curtailment—an interval that PJM’s own documented difficulties in bringing resources 
online demonstrates is not realistic.  The result is that large loads that have spent billions of dollars

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and entered complex commercial arrangements in reliance on PJM’s longstanding rules will 
suddenly face the prospect of being unable to obtain the reliable service their projects depend on.   
 
Rather than implementing measures to degrade the quality of service provided to Eligible 
New Large Loads, PJM should be pursuing reforms that eliminate barriers to the development of 
the new generation capacity needed to maintain reliability and avoid the curtailment of retail 
customers.  Yet, PJM proposes to undermine the ability of the capacity market to send price signals 
for the development of new capacity by excluding Eligible New Large Loads from the calculation 
of the Variable Resource Requirement curve (“VRR Curve”) beginning with the 2029/2030 
Delivery Year.  Ultimately, the result will be a capacity market that produces prices and results 
that are untethered to actual supply and demand conditions within the PJM footprint.  A capacity 
market that is modeled as if a large and growing increment of demand does not exist cannot send 
the price signals needed to attract the supply that PJM says the region lacks.  
DCC recognizes that the PJM region must adapt to this high load growth environment in 
which new resource entry remains frustrated and is committed to advancing durable solutions that 
preserve states’ role in integrating large loads, protect existing customers from inappropriate cost 
shifts, and provide data centers and other large loads with timely pathways to power that ultimately 
improves reliability throughout the region.  Establishing a framework that can accomplish these 
objectives is essential to ensuring that America’s industries of the future—data centers, 
semiconductors, battery manufacturing, and the automotive, steel, metal, chemical, petrochemical, 
and refining industries—remain competitive in the global economy.  But PJM’s proposal to impose 
a retail curtailment scheme on states that eviscerates the jurisdictional lines drawn by Congress, 
requires customers to pay for capacity that they will not benefit from, undermines the settled

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expectations of New Large Loads, and may ultimately prove unworkable is not a viable path 
forward.   
For the foregoing reasons, DCC asks the Commission to issue an order rejecting the Filing 
and encouraging PJM to work with stakeholders to develop changes to PJM’s emergency 
procedures that accommodate—rather than dictate—the retail curtailment priorities of individual 
states.  Alternatively, if the Commission finds that the growth of large loads has rendered PJM’s 
existing emergency procedures unjust and unreasonable, the Commission should initiate a Section 
206 proceeding to develop proposed revisions to these procedures that respect the jurisdictional 
boundaries established by the FPA while protecting existing retail customers from service 
disruptions and inappropriate cost shifts.   
If the Commission does not reject IRAS outright, then it should direct PJM to establish a 
meaningful transition mechanism that avoids disrupting existing contractual arrangements and 
provides both large load customers and the states a reasonable timeline to take the steps necessary 
to adapt to the IRAS framework.  Among other things, any transition mechanism should limit the 
application of IRAS in a manner that respects existing contracts and investment decisions, 
including exempting large load customers that have already entered into contracts for retail service 
that pre-date implementation of IRAS.  Additionally, the Commission should direct PJM to delay 
implementation of IRAS until June 1, 2028 to provide new large loads a reasonable amount of 
time to comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements and to provide state authorities with the time 
necessary to update their retail policies to account for the IRAS framework.

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II. 
PROTEST 
A. 
IRAS Unlawfully Intrudes On State Authority Over Retail Sales 
In drafting the FPA, “Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between 
state and federal jurisdiction[.]”7  Congress granted FERC jurisdiction over wholesale sales of 
electricity and transmission service in interstate commerce.8  At the same time, the FPA “limits 
FERC’s regulatory reach, and . . . maintains a zone of exclusive state jurisdiction”9 by reserving 
to the states jurisdiction over “any other sale of electric energy” and “over facilities used for the 
generation of electric energy” and “facilities used in local distribution[.]”10   
Although the “wholesale and retail markets in electricity are inextricably linked,” the mere 
fact that the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service may affect wholesale markets is not a 
sufficient basis for FERC to assert jurisdiction.11  FERC cannot take an action transgressing the 
limits prescribed by Congress “no matter how direct, or dramatic, its impact on wholesale rates.”12  
FERC may not approve tariff provisions that directly regulate retail customers, dictate retail 
service terms, or prescribe the curtailment priority of retail customers.13  Nor may FERC approve 
tariff provisions that “target” those matters left for the states to regulate.14  
PJM portrays IRAS as a narrow reliability measure that merely supplements existing 
emergency procedures.  But the proposal cannot be evaluated based on labels alone.  The 
 
7 Federal Power Comm’n v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).  
8 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).    
9 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266 (2015).  
10 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).  
11 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 264 (2015). 
12 Id. at 280. 
13 Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that FERC’s “attempt to 
regulate the curtailment of electrical transmission on native/retail consumers is unlawful, as it falls outside of the 
FPA’s specific grant of authority to FERC.”); Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., 193 FERC ¶ 
61,070, at P 49 (2025) (rejecting large load tariff that “appear[s] to dictate certain terms and conditions for retail 
sales[.]”). 
14 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385 (2015).

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Commission must examine what IRAS actually does in practice.  When PJM’s Filing and proposed 
tariff language are considered as a whole, the target of the Filing becomes clear: IRAS is an 
unprecedented program that aims to interrupt service to specific retail customers that do not 
comply with federally-approved resource procurement requirements prescribed by the PJM tariff 
and directs state-regulated distribution utilities to implement PJM’s retail curtailment priorities.   
PJM casts IRAS as a new wholesale service that retail customers can provide.  But IRAS 
is not a novel form of demand response; it is a framework for singling out retail customers for 
forced service interruptions during tight grid conditions based on criteria established in a FERC-
jurisdictional tariff.  Under IRAS, “end-use customer load” with a peak load of 50 MW or greater 
that goes into service15 after PJM prescribed deadlines (i.e., New Large Loads) will be required to 
bring capacity meeting PJM’s BYONC criteria or be deemed to be subject to interruption during 
emergency conditions.  In effect, IRAS: 
• seeks to create a new interruptible retail customer class consisting of large load 
customers that do not meet PJM’s BYONC requirements;16 
• authorizes PJM to issue curtailment instructions during prescribed conditions to 
compel Electric Distributors17 to reduce the load of these customers;18  
• directs Electric Distributors to provide compensation to Eligible New Large Loads 
whose load is curtailed pursuant to these directives equal to 50% of the Non-
Performance Charge Rate set out in the PJM tariff (unless the Eligible New Large 
Load agrees to “accept in its retail rates” a lower sum);19 and  
 
15 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 1, n.2 (defining “New Large Load” to include end-use customer load that is 
either “a Large Load that goes into service after” the deadline prescribed by the tariff or “incremental load in-service 
after [such deadline], that increases the existing end-use customer load at a single electrical site that, prior to such 
incremental load, did not previously meet the definition of Large Load.”). 
16 Id. at 69.  
17 Electric Distributor is defined as a PJM member that owns or leases electric distribution facilities that are 
used to provide electric distribution service to load within the PJM region or a cooperative or joint municipal agency 
that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric distribution service to load within 
the PJM region.  PJM, Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region, Art. 1 
(defining Electric Distributor).  
18 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 74-75, 83-84. 
19 Id. at 102.

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• directs Electric Distributors to impose charges on other customers to fund these 
compensation payments.20 
PJM has failed to provide a sufficient basis for the Commission to find that IRAS does not 
regulate the terms and conditions of retail service in ways that go beyond the Commission’s 
authority.  FERC does not have any authority to exercise jurisdiction over the quality of service 
that retail customers receive, the terms and conditions that retail customers must meet to avoid 
interruption during emergency conditions, or the compensation paid to retail customers whose 
service is curtailed.  Each of these areas are matters that states have historically regulated pursuant 
to their exclusive authority over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service.   
The extent to which IRAS targets matters within the jurisdiction of the states is readily 
discernable by even a cursory review of the subject matters addressed by state laws and tariffs 
governing retail service.  For instance, state laws and tariffs within the PJM region recognize the 
authority of state public utility commissions to establish the relative priority of retail customers for 
service,21 require state electric utilities to implement curtailments in a manner that complies with 
state law and regulation, establish interruptible service classes,22 determine eligibility for 
participation in interruptible rate schedules,23 and establish credits and compensation for customers 
 
20 Id., Att. A, Proposed Att. DD-4(X). 
21 See, e.g., Va. Code § 56-250 (authorizing Virginia state corporation commission to establish plan 
governing curtailment of retail customers during grid emergencies and shortages); 20 VAC5-300-20 (establishing 
procedures for Virginia utilities to take during emergencies and establishing relative priority of residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers);  Ohio Administrative Code 4901:5-19 (recognizing right of Public Utility 
Commission of Ohio to implement measures that fulfill “electric requirements for priority use by its consumers” and 
reallocate or curtail supplies “among its consumers”).  
22 See, e.g., PPL Electric Utilities Corp., General Tariff: Rules and Rate Schedules for Electric Service, Rate 
Schedule LP-6 (Large Load Interconnections) (providing large load customers the option to voluntarily elect 
“interruptible service . . . instead of firm service”). 
23 See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for 
Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143, In The Form Of An Electric Security Plan, 
Opinion and Order, Case No. 23-23-EL-SSO at ¶¶ 105-109, 140-144 (Apr. 3, 2024) (approving interruptible power 
tariff for customers that meet notice requirements and establishing demand credits).

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that interrupt their service.24  The service classification of retail customers, the curtailment priority 
of different classes, and the consideration paid for these service interruptions are all familiar 
components of state-regulated retail service and beyond the bounds of permissible FERC 
regulation.  
PJM attempts to justify its proposal by stating that it will not curtail specific end-use 
customers directly, but will direct Electric Distributors25 to curtail these customers’ demand.26  But 
the fact that PJM does not have authority to directly curtail retail customers merely reinforces that 
PJM is attempting to exercise control over matters that are outside of its purview and beyond the 
boundaries of the Commission’s jurisdiction.  And the fact that PJM is attempting to do indirectly 
what it cannot do directly is of no legal significance.27  The FPA leaves no room either for FERC 
to directly regulate retail sales or approve regulations that would indirectly achieve this result. 
PJM argues that IRAS is consistent with the Supreme Court’s determination in EPSA that 
Order No. 745’s directive to regional transmission organizations (“RTO”) and independent system 
operators (“ISO”) to pay demand response resources participating in the energy market the 
locational price for energy did not intrude on the jurisdiction of the states.28  But the reasoning that 
the Court employed in sustaining Order No. 745 in EPSA has no application to IRAS.   
Importantly, EPSA upheld Order No. 745 based on the Court’s determination that Order 
No. 745 merely established a rate for wholesale transactions and was confined solely to the rules 
 
24 See, e.g., id. 
25 DCC notes that it is unclear how PJM’s proposal would work in retail choice jurisdictions where 
competitive retail suppliers—rather than the Electric Distributor—may be responsible for providing service to retail 
customers. 
26 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 86.  
27 Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 163 (2016) (“FPA leaves no room either for direct 
state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales or for regulation that would indirectly achieve the same result.”). 
28 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266 (2015).

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governing the wholesale markets.29  The same cannot be said of IRAS.  To the contrary, PJM’s 
tariff revisions seek to prescribe the amount paid to retail customers through their retail rates for 
service interruptions implemented at PJM’s direction.30  And, in contrast to Order No. 745, the 
effectiveness of PJM’s proposed framework depends on electric distributors issuing directives to 
their retail customers to reduce demand31 and state regulatory authorities adopting retail tariffs that 
align with the curtailment priorities set forth in the PJM tariff.32  
 
The Court also noted that Order No. 745 was carefully crafted to preserve the jurisdiction 
of the states by providing state regulators with the option of prohibiting retail customers from 
offering demand response into the wholesale markets33 and FERC’s “justifications for regulating 
demand response are all about, and only about, improving the wholesale market.”34  IRAS does 
not provide state regulators with any such opt out.  Regardless of the decisions made by individual 
state regulators, PJM will continue to issue directives to electric distributors to curtail New Large 
Load customers that do not comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements.  And while the 
justifications for Order No. 745 were all about the wholesale market, PJM acknowledges that IRAS 
is intended to “establish load reduction priorities for retail customers”35 and encourage “states to 
 
29 Id. at 282 (stating that “every aspect of the regulatory plan happens exclusively on the wholesale market 
and governs exclusively that market’s rules”).  
30 Filing, Att. A, Proposed Att. DD-4(X)(a) (stating that the rate for the provision of IRAS “shall be 50% of 
the Non-Performance Charge Rate . . . unless any Eligible New Large Load elects to (i) accept in its retail rates a sum 
less than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate . . . or (ii) waive receipt in its retail rates any compensation for 
the provision of” IRAS”) (emphasis added). 
31 Id., Transmittal Letter at 26 (“Electric Distributors must execute PJM’s load reduction directives when 
PJM issues an Interim Resource Adequacy Alert.”).  
32 Id. at 3 (“PJM anticipates participating in efforts to develop standardized regulatory tools and model retail 
tariff structures that individual state commissions may consider as they address the integration of new loads and 
otherwise decide whether and how to act in response to the evolving federal wholesale landscape, inclusive of the 
IRAS filing.”).  
33 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 287 (“[T]he Rule allows any State regulator to prohibit 
its consumers from making demand response bids in the wholesale market.”).  
34 Id. at 282. 
35 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 31.

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re-evaluate load reduction plans.”36  The objective of IRAS is clear: to compel state regulators to 
modify their regulation of the retail market to conform to PJM policy.  
Additionally, Order No. 745 established the rate that demand response providers would be 
paid if they voluntarily elected to participate in the wholesale markets.  The wholesale demand 
response programs at issue in Order No. 745 did not compel retail customers to curtail their loads 
involuntarily or state regulators to re-evaluate their retail curtailment programs.  IRAS, in contrast, 
targets individual retail customers that fail to comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements for 
involuntary curtailment and seeks to ensure that states conform their curtailment policies to align 
with the priorities established by the PJM tariff. 
PJM attempts to avoid these jurisdictional issues by claiming that states retain discretion37 
over how to shape their retail policies in response to IRAS and that it will be Electric Distributors 
and state regulators that determine which retail customers actually are curtailed.  PJM’s reasoning 
misses the point.  It is the role of the states—not PJM—to establish load reduction priorities for 
retail service.  Neither PJM nor FERC should be dictating retail curtailment rules, whether directly 
or by establishing market rules intended to compel compliance.  
Ultimately, IRAS does not offer states a genuine choice.  For a state to ignore PJM’s 
dictates would be to run the risk that reliability events could result in broader service disruptions 
affecting other customers within its jurisdiction rather than a more targeted curtailment of 
individual large load customers.  Offering states the choice between compliance and indiscriminate 
curtailment of retail customers is well past the point at which “pressure turns into compulsion” and 
 
36 Id. at 3.   
37 Notwithstanding PJM’s claims about the flexibility afforded to state authorities, a decision by FERC to 
assert jurisdiction over, and approve, IRAS would raise serious legal questions about what discretion states have to 
deviate from the terms of the filed rate approved by the Commission.  See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 
476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (once FERC “sets a rate, a state may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-
approved wholesale rates are unreasonable”).

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undermines the cooperative federalism embodied in the FPA.38 
Even if states were given a meaningful choice, PJM’s repeated references to the discretion 
of the states as to whether to comply with IRAS highlights a fundamental flaw in PJM’s proposal. 
PJM cannot simultaneously maintain that states retain meaningful discretion over the 
implementation of retail curtailments and assume that IRAS will operate exactly as PJM describes.  
If states are genuinely free to establish different curtailment priorities, PJM cannot guarantee that 
the customers it seeks to target through IRAS will actually be curtailed or that the proposal will 
achieve its objectives.  
Nor can PJM ensure that new large load customers that comply with PJM’s BYONC 
requirements will avoid service interruption.  For instance, an Eligible New Large Load customer 
that procures new capacity to meet its load may still experience service disruptions during 
emergency conditions if the relevant state authorities and Electric Distributors do not adopt 
curtailment priorities that align with the IRAS framework.  The lack of certainty that a customer 
that complies with PJM’s BYONC requirements will avoid service interruptions will undermine 
one of the primary justifications for the IRAS framework: to provide an incentive for new large 
load customers to support the development of new capacity required to meet their needs. 
PJM states that IRAS is merely an example of the “federal regime helping to effectuate 
state decisions associated with the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service.”39  But it is quite 
the opposite.  Rather than accommodating state decisions—as the proposal DCC advanced in the 
PJM stakeholder process would have—PJM asks the Commission to approve a tariff framework 
designed to ensure that retail customers are curtailed in a manner that aligns with PJM’s 
 
38 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
39 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 3.

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preferences, priorities, and requirements.  If Congress had intended to give FERC the authority to 
determine the retail load priorities within 13 states and the District of Columbia then it would have 
explicitly provided FERC with this authority in the FPA.40  But it did not.  Instead, it explicitly 
denied FERC any authority to exercise jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail 
service, reserving these matters to the states.   
PJM minimizes jurisdictional concerns by noting that the FPA’s drafters could not have 
foreseen the resource adequacy impacts of data centers and technological advancements in 
artificial intelligence.41  That may be true.  But the drafters of the FPA did foresee a different risk: 
that federal regulation of the electric industry could encroach upon the authority long enjoyed by 
the states.  Congress therefore drew a clear jurisdictional boundary, granting FERC authority over 
wholesale sales and interstate transmission while reserving regulation of retail service to the states.  
Implicit in this structure is the recognition that not all problems require a federal solution.  The 
novelty of today’s reliability challenges does not permit the Commission to disregard the 
boundaries established by Congress.       
 
40 West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 716 (2022) (explaining that under the major questions doctrine, “courts 
‘expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political 
significance.’”) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 571 U.S. 302 (2014)). 
41 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 91.

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B. 
IRAS Is Unjust, Unreasonable, Unduly Discriminatory, And Inconsistent 
With Cost Causation Requirements 
 
1. 
Curtailing New Large Loads Before Requiring Demand Resources To 
Perform Is Unjust And Unreasonable 
The purpose of committing capacity through the PJM Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) 
is to ensure that PJM has sufficient resources available to avoid the risk of supply interruptions.42  
In the last two PJM Base Residual Auctions (“BRA”), Demand Resources were paid over a 
combined $1.5 billion to reduce their demand when called upon by PJM to maintain reliability.43  
Demand Resources are compensated at this level based on “the expectation that such resources 
will be available to provide energy and reserves when called upon” just like other Capacity 
Resources.44   
If IRAS is approved, however, Demand Resources committed through the capacity market 
will no longer be available to serve the needs of Eligible New Large Load customers.  Specifically, 
PJM’s proposed curtailment order following the adoption of IRAS would be as follows:  
• PJM dispatches available generation and economic demand response;45 
 
• PJM curtails non-firm export transactions associated with Capacity Resources;46 
 
• PJM curtails new Non-Firm Contract Demand Service and Interim Network 
Integrated Transmission Service;47 
 
42 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, 
and Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 14 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-
design.pdf.  See also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 520 (2026) (“Capacity resources are 
purchased to meet the needs of transmission customers taking existing firm service, such as NITS.”). 
43 See PJM 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction Report at 2-3, 5, 12 (July 14, 2026), available at: 
https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (showing 7,641 MW of Demand Response clearing at 
$333.44 MW-day for 2027/2028 Delivery Year and 7,364 MW of Demand Response clearing at $325.00 MW-day 
for 2028/2029 Delivery Year).  
44 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 151 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 99 (2015).  
45 Filing, Att. C – Aff. of Christopher Pilong on behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at ¶ 8.  See also Filing, 
Transmittal Letter at 78. 
46 Id. at ¶ 9.  See also Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78. 
47 Id. at ¶ 12.  See also Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78.

- 17 - 
 
• PJM curtails Eligible New Large Loads under IRAS;48 and, finally, 
 
• PJM initiates Pre-Emergency Load Management Reduction Actions, including 
mandatory reductions for Demand Response.49 
In short, under PJM’s proposal New Large Loads that have not satisfied the BYONC requirements 
will be curtailed before PJM calls on Demand Resources that have been paid to reduce their load.50  
PJM has not demonstrated that it is just and reasonable to direct the curtailment of retail 
customers prior to deploying Demand Resources that have been committed precisely to avoid such 
service disruptions.  The point of Capacity Resources and Demand Resources is that they will 
provide capacity when called upon “to avoid periods of involuntarily firm load shed or 
blackouts.”51  And the Commission has consistently found that paying resources, including 
Demand Resources, for capacity but not expecting them to perform “threaten[s] reliable operation 
of the system and forc[es] consumers to pay for capacity without receiving commensurate 
reliability benefits” ultimately resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates.52  PJM’s IRAS proposal 
reverses that relationship: PJM proposes to involuntarily curtail customers that continue paying 
 
48 Id. at ¶ 13. See also Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78.  
49 Id. at ¶ 14; PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations § 2 (Revision 98; effective June 24, 2026) 
(“Applicability: Any site registered in the PJM Demand Response program as a demand resource (a.k.a. DR) type that 
needs 30, 60 or 120 minute lead time to make its reductions.  These reductions are mandatory when dispatched during 
the product availability window.”).  
50 The relative curtailment priority of Eligible New Large Loads and Demand Resources also raises questions 
about the efficacy of the IRAS framework.  Under PJM’s proposal, a New Eligible Large Load would have a strong 
incentive to become a Demand Resource, receive capacity revenues, and then be dispatched under PJM’s demand 
response rules—after IRAS otherwise would have required it to curtail.  In effect, a New Large Load customer could 
move from paying for capacity and being curtailed prior to the deployment of demand response to receiving capacity 
revenues and receiving a later curtailment priority simply by changing its wholesale market status.   
51 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, 
and Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 14 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-
design.pdf. 
52 ISO New England, Inc., 147 FERC ¶ 61,172, at P 23 (2014).

- 18 - 
capacity charges while leaving Demand Resources that have been committed to provide capacity 
undeployed.  
The only explanation PJM has provided to justify its proposal is that Demand Resources 
are curtailed as part of the Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions when a North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation Energy Emergency Alert Level 1 (“EEA1”) is established.53  And 
because Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions indicate that the “region is approaching a 
capacity event,” PJM says that it is “[t]hus, … appropriate for PJM to direct Electric Distributors 
to reduce those New Large Loads that have failed to cover their capacity obligations before relying 
on Demand Resources, through Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions Actions, to 
maintain reliability.”54  
While it is obvious that requiring Eligible New Large Loads to curtail would be helpful to 
avoid Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions Actions, it does not follow that curtailing 
retail customers through IRAS is an appropriate mechanism to prevent Demand Response from 
being called upon to avoid Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions Actions.  If PJM is 
concerned that calling upon Demand Resources will trigger a Pre-Emergency Load Management 
Reduction or EEA1 earlier than it believes is warranted, it should revise its curtailment procedures 
to allow it to require Demand Response to perform without triggering a Pre-Emergency Load 
Management Reduction or EEA1.  Indeed, PJM has previously recognized that it needed to revise 
its definition of “Emergency Action” to avoid triggering a Performance Assessment Interval 
(“PAI”) when it called upon Demand Resources: 
[I]nclusion of load management resources, which are generally committed Demand 
Resources in the capacity market, in the definition of Emergency Action is not 
representative of a capacity emergency.  That is because Pre-Emergency Load 
 
53 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 79.  
54 Id. (emphasis in original).

- 19 - 
Response Program, like all other committed Capacity Resources, should be able to 
support the reliability needs of the PJM Region regardless of whether there is a 
capacity emergency.  Consequently, deployment of pre-emergency load 
management reduction should not, in and of itself, trigger a PAI.55 
 
If PJM is similarly concerned that it cannot call upon Demand Resources before triggering a Pre-
Emergency Load Management Reduction or EEA1, then it should revise its curtailment procedures 
so that Demand Resources can be relied upon to perform the capacity function they are paid for.  
But PJM should not be permitted to only rely on Demand Resources after it has issued directives 
calling for the curtailment of retail load.  
2. 
Curtailing Load That Pays For Demand Response Before Calling Upon 
Demand Response Is Inconsistent With Cost Causation Requirements 
 
 
The Commission and the courts have recognized that the FPA’s “just and reasonable” 
standard incorporates a cost causation principle.56  The cost causation principle requires that “all 
approved rates reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay 
them” and prohibits the Commission from approving a rate scheme that will result in one group of 
customers being required to subsidize the provision of service to a different group of customers.57  
The cost causation principle can be considered “a matter of making sure that burden is matched 
with benefit.”58 
 
DCC and its members are committed to paying for the costs associated with integrating 
data centers into the grid, including the incremental capacity costs associated with providing them 
firm, reliable service.  DCC is also a strong proponent of BYONC mechanisms that facilitate 
 
55 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER23-1996-000, Proposed Revisions to Prospectively Refine 
the Definition of Emergency Action, Request for Shortened Comment Period and Expedited Commission Action at 8 
(May 30, 2023).  
56  See, e.g., City of Lincoln v. FERC, 89 F.4th 926, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2024). 
57 Constellation Mystic Power, LLC v. FERC, 45 F.4th 1028, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Black Oak 
Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).  
58 BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d 264, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

- 20 - 
pathways to power for data centers and other large loads while adding capacity to the grid for the 
benefit of all customers.  But it is nevertheless important that costs imposed on large loads be 
consistent with the cost causation principle.   
PJM’s IRAS proposal will result in Eligible New Large Load customers incurring the 
burden of paying Demand Resources for capacity for which these large loads will not receive a 
corresponding benefit.  Under PJM’s proposal, NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads 
will continue to be responsible for paying Locational Reliability Charges reflecting the costs of 
capacity procured through the BRA, including Demand Resources—costs that ultimately will be 
passed through to Eligible New Large Load customers.59  Yet, these NITS customers and the 
Eligible New Large Loads that they serve will no longer benefit from the Demand Resources 
committed through the capacity market, as these resources will only be called upon to perform 
after PJM issues a directive to these customers to curtail.  Requiring NITS customers and their 
retail customers to pay the costs of capacity that only will be deployed after their service has been 
curtailed is inconsistent with cost causation requirements.  
 
PJM appeared to recognize as much in its stakeholder process.  Specifically, in its June 10, 
2026 presentation to stakeholders PJM stated that “[l]oads that are subject to Connect and Manage 
[now known as IRAS] are not assessed capacity charges” and that it “will adjust EDC RPM Load 
Obligations to reflect UCAP associated with new Large Loads assigned Connect & Manage.”60  
Yet, PJM’s Filing in this proceeding is devoid of any tariff revisions that would result in Eligible 
New Large Loads subject to IRAS being exempt from capacity charges.  PJM has not proposed to 
 
59 See PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market § 9.2.1 (Revision 62; effective Dec. 17, 2025) (“Each LSE that 
serves load in a PJM Zone or load outside PJM using PJM resources (Non-Zone Network Load) during the Delivery 
Year is responsible for paying a Locational Reliability Charge equal to their Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in a 
Zone times the applicable Final Zonal Capacity Price for that Delivery Year.”).  
60 PJM CIFP–RBP / Connect and Manage - Stage 3 (June 10, 2026 – Meeting Materials), Connect & Manage 
Package Updates at 40 (June 10, 2026), available at: https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp.

- 21 - 
revise provisions of its tariff addressing the Locational Reliability Charge61 or the determination 
of Unforced Capacity Obligations.62  Moreover, PJM’s Filing does not include any mention of 
exempting Eligible New Large Loads from a capacity charge other than its cursory statement that 
“[t]he net result” of the compensation that may be paid to Eligible New Large Loads subject to 
curtailment “is a reduced capacity charge for Eligible New Large Loads.”63  But even if this 
compensation was intended to offset the capacity costs Eligible New Large Loads will pay for, it 
is only a partial offset.  And, as PJM concedes, there is no guarantee that such compensation will 
even be awarded to Eligible New Large Loads.”64   
 
The cost causation principle “generally calls for giving the same treatment to new and 
continuing customers, [w]here ‘all customers cause the incurrence of the costs . . . , whether by 
adding or merely continuing their usage[.]”65  But this principle is founded upon the understanding 
that all customers contributing to the costs will be given an equal opportunity to enjoy the 
corresponding benefits.  It is inconsistent with cost causation to force Eligible New Large Loads 
to bear the cost of Demand Resources that will not be used to provide them with service.  And if 
Eligible New Large Loads are to bear the costs of these capacity resources, then Demand 
Resources committed to provide capacity should be deployed prior to interrupting service to 
Eligible New Large Loads.       
 
61 PJM, Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region § 7.2 (“[E]ach 
Party shall pay, as to the loads it serves in each Zone during a Delivery Year, a Locational Reliability Charge for each 
such Zone during such Delivery Year.  The Locational Reliability Charge shall equal such Party’s Daily Unforced 
Capacity Obligation in a Zone, as determined pursuant to RAA, Schedule 8, times the Final Zonal Capacity Price for 
such Zone, as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD.”).  
62 PJM, Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region, Schedule 8.  
63 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 104.  
64 Id. at 106 (stating that “how this wholesale rate is used to compensate for IRAS and how it is used to collect 
monies for such compensation will be left to the Electric Distributors that directed the specific load reductions to 
implement IRAS, consistent with their state-approved program…”). 
65 BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d 264, 268 (2014) (citations omitted).

- 22 - 
To be clear, data centers are committed to paying their fair share of the costs associated 
with procuring sufficient capacity to maintain reliability in PJM.  Indeed, the DCC and the data 
center industry generally have been vocal proponents of proposals that allow data centers to bring 
their own capacity to mitigate the potential resource adequacy impact of large load integration.  
But where data centers in fact pay for capacity and that capacity is available to be called upon to 
preserve reliability, it is unjust and unreasonable for PJM to instead curtail data centers and other 
large loads rather than requiring paid-for capacity to perform.   
3. 
PJM’s Proposal Will Require Customers In Zones With Large Load 
Customers To Subsidize The Costs Of Capacity For The PJM Region   
PJM’s IRAS proposal also presents a separate and distinct cost causation issue: customers 
located in electric distribution service areas where large loads are interconnecting will be required 
to subsidize the cost of capacity for the broader PJM region.  Under PJM’s proposal, Eligible New 
Large Loads will contribute to paying a share of Locational Reliability Charges and, thus, reduce 
the capacity costs borne by other customers across the PJM region.  PJM then proposes to offset 
these capacity costs by requiring Electric Distributors to compensate Eligible New Large Load 
customers that are curtailed under IRAS.  However, the costs of funding these payments to Eligible 
New Large Loads will not be allocated across the region.  Instead, PJM’s proposal contemplates 
that Electric Distributors will be required to fund these payments by imposing additional charges 
on the customers within their service territory.  The net result of this framework is that customers 
in service territories with large load growth effectively will be required to subsidize rate reductions 
for customers in other portions of the PJM footprint.66   
PJM’s proposed payment scheme for funding payments to Eligible New Large Loads 
 
66 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 101.  Indeed, PJM says that the rate paid to large loads for curtailment under 
IRAS by electric distributors is “intended to be conjoined with retail rates.” Filing, Transmittal Letter at 104.

- 23 - 
violates cost causation requirements.  As the courts have recognized, the cost causation principle 
prohibits the Commission from approving a rate scheme that requires one set of customers to 
subsidize the provision of service to others.67  In this case, the capacity-related benefits produced 
by Eligible New Large Loads would be shared across the PJM region through lower Locational 
Reliability Charges, but the costs of compensating those loads for IRAS curtailments would be 
imposed on customers in the host Electric Distributor’s service territory.  The result is a mismatch 
between costs and benefits: customers in areas experiencing large load growth are required to fund 
a regional benefit enjoyed by customers throughout PJM.  Cost causation principles do not permit 
such cross subsidization.  
4. 
Providing Inferior Service At The Same Price Is Unjust, Unreasonable, 
and Contrary To Cost Causation Principles 
PJM also has not demonstrated that charging NITS customers serving Eligible New Large 
Loads the same transmission rates as other NITS customers is just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.  The Commission repeatedly has recognized that the transmission 
rates imposed on customers must reflect the firmness of the service provided.68  In Order No. 888, 
the Commission recognized that “non-firm transmission prices should reflect the interruptibility 
of the service and should promote efficient use of the transmission system[.]”69  More recently, 
the Commission rejected the PJM Transmission Owner’s proposal to set the rate for Non-Firm 
Contract Demand transmission service equal to the rate for Firm Point-to-Point Service because it 
 
67 El Paso Elec. Co. v. FERC, 76 F.4th 352, 363 (5th Cir. 2023). 
68 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 406 (2026) (stating that “rates should vary based 
on the quality of the transmission service”).  
69 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Servs. by Pub. 
Utils.; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Pub. Utils. & Transmitting Utils., Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 
(1996), clarified, 76 FERC ¶ 61,009 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, at 
30272 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 
FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 
225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).

- 24 - 
found “the rates should vary based on the quality of the transmission service.”70  Under the IRAS 
proposal, NITS customers subject to interruption under IRAS would be required to pay the same 
transmission rates as other NITS customers despite receiving inferior service.   
PJM cannot have it both ways.  If NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads pay 
the same rates as other NITS customers, then they should receive a comparable level of service 
and be curtailed at the same time as other NITS customers.  Alternatively, if PJM is going to 
subject NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads to interruption ahead of other NITS 
customers, then the rates for these customers must reflect the lower quality of service being 
provided.  PJM’s proposal to offer less service at the same price is unjust, unreasonable, and 
contrary to cost causation requirements.   
5. 
Excluding New Large Loads From The VRR Curve Will Undermine 
Efforts To Maintain Reliability 
 
At a time when PJM needs additional capacity to meet resource adequacy needs within the 
region, PJM’s proposal to exclude New Large Loads that do not meet BYONC requirements from 
the VRR Curve beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year is counterproductive and 
misguided.71  The VRR Curve is intended to “produce accurate market signals that will encourage 
appropriate capacity investment and achieve an adequate level of reliability.”72  But the VRR 
Curve and the market as a whole can only send the price signals necessary to attract new 
investment if they accurately reflect supply-demand conditions within the PJM region.  By 
excluding Eligible New Large Loads from consideration in the capacity market, PJM’s proposal 
will result in a capacity market construct that will produce market prices and results that are 
 
70 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 406 (2026). 
71 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 23.   
72 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 167 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 19 (2019).

- 25 - 
untethered from market fundamentals within the PJM region.  
The fact that excluding Eligible New Large Loads from the VRR curve will mute 
investment signals and undermine reliability has been acknowledged by PJM.  In the stakeholder 
process, PJM explained that it was important to model loads subject to IRAS in the RPM because 
“[i]ncluding Connect and Manage [now known as IRAS] in the RPM Auction continues to provide 
price signals for new investment while providing an incentive for New Large Load to BYONC 
through new supply or DR/DER.”73  Indeed, there would be no way for the market to send a price 
signal that additional supply is needed in the region if the market treats new demand as if it did not 
exist.  The PJM Board, however, modified the IRAS proposal to remove Eligible New Large Loads 
from the VRR Curve on the basis that “[i]ncremental new Large Loads relative to the forecast 
utilized for the 2028/2029 BRA will be excluded from the forecast used in future RPM auctions 
for the 2029/2030 Delivery Year and beyond unless and until there are new supply resources 
offered into an RPM auction in sufficient quantity to cover the new Large Load.”74  The PJM 
Board cannot expect new supply resources to appear if the price signals sent by the market do not 
reflect—as will be the case under PJM’s IRAS proposal—the actual load that must be served in 
the region.  
  
While PJM’s proposal may temporarily suppress capacity prices, it will do so based on an 
utterly inaccurate view of the actual demand for capacity in PJM.  And if the RPM does not 
accurately reflect demand, it is hard to understand how PJM expects the RPM to send price signals 
that will ensure the entry of new resources capable of meeting the region’s needs.  As the 
 
73 PJM CIFP – RBP / Connect and Manage - Stage 3 (May 27, 2026 – Meeting Materials), Connect and 
Manage PJM Package at 29 (May 27, 2026), available at: https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp. 
74 PJM Post CIFP Workshop - Technical Overview, PJM Board - CIFP Framework for Service During 
Periods of Insufficient Resource Adequacy - Executive Summary (July 30, 2026), available at: 
https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp.

- 26 - 
Commission observed, a capacity market should “provide price signals that guide the orderly entry 
and exit of capacity resources, result in the selection of the least-cost set of resources that possess 
the attributes sought by the markets, provide price transparency, shift risk as appropriate from 
customers to private capital, and mitigate market power.”75  But a capacity market that does not 
send price signals that accurately reflect market fundamentals cannot achieve these objectives.  
6. 
PJM’s Proposal To Provide Inferior Service To NITS Customers 
Serving Eligible New Large Loads Is Unduly Discriminatory 
IRAS is not merely a change to PJM’s emergency operating procedures.  IRAS degrades 
one of the defining characteristics of NITS—its curtailment priority—for a subset of customers.  
NITS customers historically have been entitled to receive “firm transmission service over the 
Transmission System for the delivery of capacity and energy from its designated Network 
Resources to service its Network Loads on a basis that is comparable to each Transmission 
Owner’s use of the Transmission System to reliably service its Native Load Customers.”76  When 
curtailments are required to maintain reliability, the transmission provider is required to curtail 
NITS customers on a non-discriminatory and pro rata basis consistent with the treatment of native 
load and firm point-to-point customers.77    
This will no longer be the case if IRAS is accepted.  In practical terms, IRAS creates a 
form of second-class NITS customers.  NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads will 
continue purchasing NITS and paying the same transmission and capacity charges as other firm 
customers.  Yet, these NITS customers and the Eligible New Large Loads that they serve will be 
deprived of one of the principal benefits of NITS: protection from service interruptions and 
 
75 ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 21 (2018).   
76 PJM Tariff, Part III § 28.1.  
77 PJM Tariff, Part II § 13.6; id., Part III § 33.5.

- 27 - 
curtailment on a basis comparable to other firm uses of the system.78  PJM cannot charge customers 
for firm service while reserving the right to treat them as interruptible customers when reliability 
conditions deteriorate.   
The FPA prohibits public utilities from engaging in any undue discrimination or granting 
any undue preference or advantage in providing transmission service.79  Undue discrimination or 
preference occurs, as both the courts and the Commission have held, when similarly situated 
customers are treated differently “for no good reason.”80  To justify treating customers differently, 
the prohibition on undue discrimination requires that the utility proposing disparate treatment 
demonstrate that there are “specific factual differences” between the customers that justify the 
specific rates, terms, and conditions imposed by the utility.81  
PJM does not deny that its proposal is discriminatory.  Instead, it attempts to justify the 
differences in treatment by pointing to the Commission’s decision to require PJM to revise its tariff 
to create a definition for large loads and cites to general statements by the Commission that large 
loads are unique and pose specific challenges to the transmission system.82  But PJM cannot justify 
the disparate treatment proposed in this case by making general references to the unique challenges 
posed by large load integration.  The issue is not merely whether there are some differences 
between the classes at issue; but whether there are differences that are “material to the inquiry at 
hand” that justify the specific differences in treatment that are being proposed.83   
 
78 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 94 (stating that NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Load customers 
will “be asked to reduce load prior to other NITS customers in accordance with the Interim Resource Adequacy 
Service they may be asked to provide”).  
79 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b).  
80 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 45 F.4th 265, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2022); State Corp. Comm’n of Kan. v. FERC, 
876 F.3d 322, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
81 See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1212 (7th Cir. 1978).   
82 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 96. 
83 N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,124, at P 10 (2018).  See Basin Elec. Power Cooperative, 
188 FERC ¶ 61,132, at PP 95-96 (2024).

- 28 - 
PJM has failed to meet its burden in this case.  As an initial matter, PJM’s suggestion that 
FERC has granted transmission providers carte blanche to discriminate against large load 
customers because of the characteristics of these customers is simply incorrect.  It is true that the 
Commission has required PJM to revise its tariff to include a definition of large load.  But the 
Commission also has sought to create new pathways for large loads to come online while 
protecting customers and maintaining reliability, including encouraging PJM and other 
transmission providers to revise their tariffs to create new transmission service products that better 
align with the characteristics of large load customers, create new interim pathways for the 
integration of large load customers and new generation capacity, and provide these customers with 
greater flexibility to calibrate their use of the transmission system to meet their needs.84  The notion 
that the Commission has found that large load customers inherently are less deserving of firm, 
predictable service is incorrect and unsupported by Commission precedent.  
 
Additionally, PJM’s justification fails to account for the fact that IRAS will result in 
Electric Distributors serving large load receiving very different treatment based on the timing of 
when the load is placed into service.  Under IRAS, two Electric Distributors purchasing NITS to 
serve loads of comparable size and paying the same rate will receive fundamentally different 
services based on when their retail customers were placed into service.  For instance, an Electric 
Distributor that takes NITS to serve a 100 MW large load customer that is placed into service on 
May 31, 2027 will not be interrupted during an emergency until PJM initiates a manual load dump 
action after all capacity resources have been exhausted.  An Electric Distributor who takes NITS 
to serve a 100 MW large load customer that is placed into service one day later, on June 1, 2027, 
 
84 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, at P 2 (2025) (directing changes to the PJM 
tariff to better account for the characteristics of large load customers).

- 29 - 
will not be guaranteed this same level of service unless they demonstrate that the retail customer’s 
load is supported by new capacity complying with PJM’s BYONC requirements.  
The arbitrary nature of IRAS becomes especially apparent when applied to facilities with 
a load ramp.  Two otherwise identical MW of the same facility could be subject to different 
curtailment priorities solely because one increment of load came online before PJM’s cutoff date 
and the other came online after.85  Such vintage-based discrimination does not reflect any 
difference material to reliability or resource adequacy and cannot justify the disparate treatment at 
issue here.  
 
Nor has PJM demonstrated that the timing of when load has come online is a legitimate 
basis for discrimination.  Existing resources, like new resources, contribute to the need for 
capacity86 and PJM has not explained why existing customers should receive preferential 
treatment.  IRAS appears premised on the assumption that New Large Load customers solely are 
responsible for recent supply shortfalls in the BRA.  But there are multiple factors that have 
contributed to the supply-demand balance within the PJM region, including the retirement of 
existing generation resources, the slow pace of new entry, and load growth within the region.87  
PJM offers no evidence that a MW of demand imposes different resource adequacy impacts based 
solely on when the demand first takes service.  Nor does PJM explain why new customers should 
 
85 As noted above, PJM proposes to define New Large Load as end-use customer load that is either a Large 
Load that goes into service after June 1, 2027 or incremental load in-service after this deadline that increases the 
existing end-use customer load at a site that did not previously meet the definition of Large Load.  Filing, Transmittal 
Letter at 1, n.2.  Although PJM’s proposed definition of New Large Load is ambiguous, DCC understands that PJM 
intends to subject any increment of load placed in service by a large load customer after the deadline to IRAS unless 
the increment is supported by capacity meeting PJM’s BYONC requirements.  However, DCC believes that the 
Commission should require PJM to clarify the scope of its proposal and its application to customers with load ramp 
periods that extend beyond the deadlines prescribed in the PJM tariff.  
86 BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d 264, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
87 See PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained 
Supply, and Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 4 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-
design.pdf.

- 30 - 
bear the reliability impact of generation retirements or a broken interconnection process.  PJM’s 
proposal to afford less favorable treatment to customers merely because they are “new” is unduly 
discriminatory and should be rejected. 
In short, PJM’s proposal to afford less favorable treatment to NITS customers serving 
Eligible New Large Loads is unduly discriminatory and preferential.  NITS customers serving 
Eligible New Large Loads are similarly situated to other NITS customers: they have reserved firm 
transmission to allow them to meet their supply obligations, pay the same transmission rates as 
other NITS customers, and will pay the costs of capacity that has been committed through the 
RPM to maintain reliability.  Yet, IRAS will result in NITS customers serving Eligible New Large 
Loads being afforded less favorable treatment than other NITS customers.  And PJM’s vague 
references to the unique characteristics of large customers are insufficient to justify the arbitrary 
differences in treatment under the IRAS proposal.   
C. 
IRAS Fails To Account For Existing Contractual Arrangements And Reliance 
Interests 
Although PJM is permitted to make filings under FPA Section 205 to change its market 
rules, in evaluating these changes FERC must be cognizant that existing market rules “may have 
‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account’”88 and “‘assess whether 
there were reliance interests’ in the prior rule, determine whether those interests ‘[are] significant,’ 
and weigh them ‘against competing policy concerns.’”89   
PJM’s proposal to curtail a subset of retail customers that do not bring their own capacity 
represents a fundamental shift in how PJM’s markets have functioned for the duration of its 
existence.  For decades new loads in the PJM region were permitted to interconnect and obtain 
 
88 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 212 (2016). 
89 Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n. v. FERC, 80 F.4th 956, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting DHS v. Regents of Univ. 
of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914 (2020)); Capital Power Corp. v. FERC, 156 F.4th 644, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

- 31 - 
service based on the same rates, terms, and conditions that were afforded to all other customers.  
Service to load in PJM was not conditioned on such load bringing its own new capacity.  PJM’s 
IRAS proposal drastically alters the ability of certain loads to obtain reliable service in PJM by 
limiting New Large Loads to receiving an inferior service until they procure their own new 
capacity.  PJM proposes these significant structural changes without any transition mechanism or 
even acknowledging the potential impact on customers’ investment decisions.   
PJM’s proposal will undermine the settled expectations of New Large Loads that have 
made investment decisions and entered into contracts based on their ability to receive firm service 
consistent with long-standing market rules and retail requirements.  As the Commission has 
acknowledged, Large Loads have entered into binding contractual obligations and made 
significant investments in reliance on the ability to obtain reliable service within the PJM region 
based on its longstanding rules.90  These arrangements include entering into energy supply and 
transmission service agreements, executing leases with data center tenants, obtaining real property 
interests, posting security for the construction of line extensions and other physical infrastructure, 
and entering into financing agreements necessary for the construction of their facilities.  PJM’s 
proposal will undermine the economic assumptions underpinning these arrangements by forcing 
New Large Loads to accept less reliable service—which may not align with the contractual 
commitments made to their tenants—or incurring significant new costs to ensure that they receive 
the same level of firm service that historically has been available.  
 
90 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211, at P 5 (2026) (“We recognize that large loads, including 
data centers, are actively working with transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take 
service from, the transmission system. We appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that 
process. We also understand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large 
loads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the 
transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.”).

- 32 - 
The disruption from IRAS will not be limited only to New Large Loads that first place their 
facilities into service after June 1, 2027 (or subsequent deadlines established by PJM).  IRAS also 
appears to extend to incremental load placed in service by an existing customer after this date.  In 
practice, this means that IRAS will extend to data center customers that have placed their existing 
facilities into operation but that have load ramp schedules that extend beyond June 1, 2027.  If 
IRAS is approved, these customers will now face the prospect that a portion of their loads will be 
deemed interruptible unless they comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements.   
In some cases, it simply will be too late for large load customers to revisit their investment 
decisions or rewrite contracts that were entered into years prior.  Even if a data center has some 
flexibility to renegotiate existing leases with their tenants, it would have to attempt to renegotiate 
these arrangements without certainty regarding how IRAS will be implemented, how relevant state 
authorities plan to address IRAS, or when the data center will be able to guarantee firm service for 
its tenants.  The significant uncertainty that would be created by approval of IRAS has the potential 
to create new obstacles to the completion of data center projects that have been under development 
for years.  
Moreover, IRAS establishes what is effectively a less than 10-month window for New 
Large Loads to obtain their own new capacity to avoid curtailment.  As the Commission is well 
aware91 and as PJM’s own documented struggles with bringing new resources online 
 
91 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2025) (Comm’r Rosner and Phillips, 
concurring at P 2) (“PJM’s legacy interconnection process is overwhelmed by the volume of requests to connect new 
generation and storage, causing the typical wait time in PJM’s queue to exceed five years.   While long overdue, PJM’s 
transition away from a legacy serial process includes the unfortunate feature of pausing study of all new 
interconnection requests while PJM implements its new, faster process.”).

- 33 - 
demonstrate,92 this timeline does not provide a realistic opportunity for New Large Loads to meet 
the BYONC requirements and avoid curtailment.  The result will be a significant disruption to 
nearly all large load projects with a post-June 1, 2027 in-service date that is likely to threaten the 
viability of many projects that are essential for maintaining the nation’s competitive edge in the 
global economy.   
PJM’s implementation timeline for IRAS and failure to include a transition mechanism is 
even more alarming given that many of the regulatory structures PJM acknowledges that states 
must adopt to give effect to IRAS have yet to even be proposed.93  While certain state commissions 
like the VA SCC may have commenced efforts to establish a regulatory scheme that is consistent 
with IRAS,94 such efforts have not been mirrored by most of the PJM state commissions.  As a 
result, New Large Loads will be forced to scramble to comply with an entirely new service 
paradigm in PJM while the rules necessary for implementing IRAS in their relevant states are still 
being developed.  Undermining the settled expectations of large load customers will alone present 
a significant challenge to the ability of large load customers to move forward with their projects, 
 
92 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, 
and Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 4 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-
design.pdf.  (“Construction timelines have doubled. A decade ago, the market’s three-year forward procurement 
horizon was calibrated to the development timeline of the market’s reference technology.  Today, a new natural gas 
turbine plant – the reference technology for the capacity market – requires at least four years under optimistic 
assumptions from financial investment decision to commercial operation, due to supply chain constraints on major 
equipment (gas turbines, step-up transformers), extended permitting and interconnection timelines, and larger project 
scale.”).  
93 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 86-87 (“PJM will not direct specific LSEs and/or specific customers of LSEs—
including specific Large Loads—to reduce their load and/or switch to on-site backup resources.  Those decisions 
would be worked out through revised state retail tariffs.”) (emphasis in original).  
94 Id. at 88 (citing Letter of Chair of Virginia State Corporation Commission, Kelsey Bagot and President 
and CEO of Data Center Coalition, Josh Levi to Ms. Paula Conboy, Chair of PJM Board of Managers, and Mr. David 
Mills, President and CEO of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 2 (June 30, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260630/20260630-written-comments---va-scc-and-data-center-
coalition.pdf).

- 34 - 
but disrupting their settled expectations and making them plan for a service paradigm in which the 
rules are still being developed presents a challenge of a different magnitude.  
PJM’s proposal to subject a subset of retail load to mandatory curtailments represents a 
stark departure from the historic paradigm in which customers were able to obtain reliable service 
on the same rates, terms, and conditions as all other customers.  While DCC supports BYONC 
requirements, such requirements must be implemented on a timeframe that provides large loads a 
reasonable opportunity to comply.  The fact that PJM has proposed this departure from its prior 
rules without including a transition mechanism as part of its proposal or even considering the 
reasonable reliance interests of large loads further warrants rejection of the Filing by the 
Commission.   
D. 
The Commission Should Reject IRAS Or Impose A Meaningful Transition 
Mechanism 
DCC urges the Commission to issue an order rejecting IRAS while encouraging PJM to 
pursue alternative pathways that better align with the jurisdictional divide established by the FPA.  
As noted above, DCC believes that the objectives underlying IRAS can be achieved by allowing 
states to take the lead in establishing interruptible retail service schedules while PJM modifies its 
operational practices to accommodate the choices of states within its footprint.  For that reason, 
DCC believes that any order in this proceeding rejecting IRAS should encourage PJM to work 
with states to pursue a framework that respects the authority reserved to the states under the FPA 
while protecting residential customers from service disruptions during emergency conditions.   
Alternatively, if the Commission determines based on the record in this proceeding that 
PJM’s emergency procedures must be reformed immediately, then it should initiate a Section 206 
proceeding to determine how PJM’s emergency procedures can be modified to mitigate reliability 
risks without encroaching on state jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail

- 35 - 
service.  While DCC believes that any effort to modify the curtailment priority of retail customers 
must be led by the states, a Section 206 proceeding would provide the Commission and other 
parties opportunities to further explore what changes can be made to the wholesale market to 
further mitigate reliability risks.   
Finally, even if the Commission is inclined to approve IRAS, it should direct PJM to 
modify its proposal to establish a meaningful transition mechanism that avoids disrupting existing 
contractual arrangements and investment decisions, and provides large load customers and the 
states a reasonable implementation timeline.  Among other things, any transition mechanism 
should limit the application of IRAS in a manner that respects existing contracts and investment 
decisions (e.g., exempting large load customers that already have entered into contracts for retail 
service prior to the implementation date of IRAS).  The Commission also should direct PJM to 
delay implementation of IRAS until June 1, 2028 to provide new large loads a reasonable amount 
of time to procure new capacity before they are subject to IRAS and to provide state authorities 
sufficient time to modify their retail policies as necessary to account for the IRAS framework.    
III. 
MOTION TO INTERVENE  
DCC respectfully moves to intervene in this proceeding. DCC is the membership 
organization for the U.S. data center industry, representing leading data center owners and 
operators that develop, operate, and maintain data center infrastructure and teams across the 
country.95  DCC members operate data centers that constitute significant loads within the PJM 
 
95 The DCC is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators.  Public testimony and 
written comments submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of each individual DCC member.  A list of 
current DCC members is accessible at https://www.datacentercoalition.org/members.

- 36 - 
region and DCC has been an active stakeholder in regional efforts to ensure reliability, enable new 
generation, and discipline load forecasts.  
DCC’s member companies provide the essential digital infrastructure that underpins the 
modern economy and supports critical public services, including cloud computing, artificial 
intelligence, emergency response systems, and public safety operations.  From 2017 to 2023, the 
data center industry contributed $3.5 trillion to U.S. GDP.  As the industry unlocks unprecedented 
economic opportunities across the country and in the PJM region, supporting affordability is a 
foundational priority for DCC members and the communities they serve.  DCC advocates for grid 
reforms that minimize unnecessary cost burdens, align with cost causation principles, facilitate 
responsible load growth, support the development of new generation, and enhance grid resilience 
system-wide without imposing undue costs on existing ratepayers.   
For the above reasons, DCC has a substantial interest in the outcome of this proceeding 
that cannot be represented adequately by any other participant to this proceeding.  DCC’s 
intervention is in the public interest and its motion for leave to intervene in this proceeding should 
be granted.

- 37 - 
IV. 
CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
DCC requests that the following names be placed on the official service list for this 
proceeding by the Commission and that all correspondence and communications with respect to 
this proceeding be addressed to the following:96 
Morgan A. Sipple 
Director, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs 
DATA CENTER COALITION 
1250 H Street, NW 
Washington, DC  20005 
morgan@datacentercoalition.org  
 
 
Stephen J. Hug 
Ben N. Reiter 
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 
2001 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20006 
Tel: (202) 887-4000 
shug@akingump.com  
breiter@akingump.com 
 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out above, DCC respectfully requests that the Commission issue an 
order consistent with this protest.  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
/s/ Stephen J. Hug 
Morgan A. Sipple 
Director, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs 
DATA CENTER COALITION 
1250 H Street, NW 
Washington, DC  20005 
morgan@datacentercoalition.org  
 
Data Center Coalition 
Stephen J. Hug 
Ben N. Reiter 
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 
2001 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20006 
Tel: (202) 887-4000 
shug@akingump.com 
breiter@akingump.com 
 
 
 
 
 
Dated: September 3, 2026 
 
 
Counsel for the Data Center Coalition 
 
96 DCC respectfully requests waiver of Rule 203(b)(3) of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 
385.203(b)(3), in order to permit designation of more than two persons for service in this proceeding.

Exhibit A 
Letter to Ms. Paula Conboy and Mr. David Mills 
from VA SCC Chair, Kelsey Bagot and DCC 
President & CEO, Josh Levi

Confidential
June 30, 2026 
  
Ms. Paula Conboy, Chair, PJM Board of Managers 
Mr. David Mills, PJM President and CEO 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
2750 Monroe Boulevard 
Audubon, Pennsylvania 19403 
  
Dear Ms. Conboy and Mr. Mills: 
The Virginia State Corporation Commission (VA SCC), along with its fellow PJM state utility 
commissions, is mandated to ensure reliable electric service, just and reasonable retail rates, and to protect 
residential and traditional industrial customers from undue cost shifts as the electric system continues to 
evolve. The growth of large electric loads presents both significant opportunities for economic 
development and important challenges for maintaining affordability and reliability across the PJM region. 
The Data Center Coalition (DCC) is the national membership association for the data center industry, 
representing leading data center owners and operators who maintain data center infrastructure across the 
country and globe, as well as companies that lease large amounts of data center capacity.1  DCC 
represents many of the companies driving investment in the PJM region and seeks to ensure that its 
members have timely, efficient, and predictable pathways to secure the power necessary for their 
operations. DCC members are fully committed to bearing the costs associated with serving their load to 
ensure existing customers are protected from any undue cost shifts. 
Together, the VA SCC and DCC recognize that the mandate of state utility commissions and serving 
emerging large loads are not mutually exclusive. Rather, achieving them will require proactive 
collaboration among states, industry, and PJM to develop standardized regulatory tools and model retail 
tariff structures that individual state commissions may consider as they address the integration of new 
large electric loads. By working collaboratively now, we believe it is possible to facilitate continued 
economic investment while preserving reliability and protecting existing customers from inappropriate 
cost shifts. Because many of the tools necessary to achieve these objectives fall within state jurisdiction, 
the VA SCC and DCC are launching a collaborative effort to develop model retail tariff structures and 
regulatory frameworks for consideration by interested state commissions. 
State-Level Interruptible Tariffs and Load Reduction Priorities 
The VA SCC and DCC will convene a joint working group with other interested states to develop model 
state regulatory frameworks that enable states to better integrate large loads while maintaining reliability 
 
1 The Data Center Coalition is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators. 
Public testimony, written comments and letters submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of 
each individual DCC member. A list of current DCC members is accessible at 
https://www.datacentercoalition.org/members.

Confidential
and protecting existing customers. The initiative will focus on two complementary, but distinct, 
workstreams. 
1. Model State Interruptible Tariffs 
The parties will develop model retail interruptible tariff structures that state commissions may consider 
adopting to facilitate the integration of new large electric loads while maintaining reliability and 
protecting existing customers. These model tariffs would: 
● Establish standardized retail tariff provisions under which large customers may receive 
interruptible service, whether through voluntary election or pursuant to state regulatory 
requirements; 
● Define the operational expectations, customer obligations, and utility responsibilities associated 
with interruptible service; 
● Establish the retail mechanisms through which interruptible customers would respond to requests 
for curtailment consistent with applicable state tariffs and regional reliability procedures; and 
● Provide model tariff language for consideration by interested state commissions while fully 
preserving each state's independent regulatory authority. 
 
The intended completion date for this work is no later than February 1, 2027. 
2. Emergency Load Reduction 
The VA SCC, DCC, and other interested states will jointly develop model state tariffs establishing 
emergency load reduction programs designed to protect residential customers during the most severe 
reliability emergencies while preserving reliable system operations. These model tariffs would: 
● Establish retail mechanisms authorizing utilities to curtail designated large commercial and 
industrial customers, or require the use of available on-site backup generation, once PJM has 
exhausted all other available reliability resources, including demand response, but before 
implementation of broad manual load shed; 
● Define the operational expectations, customer obligations, and utility implementation procedures 
associated with those programs; and 
● Provide model tariff language for consideration by state utility commissions while preserving 
each state's independent regulatory authority. 
 
By targeting reductions from large commercial and industrial customers before implementing widespread 
feeder-level outages, this approach can significantly reduce the likelihood that residential customers are 
interrupted during the most severe reliability emergencies. It is particularly beneficial for jurisdictions 
with little or no large-load development, where residential customers could otherwise be subject to 
manual load shed even though targeted reductions of large loads—or deployment of available on-site 
backup generation—in other parts of the PJM region would have been sufficient to address the reliability 
need. 
The intended completion date for this work is no later than February 1, 2027.

Confidential
Reliability Backstop Cost Allocation 
The VA SCC, DCC, and other interested states will also collaborate to develop model state tariff 
provisions addressing the retail allocation of costs associated with PJM's Reliability Backstop 
Procurement. 
The objective is to develop transparent retail mechanisms that appropriately assign reliability backstop 
costs to the large load customers whose demand contributes to the need for those procurements, while 
protecting existing residential and traditional industrial customers from inappropriate cost shifts. 
The intended completion date for this work is no later than January 1, 2028. 
Moving Forward 
This collaborative effort reflects our shared commitment to finding practical, durable solutions that 
balance reliability, affordability, economic development, and regulatory certainty. 
Together, the VA SCC and DCC recognize that these objectives are complementary. Achieving them will 
require proactive collaboration among states, industry, utilities, and PJM to develop standardized 
regulatory tools and model retail tariff structures that state utility commissions may consider as they 
address the integration of new large electric loads. We also recognize that meeting the region's growing 
electricity demand will require significant investment in new generation and other energy resources. DCC 
members are committed to pursuing those investments, and both the VA SCC and DCC recognize that 
clear, predictable regulatory frameworks are essential to supporting the investment in new generation and 
energy resources needed to reliably serve the region's growing demand while protecting existing 
customers. 
We appreciate PJM's continued leadership on these matters and look forward to working collaboratively 
with PJM, the states, and all stakeholders as these efforts move forward.  
 
Sincerely, 
Kelsey Bagot 
Chair, Virginia State Corporation Commission 
  
Josh Levi 
President & CEO  
Data Center Coalition

Exhibit B 
DCC Connect & Manage Alternative: State-Led 
Implementation with Immediate Residential 
Customer Protection

DCC Connect & Manage Alternative:  
State-Led Implementation with Immediate Residential 
Customer Protection 
The Data Center Coalition supports PJM’s objective of ensuring that new large loads 
contribute to maintaining system reliability and that sufficient capacity is developed to 
support continued economic growth. We agree that reliability must be maintained and that 
new capacity should accompany significant new load additions. At the same time, 
implementation frameworks must provide clear customer treatment, align obligations with 
benefits, and protect existing customers. 
DCC’s proposal is founded on the principle that large-load integration requires 
coordination among PJM, states, electric distribution companies (EDCs), and customers. 
Durable solutions must recognize the respective roles of wholesale and retail regulators 
while providing certainty regarding reliability obligations, customer protections, and 
curtailment treatment. 
State Opt-In Framework 
DCC proposes a State Opt-In model that allows states and EDCs to establish interruptible 
service classifications and customer treatment rules while PJM continues to administer 
wholesale reliability requirements. Under this approach: 
• States establish interruptible customer classes and associated tariff provisions for large-
load customers. 
• PJM monitors system conditions and, when reliability conditions warrant, issues a 
wholesale reliability signal for interruption of interruptible load. 
• The PJM signal activates the applicable state interruptible tariff. 
• The EDC implements curtailments in accordance with state-established customer 
classifications, priorities, and protections. 
• PJM maintains responsibility for bulk-system reliability, while states retain authority over 
retail customer classifications and curtailment treatment. 
• This approach achieves the desired reliability outcome while preserving the traditional 
division of state and federal responsibilities and avoiding the jurisdictional concerns 
associated with PJM directly imposing mandatory curtailment obligations on retail 
customers.

• The framework also preserves incentives for customers to support the development of 
new capacity resources. 
The proposal acknowledges a practical reality: regardless of the wholesale framework 
adopted, states and EDCs ultimately determine how customers are treated during 
emergency conditions. By explicitly incorporating state implementation into the 
framework, the proposal creates a more transparent and durable path for integrating large-
load growth while maintaining reliability. 
The state-led approach is also necessary to avoid significant jurisdictional concerns. Any 
framework that requires PJM to impose mandatory curtailment obligations based on the 
characteristics of specific retail customers risks blurring the longstanding division between 
wholesale and retail regulation. By relying on states and EDCs to establish customer 
classifications, interruptible service arrangements, and curtailment priorities, the proposal 
preserves the traditional regulatory compact while allowing PJM to maintain reliability 
through wholesale market signals. 
 
Immediate Reliability Action to Protect Residential Customers 
While states develop long-term large-load tariffs and customer classifications, PJM, states, 
and EDCs should take immediate action to strengthen emergency load-shed procedures 
and better protect residential customers. 
DCC proposes a phased manual load-shed approach under which large commercial and 
industrial customers are contacted and provided an opportunity to curtail load before 
residential customers are interrupted during emergency reliability events. States and zones 
without significant large-load customers available for curtailment would not be expected 
to participate in the initial phase. Instead, the first phase would focus on areas where large 
commercial and industrial load reductions can be achieved. Residential customers and 
critical services would remain a last-resort option after practical large-customer 
curtailment opportunities within the affected area have been exhausted. 
This recommendation is significant because it can be implemented immediately and does 
not require states to first complete lengthy tariff, rulemaking, or customer-classification 
proceedings. It provides a practical bridge between today’s reliability challenges and the 
longer-term frameworks currently under development across the PJM region. 
The approach offers several benefits: 
• Provides immediate protection for residential customers. 
• Reduces the likelihood that residential and critical-service customers are interrupted.

• Preserves state authority over retail customer classifications and curtailment priorities. 
• Improves reliability outcomes during emergency conditions using existing operational 
tools and processes. 
• Creates time for states, EDCs, customers, and PJM to develop durable long-term 
solutions without delaying meaningful residential customer protections. 
Conclusion 
DCC’s proposal advances PJM’s reliability objectives while providing a practical 
implementation pathway that aligns responsibilities among PJM, states, EDCs, and 
customers. The State Opt-In framework recognizes the realities of retail implementation, 
preserves incentives for new capacity development, and provides greater clarity regarding 
customer obligations and protections. Combined with immediate actions to better protect 
residential customers during reliability emergencies, the proposal offers both a near-term 
and long-term path for maintaining reliability while supporting continued economic growth 
throughout the PJM region.

Exhibit C 
DCC – A Path to Reliable Large-Load 
Integration: Creating Certainty for Investment, 
Customers, and the Grid

June 10, 2026
A Path to Reliable Large-Load Integration
Creating Certainty for Investment, Customers, and the Grid

New Load Should Fund New Capacity
Industry practice has already shifted toward customer-funded capacity to 
protect existing ratepayers.
2

Predictable Pathway to Firm Service
Large load needs regulatory certainty to confidently invest in new capacity. 
Key Takeaway: 
Data Centers are 
committed to invest in 
new capacity once the 
path to firm service 
without paying twice is 
assured. 
3

PJM Cannot Provide the Needed Answers
PJM lacks the authority to answer critical questions that customers need 
before investing billions to bring new supply to PJM.
Key Takeaway: PJM’s proposal depends on customer action 
that PJM lacks authority to define, enforce, or guarantee.
4

Large-load integration requires new 
capacity and customer accountability. 
Lasting solutions require states and PJM 
to each perform their proper role.
5

Connect & Manage: 
Challenges

Jurisdiction: Core Issue
C&M relies on retail customer characteristics to determine wholesale 
obligations creating a jurisdictional vulnerability. 
Curtailment obligations depend on retail customer 
characteristics. 
Large-load size and interconnection date/ load ramp 
drives outcomes
Retail customer attributes become wholesale triggers
Appears targeted at retail transactions
Raises Federal Power Act concerns
7

C&M Is Not Really About Load Growth
Example
SCENARIO A
SCENARIO B
New Load
200 MW
100 MW
Customer Type
Many small loads
One large load
C&M Obligation
No
Yes
 
The outcome depends on customer type – 
 
 
not the amount of load growth
8

Undue Discrimination Risk
The proposal is not truly prospective – loads face different treatment based on 
ramp duration, not when they were put in service or contract terms. 
The difference is based on ramp timing. Proposed rules do not permit or 
contemplate evaluating contracts in place. Cost causation rationale is weak.
9

Arbitrary Outcomes Created by Vintage
Cutoff dates create arbitrary results that are not based on load magnitude or 
system impact. 
10

Protection is Not Assured
The Claimed Benefit of BYONC Is Outside PJM’s Control
Protection Must Be Real
• PJM cannot dictate retail curtailment decisions 
• States and EDCs determine actual load-shed priorities 
• Meeting PJM requirements may not guarantee protection 
• Customers may still face curtailment despite meeting PJM’s 
BYONC requirements 
• Benefits and obligations may not align
Customers need certainty regarding the benefit they receive for 
bringing new capacity.
11

What Service Is Being Purchased?
• C&M load remains subject to interruption 
• Customers continue paying for firm transmission (NITS) 
• The proposal does not clearly establish what reliability rights 
accompany C&M treatment
• Undue discrimination relative to DR and disruption of DR contracts
• Benefits and obligations may not align
• Customers need certainty regarding the service they are purchasing
Service Classification Mismatch
If customers are subject to interruption, the associated service rights 
and classifications should be clearly defined.
12

• States may require locational or “in state” resources
• States may impose policy priorities on the resource 
type, e.g., threshold % for  clean resources
• States may impose additional conditions on workforce 
or other requirements
• Pennsylvania illustrates this trend
• BYONC to PJM ≠ BYONC to State
State Policy Preferences Will Differ
Retail implementation will remain state-specific
13

Operational, Policy, and Litigation Risks
Defining new load, implementing across states and EDCs, and allocating costs create 
significant operational, policy and legal risks without assured customer benefit
14

So Where Does This Leave Us? 
We Agree on the Objective
• Reliability must be maintained
• New capacity should accompany new large load 
The Missing Piece
• States, EDCs, and PJM lack a coordinated framework for customer 
curtailment and protection
The Path Forward
✓ Respect and coordinate with state jurisdiction
✓ Create clear customer treatment rules
✓ Align obligations with benefits
✓ Preserve incentives for new capacity
15

A Better Path Forward: State Opt-In Model
16

Immediate Reliability Action
Manual Load Dump: Curtail Large C&I Before Residential Load
While states develop interruptible-load tariffs and customer classifications, States, EDCs, 
and PJM should immediately improve emergency load-shed procedures. 
17

• Large-load integration requires action from PJM, states, EDCs, and 
customers
• Initial feedback on the opt-in framework focused on what happens if 
states do not act - that risk exists under any C&M framework
• PJM cannot establish retail curtailment rules through assumption
• State implementation is a dependency whether acknowledged or not
• PJM's proposal assumes states will take actions that the tariff itself 
cannot require
• Our proposal explicitly recognizes the respective roles of PJM and the 
states.
State Action is Necessary and Unavoidable
Restoring the Regulatory Compact
Ignoring the need for state action does not eliminate the 
dependency, it only obscures it.
18

Reliability Backstop 
Mechanism

We Support a Limited, Targeted Backstop
• Bilateral procurement remains the preferred path for securing new 
capacity
• DCC supported PJM's proposal for an extended bilateral procurement 
window before any backstop procurement
• We recognize PJM's need to move forward on a September timeline 
We Will Not Oppose a September Backstop Auction
• The backstop should supplement – not replace – bilateral 
procurement 
The Backstop Must Remain Limited
• Procurement should be limited to demonstrated capacity shortfall 
that will not be addressed through bilateral arrangements. 
Reliability Backstop: DCC Position
20

Procure Only for Load That Will Not Bilateral
• Backstop MWs should be limited to demonstrated reliability shortfalls
• Capacity should not be procured for customers actively pursuing 
bilateral solutions – particularly for load on the 2030+ timeframe
• Avoid duplicative procurement for the same future load
• The objective is to fill remaining gaps, not substitute for 
private contracting
Procurement: Limited to Residual Needs
21

Cost Responsibility Established Up Front 
Transparency and Accountability Matter
• Cost responsibility should be determined before procurement 
commitments are made
• Customers expected to fund procurement should be identified 
whenever feasible
• States and EDCs should provide notice before acting on behalf 
of specific customers
• Broad socialization should not replace targeted cost 
responsibility
Capacity procurement and cost allocation should be determined together
—not sequentially.
22

Meaningful Market Power Mitigation
Mean + 2 Standard Deviations is Not a Market Power Screen
• The benchmark is calculated from market offers
• Market offers may already reflect concentrated supply conditions
• Excluding statistical outliers does not establish that remaining offers are 
competitive
• The benchmark may continue to embed market power
• Consumer protections should be grounded in resource economics
• Consider a cap based on Net CONE (require support for costs > Net CONE)
Mitigation Should Not Depend on Potentially Exercised Market Power
A statistical filter is not a substitute for economic mitigation
23

Pamela Quinlan
Principal, GQS 
PQuinlan@GQSenergy.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing document on the persons 
designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. 
 
Dated at Washington, D.C., this 3rd day of September 2026. 
/s/ Stephen J. Hug 
 
 
 
Stephen Hug