ER26-3515-000 · 2026-09-03 · Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

Comments of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission to the Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and Large Load Registry to address System Reliability

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA  
  
  
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION 
COMMONWEALTH KEYSTONE BUILDING  
400 NORTH STREET, THIRD FLOOR 
  
HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17120  
  
September 3, 2026 
  
Via Electronic Filing  
  
Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese, Secretary  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
888 First Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C.  20426  
  
  
Re:  
Comments of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission; PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
  
Dear Secretary Reese:  
  
Please find for e-filing the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s Comments 
for the above-referenced PJM Interconnection L.L.C. proceeding at Docket No. ER26-
3515. 
 
Copies of this document have been served upon all parties designated on the 
Commission’s official service list, in accordance with Rule 2010 of the Commission’s 
Rules of Practice and Procedure.  
  
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.  
   
Respectfully submitted,  
  
Elizabeth H. Barnes 
Elizabeth H. Barnes  
Deputy Chief Counsel   
Pennsylvania Public Utility  
Commission   
(717)772-5408

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
) 
Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
 
 
 
COMMENTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION 
 
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PA PUC) submits these comments 
to the Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (PJM) to Establish Interim Resource 
Adequacy Service and Large Load Registry to Address System Reliability (IRAS).1  PA 
PUC supports the creation and maintenance of a New Large Load (NLL) Registry and 
suggests improvements to the Registry.  However, PA PUC objects to the proposed, red-
lined tariffed language at PJM’s Transmittal Appendix A at page 105 - X (Compensation 
for Providing Interim Resource Adequacy Service), which conflicts with averments in 
PJM’s Transmittal Letter at pages 106-107.  The curtailment protocol in the proposed 
Appendix A Tariff amendment was not developed with PA PUC’s input, and it appears to 
impinge upon our jurisdiction over retail rates.    PA PUC is concerned that PJM is 
placing a burden upon Electric Distributors, including Pennsylvania electric distribution 
companies (EDCs) and electric generation suppliers (EGSs) to bear responsibility to 
implement a compensation scheme for a retail customer class of NLLs that provide the 
 
1 PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Proposal to Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large 
Load Registry to Address System Reliability, Docket No. ER26-3515-000 (August 13, 2026) (“IRAS 
Filing”).

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IRAS load reduction service allowing the NLL to determine its percentage of 
compensation without consideration as to the entities or persons responsible for bearing 
the cost of compensation at a retail level and without express state commission oversight.  
The PA PUC has significant concerns that PJM’s representations that the IRAS 
curtailment compensation framework honors state retail authority, as set forth in its 
supporting transmittal materials, are irreconcilable with the plain language of the 
operative tariff provisions offered in the filing.  Specifically, PJM claims that the IRAS 
framework  is “intentionally designed to avoid conflicts with state authority and regimes 
by leaving load reduction plans and retail cost allocation to state-level entities, while 
offering non-mandatory options under the federal tariff to aid collection and settlement of 
compensation for IRAS.”2  However, as explained more thoroughly below, the actual 
tariff language fails to provide states with any authority to protect its jurisdictional 
ratepayers from paying curtailment compensation costs controlled by NLLs.  To be sure, 
PJM’s proposed tariff explicitly provides for any Eligible New Large Load to “accept in 
its retail rates a sum less than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate. . . .”3 Under the 
tariff as it is proposed now, retail ratemaking authority would be inappropriately and 
unlawfully abdicated to NLLs.  PJM’s filing appears to acknowledge that its proposal 
crosses over the threshold of wholesale rates and veers into state retail rates, as PJM 
indicates that the IRAS rate is “is intended to be conjoined with retail rates. . . .”4     
The PA PUC objects to the proposed infringement upon its retail ratemaking authority. 
 
2 IRAS Filing at 3. 
3 See proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section X(a). 
4 IRAS filing at 104 (emphasis added).

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I. 
Compensation for Load Reduction Under IRAS 
 
PJM proposes a compensation mechanism for NLLs that provide a load reduction 
service, i.e. curtailment, which creates new obligations for Electric Distributors.  PJM’s 
Transmittal Letter states that Electric Distributors bear the responsibility to implement 
the compensation scheme for New Large Loads that provide the IRAS load reduction 
service and PJM proposes to extend the rate applicable for Pre-Emergency Load 
Response non-performance (and conversely for bonus payments) – 50% of the Non-
Performance Charge Rate as the maximum rate for IRAS performance.5  PJM’s proposal 
also allows eligible NLLs to agree upon a retail rate between 50% of the Non-
Performance Charge Rate and zero dollars, to “further facilitate implementation of the 
Ratepayer Protection Pledge and retail level arrangements.”6  There is an opportunity for 
NLLs to waive this compensation, and PJM also claims that there are ways that states 
may be able to modify this compensation at the retail level.  
In its Transmittal Letter, PJM states in pertinent part: 
The program will be administered by the Electric Distributor in coordination with 
the relevant state authorities or RERRA.  That said, PJM’s proposal imposes no 
obligation on any state to do anything. States are free to design retail rate regimes 
that facilitate the recovery and allocation of wholesale IRAS rates through generally 
applicable retail rate tariffs.  Alternatively, if states decline to act generically, they 
could negotiate specific retail filed rates with affected entities.  Further still, if states 
decline to act,  Eligible New Large Loads could initiate regulatory proceedings to 
develop retail pathways to recover wholesale IRAS rates.  Or, if states decline to 
act and Eligible New Large Loads decline to initiate regulatory proceedings to 
recover through retail rates the wholesale IRAS rate, they would effectively waive 
a right to compensation.  Under PJM’s proposal, the wholesale rate can flow into 
 
5 See Transmittal Letter at 102. 
6 See proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section X(a).

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retail rates outside the PJM settlements realm.  Alternatively, Electric Distributors, 
in consultation with their state regulators, can request PJM’s support in 
implementing payment of the wholesale rate to Eligible New Large Loads and/or 
collection of charges to fund such compensation.  Other potential flexibility might 
exist.  The key takeaway is that PJM is not mandating any action at the retail or 
state level.7 
 
However, PJM’s claims do not comport with its proposed tariff changes in Appendix 
A and B to its Transmittal Letter prescribing different compensation rules.  The redlines 
for Tariff section X identify EDC compensation obligations and collection thereof 
through retail rates paid by jurisdictional customers.8  The tariff does not expressly 
recognize state authority to prohibit, approve, or modify such compensation and 
jurisdictional recovery, as its plain language does not prescribe any role for state utility 
regulators to challenge or reject the degree of compensation that NLLs are willing to 
accept.  The end result appears to be that States must accept and enforce in retail rates a 
compensation level chosen by the NLL without any additional requirement that the NLL 
show evidence of actual curtailment, i.e. a validation step.  Under this scheme, the NLL 
functions as a retail rate regulator that sets its own curtailment compensation rates up to a 
maximum threshold of 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate. Aside from the clear 
retail rate consequences that state regulators could be powerless to prevent, states would 
not be empowered to ensure that the rate was justified under the tariff.  State 
Commissions considering retail consequences may need to understand not merely that a 
Large Load participated in an IRAS arrangement, but what evidence supports the 
 
7 Transmittal Letter at 106-107 (footnotes omitted). 
8 See proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section X (Appendix A at 105).

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quantity for which compensation is claimed but no mechanism for confirmation appears 
to be contemplated.   
 
Although PJM asserts that the proposed framework “avoids the potential for 
conflicts with state policy determinations and jurisdictional domains”9 this claim too does 
not bear out in the proposed tariff language.  Instead, as it is currently set forth in the 
proposed tariff, adoption of PJM’s curtailment compensation proposal would impede 
states’ ability to enforce any NLL’s commitment to protect ratepayers from the costs that  
the NLL is causing.  Additionally, PJM’s curtailment compensation rate acts as an 
obstacle for states that wish to enact legislation or propose policies to protect ratepayers 
from paying any costs associated with data centers.  As an example, in Pennsylvania, 
Governor Josh Shapiro signed Executive Order 2026-05 on August 18, 2026.  This 
Executive Order, inter alia, seeks to limit electric system costs caused by data centers 
from being imposed upon other customers.10  The curtailment compensation payments 
prescribed in IRAS are antithetical to limiting costs caused by data centers.  As currently 
proposed, PJM’s  tariff appears to require state utility regulators to pass through NLL’s 
determined compensation amount, thereby imposing costs upon jurisdictional ratepayers 
to compensate data centers for the curtailment needs they are causing—and without 
recourse.  To the extent that this is not the outcome PJM intended, the plain language of 
its proposed tariff is squarely at odds with providing state utility regulators oversight over 
retail rates.  
 
9 IRAS filing at 107. 
10  Pa. Executive Order 2026-05, Protecting Pennsylvania Consumers from Data Center Impacts, ¶3(b) (Aug. 18, 
2026),

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As currently written, PJM’s proposed Tariff amendment language is unjust and 
unreasonable in that it infers the State’s role is to rubber-stamp a seemingly pass-through 
mechanism for compensation determined by an LLC from an Electric Distributor, the 
costs for which may ultimately be borne state jurisdictional customers.  As written, the 
language of PJM’s tariff does not contemplate application of state regulatory authority to 
either prohibit or determine NLL curtailment compensation as necessary to regulate 
recovery through retail rates.  PA PUC requests this provision at X (Compensation for 
Providing Interim Resource Adequacy Service) on page 105 of PJM’s Transmittal 
Letter’s Appendix A be denied, severed, or stricken altogether from the proposed Tariff 
as unjust and unreasonable.  In the alternative,  and without waiving that position, PA 
PUC offers the following suggested language for consideration as just and reasonable.  
X. 
COMPENSATION FOR PROVIDING INTERIM RESOURCE 
 
ADEQUACY SERVICE 
 
(a) 
The rate for the provision of Interim Resource Adequacy Service shall be 0% 
of the Non-Performance Charge Rate specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, 
section 10A(e), unless any State Utility Regulator elects to permit in its 
jurisdictional retail rates a sum greater than 0% but not more than 50% of 
the Non-Performance Charge Rate as compensation for the New Large 
Load’s provision of wholesale Interim Resource Adequacy Service. 
 
(b) 
If a state utility regulator elects to permit recovery of compensation through 
retail rates as provided above, following an Interim Resource Adequacy 
Event, unless the Electric Distributor informs the Office of the 
Interconnection otherwise in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD-4, 
section X(b)(ii), the Electric Distributor shall be responsible for 
compensating all Eligible New Large Loads that provided Interim Resource 
Adequacy Service for up to the amount of such service provided. The 
Electric Distributor shall be responsible for charging customers in its 
zone/area to fund any such compensation in accordance with applicable 
state law and state regulatory authority. 
 
(c) 
Nothing in this Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section X shall interfere with any

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State Utility Regulator’s election to deny New Large Loads any level of 
compensation for the provision of wholesale Interim Resource Adequacy 
Service, or (ii) to establish jurisdictional retail rates in accordance with 
applicable state law and regulatory requirements.  
 
II. 
Large Load Registry  
 
PA PUC supports PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry and requests that it be 
improved to enable authorized users to compute compensation.  Data regarding 
represented curtailment capability during pre-emergency phase capabilities versus 
capability actually observed and evidenced can assist in quantifying amounts for 
computation of compensation.  PA PUC supports appropriate confidentiality protections, 
but in the event PA PUC will be determining how curtailment should be implemented at 
the retail level and how costs of curtailment if any should be allocated, state utility 
commissions should have access to the Registry and curtailment data should be provided 
in the Registry.  
III. 
Conclusion 
For these aforementioned reasons, the PA PUC objects to portions of PJM’s tariff 
filing, specifically to the Proposed IRAS Compensation Rate.  We respectfully request 
the Commission sever and deny the changes to PJM’s tariff regarding the Proposed IRAS 
Compensation Rate; or, in the alternative, adopt the proposed language offered by the PA 
PUC herein.  Additionally, we request a modification of the proposed New Large Load 
Registry.  Otherwise, the PA PUC  supports the PJM filing and the allowance of other 
components of the proposal to go into effect as requested.

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Respectfully submitted, 
 
/s/ Elizabeth H. Barnes 
Elizabeth H. Barnes, Deputy Chief Counsel 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
400 North St., 3rd Floor 
Harrisburg, PA 17120 
Telephone: 717-772-5408 
ebarnes@pa.gov 
 
Counsel for the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
 
 
Dated: September 3, 2026

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am on this date serving a copy of the foregoing document 
upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in accordance with the requirements of Rule 
2010 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.  
   
Respectfully submitted,  
 
/s/ Elizabeth H. Barnes 
Elizabeth H. Barnes  
Deputy Chief Counsel  
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission  
400 North St., 3rd Floor 
Harrisburg, PA  17120  
Tel: (717) 787-5000  
  
Dated:  September 3, 2026