ER26-3650-000 · 2026-11-03 · Data Center Coalition

Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of the Data Center Coalition re the 10/13/2026 Answer of Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
) 
Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator, Inc. 
 ) 
 Docket No. ER26-3650-000
) 
 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER 
AND ANSWER OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION 
Pursuant to Rules 212 and 213 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”),1 the Data Center Coalition (“DCC”)2 
hereby moves for leave to answer3 and answers the answer of Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator, Inc. (“MISO”)4 and certain other parties concerning MISO’s proposal to establish 
Interconnection Reliability Requirements (“IRR”) for Large Loads.5 
I. 
ANSWER 
DCC supports the objectives underlying MISO’s Filing in this proceeding.  DCC and its 
members have led efforts, both in MISO and at the state level, to advance reforms that 
 
1 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.212 and 385.213. 
2 DCC is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators. Public testimony and 
written comments submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of each individual DCC member.  A list of 
current DCC members is accessible at https://www.datacentercoalition.org/members. 
3 DCC acknowledges that the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure do not typically allow answers 
to answers.  However, the Commission has accepted answers in the past when they have (i) assisted the Commission 
in understanding the issues presented, (ii) provided additional information for the Commission’s decision-making 
process, and (iii) helped ensure an accurate record. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 181 FERC ¶ 61,162, at P 
29 (2022); Canal Generating LLC, 181 FERC ¶ 61,157, at P 14 (2022); Equitrans, L.P., 134 FERC ¶ 61,250, at P 6 
(2011); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 132 FERC ¶ 61,023, at P 16 (2010).  DCC’s answer will help the Commission 
understand the issues presented by MISO’s answer and provide further information related to the issues in this 
proceeding to inform the Commission’s decision-making process.  DCC therefore respectfully requests leave to file 
this answer and asks the Commission to consider this answer in its deliberations in this proceeding. 
4 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion for Leave to Answer and 
Answer of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (Oct. 13, 2026) (“MISO Answer”). 
5 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Proposal of Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator, Inc. to Establish Certain Interconnection Reliability Requirements for Large Loads 
(Aug. 28, 2026) (“Filing”).

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accommodate large-load growth across the region.  DCC shares the goal of creating a durable, 
transparent framework that maintains reliability, protects retail customers, and provides large-load 
customers, utilities, and states the certainty they need to plan and invest with confidence. 
Unfortunately, as DCC explained in its comments, MISO’s proposal falls short of 
establishing the “clear and consistent” framework contemplated by the Commission’s Show Cause 
Order and ultimately required by the filing requirements of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).6  
MISO’s proposed tariff revisions in this proceeding tell transmission customers that they will be 
subject to new reliability requirements but without providing any detail on the substance of the 
requirements that will be applied.  MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load and its proposal to 
grant itself authority to revoke a customer’s exemption from the reliability requirements only 
create further uncertainty about the scope and application of these requirements.  
DCC is not alone in expressing concern about MISO’s Filing in this proceeding.   
Stakeholders representing a broad cross-section of interests have objected to MISO’s decision to 
leave substantive requirements outside the tariff and expressed concern about the uncertainty that 
customers will face under the proposal.7  Entergy, for example, explained that “[w]ithout defined 
and clear reliability standards,” transmission customers and Large Loads lack the transparency 
 
6 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion to Intervene and Comments 
of the Data Center Coalition (Sept. 18, 2026) (“DCC Comments”); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., et al., 
195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at P 48 (2026) (“Show Cause Order”). 
7 See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Limited Protest of Entergy 
Services, LLC at 1-17 (Sept. 18, 2026) (“Entergy Protest”); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. 
ER26-3650-000, Protest of the Southern Regulators at 1-2 (Sept. 18, 2026) (“Southern Regulators Protest”); 
Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Comments of Google LLC at 7-8 (Sept. 18, 
2026); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Comments and Requests for 
Clarification and in the Alternative Limited Protest of the Large Energy Users at 6-9 (Sept. 18, 2026); Midcontinent 
Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Protest of Sierra Club, et al. at 18-23 (Sept. 18, 2026); 
Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Comments, Request for Clarification, and 
Limited Protest of Rowan Digital Infrastructure, LLC at 1-3 (Sept. 18, 2026).

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necessary to understand their obligations or evaluate their operational and financial impacts.8  The 
Southern Regulators put the point more starkly: developers and transmission owners risk 
“installing equipment, consistent with good utility practices, only to then replace that equipment 
at great expense after MISO later publishes the actual requirements.”9  The breadth of opposition 
to MISO’s proposal reinforces the serious issues created by a framework in which MISO can 
unilaterally change the standards applicable to customers. 
MISO’s Answer fails to allay these concerns or address the legal defects in its preferred 
approach.  MISO states that it intends to keep the substance of the reliability requirements in its 
Business Practice Manuals (“BPM”) given its expectation that they will “require periodic updates” 
and wants to ensure that MISO can change them “without repeatedly reopening the Tariff.”10  
MISO further suggests that customers that are nominally exempt from the reliability requirements 
under its proposed transition provisions cannot rely on these exemptions, as they “do not create an 
absolute or perpetual reliability exemption” and that MISO retains the discretion to “require 
compliance with any or all Section 37A requirements” based on criteria and procedures that will 
not be filed with or approved by the Commission.11  The effect of this proposal would be to 
establish a framework under which MISO can unilaterally define, change, and apply reliability 
requirements as it deems fit and without meaningful Commission oversight.   
MISO argues that commenters that advocate for additional details to be included in the 
tariff are merely presenting “alternative approaches to particular aspects of MISO’s proposal, but 
do not establish that the framework proposed by MISO fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 
 
8 Entergy Protest at 3.   
9 Southern Regulators Protest at 1 (emphasis in original).   
10 MISO Answer at 26, 33. 
11 Id. at 19.

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205 of the [FPA].”12  This is not a case, however, where a filing party and commenters are arguing 
over which of a range of just and reasonable alternatives should be adopted.  As the filing utility, 
MISO has the burden of submitting tariff revisions that comport with the FPA and the Rule of 
Reason, and MISO has not made any effort to demonstrate how its proposed tariff revisions meet 
these statutory requirements.  
DCC does not seek to tie MISO’s hands by requiring it to incorporate every detail of its 
proposed reliability requirements in the MISO tariff.  But the Rule of Reason already strikes a 
balance between customers’ interests in receiving advance notice of the terms and conditions of 
service and the potential burden on utilities by allowing transmission providers to place 
implementation details of “practical insignificance” in their manuals13 while requiring the utility 
to file those practices that “significantly affect rates, terms, and conditions” of FERC-jurisdictional 
service.14  The balance struck by the Rule of Reason does not permit a utility to avoid the filing 
requirements of the FPA simply because it wishes to retain greater flexibility; where, as here, 
requirements significantly affect the terms and conditions of jurisdictional service, they must be 
included in the tariff and remain subject to Commission oversight.  
Nor is there any tension between MISO’s stated interest in protecting reliability and the 
notice requirements of the FPA.  To the contrary, the two go hand in hand.  Large Loads can only 
make the investments needed to maintain reliability if they understand the requirements that will 
apply to them.  A framework that tells customers they must comply with reliability requirements 
 
12 Id. at 2-3. 
13 Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
14 See, e.g., Boston Energy Trading & Mktg. LLC v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 FERC ¶ 
61,336, at P 39 (2015).

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but leaves customers guessing as to whether they are subject to these requirements and the 
substance of their obligations undermines the very reliability objectives MISO seeks to advance.   
Indeed, MISO’s proposal to relegate the substance of the reliability requirements to its 
BPMs creates an enforceability problem.  The Commission and the courts have recognized that 
the Commission has no obligation to enforce the terms of an unfiled BPM.15  Even in cases where 
BPMs were incorporated by reference into the tariff, the courts have found that provisions of 
unfiled BPMs that significantly affected the rates, terms, and conditions of service were 
unenforceable as a matter of law.16  MISO’s proposal to include the substance of its standards in 
its BPMs raises serious questions as to whether these standards are enforceable against 
transmission customers at all.   
MISO’s desire to refine these requirements in the future does not require leaving them out 
of the tariff.  If MISO later determines that its reliability requirements should be modified, the FPA 
already provides a path: MISO may file proposed tariff revisions under Section 205 of the FPA.  
Given the significant effect that these requirements can have on customers’ investment decisions 
and their ability to obtain transmission service, requiring MISO to give 60 days’ notice and obtain 
Commission acceptance before changing them is hardly an undue burden.   
For the reasons described herein and in DCC’s comments, the Commission should reject 
the IRR proposal without prejudice to MISO filing a revised proposal that (1) places the 
substantive requirements and standards required by Section 205 and the Rule of Reason in the 
tariff, (2) adopts objective and transparent Large Load classification and aggregation criteria, and 
(3) establishes transition protections reasonably tied to objectively demonstrable commercial 
 
15 RWE Clean Energy, LLC v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 194 FERC ¶ 61,212, at P 38 (2026); Keyspan-
Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Keyspan-Ravenswood”). 
16 Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d at 811.

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commitments and reliance interests rather than solely to the status of associated transmission 
upgrades.   
A. 
MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposal To Leave The Substance Of 
The Standards To Its BPMs Is Consistent With The FPA 
1. 
MISO Overstates The Detail Provided In The Tariff 
MISO argues that proposed Section 37A “contains the core obligations” applicable to Large 
Loads and Computational Loads, while the BPMs will merely supply the “technical and 
administrative detail” needed to implement them.17  According to MISO, the Rule of Reason does 
not require “every engineering parameter, data format, testing protocol, or implementation 
procedure to be frozen in a filed tariff.”18 
MISO vastly overstates the level of detail included in its proposed tariff revisions.  While 
MISO maintains that it is merely proposing to leave implementation details to the manuals, the 
detail omitted from the tariff goes far beyond engineering details and technical data submission 
requirements.  To the contrary, MISO’s proposed tariff revisions effectively grant MISO authority 
to impose new reliability requirements on transmission customers serving Large Loads, but 
without providing any detail regarding the substance of these reliability requirements.   
MISO’s treatment of ramp smoothing illustrates the problem.  MISO explains for the first 
time in its Answer that associated generation, energy storage, uninterruptible power supply 
systems, and other load-management technologies may be used to smooth a customer’s changes 
in demand.19  None of this detail appears in the tariff.  The only reference to ramp smoothing in 
MISO’s proposed tariff revisions is a single statement in Section 37A.7 that ramp limits shall 
 
17 MISO Answer at 22. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 24-25.

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include “any reduction/ramp smoothing provided by generation or other resources[.]”20  
Notwithstanding MISO’s claim that the tariff establishes “eligibility for ramp smoothing,”21 the 
proposed tariff does not identify which resources qualify, the criteria these resources need to meet, 
how their contributions will be measured, or how those contributions will be factored into whether 
a customer has complied with the ramp limits.  Indeed, a customer that reviewed the language of 
Section 37A.7 would have difficulty even understanding what ramp smoothing is or how it relates 
to MISO’s proposed ramp limits.   
The same is true of the ramp limits and ride-through requirements themselves.  The 
proposed tariff states that transmission customers taking service on behalf of Computational Loads 
must comply with ramp limits and ride-through requirements, but leaves the substance of those 
obligations to the BPMs, including the applicable ramp limit, the disturbances that customers must 
ride through, the performance criteria that customers must meet, and the manner in which 
compliance will be evaluated and tested.22  MISO confirms that it intends to impose an initial ±30 
MW/minute ramp limit, yet it declines to include that limit in the tariff.23  These are not mere 
implementation details; they represent the core of the obligations that transmission customers 
serving Large Loads will be required to meet to obtain FERC-jurisdictional service.   
MISO acknowledges that a tariff “must state the operative obligation and sufficiently 
constrain discretion.”24  But proposed Section 37A does neither.  By MISO’s own description, 
 
20 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.7. 
21 MISO Answer at 22.  
22 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 25-26, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.6, 37A.7; MISO Answer at 22, 24. 
23 MISO Answer at 24-25.  DCC’s position that the ramp limit must be stated in the tariff does not concede 
that a ±30 MW/minute limit is just and reasonable. Absent the operative standards in the filed tariff, neither the 
Commission nor commenters can determine whether MISO’s proposed requirements are supported by demonstrated 
reliability needs or reasonably tailored to the risks MISO seeks to address. DCC Comments at 4, 15; see also MISO 
Answer at 25 (stating that this figure is an “industry-informed baseline” that “may be refined”). 
24 MISO Answer at 24.

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Computational Loads must comply with ramp limits and ride through disturbances “within 
performance criteria established through the BPM” and MISO will have complete discretion to 
modify these requirements by revising its BPM.25  MISO’s proposed tariff language does not 
constrain discretion; it reserves it. 
MISO likewise does not justify placing the substance of its proposed standards in its BPMs 
when its tariff has specified ride-through requirements for generators and detailed testing and 
verification standards for other resources.26  MISO does not explain why Large Loads should 
receive materially less certainty and transparency regarding the standards against which their 
compliance will be measured.   
Nor does MISO meaningfully respond to the precedent DCC cited concerning metering, 
measurement, and verification, and submission deadlines.27  The Commission previously required 
MISO to include measurement and verification protocols, including metering standards, in its 
tariff, and has found a tariff deficient where it omitted a deadline for submitting meter data.28  Yet 
proposed Sections 37A.1 and 37A.2 require customers to submit facility, one-line, and modeling 
information “consistent with timelines specified in the BPMs,” rather than establishing those 
deadlines in the tariff.29  These are not mere administrative details.  The measurement and 
verification requirements establish how compliance will be demonstrated, while the submission 
deadlines determine when customers must provide the information necessary to obtain and 
 
25 Id.   
26 DCC Comments at 10-11 (citing Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 114 FERC ¶ 61,270 
(2006); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 187 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2024); MISO Tariff § 69.A.3.5(j)). 
27 DCC Comments at 10-11, 14. 
28 Id. at 10, 14 (citing Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 137 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 79 (2011); 
Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 169 FERC ¶ 61,137, at P 252 (2019); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 182 
FERC ¶ 61,143, at P 249 (2023)). 
29 DCC Comments at 14-15 (citing Filing, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.1, 37A.2).

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maintain service.  MISO does not explain why comparable requirements were required to be 
included in filed tariffs in those proceedings but may be left to the BPMs here. 
MISO argues that its proposed approach is consistent with the Commission’s acceptance 
of Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s (“SPP”) High Impact Large Load (“HILL”) framework.30  But 
MISO’s reliance on the Commission’s order approving the SPP HILL proposal is misplaced, as the 
Commission’s order did not address the Rule of Reason or its application to the tariff revisions 
proposed in that proceeding.  Thus, the Commission’s decision cannot be construed as an 
endorsement of any application of the Rule of Reason, let alone the approach taken by MISO in 
this proceeding.31 
2. 
MISO’s Desire For Flexibility Does Not Justify Leaving Its Standards 
In The BPMs And Would Undermine Settled Expectations 
MISO’s principal justification for leaving the substance of its requirements to the BPMs is 
that it may wish to modify those standards in the future.32  But including the substantive standards 
in the tariff does not freeze them in time.  MISO will retain its right under Section 205 of the FPA 
to propose changes to these requirements as needed, just as it does for every other aspect of its 
tariff and markets.  MISO’s reliability requirements are no different from any other market rule.  
 
30 MISO Answer at 24 (citing Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at PP 13-21, 61, 63 (2026)). 
31 Duke Energy Progress, LLC, 177 FERC ¶ 61,001, at P 37 n.64 (2021), order on reh’g, 179 FERC ¶ 61,007 
(2022) (finding that prior approval of agreements that did not require the transmission provider to reimburse customers 
for network upgrade costs were not determinative as the issue of reimbursement was not raised in prior proceedings 
and “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not 
to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedent”) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507 (1925)).  
See also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 153 FERC ¶ 61,308, at P 13 (2015) (“[S]ilence is not evidence of Commission 
policy.”). 
32 MISO Answer at 23, 33.

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Indeed, if the possibility that a requirement may later change were sufficient to keep it out of the 
tariff, virtually no requirement would ever need to be filed. 
MISO’s approach also would expose the substantial, long-term investments of Large Load 
customers to material uncertainty.  These customers must make equipment, engineering, 
procurement, and operational decisions based on the standards that govern their service.  The 
Commission recognized in the Show Cause Order that new requirements could disrupt those 
investments and directed MISO to minimize disruption to existing commercial arrangements.33  
Yet MISO’s framework would allow it to create through future BPM revisions the very disruption 
that the Commission directed it to avoid. 
For instance, nothing in proposed Section 37A would prevent MISO from tightening the 
ramp limit from ±30 MW/minute to a fraction of that level, or materially changing the ride-through 
criteria, after customers have procured and installed equipment to satisfy the existing standards—
all without a Section 205 filing or Commission review.  And since MISO would be able to make 
this change unilaterally, it would have no obligation to propose a transition period or other 
measures to avoid disrupting existing contractual arrangements and investments that were made 
based on the prior standards.  MISO’s statement that BPMs allow technical requirements to be 
refined “without repeatedly reopening the Tariff” therefore confirms, rather than resolves, DCC’s 
concern.34 
 
33 Show Cause Order at P 123; DCC Comments at 16. 
34 MISO Answer at 26.

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B. 
MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposed Large Load Definition Is Just 
And Reasonable Or Provides Customers Adequate Notice 
1. 
MISO Does Not Resolve The Treatment Of Distribution-Connected 
Loads 
As DCC and other parties have pointed out, MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load 
could be interpreted as extending to loads interconnected to the distribution system.35  Although 
other tariff revisions proposed by MISO appear to contemplate transmission-interconnected load, 
the definition of Large Load is ambiguous.36  To eliminate any ambiguity, DCC and other parties 
urge the Commission to direct MISO to revise the definition of Large Load to explicitly reference 
a voltage threshold and/or interconnection to the MISO transmission system.37 
In its Answer, MISO argues that these concerns are misplaced and that Section 37A does 
not apply to “distribution-connected load that is not taking MISO Transmission Service.”38 While 
DCC appreciates MISO’s effort to provide additional clarity, MISO’s statement does not resolve 
the ambiguity DCC identified or eliminate the need for tariff language explicitly limiting the 
definition to load interconnected to the MISO transmission system.39  In practice, utilities take 
transmission service to serve all of their loads, including those interconnected to the distribution 
system.40  As a result, MISO’s statement could be interpreted as implying that the proposed 
definition of Large Load extends to customers that are interconnected to the distribution system 
merely because the energy used to serve these customers flows over the transmission system.  
 
35 DCC Comments at 18-20; Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion 
to Intervene and Comments of Central Municipal Power Agency/Services, Indiana Municipal Power Agency, 
Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission, and WPPI Energy at 4-8 (Sept. 18, 2026) (“Midwest TDUs 
Comments”). 
36 DCC Comments at 18-20; Midwest TDUs Comments at 5-7. 
37 DCC Comments at 18-20; Midwest TDUs Comments at 4, 7-8. 
38 MISO Answer at 26-27. 
39 Id. at 27 (citing Filing, Transmittal Letter at 12; Filing, Tab C at 14-16). 
40 DCC Comments at 18-20; see also MISO Answer at 27.

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Neither the Commission nor customers should be required to guess at the proper 
interpretation of MISO’s statement or the meaning of the tariff.  The definition of Large Load that 
the Commission proposed in the Show Cause Order was limited to load that “interconnects to the 
transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV[.]”41 The SPP HILL framework on 
which MISO relies in this proceeding similarly includes a voltage threshold.42  MISO does not 
explain why it cannot provide customers with a comparable level of clarity regarding the scope of 
its proposed definition. 
MISO states that no “separate voltage threshold is necessary because Points of Withdrawal 
bound applicability across the Transmission System”43 and that the MISO “Transmission System 
includes both facilities over which functional control has been transferred to MISO and certain 
facilities over which MISO does not have functional control.”44  But even if MISO believes that a 
specific voltage threshold would be inappropriate—which has not been shown—MISO has not 
explained why the definition of Large Load cannot include explicit language limiting its 
application to load interconnected to the MISO transmission system.  
A clear definition of Large Load is needed to ensure that MISO’s requirements only extend 
to those loads that present the reliability risks that MISO cites in support of its Filing.  MISO offers 
no analysis showing that 50 MW attributable to one distribution-connected customer affects the 
transmission system differently than 50 MW attributable to multiple retail customers that are 
interconnected to the distribution system.45  Extending MISO’s proposed reliability requirements 
 
41 Show Cause Order at P 58. 
42 MISO Answer at 7-8 (citing Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at PP 13-21). 
43 Id. at 10.  
44 Id. 
45 DCC Comments at 19-20.

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to customers interconnected to the distribution system would be unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory, and contrary to the Show Cause Order.  
2. 
MISO’s Aggregation Standard Remains Overbroad And Undefined 
MISO argues that its proposal to aggregate load associated with facilities that are owned, 
operated, or controlled by a “single entity or . . . a group of entities that will coordinate with respect 
to the profile of the Load” provides customers sufficient notice of whether they will be classified 
as a Large Load.46  According to MISO, its proposal provides “clear and objective aggregation 
criteria” 
including 
a 
“single-substation 
location, 
common 
or 
coordinated 
ownership/operation/control, and a 50 MW Demand threshold.”47   
But merely restating MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load does not resolve the 
ambiguities that DCC pointed out in its comments.  For example, while MISO states that it will 
aggregate customers that coordinate with respect to their load, neither the Filing nor the Answer 
identifies the degree of coordination required to subject customers to regulation.  As a result, it is 
unclear how a customer will be able to determine in advance whether its facility will be aggregated 
with the load of an adjacent facility.  Indeed, MISO states that the definition is intended to preserve 
“MISO’s ability to evaluate the system impacts and coordinated operations of coordinated 
facilities,”48 suggesting that aggregation is likely to turn on MISO’s after-the-fact evaluation rather 
than criteria a customer can apply in advance.49  If MISO intends to aggregate separately owned 
facilities based on coordination, the tariff should define the conduct, contractual arrangements, or 
operational relationships that constitute “coordination,” and the degree of coordination required, 
 
46 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 10; Filing, Tab A, Proposed Module A, § 1.L.  MISO Answer at 9-10. 
47 MISO Answer at 9. 
48 Id. at 10. 
49 Id.

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so that customers can determine in advance whether their facilities will be treated as a single Large 
Load.50 
MISO attempts to justify its aggregation proposal based on the potential effects of facilities 
that coordinate their operations and behave as a unified electrical entity.51  But MISO’s definition 
is not limited to facilities that coordinate their operations or otherwise behave as a unified electrical 
entity.  MISO’s definition provides for aggregation based on common ownership alone.52  
Independent tenants therefore could be aggregated merely because they lease facilities from a 
common owner, even when their operations and load profiles are unrelated.53   
The consequences of MISO’s overbroad aggregation standard are likely to be particularly 
severe where one facility contains enough information technology demand to trigger the 
Computational Load definition.  As DCC’s comments demonstrated, a single computational tenant 
could sweep unrelated industrial and commercial facilities into regulation as Computational 
Load.54  MISO defends computational activity as a proxy for the rapid, coordinated behavior that 
its heightened requirements are intended to address, but it does not demonstrate that it is just and 
reasonable for unrelated non-computational facilities to become subject to those requirements 
through aggregation.55   
 
50 DCC Comments at 23-24. 
51 MISO Answer at 10. 
52 Filing, Tab A, Proposed Module A, § 1.L (defining Large Load to include qualifying facilities owned, 
operated, or controlled by “a single entity”); see also MISO Answer at 9. 
53 DCC Comments at 21-22. 
54 Id. at 22-23. 
55 MISO Answer at 12-13; DCC Comments at 22-24.

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C. 
MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Transition Framework Will Minimize 
Disruption To Existing Commercial Arrangements  
1. 
MTEP/EPR Status Is Not A Reasonable Proxy For Commercial 
Reliance 
MISO maintains that its proposal to exempt from ramp and ride‑through requirements 
certain Large Loads that are associated with a transmission project approved in the MISO 
Transmission Expansion Plan (“MTEP”) or submitted for Expedited Project Review (“EPR”) prior 
to certain dates will “limit the potential need to revisit equipment selections and operating 
arrangements made in reliance on existing requirements[.]”56  But MISO fails to demonstrate that 
there is any nexus between when a transmission project is approved in the MTEP process or 
submitted to the EPR process and the timing of when customers make binding investment 
decisions.  In practice, customers may execute utility service agreements, secure financing, procure 
major equipment, and make other irreversible business decisions well in advance of when 
associated transmission is approved in MTEP or submitted into the EPR process.57  While limiting 
the exemption to customers based on the status of transmission facilities in the MTEP and EPR 
processes may be administratively convenient for MISO, MISO has not provided any evidence 
that its proposal will avoid disruption to existing arrangements consistent with the Show Cause 
Order.    
MISO also does not respond to DCC’s showing that this mismatch will result in materially 
different treatment of projects based solely on whether they require transmission upgrades through 
the MTEP or EPR processes.58  A substantially developed project that does not require such 
upgrades would receive no transition protection unless it commences service by December 4, 2026, 
 
56 Filing, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.II.1, 37A.II.2(b); MISO Answer at 15.  
57 DCC Comments at 26. 
58 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.II.2; MISO Answer at 15-16; DCC Comments at 27.

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while a less-developed project may qualify merely because an associated transmission project was 
approved through the MTEP or submitted into the EPR process.  In practice, a facility in the final 
stages of development that can come online in the near term without the construction of significant 
transmission upgrades could be required to delay energization to redesign its equipment, while a 
project that must wait years for transmission construction could receive transition protection.59  
Providing less favorable treatment to a project that is more mature based solely on the status of 
associated transmission is unduly discriminatory and preferential and inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Show Cause Order. 
2. 
MISO Regularly Relies On Commercial Commitments As Evidence Of 
Project Maturity 
MISO’s principal defense of its framework is that it is preferable to a “project-by-project 
inquiry into private commercial commitments.”60  MISO argues that “[t]reating all agreements as 
a sufficient determination of project maturity would render the requirement largely meaningless” 
and that “developing prescribed contractual terms and requirements would be unworkable for 
Large Loads whose commercial arrangements do not conform to predefined structures.”61  MISO 
adds that requiring it to make an individualized determination for “each piece of evidence would 
require a degree of specialized legal knowledge and commercial expertise that MISO does not 
possess and could not reasonably acquire without significant staff augmentation.”62 
MISO’s arguments are flawed in several respects.  As an initial matter, even if the 
alternative proposal that DCC outlined were unworkable, the fact remains that MISO has not 
provided any evidence that the proposal that it has filed in this proceeding will avoid disruptions 
 
59 DCC Comments at 27. 
60 MISO Answer at 16.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.

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to existing commercial arrangements consistent with the Show Cause Order and is otherwise just, 
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  MISO cannot avoid its burden by 
claiming that alternatives identified by commenters are administratively inconvenient.    
MISO also mischaracterizes DCC’s proposal.  DCC did not propose that the ability of a 
customer to produce any type of agreement would qualify a project for an exemption.  Instead, 
DCC proposed that grandfathering be based on a defined set of verifiable commercial 
commitments—such as executed interconnection, transmission-service, or utility-service 
agreements and major equipment orders—that objectively demonstrate project maturity and 
commercial viability serve as the basis for relief from the ramp and ride-through requirements 
only.  That proposal would require MISO to verify that the customer has entered into one of the 
listed commitments, not to assess the commercial merits of private contracts.63 
MISO’s claim that such a framework would be unworkable is undermined by the fact that 
MISO regularly requires customers to provide evidence of contractual commitments to 
demonstrate commercial viability and maturity.  For instance, MISO’s Expedited Resource 
Addition Study (“ERAS”) process, which expedites interconnection of generating facilities needed 
to address an identified resource adequacy need, requires an executed agreement linking the 
proposed generating facility to that need, while MISO’s standard interconnection process requires 
 
63 DCC Comments at 28-29.  ON Energy Storage, Inc. generally agrees that commercial reliance interests 
warrant protection, but proposes, among other things, an outside energization date for transition relief and prospective 
reliability assessments that could result in otherwise-exempt Large Loads being required to implement ride-through 
capability or other mitigation.  See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion for 
Leave to Answer and Limited Answer of ON Energy Storage, Inc. (Sept. 24, 2026).  DCC does not address the merits 
of this alternative here because the question presented under Section 205 is whether MISO has demonstrated that its 
own proposal is just and reasonable.  The relevant point is that MISO has not demonstrated that its MTEP/EPR-based 
framework adequately protects the commercial reliance interests identified in the Show Cause Order, while the record 
identifies readily available alternatives that would more directly account for objectively demonstrable commercial 
commitments.

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customers to provide contractual evidence of Site Control.64  Similarly, MISO’s pending Large 
Load Addition Resource Study (“LARS”) would require customers to provide executed, legally 
binding agreements as a condition of participating in the process to prevent speculative requests 
and ensure that only commercially viable, “shovel ready” projects proceed.65  Requiring market 
participants to provide executed contracts is not only workable, but aligns with the practices that 
MISO and other transmission providers regularly use to evaluate project maturity in a variety of 
contexts.66    
3. 
MISO Has Not Justified Giving Itself Unconstrained Authority To 
Override Transition Protections 
Whatever protection MISO’s transition framework provides is further undermined by 
proposed Section 37A.II.3, which would allow MISO to apply otherwise-exempt requirements to 
a Large Load whenever MISO determines that its operation results in a material adverse effect on 
transmission system reliability.  Although MISO describes this provision as a “targeted reliability 
backstop” that “preserves commercial certainty,” MISO’s proposal to leave the criteria that it will 
use to determine whether to revoke an exemption to the BPMs means that the Commission does 
not have any way of verifying MISO’s representations.67  Nor does the Commission have any 
 
64 See MISO Tariff, Attachment X §§ 1, 3.3.1, 3.9.1, 7.2.1, 7.3.1.4.1. Section 3.9.1 requires an ERAS 
applicant to provide an executed agreement evidencing that the proposed project is intended to be used by the entity 
asserting the applicable resource-adequacy or reliability need; Section 1 defines Site Control to include specified 
property and contractual rights; and Sections 3.3.1, 7.2.1, and 7.3.1.4.1 establish Site Control and financial-milestone 
requirements as an Interconnection Request enters and advances through the Definitive Planning Phase. 
65 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER27-25-000, Large Load Addition Resource Study 
Process at 9, 11, 27 (Oct. 2, 2026). 
66 Nor is reliance on such evidence unique to MISO’s own processes. FERC-approved North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) Reliability Standard PRC-029-2 permits certain inverter-based resources 
with documented hardware limitations to obtain relief from otherwise-applicable ride-through requirements based in 
part on objectively verifiable prior commitments, including an executed interconnection agreement and an equipment 
procurement contract executed before specified dates. See N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Docket No. RD26-10-000, 
(Sept. 30, 2026) (delegated letter order); NERC Reliability Standard PRC-029-2, Requirement R4 & Measure M4. 
The standard therefore provides another example of executed agreements and equipment commitments serving as 
administrable criteria for transition relief from applicable reliability requirements. 
67 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.II.3; MISO Answer at 19; DCC Comments at 12-14.

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assurance that the exemption process will be administered in a manner that is fair, transparent, and 
that provides customers with an adequate timeline for coming into compliance.  A provision that 
grants MISO effectively unbounded discretion to revoke a customer’s exemption is the opposite 
of commercial certainty.  
No one disputes that MISO must be able to act to preserve reliability.  But providing 
customers and the Commission with notice and the opportunity to review the criteria and 
procedures that MISO will apply to determine whether to revoke an exemption is not incompatible 
with the objective of maintaining reliability.  If MISO is going to have the authority to revoke a 
customer’s exemption from ramp and ride-through requirements, then the criteria and procedures 
that will be applied in connection with this authority must be memorialized in the tariff and filed 
with the Commission for approval.68   
 
68 DCC Comments at 12-16.

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II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, DCC respectfully requests that the Commission reject the IRR 
proposal without prejudice to MISO filing a revised proposal consistent with DCC’s comments 
and this answer.  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
/s/ Stephen J. Hug 
Morgan A. Sipple 
Director, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs 
DATA CENTER COALITION 
1250 H Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20005 
morgan@datacentercoalition.org  
 
Data Center Coalition 
Stephen J. Hug 
Christopher Hargett 
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP 
2001 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20006 
Tel: (202) 887-4000 
shug@akingump.com 
chargett@akingump.com  
 
 
 
Dated: November 3, 2026 
 
 
Counsel for the Data Center Coalition

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing document on the persons 
designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. 
 
Dated at Washington, D.C., this 3rd day of November 2026. 
/s/ Stephen J. Hug 
 
 
 
Stephen J. Hug