Topics in the text: Cost allocation · Credit and exit · Reliability and curtailment
Filing record · PDF pp. 1–3
PJM says the November 9 filing repeats the substance of its October 29 proposal. It changed the electronic filing code to identify a new section 205 rate filing, rather than compliance with an earlier order.
updates the eTariff metadata code to reflect this filing as a FPA section 205 filing rather than a compliance filing PDF p. 2
Commissioner David LaCerte · Related public statement
LaCerte urged PJM to refile promptly rather than wait for more briefs. He said new loads should pay for the capacity they require and cited the commitment to build, bring or buy that capacity.
PDF pp. 96–97, LaCerte concurrenceFiling record · PDF pp. 3–5
The September order set three questions for paper hearing: who pays, what collateral protects against default and who pays after exit. PJM offers revisions under section 205 and consents to FERC severing individual provisions if necessary.
modify, reject, or sever discrete elements of the proposed Tariff revisions while accepting the remainder of the filing PDF p. 5
Cost allocation · PDF pp. 5–11
PJM replaces its load-adjustment proxy with distributors' reports of incremental peak demand between summer 2026 and the expected 2028/29 peak. A qualifying agreement backs each identified load. This one-time measurement for backstop costs is initially separate from the ongoing registry.
the information required under this proposal will initially be reported separately from the Large Load Registry PDF p. 11
Commissioner Lindsay See · Related public statement
See wanted dependable generation quickly but said the first proposal left existing customers exposed. Better evidence about which projects will actually connect should guide who pays for the resulting capacity.
PDF p. 94, See concurrenceIllinois Commerce Commission and Joint Consumer Advocates · Related public statement
Illinois regulators and the consumer advocates warned that a single end date for contracts could amplify forecast errors. FERC recorded that concern as it considered freezing load shares at one point in time.
PDF p. 40, footnote 144New Jersey Board of Public Utilities · Related public statement
In comments on the July proposal, the board showed how different distributor cutoffs could charge comparable projects differently. It sought a uniform threshold before assigning bills. That objection explains why it matters which projects count in the refiling.
PDF pp. 43–44, NJBPU comments summarized by FERCRetail jurisdiction · PDF pp. 13–16
A state or retail regulator can direct the allocation among load-serving entities. With no reported allocation, PJM would use each supplier's share of daily unforced capacity obligation. The state retains authority over recovery from retail customers.
PJM does not propose, and lacks authority, to dictate how any LSE subsequently allocates or recovers those costs from retail customers PDF p. 16
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel · Related public statement
On rehearing of the September order, OCC argued that households should not pay to cover a shortfall caused by data centers. It separately questioned FERC’s decision to allow sellers to receive their own bid prices.
PDF pp. 15, 21–23Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate · Related public statement
Pennsylvania’s consumer advocate objected to relying on states to determine wholesale obligations in the original July proposal. The distinction between a wholesale supplier’s share and retail cost recovery remained relevant when PJM refiled.
PDF pp. 3–5Credit and default · PDF pp. 16–24
PJM proposes collateral equal to 40% of discounted total payment obligations. Kelly compares posting costs with expected losses borne by other members. At an assumed $555/MW-day clearing price, the illustration produces about $686,000/MW; it is neither a clearing price nor a bill.
40% of the net present value of the total RBP payment obligation PDF p. 23
Credit and default · PDF pp. 24–27
The uniform rate would apply only to committed capacity in commercial operation by the start of the relevant delivery year, excluding rescinded MW. PJM describes how it could release excess collateral as the payment obligation declines.
no collateral would be required for RBP Resources not in service for that Delivery Year PDF p. 24
Credit and default · PDF pp. 27–29
The initial allocation would be reported 120 days before 2028/29; suppliers still post collateral 45 days before delivery. PJM adds surety bonds to cash and letters of credit, giving suppliers another way to secure the obligation.
LSEs must post RBP Collateral at least 45 days before the start of a Delivery Year PDF p. 27
Commissioner Judy Chang · Related public statement
In the separate Duke case, Chang dissented because Duke had not shown that its security requirements backed the full 15-year payment promise. The comparison bears on PJM’s proposed collateral; Chang was not evaluating PJM’s dollar amount.
Chang dissent, section on security requirementsCredit and default · PDF pp. 29–31
PJM proposes to review collateral after all committed resources enter commercial operation and take any recommendations to members. It would exclude payments for those resources from the separate Peak Market Activity calculation.
shall not be included in Peak Market Activity PDF p. 31
Exit liability · PDF pp. 31–40
PJM puts the continuing obligation on the withdrawing load-serving entity, including when a transmission owner's exit forces it to leave. A later rate filing would set the terms and amounts. The supplier could seek recovery from another entity responsible for the exit.
subject to a rate filing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that details the specific terms and amounts owed PDF p. 36
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners · Related public statement
The owners argued that FERC should reject the original exit amendment on cost-causation grounds and that their agreement reserved the relevant filing right to them. Their rehearing request concerned the earlier wording.
PDF pp. 5–8Cost allocation · PDF pp. 40–41
PJM proposes to remove the opt-out available solely because a distributor is not state-regulated. FERC had questioned whether similarly situated large loads would escape costs because of the type of distributor serving them.
eliminate the provision that permits an Electric Distributor PDF p. 41
American Municipal Power · Related public statement
AMP asked FERC to protect systems that did not cause the new demand. It also disputed the suggestion that the forecast table excluded projects PJM had actually counted.
PDF pp. 7, 15Demand flexibility · PDF pp. 41–43
PJM would let qualifying peak shaving reduce the procurement target only with a commitment of at least five years. This matches the minimum duration of a bilateral supply offset.
committed to participate in the applicable Peak Shaving Adjustment program for a minimum term of five years PDF p. 42
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities · Related public statement
The New Jersey board sought more flexible terms for demand resources and distributed resource aggregations in the original procurement. This concerned auction eligibility; it did not endorse the later peak-shaving formula.
PDF p. 15, footnote 54Seller eligibility · PDF pp. 43–45
A seller would have five calendar days from notification to cure a deficiency, even if the submission window closes before those five days are up.
five calendar days from receipt of a deficiency notice to cure any deficiencies identified by PJM PDF p. 44
Demand flexibility · PDF pp. 45–50
PJM limits the offset to the load's capacity obligation. A planned demand resource or distributed aggregation must identify its supporting customers and show incremental capability rather than count the same existing capacity twice.
the Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW must be the subject of a bilateral agreement with a Large Load PDF p. 47
Public Service Commission of West Virginia · Related public statement
The West Virginia commission warned that complex rules could discourage participants from reporting qualifying capacity. That would make the final purchase larger than necessary.
PDF pp. 2–4, bilateral matching and offsetsSeller eligibility · PDF pp. 50–53
PJM would reserve the separate three-year, 100% site-control showing for projects outside current or completed PJM interconnection studies. A project already showing site control in that process would avoid duplicating the proof.
only projects that are not currently undergoing, and have not previously completed, an interconnection study PDF p. 52
Procurement target · PDF pp. 53–56
PJM keeps 2028/29 as its reference year but uses updated load forecasts and capacity ratings. The initial target would be the smaller of the recalculated shortfall and the region's aggregate large-load quantity, in unforced capacity MW.
the lesser of the calculated value of the 2028/2029 Delivery Year shortage and the region-wide total of Large Load MW PDF p. 54
Joint Consumer Advocates, including Delaware, D.C., Illinois, Maryland and New Jersey offices · Related public statement
The advocates estimated that buying 15 years rather than five could add $13 billion. They also warned that without a location requirement, customers could pay for capacity built far from the shortfall. These were their estimates and objections to the September order.
PDF pp. 2, 4, 6–7Organization of PJM States · Related public statement
OPSI asked PJM to remove withdrawn large projects when setting the procurement target. Otherwise existing customers could pay for generation to meet demand that no longer exists.
PDF pp. 3–4, original August 21 commentsSeller obligations · PDF pp. 56–58
PJM proposes a must-offer obligation beginning with the first delivery year for which a resource is committed and expected in service. The text makes a timing exception for certain 2030/31 resources without a prior auction notice of intent.
That must offer obligation, regardless of resource type, will continue through the end of the term of the RBP commitment PDF p. 57
Reliability and timing · PDF pp. 58–61
If the December auction produces a third qualifying shortfall, PJM asks to waive the existing investigation and backstop-auction filing requirements. It argues the planned procurement addresses the shortage. This is a request for a one-time waiver.
This one-time prospective waiver satisfies all four of the Commission’s waiver criteria PDF p. 60
Consultation · PDF p. 61
PJM reports consulting its Members Committee and transmission owners on October 22. Its account of consultation is not a stakeholder endorsement of the filing.
PJM consulted the Members Committee and the Transmission Owners on October 22, 2026 PDF p. 61
Reliability and timing · PDF pp. 61–63
PJM requests a January 29 ruling and early effectiveness for the distributor reporting rule; most provisions would take effect February 28. PJM proposes starting March 1 with a four-week offer window. These are proposed dates.
extend the RBP Sell Offer window by one week so that it will be open for a total of four weeks PDF p. 62
Chairman Laura Swett · Related public statement
Swett said the original procurement arrived too late for a deficiency letter or further evidence. She urged a prompt section 205 filing to repair the rejected terms. Her September concurrence did not address the later timetable.
PDF p. 92, Swett concurrenceFiling record · PDF pp. 64–66
A marked tariff, a clean tariff and two affidavits accompany the letter. Kelly supports the credit calculations; Croop explains the procurement target and allocation. PJM asks FERC to accept the revisions.
PJM respectfully requests that the Commission accept the proposed Tariff revisions PDF p. 66
Independent Market Monitor for PJM · Related public statement
The monitor objected to eligibility rules that could let an existing resource reclassify its capacity. Its test was whether an award actually paid for additional physical supply.
PDF p. 15, responsive pleadingsNorthern Virginia Electric Cooperative · Related public statement
NOVEC identified causes of the capacity shortage besides growth in large loads. It preferred voluntary subscription, with interruptible service for a customer that declined. It is a cooperative, not the Virginia regulator.
PDF pp. 3–5, 16Printed headings where available; page ranges otherwise. Open a heading to read the original passage.