ER26-3515-001 · 2026-11-09 · Ohio Consumers’ Counsel

Request for Rehearing to Promote Transparency for Ohio Consumers

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
)
Docket Nos. ER26-3515-000
REQUEST FOR REHEARING
TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY FOR OHIO CONSUMERS
BY
OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL
Maureen Willis
Consumers’ Counsel
Angela O/Brien
Deputy Consumers’ Counsel
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
65 East State Street, Suite 700
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Telephone: (614) 466-9531
angela.obrien@occ.ohio.gov
Denise C. Goulet, Esq.
McCarter & English, LLP
1301 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 West
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 753-3400
dgoulet@mccarter.com
Special Counsel to the Ohio Office of the
Attorney General for the
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
November 9, 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
II.
BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................4
III.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS ON REHEARING ........................................................6
IV.
ISSUES ON REHEARING .................................................................................................7
V.
REQUEST FOR REHEARING ...........................................................................................8
A.
FERC’s failure to allow state consumer advocate offices access to the 
Large Load Registry confidential information fails the test for reasoned 
decision-making because FERC never addressed OCC’s concerns. .......................8
B.
FERC’s exclusion of state consumer advocate offices from the 
confidential information in the Large Load Registry unduly discriminates 
against these statutorily mandated consumer representatives. ...............................13
C.
FERC’s ruling is an unlawful unexplained departure from its rulings in the 
RTO show cause proceedings recognizing the need to provide critical 
transmission planning and cost allocation information to state regulatory 
commissions and state consumer advocate offices. ...............................................15
VI.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................17

1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
) 
Docket Nos. ER26-3515-000 
REQUEST FOR REHEARING
TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY FOR OHIO CONSUMERS
BY
OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL
I.
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) October 9, 2026 Order1 in this 
case fails to protect consumers in Ohio and elsewhere in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) 
from the risks and costs that will result from acceptance of PJM’s Large Load Registry proposal 
in these dockets. In particular, that order allows PJM to exclude state consumer advocate offices 
from the list of entities entitled to access confidential information to be collected and maintained 
in the Large Load Registry.
This decision will prevent state agencies directly charged with representing consumers 
from being able to access critical information related to large load data centers with “billion-
dollar implications for consumers.”2 Consumer advocates have a statutory responsibility to 
protect residential and other utility consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates. That 
1PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 (2026) (“October 9 Order”).
2PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245 (2026), Chairman Laura V. Swett concurring at P 2 (order 
accepting in part and rejecting in part PJM’s companion filing to establish a Reliability Backstop Procurement 
auction to secured sufficient generating capacity needed to serve forecasted load associated with large data centers).

2
responsibility differs from the responsibility of state regulatory commissions that generally 
balance the interests of consumers against the interests of other participants, including utilities 
and data centers. Responsibility for advocating for consumer interests cannot be meaningfully 
discharged without access to information concerning the magnitude, location, and anticipated 
growth of large load.  Such information is essential to evaluating whether transmission 
investments, resource adequacy costs, and other infrastructure expenses driven by large load 
customers are being improperly shifted to consumers who neither caused nor benefit 
proportionally from those costs.
The Order provides no reasoned decision for excluding state consumer advocate offices 
from access to this critical information, or for treating these offices in an unduly discriminatory 
manner as compared to similar entities such as state regulatory commissions that are allowed 
access to this critical information.  The Commission’s exclusion of consumer advocates creates 
an unjustified informational imbalance.  It allows utilities and other market participants access to 
information critical to planning and cost allocation while denying that same information to those 
charged with representing consumers’ interests.  Legitimate confidentiality and security concerns 
can be addressed through protective measures rather than categorical exclusion.
The Commission’s exclusion of consumer advocates from the Large Load Registry 
conflicts with its express recognition in the PJM and Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Show Cause 
proceedings in Docket Nos. EL26-67-000 and EL26-68-000 of their important role in protecting 
consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates, including costs associated with large load

3
growth.3  Denying advocates access to critical planning information undermines their ability to 
evaluate whether large-load costs are improperly shifted to those they represent -- consumers.
Under Section 313 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 825l, and Rule 713 of 
the FERC’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.713, the Office of the Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”) requests rehearing of the October 9 Order. OCC is the statutory 
representative of millions of Ohio residential utility consumers, per Ohio R.C. Chapter 4911. 
OCC actively advocates for Ohioans in numerous state and federal regulatory proceedings, 
including proceedings before FERC. OCC timely intervened in this case on September 3, 2026,4
and submitted a Protest of the filing that same day.5
Ohio residential consumers are adversely affected by FERC’s October 9 Order in this 
case because they are at risk of paying the costs for the capacity to be acquired by the Reliability 
Backstop Procurement (“RBP”) auction authorized in a companion docket.6 Ohio consumers are 
also at risk of being curtailed  because of the significant new loads brought by these large load 
data centers.  Ohio residential consumers did not cause the need for the RBP auction, nor did 
they cause the need for the curtailments that could result from interconnecting these large load 
data centers to the grid.  Still, under the RBP order, they will pay the related capacity costs (and 
3PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at PP 66, 71 (2026) (finding that greater transparency is needed 
related to transmission planning and cost allocations related to large load data centers, and encouraging state 
regulatory commissions and state consumer advocates to identify whether additional, more granular transmission 
cost information is needed to inform proper state-jurisdictional cost allocation); see also Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 
FERC ¶ 61,213 at P 51 (2026).
4Doc-less Motion to Intervene in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3515-000, filed by Office of the 
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, available on FERC’s e-library website as Accession Document No. 20260903-5029.
5Protest by Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (Aug. 21, 2026), Docket No. ER26-3515-000, available on 
FERC’s e-Library website as Accessions Document No. 20260903-5189 (“OCC Protest”).
6PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245 (2026).

4
likely other unknown costs).  And under the October 9 Order at issue here, they may suffer 
related curtailments due to resource inadequacy.
Yet under the October 9 Order, consumers’ statutory representatives, like OCC, will not 
have access to the confidential information they need to fully represent their interests, and to 
understand and challenge the costs these large load data centers may shift onto them.  The FERC 
Order fails consumers who deserve full transparency when it comes to rates they are paying for 
the extraordinary load associated with data center deployment.
II.
BACKGROUND 
PJM proposed in this case to implement an Interim Resource Adequacy Service 
(“IRAS”), effective with the June 1, 2027 Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) Delivery Year.  
That proposed service would interrupt, or curtail service to New Large Loads that fail to bring 
sufficient capacity to satisfy their capacity obligations.7 PJM represented in the filing that it 
“hosts the largest concentration of data center load in the world,”8 and its load forecast “predicts 
peak load growth of 32 gigawatts [(“GW”)] from 2024 to 2030, 30 GW of which is projected to 
be from data centers.”9 PJM explained that the 2027/2028 RPM base residual auction cleared 
over 6,600 MW short of the region’s reliability requirement, and that the 2028/2029 RPM 
capacity auction cleared over 6,800 MW short of that requirement.10 In other words, PJM 
represented that the addition of new supply has not kept pace with rapid large load demand 
7PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3515-000, Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Establish 
Interim Resource Adequacy Service and A Large Load Registry to Address  System Reliability at 7, 22 (Aug. 13, 
2026) (“IRAS Transmittal Letter”).
8Id. at 13.
9Id.
10Id. at 14.

5
growth, thus giving rise to the significant tightening of the capacity market in recent years and 
subsequent resource adequacy shortfalls.11  (This in turn has caused upward pressure on capacity 
and energy prices.  According to PJM’s Independent Market Monitor, data center growth has 
driven $29 billion in additional capacity costs over the last four Base Residual Auctions,12
underscoring the substantial financial consequences for consumers and the critical need for 
consumer advocates to access large-load planning information.)
PJM proposed the IRAS mechanism as one element of a larger process to protect 
consumers not causing the need for new capacity from possible curtailments associated with the 
resource adequacy shortfall.  The IRAS program included a proposal to establish a Large Load 
Registry that would incorporate information on all Large Loads in the region, including 
information that identifies the entities, their peak loads, their locations and Electric Distributor 
zones, their in-service dates, peak load shaving capability, if any, ramp rates, back-up generation 
if any, and other related information.13PJM proposed to define Large Load as “end-use 
customer(s) load that has a cumulative peak load of 50 megawatts or greater at a single electrical 
site behind one or more points of interconnection . . . .”14 PJM further proposed that for 
configurations involving multiple affiliated load facilities or multiple points of interconnection 
with affiliated load facilities behind them, “all affiliated load facilities within a one-mile radius 
will be considered a single electrical site as further described in the PJM Manuals.”15 PJM 
11Id. at 13.
12Monitoring Analytics, LLC, Analysis of the 2028/2029 RPM Base Residual Auction- Part A, at Table 1 (Oct. 30, 
2026), IMM Report.
13Id. at 28-29, and 37.
14Id. at 31.
15Id.

6
represented that it will provide access to that information on a confidential basis to authorized 
state commissions, Transmission Owners, the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Electric 
Distributors, FERC and Load Serving Entities.16  PJM further represented that the purpose of the 
Registry is to provide transparency and “key information” for state and retail entities.17
The Large Load Registry will contain substantially more detailed information than the 
aggregated data made publicly available.  Aggregated data cannot substitute for access to the 
underlying information needed to independently evaluate load forecasts, infrastructure costs, and 
the risk of shifting costs attributable to large-load customers onto other customers, including 
residential consumers.  But under PJM’s proposal, independent state consumer advocates are 
not permitted access to the confidential registry.
The October 9 Order accepts PJM’s Large Load Registry proposal, including the 
definition of Large Loads and the provision that excludes state consumer advocate offices from 
access to the confidential information collected and maintained in the Registry.18 The October 9 
Order rejected all other elements of the IRAS proposal.19
III.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS ON REHEARING 
1. 
FERC erred by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner in approving PJM’s 
Large Load Registry proposal without ensuring that state consumer advocate offices have access 
to the confidential information that will be collected and maintained in that Registry.  FERC 
16Id. at 28.
17Id. at 29, 37-38.
18October 9 Order at PP 27, 48-49.
19Id. at P 52.

7
never explains why state consumer advocate offices should be excluded from access to this 
information despite the demonstrated need for such access.
2. 
FERC also acted arbitrarily in failing to address OCC’s concern that excluding 
state consumer advocate offices from the confidential information in the Large Load Registry is  
unduly discriminatory since others with a similar need for that information are granted such 
access.  
3. 
FERC’s ruling excluding state consumer advocate offices from the confidential 
information in the Large Load Registry is inconsistent with its recent decisions in the Show 
Cause proceedings initiated for Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) like PJM and 
Southwest Power Pool, Inc., that require greater transparency for state regulatory commissions 
and state consumer advocate offices with respect to the effects of large load customers on 
transmission planning, transmission cost allocation, and the need for transmission Network 
Upgrades.
IV.
ISSUES ON REHEARING 
1. 
Whether FERC’s failure to allow state consumer advocate offices to be included 
in the subset of entities that will be allowed to access the Large Load Registry confidential 
information is arbitrary and capricious, without reasoned decision, in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 
Sithe/Indep. Power Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Sithe/Indep. 
Power Partners”); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“EPSA”) 
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); 
and Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Neighborhood TV Co.”) 
(the court must be able to “discern a reasoned path from the facts and considerations before the

8
[agency] to the decision it reached”) because it did not address the concerns raised by OCC (and 
others) related to the need for access to that information?
2. 
Whether FERC’s ruling excluding state consumer advocate offices from the 
confidential information in the Large Load Registry unduly discriminates against state consumer 
advocate offices as compared to other entities entitled to access that information, contrary to the 
statutory requirements in Federal Power Act sections 205 and 206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d and 824e, 
prohibiting undue discrimination?
3. 
Whether FERC’s ruling excluding state consumer advocate offices from the 
confidential information in the Large Load Registry is inconsistent with its rulings in the Show 
Cause proceedings initiated against PJM, Southwest Power Pool and other RTOs in Docket Nos. 
EL26-67-000, EL26-68-000, EL26-69-000, EL26-70-000, EL26-71-000 and EL26-72-000 
(collectively “Show Cause” proceedings) that require greater transparency related to large load 
data center information for certain stakeholders, including state consumer advocate offices, 
contrary to Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“Williams Gas Processing”) (citing Brusco Tug & Barge Co. v. NLRB, 247 F.3d 273, 278 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic that [agency action] must either be consistent with prior 
[action] or offer a reasoned basis for its departure from precedent’”)?
V.
REQUEST FOR REHEARING 
A.
FERC’s failure to allow state consumer advocate offices access to the Large 
Load Registry confidential information fails the test for reasoned decision-
making because FERC never addressed OCC’s concerns. 
OCC seeks rehearing of FERC’s failure to direct PJM to allow state consumer advocates 
access to the Large Load Registry confidential information. FERC’s Order relies on PJM’s 
explanation that “the Large Load Registry will be available only to entities that already have 
access to this sort of information and consistent with existing confidentiality rules, i.e., PJM

9
proposes to follow its existing, Commission-approved rules, rules that currently do not allow 
state consumer advocates or similar entities to have access to this type of information.”20 These 
statements are not a reasoned explanation for rejecting OCC’s arguments.
OCC demonstrated in its Protest that PJM’s reasoning for providing access to the 
confidential information in the Large Load Registry for state regulatory commissions is the same 
as the reason OCC and other state consumer advocate offices need access to that information.  
PJM argued that “[s]tates may leverage the Large Load Registry to inform the implementation of 
retail constructs including load reduction priorities and cost allocation at the retail level to 
appropriate end-use customers.”21 PJM further explained that “[t]he Large Load Registry will 
assist states in administering their respective programs at the retail level while allowing each 
state to retain the flexibility to administer those programs, including the flexibility to determine 
when and whether Large Loads and Existing Large Loads have demonstrated that their loads are 
matched with new capacity that they have procured to serve their needs.”22  In accepting PJM’s 
claims, FERC accepted these reasons for including state regulatory commissions, Electric 
Distributors and Load Serving Entities in the group of those provided access to the confidential 
information.
The October 9 Order recounts PJM’s argument that the confidential information in the 
Registry must be available only to “‘as small a universe of entities as possible,’ while still 
making sure it is available to those who require access to implement their responsibilities, as well 
20October 9 Order at P 49.
21IRAS Transmittal Letter at 29.
22Id.

10
as operational and planning needs.”23 FERC found that “PJM’s proposal includes reasonable 
safeguards for confidential information.”24 But the Order does not explain why the list of entities 
able to access the confidential information should exclude state consumer advocate offices. This 
is especially concerning given that statutorily mandated state consumer advocate offices also 
require access to this information to implement their responsibilities to represent consumers – 67 
million in the PJM region who pay the ultimate bill for capacity and energy.
As OCC explained in its Protest, state consumer advocate offices such as OCC, are 
statutorily mandated to protect the interests of retail consumers in their respective states.25 OCC 
demonstrated that “just as authorized state commissions need to access confidential Registry 
information to assess the impact of Large Loads in their states and to ensure just and reasonable 
cost and curtailment allocations for their retail customers, state consumer advocates need access 
to that information.”26 FERC never addresses this concern.  It simply ignores it.
Simply repeating PJM’s reasoning that some limit needs to be placed on who can access 
confidential information does not explain why state consumer advocate offices should be 
excluded from access when they have the same need for that information as do others included 
on the list. OCC’s request for access to the confidential information does not extend to a broad 
array of entities or to the public at large. It extends only to the statutorily-created state consumer 
advocate offices, each of whom has significant expertise and experience in maintaining the 
confidentiality of materials received under regulatory tariffs or orders.  Expanding the list of 
23October 9 Order at P 42, citing the IRAS Transmittal Letter at 11.
24Id.
25OCC Protest at 22.
26Id.

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those entitled to access the Large Load Registry confidential information to include only one 
additional type of entity, i.e., state consumer advocate offices with statutorily-mandated 
obligations to protect retail consumers, is not the unlimited disclosure PJM feared in establishing 
the limited access requirement. FERC never explained why state consumer advocate offices 
should be excluded from the access group.  In fact, transparency of large load data center 
locations, projected loads and needs for network upgrades is most important for the 67 million 
consumers in PJM who are paying the bills created by the policies adopted by FERC.
As OCC explained in its Protest, state consumer advocates have no other means to obtain 
the confidential Large Load Registry information.27 They will find their efforts to obtain that 
information in state proceedings stymied by the confidentiality provisions in the Large Load 
Registry tariff.28 Without a federal rule providing for Registry access, state consumer advocates 
will be denied access to this essential information in the state proceedings, and their ability to 
advocate for their statutorily-mandated constituency stymied.29
FERC precedent supports granting access to confidential information to those willing to 
sign a protective agreement and to keep that information confidential.30  In West Deptford 
Energy, LLC, FERC stated that “[i]n crafting a protective order the goal is to issue the least 
restrictive order that will accomplish the purpose of protecting against the harm of disclosure.”31
In rejecting West Deptford’s effort to restrict access to its confidential information to only the 
27Id.
28Id.
29Id.
30See, e.g., West Deptford Energy, LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,189 at P 27 (2011) (“West Deptford”);  see also Duke 
Energy Carolinas, LLC et al., 127 FERC ¶ 61,281 at P (2009) (“Duke Energy”).
31West Deptford at P 28 (emphasis added).

12
Commission, PJM and the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, FERC stated that the company 
had not shown why the normal procedure of requiring a protective agreement was not “an 
appropriate balancing of” the competing concerns of need for access to the information and need 
for protection from broad disclosure of confidential information.32  FERC further found that “a 
party claiming that confidential material should be withheld entirely will be expected to show 
that a protective order will not adequately safeguard its interests and that this concern outweighs 
the need for the material to develop the record.”33
In the instant case, PJM never explained why a protective order signed by state consumer 
advocate offices would not adequately safeguard its interest in maintaining the confidentiality of 
the large load data centers. And FERC never balanced the competing concerns of the state 
consumer advocate offices need for that information and the need to protect that information 
from broad disclosure. 
While West Deptford involved an adjudicatory proceeding, the requirement for an 
appropriate balancing of interests is no less important here, where PJM could amend the 
confidentiality provisions of its Tariff to include state consumer advocate offices to allow access 
to the Large Load Registry.  Neither PJM nor FERC reasonably explain why state consumer 
advocate offices should be excluded from the list of those with access to the Large Load 
Registry. Consumer Advocates need access to ensure that rates charged to consumers for Large 
Load interconnections and any curtailments treat consumers in a just and reasonable manner. 
32Id. at P 27, citing Mojave Pipeline Co., 38 FERC ¶ 61,249 (1987).
33Id. at 61,842 (emphasis in original).

13
FERC’s failure to address this issue is contrary to judicial requirements that FERC consider 
important aspects of the problem.34
B.
FERC’s exclusion of state consumer advocate offices from the confidential 
information in the Large Load Registry unduly discriminates against these 
statutorily mandated consumer representatives. 
In Duke Energy, FERC found that it is unreasonable to limit access to confidential 
information and Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (“CEII”) in the transmission planning 
process only to certain entities that obtained authorization from the Commission to access CEII 
contained in Form 715 reports.35  FERC stated that “these limitations unreasonably restrict the 
ability of affected stakeholders to participate fully in transmission planning meetings and that 
transmission providers may develop mechanisms, such as confidentiality agreements and 
password-protected access to information, in order to manage confidentiality and CEII 
concerns.”36
Notably, the confidentiality concerns in Duke Energy did not involve an adjudicatory 
proceeding, but rather involved access to confidential information in a transmission planning 
process. That process is not unlike the situation here, where state consumer advocate offices need 
access to confidential information that will affect generation and transmission planning, rates and 
curtailments for retail consumers, including the 67 million consumers who ultimately pay the 
rates under discussion.
34 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43 (FERC’s orders are arbitrary and 
capricious if it “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”); see also Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68, 80 (4th Cir. 2020); 
Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd., 912 F.3d 746, 753 (4th Cir. 2019). 
35Duke Energy at P 22.
36Id.

14
That lack of transparency for consumers is egregious, unjust and unreasonable. By 
excluding authorized state consumer advocates from the Registry, PJM’s proposal unduly 
discriminates against consumer representatives in violation of sections 205 and 206 of the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d and 824e, and in violation of long-held judicial 
precedent prohibiting such undue discrimination.37
In Cal. Independent Sys. Operator, Inc, FERC found that the FPA does not prohibit all 
discrimination, only “undue discrimination.”38 FERC stated that “[d]iscrimination is undue when 
similarly situated customers are treated differently.”39 In Calpine Corp., FERC found that 
“[w]hether a rate or practice is unduly discriminatory depends on whether it provides different 
treatment to different classes of entities and turns on whether those classes of entities are 
similarly situated.”40 FERC explained that “[d]ifferential treatment does not necessarily amount 
to undue preference where the difference in treatment can be explained by some factor deemed 
acceptable to regulators (and the courts),”41
Here, neither PJM nor FERC provides a reasoned explanation for excluding OCC and 
other PJM state consumer advocates from access to the confidential information in the Large 
Load Registry where their need for such information is identical to the reasons state regulatory 
37 See, e.g., Cal. Independent System Operator, Inc., 193 FERC ¶ 61,117 at P 33 (2025) (“CAISO”); see also New 
England Power Gen. Ass’n. v. FERC, 881 F.3d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing BP Energy Co. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 
959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“vacating finding of no undue discrimination where Commission identified differences 
between two natural-gas companies but failed to adequately explain why they provide a rational basis for the 
difference in treatment”)).
38CAISO at P 33, citing Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 171 FERC ¶ 61,035, at P 318 (2020) (“As the 
Commission has previously explained, the FPA forbids ‘undue’ preferences, advantages, and prejudices.”). 
(“Calpine Corp.”)
39Id.
40Calpine Corp. at P 318, citing Town of Norwood v. FERC, 202 F.3d 392, 402 (1st Cir. 2000)
41Id. (emphasis in original); see also Cities of Newark v. FERC, 763 F.2d 533, 546 (3d Cir. 1985)

15
commissions were given access to that information.  The regulations imposing confidentiality 
obligations on the state regulatory commissions could be extended to state consumer advocate 
offices as well.
C.
FERC’s ruling is an unlawful unexplained departure from its rulings in the 
RTO show cause proceedings recognizing the need to provide critical 
transmission planning and cost allocation information to state regulatory 
commissions and state consumer advocate offices. 
As noted previously, FERC recently issued Show Cause orders against the six RTOs in 
the nation. These orders find that the existing tariffs of these RTOs are unjust and unreasonable 
because they provide insufficient transparency for state regulatory commissions and state 
consumer advocate offices regarding the effects of large load data centers on transmission 
planning and allocation of transmission costs.42
FERC specifically noted in PJM’s Show Cause Order that “the lack of centralized 
information on the associated transmission costs in PJM hamper the ability of the Commission 
and stakeholders (including transmission customers and state regulators) to understand and 
accurately assess the relationship between the addition of large loads to the transmission system 
and wholesale transmission costs.”43 Citing the “speculative nature” of requests for transmission 
service for large data center loads, FERC found that “[t]he speed and scale with which Eligible 
Customers are seeking transmission service on behalf of large loads makes it difficult for 
interested parties, including transmission customers and state regulators, to accurately assess 
42See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 73 (“The speed and scale with which Eligible 
Customers are seeking transmission service on behalf of large loads makes it difficult for interested parties, 
including transmission customers and state regulators, to accurately assess which transmission costs are driven by 
requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers to serve large loads.”); see also Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 
FERC ¶ 61,213 at P 51 (finding that additional transparency obligations are necessary to “give state public utility 
commissions and other state regulators the information necessary to allow them to understand which transmission 
costs are caused by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate these costs to the appropriate retail 
customers.” 
43 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶61,211 at P 73.

16
which transmission costs are driven by requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers 
to serve large loads.”44  FERC citied to comments from stakeholders that “the opaque nature of 
requests for transmission service by Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, and the 
associated Network Upgrades required to provide that transmission service, prevent wholesale 
and retail customers, states, and other stakeholders from understanding such costs.”45  FERC 
then found PJM’s existing tariff unjust and unreasonable because it did not provide sufficient 
transparency on these matters.46
FERC is still in the process of assessing specific proposals related to the concerns raised 
in the Show Cause orders.  However, the important point here is that the Show Cause orders 
explicitly recognized the need of state consumer advocate offices, as well as state regulatory 
commissions, to have greater insight into large load data center impacts on transmission 
planning, the need for new transmission network upgrades, and the allocation of costs associated 
with those demands.  The same is true of the state consumer advocate offices need to access the 
confidential information in the Large Load Registry.
The October 9 Order is an unwarranted departure from FERC’s rulings in the RTO Show 
Cause orders, contrary to Williams Gas Processing, 475 F.3d at 326 (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic that 
[agency action] must either be consistent with prior [action] or offer a reasoned basis for its 
departure from precedent’”).  In the Show Cause orders, FERC found that state consumer 
advocate offices, like state regulatory commissions, need access to critical information related to 
large load data centers in order to effectively represent consumer interests in planning and cost 
44Id. 
45Id. at P 74. 
46 Id. at PP 75-76.

17
allocation proceedings. The fact that some of the information in the Large Load Registry is 
confidential is of no import for purposes of determining whether state consumer advocate 
offices, like state regulatory commissions, should be able to access the information they need to 
inform their advocacy for consumers. FERC never explained why non-disclosure agreements 
would work for state regulatory commissions but not for state consumer advocate offices to 
protect the confidentiality of the Large Load Registry information.
FERC has recognized the importance of sufficient transparency regarding Large Loads, 
stating that “without sufficient transparency . . . stakeholders may lack information and visibility 
regarding the costs driven by large load additions.”47 State consumer advocate offices have 
needs for the confidential information similar to those identified for state regulatory 
commissions.  And state consumer advocates are just as capable of maintaining the 
confidentiality of that information under regulatory rules and orders.  FERC should reverse its 
ruling on this issue, and direct PJM to extend access to the Large Load Registry confidential 
information to state consumer advocate offices, subject to confidentiality obligations.
VI.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, OCC respectfully requests that FERC reconsider its ruling in the October 
9 Order.  FERC should afford consumers in Ohio and elsewhere in PJM the full protections of 
just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory and preferential rates.  FERC should reject PJM’s 
Large Load Registry proposal with directions to refile the proposal with a provision that includes 
state consumer advocate offices in the list of entities entitled to access the confidential 
information that will be collected, maintained and made available in that Registry.
47 IRAS Application at 48, citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 74 (2026).

18
Respectfully submitted,
Maureen Willis
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
/s/ Angela O’Brien
Angela O’Brien
Deputy Consumers’ Counsel
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
65 East State Street, Suite 700
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Telephone: (614) 466-9531
angela.obrien@occ.ohio.gov
/s/ Denise C. Goulet
Denise C. Goulet, Esq.
McCarter & English, LLP
1301 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 West
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 753-3400
dgoulet@mccarter.com
Special Counsel for The Office of
Attorney General of Ohio on Behalf of
the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
November 9, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have on this date served a copy of the foregoing document via 
electronic mail upon all parties of record on the Commission’s official service list in this 
proceeding. Dated in Washington, D.C., on this 9th day of November, 2026.
/s/ Denise C. Goulet
Denise C. Goulet, Esq.
McCarter & English, LLP
1301 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 West
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 753-3400 – Telephone
dgoulet@mccarter.com