AD26-8-000 · 2026-10-21 · PJM
Reliability Technical Conference Comments from PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (Christopher Pilong, Panel 1)
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For Public Use
Reliability Technical Conference
Comments from PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C.
FERC Reliability Technical Conference, Docket No. AD26-8-000
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Reliability Technical Conference Comments from PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
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Contents
Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
RTOs Need Detailed Site Information About Large Loads Seeking to Interconnect ............................................. 2
How PJM Is Responding to the Rapid Interconnection of Large Loads and Technologies like Inverter Based
Resources ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Physical And Cybersecurity Risks Posed by Large Load Integration .................................................................... 3
How PJM Is Addressing Fuel Issues and Issues Posed by Behind-the-Meter and Front-of-the-Meter Gas-Fired
Generation Resources on the Same Natural Gas Pipelines ..................................................................................... 4
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Reliability Technical Conference Comments from PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
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Summary
On behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”), I, Christopher Pilong, Senior Director of Operations Planning,
appreciate the opportunity to provide this written statement for the Commission’s October 21, 2026 reliability technical
conference.
PJM welcomes the opportunity to participate in a public discussion about the state of reliability in our changing energy
landscape and, in particular, the operational challenges involved with integrating large loads and addressing evolving
system dynamics.
The pace of load growth and emergence and adoption of technologies such as inverter-based resources are presenting
novel challenges. PJM is working with stakeholders to respond to those reliability challenges. Both state and federal
action will be critical to continuing to ensure system reliability.
My statement addresses four reliability priorities: the detailed and continuously updated information PJM needs from
Large Load operators; PJM’s response to the rapid interconnection of Large Loads and the growing penetration of
inverter-based resources; the physical and cybersecurity risks associated with concentrated Large Loads; and the fuel-
security and infrastructure implications of behind-the-meter and front-of-the-meter gas-fired generation that relies on
shared natural gas pipelines.
Going forward, PJM supports a reliability framework that: requires timely, accurate, and continuously updated technical
information from Large Load operators; establishes enforceable voltage and frequency ride-through requirements for
both new and existing Large Loads; ensures that interconnection and energization decisions reflect the time required to
develop sufficient generation and transmission; and advances coordinated electric-gas planning, cybersecurity
protections, and accountability for facility performance.
Large Loads are seeking interconnection in PJM faster than the generation and transmission needed to serve them can
be placed in service. A data center may seek interconnection within two years, while new generation can take three
years or more to come online and major transmission facilities can take seven years or more. This timing mismatch
creates a reliability risk.
Large Loads also exhibit very high and relatively constant power utilization, unlike traditional residential, industrial, and
commercial load, which generally declines overnight, on weekends, and during the spring and fall shoulder seasons.
Large Loads therefore raise the system’s base demand across nearly all hours, producing not only higher summer and
winter peaks but also higher demand during spring, fall, and other historically off-peak periods. This change makes it
more difficult to maintain reliability during planned transmission and generation outages needed for construction,
equipment overhauls, and major maintenance. Given their potential effect on system reliability, Large Loads must
provide sufficient operational flexibility or be subject to load reductions until the generation and transmission needed to
serve them have been studied and placed in service. Without those safeguards, reliability for existing customers may
be placed at risk. The urgency is illustrated by PJM’s increasing need to seek Department of Energy authorization
under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act to operate generation beyond otherwise applicable limits and potentially
use backup generation at data centers and other sites during anticipated emergencies, including over the October 12–
14, 2026 period. PJM historically has not needed to seek such relief under comparable temperatures and seasonal
conditions.
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RTOs Need Detailed Site Information About Large Loads Seeking to
Interconnect
Because Large Loads present with various configurations that can affect reliable electric service, it is essential that
RTOs receive detailed site information about Large Loads seeking to interconnect, including the specific system
conditions that may trigger a load to switch ‘off grid power’ and move to its UPS or backup generator. Such information
is necessary for PJM to understand and validate how the Large Load facilities will respond to system events before
Large Loads interconnect with the grid, as opposed to having an unexpected response to system conditions in real time
operations.
Ongoing participation of the Large Loads in furnishing detailed information to appropriate entities and either directly or
ultimately to the RTOs is critical. They must provide—and be held accountable for providing—accurate information on
an ongoing basis and must ensure any changes they make are appropriately coordinated with the entities they affect
(e.g., Transmission Owners, Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, etc.).
Given wholesale and transmission system impacts, PJM is exploring pathways to ensure Large Loads are required to
participate in commissioning tests, periodic validation of models and settings, prompt notice of material facility changes,
event-data retention, and post-event performance reporting. Where a facility’s actual performance differs from its
submitted models or approved settings, the applicable framework should provide for corrective action, operating
restrictions, or other consequences proportionate to the reliability risk.
Large Load operators should be subject to consistent performance requirements and standards. PJM has already
experienced multiple instances in which Large Loads unexpectedly disconnected from the grid. In July 2024,
approximately 1,500 MW of load transferred off grid in response to a system fault in Northern Virginia. Two additional
major events have since occurred, including the sudden transfer of approximately 3,900 MW of load off grid on July 22,
2026. PJM has also observed multiple events outside its footprint. These events demonstrate the need to implement
voltage ride-through requirements without delay.
As part of its response to the June 18, 2026 Large Load show-cause order, PJM is developing voltage and frequency
ride-through requirements informed by the July 22, 2026 event. Those requirements could have mitigated the event if
they had applied to the affected facilities. To reduce the risk of recurrence, the requirements should apply, as legally
and technically appropriate, to both new and existing Large Loads. The expected magnitude and reliability
consequences of future events will increase as concentrated Large Loads continue to grow, making timely action
essential.
The modeling and adherence to voltage/frequency ride through requirements also allows RTOs to direct reinforcements
to the system that will support the new Large Loads while maintaining the current high level of reliability for existing
customers.
PJM has actively participated in the NERC efforts to draft standards pertaining to Large Computational Loads, which
will also assist in these efforts and are critical to have in place as soon as possible.
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How PJM Is Responding to the Rapid Interconnection of Large Loads and
Technologies like Inverter Based Resources
There are essential reliability attributes that all generators produce at varying levels that are critical to maintaining grid
reliability. PJM is considering system reliability needs via markets products, and the development of enhanced
Essential Reliability Services,1 which are the building blocks of grid reliability.
PJM and other regions will need to continue to track and value Essential Reliability Services, potentially implementing
market solutions. One example is PJM’s Primary Frequency Response review, as the September 10, 2026 PJM
Operating Committee presentation shows.2
In addition, PJM must obtain sufficient reserves via markets to address Essential Reliability Services. In this regard,
PJM’s Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force (“RCSTF”) effort will help achieve sufficient reserves to address
uncertainty and ramping. The RCSTF proposal was presented at PJM’s September 24, 2026 Markets and Reliability
Committee meeting.3 Stakeholders will vote on the proposal at the November Members Committee meeting, and,
assuming a passing vote, PJM expects to file the proposal at the Commission in December.
Physical And Cybersecurity Risks Posed by Large Load Integration
The physical and cybersecurity risks presented by Large Load vary.
The principal physical and cybersecurity risks associated with Large Loads arise from the amount of demand
concentrated at individual facilities and within geographic areas. Erratic operation, simultaneous disconnection, or
malicious manipulation of multiple facilities could produce sudden load changes that affect grid frequency, voltage, and
system stability.
The disruptive Large Load events observed to date appear to have been inadvertent, including the July 22 event
involving the sudden disconnection of nearly 3.9 GW in Virginia. A malicious actor, however, could seek access to a
data center’s workload-management systems, manipulate computing activity, and create abrupt load increases or
losses. Coordinated manipulation across multiple facilities could activate protection systems and compound the system
effects observed during an inadvertent event. These scenarios support development of security controls, incident-
reporting obligations, operational coordination protocols, and recovery requirements proportionate to the grid
consequences of concentrated computational load.
1 As described by NERC, Essential Reliability Services include frequency support, voltage support, and ramping capability on the
Bulk Electric System. See NERC Essential Reliability Services Abstract Report, available at
https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/programs/rapa/ra/ers-abstract-report-final.pdf.
2 The September 10, 2026 Operating Committee presentation addressing the Primary Frequency Response Review is available at
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/committees/oc/2026/20260910/20260910-item-06---primary-frequency-
response-update---presentation.pdf.
3 Reserve Certainty Senior Task Force Overview and Proposal, available at https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-
groups/committees/mrc/2026/20260924/20260924-item-02a---1-pjm-rcstf-proposal-summary---presentation.pdf.
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Because large computational loads can materially affect real-time grid operations, NERC reliability standards should
address the operational and cybersecurity obligations appropriate to those facilities. The standards should clarify
applicability, performance expectations, coordination with Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities, event
reporting, model validation, and cybersecurity protections commensurate with the facilities’ potential effect on the Bulk-
Power System.
How PJM Is Addressing Fuel Issues and Issues Posed by Behind-the-Meter
and Front-of-the-Meter Gas-Fired Generation Resources on the Same
Natural Gas Pipelines
PJM actively considers the implications of fuel availability for gas-fired generation to meet the additional demands of
interconnecting Large Loads.
Gas-fired generation is an important component of PJM’s resource mix. PJM currently has approximately 90 GW of
installed gas-fired generation, of which 80% is served directly by interstate pipelines and 20% is served by local
distribution companies. Approximately 29% of gas-fired resources have dual-fuel capability, and 51% have firm gas-
delivery arrangements.
To minimize reliability threats posed by unavailability of fuel, PJM’s Gas Electric Coordination Team works closely with
generation owners and pipelines. PJM’s team coordinates with generation owners and conducts surveys to ensure
adequate fuel is available and secured going into peak periods. In addition, when PJM declares a maximum generation
emergency, there is a focus on fuel inventory for different generation resources, including instructions to generation
resources to conserve available fuel for critical periods if there is a shortage.
Recent reports indicate that as much as 30 GW of gas-fired generation may be developed to serve data-center load
over the next four to five years. Whether that generation is co-located behind the meter or interconnected in front of the
meter, substantial new pipeline capacity and increased gas production may be needed in some areas to support the
generation while maintaining reliable service for existing customers. The need is particularly significant if the generation
is expected to operate throughout the year to serve data centers with high capacity factors. Meeting rapid energization
targets will require early coordination with the natural gas industry and realistic assumptions about siting, permitting,
construction schedules, materials, labor, and fuel-delivery capability. These considerations reinforce the need for close
gas-electric coordination.
Consideration should also be given to account for common-mode fuel risks. Multiple behind-the-meter and front-of-the-
meter generators serving Large Loads may depend on the same pipeline, compressor station, local distribution system,
or upstream supply path. PJM and the gas industry therefore need sufficient information to identify correlated
contingencies, evaluate deliverability during peak electric and gas conditions, and determine whether firm
transportation, dual-fuel capability, on-site fuel, demand flexibility, or other mitigation is needed.
Data centers with capacity factors of 80–90% increase the system’s base demand and therefore the need for resources
capable of serving sustained load. PJM also must retain a portfolio able to meet seasonal and weather-driven demand
that varies by hour and time of year. PJM’s Commission-accepted Effective Load Carrying Capability analysis (“ELCC”)
supports that objective by assessing each resource type’s contribution to resource adequacy during the hours when the
system is most constrained.
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PJM respectfully requests that the Commission use this technical conference to advance a coordinated reliability
framework for Large Loads—one that aligns energization with available infrastructure, requires accurate models and
dependable facility performance, addresses correlated cyber and fuel risks, and preserves reliable service for existing
customers as the system evolves.