PJM proposes its first reliability backstop procurement
PJM files tariff and Reliability Assurance Agreement revisions for a one-time Reliability Backstop Procurement of new capacity, with 15-year commitments, pay-as-bid selection under a $555/MW-day cap, and costs allocated to zones and then to load serving entities, with state input.
Asks FERC to: Accept the RBP and make it effective by September 29, 2026, so the procurement window can open September 30; PJM consents to FERC modifying or severing parts of the proposal under section 205.
Parallel proceeding. PJM's separate section 205 backstop filing for capacity to serve large loads, a companion to the E-7 order's resource adequacy report directive and its concern about cost shifting to existing customers.
E-7 PJM: 30-day report on serving large loads with adequate generation (p. 8) E-7 PJM: Cost-recovery agreement (P 77, p. 28)
Key points
- PJM describes the RBP as a one-time procurement responding to capacity shortfalls driven by large loads, mainly data centers.
a one-time procurement of new capacity to address resource adequacy challenges in the PJM Region PDF p. 8
- PJM ties the RBP to the NEDC/PJM Governors' Principles: a backstop auction, 15-year price certainty, and cost allocation to LSEs with new data centers that have not self-procured.
allocate the cost of any new capacity procured through the aforementioned [RBP] to [Load Serving Entities ("LSE")] with new data centers that have not self-procured new capacity or agreed to be curtailable. PDF p. 9
- PJM cites a forecast of 32 GW of peak growth from 2024 to 2030, 30 GW from data centers.
PJM's load forecast predicts peak load growth of 32 gigawatts [("GW")] from 2024 to 2030, 30 GW of which is projected to be from data centers. PDF p. 13
- The 2028/2029 auction cleared 6,831.3 MW short of the reliability requirement at the $325/MW-day price cap.
cleared 6,831.3 MW (in Unforced Capacity ("UCAP")) short of PJM's Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO")-wide reliability requirement at the market price cap of $325/MW-day. PDF p. 14
- RBP Resources get commitments of up to 15 years, from 2028/2029 through 2042/2043.
for a fixed term of up to 15 years, starting with the 2028/2029 Delivery Year and ending with the 2042/2043 Delivery Year. PDF p. 15
- PJM caps the MW-weighted levelized procurement cost at $555/MW-day.
not exceed a maximum willingness to pay of $555/MW-day UCAP, on a MW-weighted average basis over all Delivery Years of the RBP. PDF p. 68
- PJM selects resources pay-as-bid rather than at a single clearing price, because the RBP is one-time and procures non-uniform resources.
PJM proposes to commit resources in the RBP using a pay-as-bid approach, PDF p. 72
- Costs go to Electric Distributor zones, then to LSEs, using state or RERRA allocations when reported, with a PJM back-up method.
the proposed cost allocation methodology empowers states and/or RERRAs to submit RBP RBOs, which PJM would then apply to the allocation of RBP Charges to LSEs. PDF p. 111
- PJM asks for an order by September 29 and plans to open the window September 30, 2026, and consents to modification or severance.
PJM requests that the Commission issue an order on this filing and make this proposal effective by no later than September 29, 2026, which is 60 days after the date of this filing. PDF p. 137
Read topic-matched comments in ER26-3380
Topics in the text: Cost allocation · Credit and exit · Reliability and curtailment
What the document says
Procurement · PDF pp. 8–26
Why PJM separated procurement from curtailment
PJM described the backstop and its forthcoming curtailment proposal as independent. It asked FERC to consider procurement even if the other tariff needed more review.
the two filings are independent of each other PDF p. 12Filed comments: Reliability and curtailment
New capacity · PDF pp. 27–52
How a customer could reduce the target
The July proposal allowed newly contracted or self-supplied capacity to reduce the quantity PJM would buy. The customer had to report the capacity during the procurement window and provide evidence.
if reported to PJM within the RBP procurement window and supported by sufficient evidence PDF p. 38
Delivery risk · PDF pp. 53–80
What happens when promised capacity does not arrive
A project could retain its commitment through delays, but failing to supply any backstop capacity for three consecutive delivery years would cancel the balance of its 15-year commitment.
If the RBP Resource fails to provide any RBP UCAP MW after three consecutive Delivery Years PDF p. 68
Revenue settlement · PDF pp. 81–100
How the supplier would be paid
PJM proposed paying suppliers the shortfall after capacity-market revenue, subject to actual availability and clearing. Customers would fund the shortfall as measured after the fact.
Loads will fund the actual revenue shortfall, measured ex post PDF p. 88
Cost allocation · PDF pp. 101–120
Where state authority enters the bill
PJM distinguished the wholesale allocation it proposed from the decision retail regulators make about passing those charges on to individual customers.
allocation to retail customers, including data centers, is within the states’ and/or RERRAs’ purview PDF p. 111
Elsewhere in the record
Other parties on the same questions, in their own documents.
- West Virginia warns restrictive offsets could drive an overbuy Public Service Commission of West Virginia
- Update the need when a project drops out Organization of PJM States
- New Jersey wanted demand-side bids to have room to compete New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
- Fifteen years of bills on one forecast Illinois Commerce Commission and Joint Consumer Advocates
- Should the original forecast bind even if load never arrives? Amazon and Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative
- The market monitor wanted new physical supply Independent Market Monitor for PJM
- Illinois supports a one-time buy, with conditions Illinois Commerce Commission
- West Virginia prefers to try buyer-seller matching first Public Service Commission of West Virginia
- Pennsylvania’s consumer advocate challenges state-set wholesale obligations Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate
- Data centers ask PJM to recognize self-supply Data Center Coalition
- West Virginia declined to join the other commissions on the backstop Organization of PJM States, recorded member positions
- New Jersey wanted one cutoff for counting load across zones New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
- Ohio’s federal energy advocate favored a state role in retail allocation Office of the Federal Energy Advocate, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
- Google and other buyers ask for state access to cost-allocation data Google, Equinix and Data Center Coalition
Source sections
Printed headings where available; page ranges otherwise. Open a heading to read the original passage.
- Opening text
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- I. THE RBP IS A LEGALLY DURABLE REFORM THAT
- A. The RBP Is a Just and Reasonable, Interim Step to Address
- E. The RBP Requires Cooperation from Numerous Sectors in Order
- III. THE PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE TARIFF AND THE RAA ARE
- B. The RTO-Wide RBP Target Is Equal to the Initial RBP Target
- C. The Procurement Process: RBP Resources, Offers, RPM Must
- D. Treatment of RBP Commitment in Event of Transmission Owner
- E. Allocation of Costs Associated with Resources Procured Through
- F. Credit Requirements of RBP Resources and LSEs Commensurate
- V. REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE AND CONSENT TO
- I. THE RBP IS A LEGALLY DURABLE REFORM THAT INCORPORATES
- A. The RBP Is a Just and Reasonable, Interim Step to Address Resource
- B. The RBP Is Consistent with the PJM Governors’ Principles.
- C. The Success of the RBP Requires State Participation.
- D. The RBP Adheres to the Legal Precedent on Jurisdiction.
- E. The RBP Requires Cooperation from Numerous Sectors in Order to Meet
- II. BACKGROUND
- BACKGROUND
- A. The Critical Issue Fast Path Stakeholder Process
- B. PJM Board Determination
- C. PJM’s Large Load Matters
- III. THE PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE TARIFF AND THE RAA ARE JUST
- A. Overview of the RBP
- B. The RTO-Wide RBP Target Is Equal to the Initial RBP Target Minus
- C. The Procurement Process: RBP Resources, Offers, RPM Must Offer,
- D. Treatment of RBP Commitment in Event of Transmission Owner Exit
- E. Allocation of Costs Associated with Resources Procured Through the
- F. Credit Requirements of RBP Resources and LSEs Commensurate with
- G. Miscellaneous and Conforming Changes
- IV. CORRESPONDENCE
- V. REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE AND CONSENT TO MODIFICATION
- VI. DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED
- VII. SERVICE
- VIII. CONCLUSION