ER27-506-000 · 2026-11-16 · California Independent System Operator Corporation

CAISO files large-load tariff revisions under section 205 in response to the show cause order

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www.caiso.com     │     250 Outcropping Way, Folsom, CA 95630     │     916.351.4400 
 
California Independent System Operator Corporation 
 
November 16, 2026 
 
 
 
The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese 
Secretary  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
888 First Street, NE 
Washington, DC 20426 
 
 
Re: 
California Independent System Operator Corporation 
 
 
Docket No. ER27- ___-000 
Large Loads Tariff Amendment  
Response to Order to Show Cause 
 
Dear Secretary Reese: 
 
The California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) 
submits this filing to (1) enhance its large load interconnection procedures 
through a tariff amendment, and (2) address the issues the Commission raises in 
its Order to Show Cause (Order).1 Taken together, the CAISO and Participating 
Transmission Owner (PTO) tariff revisions supply the tariff-level clarity, customer 
protections, and operational tools the Order seeks. The result is a 
comprehensive near-term response to the Order that can accelerate viable large 
load projects without compromising reliability, affordability, or open access. 
 
I.  
Executive Summary 
 
 
California and the West have an established framework for integrating 
new load growth, including for data centers and other large loads. Through 
coordinated resource planning, long-term procurement of clean and reliable 
generation, and an unprecedented expansion of the transmission system, the 
CAISO and its PTOs are working to ensure that new demand can be served 
without compromising reliability or affordability. This work entails close, careful 
coordination with California’s principal energy agencies, the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the California Energy Commission (CEC), and 
local regulators across the West. It also recognizes that generation and 
 
1  
The CAISO submits this filing pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 
U.S.C. § 824d, and Part 35 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 35. Capitalized terms 
not otherwise defined herein have the meanings set forth in appendix A to the CAISO tariff, and 
references to specific tariff sections and appendices are references to sections and appendices in 
the existing CAISO tariff unless otherwise specified.

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The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese 
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transmission are complementary investments: securing adequate generating 
resources is only valuable if those resources can be delivered where and when 
they are needed. By planning both in tandem over longer time horizons, 
California’s framework supports continued investment in innovation, 
electrification, and advanced computing infrastructure while maintaining a 
reliable, resilient, and increasingly carbon-free electric grid for all customers. 
 
The CAISO and PTOs have complementary and clearly defined 
responsibilities within this framework. The PTOs lead customer interconnection 
and the development, engineering, construction, and maintenance of the 
transmission facilities needed to reliably serve new and expanding customers. 
For more than a century, that work has enabled California’s growth, supporting 
everything from Silicon Valley and the State’s agricultural and industrial base to 
its ports, cities, and emerging centers of technological innovation. The CAISO 
builds on that foundation through independent, systemwide transmission 
planning, coordination of interconnection and grid-development activities, and 
reliability oversight, evaluating individual projects and load additions in the 
context of the broader needs of California and the Western interconnected 
system. 
 
The Commission’s Order asks whether the CAISO tariff remains just and 
reasonable as unprecedented large load growth tests utility tariffs nationwide. 
The CAISO’s proposed reforms answer the Commission’s concerns through a 
framework tailored to the CAISO’s distinctive market design and the existing 
division of responsibility between the CAISO and its PTOs. The CAISO’s 
proposals constitute a major step toward enabling the timely development and 
interconnection of data centers and other new large loads. The concepts 
proposed rest on a foundation of highly integrated planning and coordination 
among the CAISO, PTOs, State energy agencies, and local regulatory 
authorities, and provide a framework upon which the PTOs will layer their own 
processes to serve new large loads while upholding and reinforcing the CAISO’s 
commitment to reliability. The proposed reforms strengthen accountability and 
protect existing customers. They improve transparency, operational visibility, 
technical standards, cost responsibility, and protection against speculative 
development. 
 
First, the CAISO and PTO tariff revisions create streamlined paths for 
large loads to interconnect to the transmission system while preserving the 
PTOs’ lead role in connecting and serving load. Standardized application 
information, deposits, milestones, study coordination, and service agreements 
will make the process more transparent and predictable. A large load threshold 
and enhanced data requirements will give the CAISO and PTOs earlier visibility 
into a project’s size, timing, operating profile, and potential system effects. 
Coordinated studies, technical standards, telemetry, modeling, ride-through, 
ramping, power-quality, and other operating requirements will allow the CAISO to

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identify and mitigate reliability impacts before service begins and to operate the 
grid reliably after the load comes online. 
 
Second, the PTOs will implement just and reasonable deposit, security, 
reimbursement, and cost-recovery provisions in their own tariffs. Milestone and 
readiness requirements will reduce the risk that speculative projects drive 
premature investment, and expanded reporting will provide greater transparency 
into large load requests, study status, projected demand, required upgrades, and 
cost responsibility. Together, these measures align costs with beneficiaries and 
cost causers and reduce the risk that abandoned, delayed, or underutilized 
projects leave other transmission customers paying for facilities built principally to 
serve a new large load. 
 
Third, the CAISO’s tariff revisions close any gaps presented by co-located 
and behind-the-meter arrangements. The CAISO clarifies their treatment and 
requires generator interconnection customers to disclose plans to serve co-
located load, enabling the CAISO to coordinate its generator studies with the 
PTOs’ load-interconnection review. The framework distinguishes service to load 
from generator interconnection service, preserves applicable transmission 
charges and reliability obligations, and allocates upgrade costs based on the 
facilities and service actually required. These provisions give load and generation 
developers significant flexibility regardless of their planned configuration. The 
CAISO also has clarified how developers can submit new interconnection 
requests or modify existing load or generation sites. 
 
Fourth, the CAISO proposes new service options for flexible large loads 
that can reduce consumption when transmission capability is unavailable. The 
CAISO’s Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) can permit earlier 
energization while network upgrades are pending, enabling the PTOs to provide 
bespoke solutions to large loads based on their configurations and constraints. 
Eligibility, study, metering, communications, dispatch, and compliance 
requirements ensure that flexibility is real and operationally dependable rather 
than assumed. FILI provides a near-term, prioritized solution for large load 
developers, with additional work planned on permanent flexibility and other 
emerging configurations. 
 
Collectively, these tariff revisions will ensure the CAISO tariff remains just 
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential in the face of the 
challenges the Commission identified in the Order associated with providing the 
transmission service needed to serve the ongoing influx of large loads while 
maintaining reliability and affordability.

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II. 
Background  
 
A.  
Large Loads 
 
The CAISO’s work on large loads has unfolded against a rapidly evolving 
policy landscape. The CAISO’s initial focus was to address the most immediate 
operational challenges that could impact reliability. As the stakeholder initiative 
progressed, the priorities and expectations of federal and State regulators for 
large load interconnections continued to develop. Through it all, the CAISO has 
sought to remain responsive to that evolving direction. The CAISO adjusted the 
scope and sequencing of its stakeholder process accordingly, while continuing to 
provide stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to shape the proposals presented 
in this filing.  
 
 
In 2025, the CAISO began regular engagement with the PTOs and formed 
a Large Load Technical Requirements Working Group (LLTRWG) to explore 
possible technical standards to ensure reliable operations as new large loads 
interconnect to the CAISO system. The CAISO’s Issue Paper, posted in January 
2026, described current roles, considerations, and processes for large loads, 
including transmission and resource planning, transmission service offerings, 
cost allocation and responsibility, technical requirements and standards, 
operational requirements, and related issues.2 The CAISO has continued to 
monitor and engage in State and federal regulatory discussions regarding large 
loads and explored central issues and procedural steps that require additional 
transparency or new products. On June 15, 2026, the CAISO issued a Large 
Loads Technical Requirements Straw Proposal on behalf of the LLTRWG in 
order to stay ahead of any potential operational concerns that large loads may 
present. As NERC’s work on large loads ramped up, the LLTRWG focused on 
responding to NERC alerts and inquiries to help share eventual reliability 
standards. 
 
On June 18, 2026, the CAISO and PTOs received the Order to Show 
Cause with the other ISO/RTOs.3 The CAISO immediately re-scoped its large 
load stakeholder initiative to work with stakeholders to address each issue in the 
Order. The CAISO’s work included weekly coordination meetings with all of its 
PTOs, and continuous discussions with local regulators and stakeholders. 
Several major large load developers participated actively in the CAISO’s 
stakeholder process, including Google, Microsoft, Tesla, and the California Large 
Energy Consumers Association. The CAISO received written comments on its 
proposal to address the Order from the following parties: American Clean Power-
 
2  
See CAISO Large Loads Issue Paper at https://www.caiso.com/documents/issue-paper-
large-load-consideration-jan-20-2026.pdf. 
3  
Order Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 195 FERC ¶ 
61,214 (2026) (Order to Show Cause).

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California, AltaGas, Antora Energy, Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group, 
California Community Choice Association, the California Department of Water 
Resources – State Water Project, the California Large Energy Consumers 
Association, the CPUC, the Public Advocates Office of the CPUC, the California 
Solar and Storage Association, Constellation, Google, GridLiance West, IGNIS 
Energy USA, Independent Energy Producers Association, KritiGrid, Lotus 
Infrastructure Partners, LS Power Grid California and DesertLink, Microsoft, 
NextEra Energy Resources, Northern California Power Agency, Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, Pattern Energy, Persistence Analytics, Power Applications 
and Research Systems, San Diego Gas and Electric, the Six Cities,4 Solar 
Energy Industries Association, Southern California Edison, State Water 
Contractors, SunZia Transmission, Tesla, Trimark Associates, Valley Electric 
Association, Viridon California, and Voltus. These parties and more also 
participated on the CAISO’s public stakeholder calls and tariff development 
process.5 Stakeholders overwhelmingly support the CAISO’s final proposal as 
approved by the CAISO Board of Governors.6  
 
Independent of this proceeding, the CAISO’s work with stakeholders and 
regulators continues, and with cause for optimism. As described in the CAISO’s 
30-day informational report on resource sufficiency to serve large loads,7 current 
State planning forecasts and procurement trajectories indicate that California can 
accommodate the large load growth reflected in the adopted demand forecast, 
provided planned resource additions, procurement and transmission 
development continue to materialize. As of January 2026, the CEC forecasts that 
data center load in the CAISO-managed grid will increase by 1.8 GW by 2030 
and 4.7 GW by 2035.8 The CAISO also is aware that utilities are receiving an 
increasing number of large load interconnection and service applications, and is 
committed to staying ahead of the curve, with the timely serving of new energy 
demand reliably and affordably. To date, California’s integrated resource 
planning efforts have resulted in more than 37 GW of nameplate new generation 
 
4  
The cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, California are 
CAISO PTOs and metered subsystems (MSS).  
5  
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/StakeholderInitiatives/Large-loads.  
6  
https://www.caiso.com/about/governance-committees.  
7  
See Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency at 
https://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-
loads-el26-71.pdf.  
8  
California Energy Demand 2025 Hourly Forecast – CAISO – Planning Scenario: 
https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=268127&DocumentContentId=105135.

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and storage capacity coming online to serve CAISO load since 2020.9 The close 
coordination between the CAISO, State agencies, and local regulatory authorities 
on demand forecasts and resource planning provides a pathway for proactive 
transmission planning that anticipates emerging large load growth by aligning 
that growth with commensurate resource and infrastructure development to serve 
new loads. This will enable the CAISO to accommodate growth reliably and 
affordably.  
 
 
The CAISO and PTOs coordinated closely throughout the development of 
their respective proposals. Consistent with their distinct tariff responsibilities and 
governance processes, each entity developed and submitted its own tariff 
revisions. The CAISO’s proposals are designed to complement the PTOs’ filings 
while preserving the existing allocation of responsibilities. 
 
B. 
Key CAISO Differences  
 
1. 
Capacity Requirements 
 
The CAISO’s approach to large loads differs from approaches advanced 
in other ISO/RTO regions because the CAISO does not condition large load 
interconnection on a requirement to “bring your own generation.” Rather than 
requiring each new large load to develop or procure a matching increment of 
dedicated generation, California addresses supply adequacy through coordinated 
long term demand forecasting, integrated resource planning, resource 
procurement, and transmission planning. These processes are designed to 
anticipate new demand and develop the resources and delivery infrastructure 
needed to serve it. Continued generation and storage additions are expected to 
support forecast load growth, subject to timely procurement and project 
development. As such, the CAISO currently can accommodate large loads 
without making each customer’s energization and transmission service 
contingent on completion of a separate generation project. At the same time, the 
CAISO recognizes that resource sufficiency depends on the realization of 
planned additions, and large loads may develop faster than forecast or 
procurement processes anticipate. For this reason, the CAISO continually works 
with the California energy agencies on forecasting, procurement, and planning.10  
The CAISO will continue assessing whether new loads create incremental 
reliability risks; however, at this time, a bring-your-own generation requirement is 
not a condition for interconnection or transmission service.  
 
 
9  
See CPUC Resource Tracking Data Reports at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-
topics/electrical-energy/summer-2021-reliability/tracking-energy-development/cpuc-resource-
tracking-data-reports.  
10  
The CAISO describes its resource adequacy framework and current load and supply 
forecasts in the 30-day Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency.

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This distinction can remove an important barrier to timely service: a large 
load customer need not independently secure new generating capacity or satisfy 
a separate CAISO forward-capacity-market requirement as a condition of 
interconnection. The CAISO has no centralized forward capacity market; instead, 
serving load remains subject to the resource adequacy obligations applicable to 
its load-serving entity (LSE) and the requirements of the relevant local regulatory 
authority. The absence of a customer-specific generation requirement therefore 
does not eliminate advance capacity procurement obligations or guarantee 
immediate service at every location. Large loads must still complete applicable 
interconnection studies, satisfy technical and operating requirements, and fund or 
await required facilities and network upgrades. The resulting framework 
facilitates access to the shared grid without requiring a one-for-one pairing of 
each new load with new generation, while preserving the planning, procurement, 
and cost-responsibility safeguards necessary to protect reliability and existing 
customers. This framework has enabled the construction of many data centers, 
including those supporting Silicon Valley, for several years. 
 
This distinction also explains why the CAISO does not propose to replicate 
generation-linked mechanisms developed or proposed in other ISO/RTO regions. 
Where a large load’s access to service depends on identifying sufficient 
incremental generation, special arrangements may be needed to pair the load 
with a generating project, coordinate their development schedules, or condition 
the load’s operation on the availability of designated supply. Those arrangements 
address a constraint that the CAISO’s framework does not impose: a large load 
customer need not sponsor a corresponding generation project to obtain 
interconnection. Adopting mechanisms whose principal purpose is to satisfy or 
provide an exception to that requirement would therefore add complexity without 
removing a comparable barrier to service in the CAISO. The relevant question is 
not whether another region has adopted a particular innovation, but whether the 
condition that makes that innovation necessary exists under the CAISO’s market 
and regulatory framework. 
 
The CAISO’s proposed reforms in the instant filing instead focus on the 
constraints that actually govern a large load’s ability to interconnect and operate 
reliably: available transmission capability, timely completion of necessary 
upgrades, adequate visibility into load characteristics, enforceable operating 
requirements, and appropriate cost responsibility. A flexible interim 
interconnection arrangement, for example, can address a transmission 
bottleneck by allowing earlier energization subject to operating limits while 
upgrades are completed; it need not also function as a bridge until the 
customer’s dedicated generation enters service. This does not eliminate the 
serving LSE’s resource adequacy obligations or the need to plan and procure 
sufficient supply. It means that those obligations remain within the existing 
planning and procurement framework, rather than becoming a separate, 
customer-specific generation-matching condition layered onto the load

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interconnection process. As explained in detail in the CAISO’s Informational 
Report on Resource Sufficiency, the CAISO will continue to assess reliability and 
capacity needs presented by large load growth with stakeholders, PTOs, LSEs, 
and State energy agencies. 
 
2. 
Eligible Customers and Order No. 888 
 
Similarly, the CAISO’s framework for providing transmission access differs 
from the traditional Order No. 888 model. First, the CAISO does not use the 
“Eligible Customer” construct in any significant way. The very few references to 
Eligible Customer in the CAISO tariff are merely catch-alls to prescribe that all 
market participants use a scheduling coordinator to interact with the markets.11 
Second, the CAISO does not offer specific transmission services. As the 
Commission stated in the Order to Show Cause: 
 
Unlike other regions, CAISO does not offer traditional Order No. 
888 network and point-to-point transmission services, offers no 
firm, long-term transmission reservations of capacity, and does not 
provide a formal application process for transmission service. 
Instead, CAISO offers a single “daily” transmission service that is 
available to all Eligible Customers on a day-to-day basis. All energy 
that is transmitted under CAISO’s Tariff that is not associated with 
historical rights or certain wheeling transactions is treated as “new 
firm use,” and those accessing the CAISO-controlled transmission 
system cannot reserve transmission capacity beyond the day-
ahead time frame.12  
 
In other words, transmission service is assumed in the sales of energy and 
ancillary services. Stakeholders agreed with the suggestions in the Commission’s 
Order that large loads do not warrant reforming how the CAISO complies with 
Order No. 888, which has remained unchanged for 30 years. As such, the 
CAISO’s compliance focuses on achieving the Order’s goals without redesigning 
transmission service or creating a centralized capacity market for the first time in 
the CAISO. The CAISO’s reforms thus provide interconnection services to enable 
large loads to interconnect to the transmission system expeditiously, and without 
jeopardizing reliability or just and reasonable rates.  
 
 
11  
See, e.g., Sections 2.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.2.1, 4.5.4.6.1 of the CAISO tariff. 
12  
Order to Show Cause at P 19.

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3. 
Allocation of Responsibilities 
 
The Commission’s Order does not require the CAISO and its PTOs to 
reallocate their existing responsibilities for interconnecting and serving load.13 
The Commission expressly stated it recognizes that the PTOs are responsible for 
conducting load interconnection studies, the Commission “appreciate[s] that this 
role may stem from how CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners 
allocated rights and responsibilities in the governing documents establishing 
CAISO,” and that the Commission “do[es] not seek to alter that allocation of 
rights and responsibilities.”14 Rather than requiring a reallocation of responsibility 
between the CAISO and PTO tariffs, the Order identifies a need for greater clarity 
and consistency in the applicable tariffs, including a clear identification of the 
entity responsible for studying service to large loads. The distinction is important: 
addressing potential gaps in the governing procedures does not require 
transferring the load interconnection study function from the PTOs to the CAISO. 
Stakeholders’ preference was for the existing framework to remain in place, with 
the PTOs administering load interconnection requests and performing the 
associated studies under their tariffs, coordinated with the CAISO’s transmission 
planning, generator interconnection, and system reliability responsibilities. The 
necessary reforms can make those complementary roles explicit and improve 
coordination without centralizing all interconnection functions in the CAISO tariff. 
 
Although the PTOs will conduct load interconnection studies under their 
tariffs, the CAISO will play a pivotal role as the balancing authority and planning 
coordinator for the CAISO area in reviewing those studies. Because each PTO 
studies requests on its own system, the CAISO is uniquely positioned to evaluate 
study results in the context of the integrated grid, including the transmission 
facilities of other PTOs, pending generation, and the CAISO’s approved 
transmission plans. In its role, the CAISO will review PTO load interconnection 
studies to confirm that study assumptions, load characteristics, and results are 
consistent with the CAISO’s planning models and long-term plans. Most 
importantly, the CAISO will identify any PTO-proposed solution that could create 
reliability risk, whether because it relies on an operating measure that cannot be 
dependably implemented, it shifts or exacerbates constraints elsewhere on the 
system, or it is inconsistent with the CAISO’s planning and operational needs. 
 
The same distinction applies to cost responsibility. Preserving the existing 
allocation of functions allows the PTOs’ tariffs to continue to set forth the 
 
13  
See, e.g., Order to Show Cause at PP 37, 40, 51, 86. The CAISO also recognizes that 
the Order implicates various types of PTOs, including non-load-serving PTOs and approved 
project sponsors that could be impacted by large load interconnection requests but are not LSEs 
and do not have retail interconnection tariffs. The CAISO expects the PTOs to work together to 
clarify and develop complementary roles and responsibilities in their respective tariffs regarding 
requests for interconnections to non-load-serving PTO facilities. 
14  
Id. at P 51.

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applicable rules for assigning and recovering the costs of facilities needed to 
interconnect and serve large loads. The CAISO, meanwhile, retains independent 
responsibility for evaluating systemwide reliability, transmission planning, and 
operational consequences. The CAISO, PTOs, and stakeholders believe this is 
the prudent approach because many of the PTOs have a direct relationship with 
their retail ratepayers and the regulators of those ultimate rates, including the 
CPUC. Likewise, it is the PTOs that will construct and own the network upgrades 
if required for the large load interconnection. As such, the CAISO does not 
propose to issue a new “top-down” cost allocation solution through its own tariff. 
The CAISO believes that the PTOs may develop their own proposals to address 
any cost shifting concerns raised in the Order, and that the current transmission 
revenue requirement and credit mechanisms in the transmission access charges 
can accommodate those proposals.  
 
The PTOs worked in good faith to establish consistent cost allocation rules 
in their tariffs; however, there is little case law or Commission precedent to guide 
what constitutes just and reasonable rates for large loads specifically. Such 
precedent will likely come from these responses to the Order to Show Cause, 
offering greater regulatory certainty in the future. If the Commission requires 
additional tariff provisions or greater uniformity, the CAISO is prepared to work 
with the PTOs and stakeholders to develop an appropriate response consistent 
with the existing allocation of responsibilities.  
 
4. 
Non-jurisdictional Transmission Owners 
 
The Order was directed to the CAISO and all its PTOs; however, the Order 
stated that if a non-public utility wished to be removed from the proceeding, the 
Commission would rescind the Order against them. In such a case, the 
Commission “expected CAISO to respond to this order regarding the non-public 
utility’s CAISO tariff provisions on file with the Commission.”15 Based on this 
direction, the CAISO’s non-public utilities requested the Commission rescind the 
Order, which the Commission granted.16 Importantly, these PTOs explained that 
their exits from the proceeding were not simply a legal issue, but that these PTOs 
were generally unlikely to receive large load interconnection requests, and as 
such, did not require tariff revisions. Morongo Transmission, for example, 
explained that it is a non-load-serving PTO, and has no end users. The Six Cities 
similarly explained that their facilities and transmission entitlements in the CAISO 
generally represent shares of jointly-owned facilities with other transmission 
 
15  
Order to Show Cause at P 2 n. 9.  
16  
Specifically, the Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, 
California (Six Cities); and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Morongo 
Transmission—wholly owned by the Morongo Band of Mission Indians, a federally recognized 
American Indian Tribe exercising jurisdiction over the Morongo Indian Reservation—also filed for 
rescission on August 12, 2026.

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owners. WAPA likewise explained only a portion of its Path 15 line, between two 
PG&E substations, is under the CAISO’s operational control.  
 
The CAISO thus believes that its tariff revisions, combined with the 
anticipated tariff revisions of the other PTOs in this proceeding, satisfy the Order. 
Together, they will cover the transmission lines and substations in the CAISO 
where large loads will interconnect to the transmission system.  
 
III. 
Tariff Revisions and Order to Show Cause  
 
Although the CAISO believes the tariff revisions in this filing do not 
substantially affect Order Nos. 888, 1000, 2003, 792, 845, 2023, or 1920 policies, 
the CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions meet both the just and reasonable standard 
and the independent entity standard. The tariff revisions address issues unique 
to the CAISO, and were generally designed to work without significant conflict 
with the CAISO’s tariff provisions modeled on the Commission’s pro forma Open 
Access Transmission Tariff and Large Generator Interconnection Procedures. 
The proposed tariff revisions build upon the CAISO tariff with independent entity 
variations previously accepted by the Commission.  
 
A. 
Transmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large 
Loads 
 
1. 
Definition and Applicability 
 
The Commission noted in the Order that the CAISO and PTO tariffs lack a 
definition of large load as a new category of load.17 The Commission directed the 
CAISO and PTOs to create an appropriate definition, including a load size and 
interconnection voltage threshold, based on the characteristics of CAISO’s 
transmission system. The Commission suggested that a potentially reasonable 
definition would be Southwest Power Pool’s (SPP) definition of “a new 
commercial or industrial customer, located at a single site behind one or more 
points of interconnection, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater, 
interconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, 
and is not part of a co-location arrangement.”18 
 
The CAISO proposes to define a Large Load as “An End User located at a 
single site behind one or more points of interconnection to the CAISO Controlled 
Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”19 The CAISO believes this 
 
17  
Order to Show Cause at P 58. 
18  
Id. at P 57. 
19  
Proposed Appendix A to the CAISO tariff. The CAISO tariff defines an End User as “A 
consumer of electric power who consumes such power to satisfy a Load directly connected to the

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definition satisfies the Order’s intent, creates a clear and easy-to-understand 
class of loads in the CAISO, and avoids infringing on State jurisdiction. Although 
the words in the CAISO’s proposed definition are different than the Commission’s 
proposed definition, the CAISO believes those differences are valuable, as 
explained below. The CAISO also notes that its proposed definition is similar to 
the proposed definition the Commission recently approved in the PJM 
Interconnection.20 
 
The CAISO proposes not to include a description of the types of load (i.e., 
commercial or industrial customer) in its definition of Large Load. Unless there is 
a relevant operational difference between the types of loads, the CAISO believes 
that specifying type is unnecessary. The CAISO also wants to avoid a definition 
that results in false positives, false negatives, or disputes about what constitutes 
“commercial” or “industrial.”21 In the future, type-based terms may be necessary 
for different reliability rules, especially as NERC finalizes its standards for 
computational loads. But the CAISO has elected not to specify any type at this 
time.  
 
Similar to generator interconnections, the CAISO proposes to continue to 
adhere to FERC and California regulations on what constitutes a “site,” and thus 
does not propose defining “site” in its definition. The CAISO believes the large 
load definition will adequately apply to large loads comprised of distinct loads 
even if they have separate retail meters. Operationally, such loads would still 
have the same impact on the CAISO transmission system. Moreover, the 
prevalence of behind-the-meter and hybrid configurations in the CAISO has led 
the CPUC and local regulators to address multi-meter and multi-unit sites. The 
CAISO also does not believe that the CAISO tariff is the proper vehicle to define 
a site. In the event of a unique configuration, Commission precedent and local 
regulations are more than sufficient in the large load context.22 Further, under its 
 
CAISO Controlled Grid, a Distribution System, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the 
Day-Ahead Market only, the transmission system of an EDAM Transmission Service Provider 
who does not resell the power, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the Real-Time 
Market only, the transmission system of an EIM Transmission Service Provider and who does not 
resell the power.” The CAISO tariff defines the CAISO Controlled Grid as “The system of 
transmission lines and associated facilities of the Participating TOs that have been placed under 
the CAISO’s Operational Control.” 
 
The CAISO purposely did not capitalize point of interconnection because its tariff 
definition is designed for generating facilities, whereas the point of interconnection for a large load 
will be determined by the retail interconnection agreement consistent with local regulatory 
authority rules. As with many aspects of this definition, the CAISO’s intent is to remain flexible for 
this new set of rules so as to avoid false positives and false negatives. 
20  
PJM Interconnection, 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 16 (2026). 
21  
Nor does the CAISO want to compound the issue by formally defining those terms. 
22  
Id.

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current rules as planning coordinator and balancing authority, the CAISO will 
continue to study impacts to the transmission system of any large load that 
connects to the distribution system or load that falls below the 50 MW peak load 
threshold but connects to the transmission system. The CAISO will similarly 
continue to work with NERC and other regulators to address smaller and 
distributed loads in the future. 
 
The CAISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also omits a specific 
voltage level for the interconnection. The CAISO does not believe this is 
necessary where the definition specifies the interconnection is to the “CAISO 
Controlled Grid,” a term that already requires evaluation under all Commission 
tests for transmission vs. distribution, including voltage. The CAISO’s proposed 
definition thus establishes that the large load is transmission-connected, 
obviating the need to specify a voltage that could conflict with the existing 
transmission registration. Although distribution-grid voltages likely make 
interconnection difficult for large loads, the CAISO recognizes that it could be 
possible for 50 MW loads to interconnect to the distribution grid. Nevertheless, 
the CAISO is focused on transmission-connected large loads at this time 
because they are the subject of FERC’s Order, and because the transmission 
grid represents the likely interconnection point for the vast majority of large loads. 
The CAISO recognizes, however, that the Order represents the frontier of 
Commission jurisdiction, and there is little precedent to better understand how a 
large load definition and accompanying rules will operate consistent with the 
Federal Power Act. The CAISO has created its definition recognizing that it does 
not have a centralized capacity market for all loads, and that the Commission has 
stressed avoiding infringement on the States’ jurisdiction over retail service and 
distribution. 
 
The CAISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also does not include 
FERC’s proposal that the definition specify that the large load “is not part of a co-
location arrangement.” The CAISO does not believe it is necessary to exclude 
large loads participating in co-location arrangements from the definition of large 
loads. Although such loads will be subject to different tariff provisions than 
standalone large loads, they would still constitute large loads. 
 
Finally, the CAISO does not propose to include the term “new” in its Large 
Load definition because that term also would require specification. Instead, the 
CAISO proposes to include in the definition and the tariff a general provision 
stating that the CAISO will not consider any load a large load subject to the 
CAISO tariff where the load is operational or has a complete request with the 
PTO before the CAISO tariff revisions’ effective date of February 16, 2027.23 This 
 
23  
Proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO has requested a later effective 
date for two sets of technology-related changes, but this should not impact studies. See Section 
VI, below.

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provision will avoid retroactive ratemaking on existing loads, and ensure the 
CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions do not affect existing commercial 
arrangements. The CAISO also proposes to include a provision stating that if a 
grandfathered load increases or modifies its load pursuant to a PTO tariff after 
the effective date, the load would become a large load and subject to those tariff 
requirements. This approach is similar to those proposed by other ISO/RTOs for 
large loads, and previous generator interconnection rule changes approved by 
the Commission.24 It ensures that existing loads are grandfathered as they are, 
but without license to evolve without operating under the same rules as other 
large loads. The CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions also recognize that the PTOs 
are the first and primary referees of which loads will be “large loads.” The PTOs 
will receive the initial energization requests from new loads or modification 
requests from existing loads, and have far more experience with load 
interconnection requests than the CAISO. As such, the CAISO purposely defers 
to their tariffs as the proper place to establish criteria for any grandfathered loads 
to become large loads consistent with the filed rate doctrine. 
 
Although the CAISO proposes to create a tariff class for large loads, the 
CAISO does not propose to create any new market participation models for large 
loads at this time.25 Rather, the CAISO proposes to enable large loads to 
participate (1) simply as typical end users, represented by an LSE, or (2) through 
any existing CAISO participation model, including, for example, proxy demand 
resources, reliability demand response resources, participating loads, or non-
generator resources.26 Large loads participating in the CAISO markets would 
then be eligible for all rights and subject to all obligations of the CAISO tariff 
under those participation models. For example, a large load that desires to 
participate as a reliability demand response resource could simply adhere to the 
tariff provisions for reliability demand response resources, just as any other end 
user.27 Large loads may participate alone or in permissible aggregations, 
including with co-located generating units.28 Likewise, the CAISO proposes to 
include tariff provisions stating that large loads are eligible to provide, without 
limitation, demand response energy, curtailable demand, resource adequacy 
capacity, and ancillary services consistent with their participation model and 
 
24  
See, e.g., Section 25.4.2 of the CAISO tariff (applying asynchronous generating facility 
technical requirements “to the extent the Generating Facility makes modifications that replace its 
Generating Unit(s) or any inverter(s)”). 
25  
As explained below, the CAISO believes it has several existing market participation 
models large loads can use, and plans to explore new, tailored models in stakeholder initiatives in 
2027. 
26  
Proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff.  
27  
Section 4.13 of the CAISO tariff. (The large load would still also be required to comply 
with all tariff provisions regarding large loads.) 
28  
Id.

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subject to the requirements of the CAISO tariff.29 Instead of trying to create a 
bespoke model for large loads, the CAISO’s proposed framework enables 
developers to choose what model will work best for them based on their 
configuration and business model. Any large load that elects to participate in the 
CAISO markets can do so on day one through existing participation models.30  
 
2. 
Large Load Interconnection Study Procedures 
 
The Order highlighted a lack of clarity and consistency regarding the study 
of the provision of transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large 
loads interconnecting to the transmission system.31 Further, the Commission 
noted that, while it does not seek to alter the allocation of rights and 
responsibilities between the CAISO and PTO tariffs, the CAISO and PTO tariffs 
may not clearly specify which entity will be responsible for studying the provision 
of transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large loads.32 The 
Order suggested that additional study considerations may be necessary to 
address the unique operational and reliability challenges presented to the 
transmission system by providing transmission service to eligible customers on 
behalf of large loads.33 The Commission noted that clear and consistent study 
processes may be necessary to fully capture the transmission system impacts of 
providing such transmission service, which could result in significant operational 
risks for the transmission system,34 and suggested that tariff provisions may 
prevent disputes over a variety of issues, e.g., study timelines and delays, how 
the transmission service needed on behalf of the large load is studied, what 
types of network upgrades are considered, and how required network upgrades 
to provide the requested transmission service are determined.35 Finally, the 
Commission suggested that the CAISO and PTO tariffs may fail to deter 
speculative or duplicative requests for transmission service by eligible customers 
on behalf of large loads.36 
 
 
29  
Proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff. 
30  
In fact, any load can do the same today, hence the CAISO’s inclusion of “Large Loads 
and Loads” in proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO included such language to 
avoid the implication that only large loads could avail themselves of such rights, even though 
loads participate significantly in the CAISO markets today.  
31  
Order to Show Cause at P 51. 
32  
Id. at P 51. 
33  
Id. at P 52.  
34  
Id. at P 53. 
35  
Id. at P 54. 
36  
Id. at P 55.

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As explained in the Order37 and Section II.B.3, above, the PTOs receive 
and perform the load interconnection studies today. The CAISO and PTOs do not 
propose to change this division of responsibility: The PTOs will therefore respond 
to the Order’s findings in their PTO filings. The CAISO expects the PTOs to 
develop consistent study procedures to be completed within 60 to 90 days, as 
required by the Commission. The CAISO also expects the PTOs to address 
network upgrade considerations and deterring speculative requests. For clarity, 
the CAISO proposes tariff revisions noting that end users, including large loads, 
interconnect to the CAISO controlled grid pursuant to PTO and retail tariffs.38 The 
CAISO also proposes tariff revisions stating that the CAISO will coordinate with 
the PTOs and any affected systems to account for large load interconnections to 
the CAISO in all interconnection studies.39 Consistent with the CAISO’s 
interconnection procedures and the PTO tariffs, the CAISO and PTOs will identify 
network upgrades and interconnection facilities best reflecting the combined 
topology of generating facility and large load interconnections.40 
 
The PTOs will thus conduct load interconnection studies under their tariffs, 
and the CAISO will review those studies. As planning coordinator and balancing 
authority,41 the CAISO will review PTO load interconnection studies to confirm 
that study assumptions, load characteristics, and results are consistent with the 
CAISO’s planning models and long-term plans.42 Most importantly, the CAISO 
will identify any PTO-proposed solution that could create reliability risk, whether 
because it relies on an operating measure that cannot be dependably 
implemented, it shifts or exacerbates constraints elsewhere on the system, or it is 
inconsistent with the CAISO’s planning and operational needs. The CAISO will 
conduct this process on a monthly basis to ensure the CAISO’s review does not 
affect the PTOs’ obligations to complete their studies within 90 days.43 Where the 
CAISO identifies a risk, it will work with the PTO to develop an alternative, such 
as a different network upgrade, an alternative transmission technology, or 
 
37  
Id. at P 51. 
38  
Proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO tariff also notes that end users do 
so consistent with local regulatory authority requirements. 
39  
Id. 
40  
Id. This provision is included for general compliance. Specific co-located load and 
generating facility interconnection study obligations are discussed in Section III.C, below. 
41  
The CAISO also maintains the base cases, transmission plans, and generator 
interconnection queues. 
42  
Proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. To avoid the implication that the CAISO 
reviews transmission upgrades for large loads only, the CAISO has included “Loads and Large 
Loads” in this provision. This is consistent with the CAISO’s status quo planning coordinator 
responsibilities to review all transmission upgrades. 
43  
Id.

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modified operating limits, so that the large load can interconnect without 
compromising reliability. This review complements, rather than replaces, the 
PTOs’ lead role in studying and serving load, and ensures that solutions 
developed at the local level are reliable and coordinated with the broader system. 
The CAISO also proposes to memorialize in the tariff that the CAISO’s 
transmission planning process will consider large load growth and any 
transmission upgrades planned as transmission solutions for public policies 
selected for consideration under Order No. 1000 processes.44  
 
The CAISO also proposes to implement new data requirements for large 
load interconnection requests and associated cost data. The CAISO discusses 
these proposals in Section III.B.2, below.  
 
3. 
Large Load Application Process 
 
The Order suggested that the CAISO and PTOs lack clear and consistent 
provisions establishing the application process and study procedures that will be 
used when the CAISO and/or the PTOs evaluate the provision of transmission 
service on behalf of large loads, including an application process, application fee 
and readiness requirements, and information and data requirements.45 The 
Order also suggested that the CAISO and PTO tariffs lack appropriate study 
provisions to recognize the unique operational characteristics of large loads that 
are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals under certain conditions to 
lessen or avoid the need for network upgrades.46 In addition, the Commission 
noted that accurate models using Electromagnetic Transient (EMT) studies may 
help to ensure that transmission service needed on behalf of large loads can be 
provided without compromising reliability and suggests clarity and consistency in 
the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies (ATTs) as potential 
solutions to accommodate an eligible customer’s request for transmission service 
on behalf of a large load.47 To the extent that traditional network upgrades are 
selected over ATTs, the Commission recommended demonstration of why ATTs 
were not selected.48 The Commission directed the CAISO and PTOs to explain 
whether their tariffs sufficiently address identification of Direct Assignment 
Facilities and Network Upgrades (as the Order defines) necessary to reliably 
 
44  
Again, this already occurs where the transmission planning process identifies reliability-
based transmission solutions and policy-driven transmission solutions, but pursuant to the intent 
of the Order, the CAISO is highlighting it for large loads to increase transparency. As the CAISO 
detailed in its 30-day informational report on resource sufficiency, the CAISO, CEC, and CPUC all 
break out large loads specifically in forecasts and planning scenarios.  
45  
Order to Show Cause at P 58. 
46  
Id. at P 59. 
47  
Id. (Also known as Grid Enhancing Technologies or GETs). 
48  
Id. at PP 60-61.

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provide transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large loads; 
include provisions for a 60-to 90-day timeline to study the unique operational 
characteristics of large loads; and include a study deadline to assess large 
loads.49 
 
The CAISO reiterates that the existing load interconnection process is 
conducted by the PTOs. For this reason, the CAISO proposes enhanced and 
ongoing coordination with the PTOs on the load and resource interconnection 
processes and expects the PTOs to align their load application processes with 
the CAISO’s resource interconnection process to ensure the level of visibility 
necessary for the CAISO to plan for new large loads and maintain reliability once 
they are interconnected. The CAISO proposes including general provisions 
explaining this coordination, as discussed in Section III.A.2, above. The CAISO 
also notes that existing load and generator interconnection study procedures 
already include ample processes to detect potential impacts on affected systems 
and multiple affected PTOs, and those processes will apply to large loads.50 The 
CAISO expects that the PTOs will address the other interconnection process 
issues in their respective filings. 
 
The CAISO understands that transmission providers must consider ATTs 
at all times. The CAISO currently evaluates ATTs in its transmission planning 
process and generator interconnection process. The CAISO’s evaluation 
includes static synchronous compensators, static VAR compensators, advanced 
power flow control devices, transmission switching, synchronous condensers, 
voltage source converters, advanced conductors, and tower lifting. Further, the 
CAISO is expanding its economic consideration of dynamic line ratings to 
mitigate congestion. As a transmission provider, the CAISO must include in the 
generator interconnection cluster study report an explanation of the results of the 
evaluation of the enumerated ATTs for feasibility, cost, and time savings as an 
alternative to a traditional network upgrade. Therefore, the CAISO supports and 
has broadly adopted the practice of duly considering and assigning ATTs to meet 
identified system needs, including when triggered by new loads interconnecting 
to the CAISO grid. The CAISO also documents consideration of such 
technologies in its annual Transmission Plan. This has been the practice in 
CAISO for several years and was recently memorialized in the CAISO’s tariff in 
compliance with FERC Order Nos. 2023 and 1920 (pending FERC approval).51 
To respond to the Order and the large load interconnection context specifically, 
the CAISO proposes to clarify these considerations through consistent language 
in the CAISO tariff, which the CAISO expects the PTOs will similarly include in 
 
49  
Id. at P 62. 
50  
See proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff; Section 3.7 of Appendix KK to the CAISO 
tariff. 
51  
See, e.g., Section 6.2 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.

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their tariffs.52 The CAISO will continue to set out the alternatives that were 
considered in the selection of all preferred transmission solutions, whether ATTs 
or other more conventional solutions, to the reasonable depth necessary given 
the nature of the transmission need. This approach has worked well in the 
generator interconnection study process, enabling the consideration and use of 
ATTs without slowing down studies. 
 
With regard to the Commission’s ATTs-related modeling concerns, the 
CAISO coordinates annually with the transmission owners during the 
transmission planning process on the feasibility of ATTs, particularly evaluating 
the application of advanced conductors and flow control devices. The CAISO 
also expects that both the CAISO and the PTOs will be advancing their EMT-
related studies, and expects that the PTO tariffs will address the timely provision 
of EMT models in the large load application process.  
 
4. 
Operational Requirements 
 
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO and PTO 
tariffs appear to be unjust and unreasonable because they lack provisions 
addressing ongoing operational requirements for eligible customers taking 
transmission service on behalf of large loads.53 The Commission enumerated 
specific examples, including the lack of provisions governing hourly forecasts, 
telemetry data, and equipment to enable the CAISO to monitor large loads.54 The 
Commission also suggested the CAISO should impose requirements to remotely 
disconnect large loads when necessary to maintain reliability; ramp rate or ride-
through requirements; and control technologies and/or protection systems that 
may be necessary to limit withdrawals from the transmission system.55 
 
The CAISO agrees that the operational requirements the Commission 
identifies in the Order are necessary. The CAISO has been exploring these 
issues through discussions with PTO representatives in the LLTRWG, CPUC 
workshops, an industry Expert Working Group (EWG), and through engagement 
with NERC. The LLTRWG was established by the CAISO and utilities 
interconnecting large loads to develop consistent technical requirements for the 
reliable interconnection and operation of large data center loads connected to the 
CAISO controlled grid. The EWG was likewise formed to gain collaborative 
feedback from diverse industry representatives focused on developing a 
 
52  
Proposed Sections 24.1 and 24.3.1 of the CAISO tariff. For co-located generating units 
and large loads, the CAISO and PTOs are already obligated to evaluate ATTs/GETs by Section 
6.2 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.  
53  
Order to Show Cause at P 63. 
54  
Id. 
55  
Id.

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coordination framework and functional model that advances opportunities in 
Transmission and Distribution coordination, including large loads, while 
maintaining current roles and responsibilities. As detailed at length in the 
LLTRWG proposal, the LLTRWG developed its operational requirements after 
broadly surveying operational requirements developed by other utilities with large 
loads.56 This process ensures that the CAISO’s operational requirements will be 
consistent with national requirements, and thus easier and less expensive to 
implement for developers. The CAISO also put its proposed operational 
requirements to stakeholders in the general large load initiative, where 
stakeholders supported the proposals.  
 
To maintain reliability, the CAISO proposes several new requirements 
regarding large loads. Because many large loads may not be directly subject to 
the CAISO tariff,57 the CAISO’s proposed requirements place the onus of 
responsibility on the PTOs and LSEs.  
 
Prior to the interconnection of any large load to the CAISO controlled grid, 
the CAISO proposes to require the PTO to provide the CAISO with the following 
information for the large load: Load type, variable or flat load designation, 
expected hourly operating profile, points of interconnection and withdrawal, MW 
capacity, minimum and maximum operating levels, expected CAISO market 
participation model (if any), curtailment and ramping capabilities, and behind-the-
meter generation capacity and characteristics (if any).58 This will provide the 
CAISO with the necessary information to assess any operational impact before 
energization. The CAISO also proposes to require the PTO to ensure the large 
load has continuous dynamic disturbance recording data and storage on the 
high-side of the main power transformer or common point of connection to 
determine the following electrical quantities for the large load: (1) Phase-to-
neutral voltage for each phase, (2) each phase current and the residual or neutral 
current, (3) real power and reactive power flows expressed on a three-phase 
basis corresponding to all circuits where current measurements are required; and 
(4) frequency.59 This requirement will ensure adequate reliability data for each 
large load. The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to ensure it can 
 
56  
Included as Attachment D to this filing, and available at 
https://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-
loads-el26-71.pdf.  
57  
In other words, many large loads may interconnect subject to a PTO tariff alone. As such, 
the CAISO may not always have contractual privity to subject large loads to its requirements or 
enforce reliability provisions. As such, the CAISO’s compliance obligations are directed toward 
the PTOs and LSEs already subject (or unavoidably subject) to the CAISO tariff. They can then 
enforce the CAISO tariff requirements through their tariffs, agreements, or procedures.  
58  
Proposed Section 25.7.1 of the CAISO tariff. 
59  
Id.

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The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese 
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disconnect or otherwise isolate the large load in the event of a contingency, 
imminent, or actual system emergency, to maintain system reliability.60 
 
The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to impose ride-through 
requirements for large loads to remain electrically connected during certain 
frequency61 and voltage disturbances.62 Similar to generating facility 
requirements,63 these rules provide the severity and length of disturbance in 
which a large load may or may not trip. All requirements were based on the work 
by NERC, regional entities, and utilities facing large load disturbances.64 The 
CAISO also has included a general tariff provision stating that a load shedding 
program or remedial action scheme directed or required by the CAISO or PTO 
takes precedence over these ride-through requirements.65 This provision avoids 
any ambiguity over potentially conflicting ride-through/trip directions. 
 
The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to impose ramp-rate 
limitations in active power consumption during normal operation, start-up, 
shutdown, and restoration processes.66 The average active power ramp rate, 
measured at the point of interconnection over a rolling ten (10)-minute interval, 
should not exceed twenty (20) megawatts per minute (MW/min), applying to both 
increases and decreases in active power consumption. This ramp-rate limitation 
does not apply to the immediate post-disturbance recovery of active power 
consumption following a system fault or voltage disturbance. The PTO also will 
require each large load to restore its active power consumption following a 
system fault or voltage disturbance to at least 90 percent of its pre-disturbance 
active power consumption within three seconds after the post-fault voltage at the 
point of interconnection recovers to at least 0.90 pu.67 Additionally, the CAISO 
has included a general requirement that after a disturbance or other reliability 
event involving a large load, the large load, any associated interconnection 
customer, scheduling coordinator, and PTO must comply with any CAISO, 
regional entity (i.e., WECC), or Reliability Coordinator data request related to the 
event.68 This is already the case today, but the CAISO believes a specific tariff 
 
60  
Id. 
61  
Proposed Section 25.7.1.1 of the CAISO tariff. 
62  
Proposed Section 25.7.1.2 of the CAISO tariff. 
63  
Attachment H to Appendix LL to the CAISO tariff. 
64  
See Attachment D to this filing. 
65  
This would include programs or remedial action schemes designed to facilitate FILI as 
well. 
66  
Proposed Section 25.7.1.4 of the CAISO tariff. 
67  
Proposed Section 25.7.1.3 of the CAISO tariff. 
68  
Proposed Section 25.7.4 of the CAISO tariff.

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provision for large loads provides greater transparency. This transparency will 
ensure parties involved in a reliability event continue to provide data to help 
understand the event and prevent future issues. 
 
 
The CAISO’s remaining operational requirements apply to the scheduling 
coordinator representing the large load’s demand. For each large load, the 
scheduling coordinator must provide the CAISO: 
 
1. Daily and hourly forecast data otherwise required for the CAISO demand 
forecast;  
2. Any real-time, material deviations from provided forecasts, including 
changes resulting from energization activities, material operational 
changes, curtailments, outages, derates, operating limits, operating 
envelopes, or co-located generation impacts that materially affect 
expected demand; 
3. The forecasts are expected to reflect the resource’s anticipated operating 
capability, including planned outages or derates that materially affect the 
large load’s expected consumption or operating capability; and 
4. Operational status and real-time consumption in accordance with the 
CAISO’s standards for direct telemetry and consistent with CAISO 
telemetry requirements.69 
 
These data requirements will ensure the CAISO has day-ahead and real-time 
information sufficient to manage reliability risks from large load demand swings. 
For those not participating through a market model, demand forecasting and 
settlement will remain at the LSE level, and the CAISO will have specific data 
inputs to understand the behavior of those large loads that could impact 
reliability. 
 
 
Based on stakeholder feedback, the CAISO believes most large loads will 
elect not to participate directly in the CAISO markets, and will simply be 
represented by their LSE like conventional loads today. Nevertheless, the CAISO 
proposes to include tariff language stating that large loads may elect to 
participate in the CAISO markets directly, including as stand-alone loads or in 
aggregation with other resources.70 Large loads also may elect to participate as 
their own LSE, a non-generator resource, or a participating load, if they qualify 
for those models under CAISO tariff and local regulatory authority 
 
69  
Proposed Section 25.7.3 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO notes that its telemetry 
requirements are tailored to coordinate with local regulatory authority standards and nationally 
available telemetry technologies. 
70  
Proposed Section 25.7.3.1 of the CAISO tariff.

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requirements.71 Such large loads could then elect to comply with the CAISO tariff 
operational requirements and participate in the CAISO markets through their own 
scheduling coordinator in lieu of their LSE scheduling coordinator. However, the 
CAISO has included a qualification that any such direct participation must be 
consistent with local regulatory authority requirements.72  
 
 
Additionally, the CAISO proposes to include a qualification that the 
applicable LSE, utility distribution company, MSS operator, large load, and 
scheduling coordinator may satisfy the operational requirements through 
coordinated arrangements that clearly assign each CAISO tariff obligation and 
avoid duplicative submissions.73 The applicable arrangement must identify the 
scheduling coordinator responsible for submitting bids, scheduled demand, meter 
data, forecasts, and real-time operational updates for the large load. The CAISO 
also must verify the arrangement will comply with the tariff before its use. This 
provision recognizes that these are novel operational requirements, and 
developers have varying needs based on their configuration and location. It is in 
everyone’s interest for the CAISO to provide flexibility to enable large loads and 
their counterparts to identify the best compliance practices. As such, the CAISO 
believes this tariff provision will provide significant value without sacrificing 
reliability. 
 
5. 
Large Load Service Agreements 
 
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO and PTO 
tariffs lack pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement, or other 
applicable agreement, to memorialize the technical and operational terms the 
Order describes.74 
 
The PTOs will propose consistent pro forma agreements to memorialize 
the technical and operational terms the Order describes. At this time, the CAISO 
and stakeholders do not believe the CAISO should always be a signatory to a 
three-party agreement for large load interconnections, especially where the large 
 
71  
In other words, this provision would not operate to make a large load an LSE or 
participating load unless the large load meets the tariff definition and requirements for those 
entities. This provision is intended to encompass rare cases where certain loads participate 
directly in the CAISO markets. The CAISO also notes that although a large load also could 
participate in a demand response program, it would still require an LSE to account for its general 
demand (in addition to demand response provider managing the demand response participation).  
72  
For example, the CAISO tariff requires the State or local regulatory authority to allow any 
end user to be an LSE or a Participating Load. See “Load Serving Entity,” Appendix A to the 
CAISO tariff; Appendix B.4 of the CAISO tariff. 
73  
Proposed Section 25.7.3 of the CAISO tariff. 
74  
Order to Show Cause at P 64.

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load is not taking FILI service or participating in the CAISO markets.75 The large 
load developer and PTO can negotiate the terms of construction and cost rules, 
while the CAISO would not require any rights or obligations. Rather, such 
arrangements will be effectuated through a two-party interconnection agreement 
between the PTO and the large load developer, as performed today.76 For a 
large load requesting FILI service, the PTO will need the CAISO to help 
memorialize and agree to the operational procedures necessary to provide that 
service through new service agreements or having the CAISO co-sign the PTO’s 
interconnection agreement.  
 
For co-located large loads with exporting generation, likewise, the CAISO 
will need to be a party to a pro forma agreement that bridges the pro forma Large 
Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) with the pro forma large load 
interconnection agreement or negotiate a non-conforming LGIA to account for 
certain details of the co-located large load interconnection on an individual basis. 
The developer also will need to execute a CAISO pro forma Participating 
Generator Agreement for the generator, but not a Participating Load Agreement 
for the large load.77 
 
B. 
Cost Shifting Risk among Transmission Customers 
 
1. 
Cost Allocation Rules and Agreements 
 
In the Order, the Commission laid out key objectives regarding cost 
allocation of infrastructure needs attributable to eligible customers taking 
transmission service on behalf of large loads: improved transparency regarding 
the assignment of network upgrades and their associated costs; and 
development of a pro forma cost recovery agreement between the CAISO, the 
relevant PTO, and the eligible customer taking transmission service on behalf of 
large loads. The Commission stated that improved transparency would provide 
important information to State public utility commissions and other State 
regulators, enabling them to identify which transmission costs are caused by 
which transmission customers to appropriately sub-allocate costs at the retail 
level. According to the Commission, a pro forma cost recovery agreement would 
ensure that eligible customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for the 
costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of network 
upgrades. 
 
75  
For example, the CAISO likely will not have any roles or responsibilities for the financing 
and construction of simple network upgrades needed for large loads receiving firm 
interconnection service. 
76  
The CAISO describes the elements required for a three-party agreement for FILI in 
Section III.D, below. 
77  
Unless it will participate as a Participating Load, in which case it would. See Proposed 
Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff.

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The CAISO shares the objectives of the Order to prevent cost shifting 
among transmission customers and to ensure that large loads equitably bear risk 
and responsibility for costs incurred to interconnect, including the cost of network 
upgrades attributed to the large loads. The CAISO understands the importance 
of maintaining affordability while addressing large load integration. The CAISO 
expects that in addressing cost shifting concerns, the PTOs will address the 
collateral issues regarding financial security, revenue stability, and adequate exit 
provisions for large loads. As explained in Section II.B.3, above, the CAISO 
believes it is prudent for cost allocation rules to be set forth in the PTO tariffs 
rather than the CAISO tariff. The PTOs will continue to manage large load 
interconnections through their tariffs. Many of the PTOs also have a direct 
relationship with their retail ratepayers and the regulators of those ultimate rates, 
including the CPUC. Additionally, it is the PTOs that will construct and own the 
network upgrades if required for the large load interconnection. As such, the 
CAISO does not propose to issue a new “top-down” cost allocation solution 
through its own tariff. The CAISO believes that the PTOs may develop their own 
proposals to address any cost shifting, and that the current transmission revenue 
requirement and credit mechanisms in the transmission access charges can 
accommodate those proposals.78 The CAISO proposes some metering and 
settlement changes in Section III.C.2 to account for co-located large loads and 
generation.  
 
2. 
Data Transparency 
 
In the Order, the Commission highlighted the need for “the provision of 
data on CAISO’s website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format 
that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, on transmission service 
provided to eligible customers on behalf of large loads, for network upgrades 
evaluated in the local transmission planning process that are needed to 
accommodate transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of those large 
loads, and the costs for those network upgrades.”79 
 
The CAISO agrees that cost data should be transparent and can be 
provided on the CAISO website in a searchable format. This is important both to 
aid large load developers in making efficient siting decisions as well as to provide 
information critical for State regulators to ensure fair cost allocation at the retail 
level. For large load developers, the CAISO notes that for the interconnection 
study process, the CAISO already provides each PTO’s per unit cost guide for all 
 
78  
The CAISO notes that the orders to show cause represent largely novel issues: There is 
little case law to guide what constitutes just and reasonable rates for large loads specifically. 
Such precedent will likely come from these responses to the Orders to Show Cause, offering 
greater guidance for future enhancements. 
79  
Order to Show Cause at P 46.

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network upgrade cost components.80 These guides are updated and shared with 
stakeholders annually based on the latest industry cost estimates. As such, the 
CAISO believes its tariff provides detailed, transparent, up-to-date cost 
information on potential costs for transmission network upgrades.  
 
For State regulators and stakeholders, per the Commission’s direction,81 
the CAISO also proposes to clarify in the transmission planning process where 
network upgrades were needed to accommodate both general load growth and 
large load interconnection specifically. Large load growth has already been 
incorporated into the CEC, CPUC, and CAISO forecasting and planning 
processes, as detailed in the CAISO’s informational report on resource 
sufficiency already submitted to the Commission.82 The CAISO also proposes to 
publicly post:83 
 
1. Aggregate amounts of proposed large load additions in the CAISO 
operating area, including the aggregate amounts in each transmission 
pricing zone; 
2. Planned network upgrades needed to accommodate eligible customers 
taking transmission service on behalf of large loads, identified by type of 
equipment and network upgrade (e.g., new substation, reconductoring, a 
new high-voltage transmission line) for each transmission service request; 
and 
3. Cost estimates for each planned network upgrade identified as needed for 
large loads, as described in (2).84 
 
The CAISO proposes to memorialize these transparency requirements in its 
tariff. The CAISO also has encouraged the PTOs to memorialize tariff 
requirements to adopt large load queue spreadsheets as they do for wholesale 
generator interconnection customers. The CAISO likewise proposes to include in 
its generator interconnection queue report whether the interconnection customer 
proposes to include a large load, and its capacity.85 
 
 
80  
See CAISO current cost guides at https://www.caiso.com/library/current-cost-guides. 
81  
Order to Show Cause at PP 70-72. 
82  
See CAISO Informational Report on resource sufficiency at 
https://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-
loads-el26-71.pdf. 
83  
Proposed Sections 24.3.1 and 24.19.1 of the CAISO tariff, and proposed Section 3.6 of 
Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.  
84  
Order to Show Cause at P 75. 
85  
See CAISO Generator interconnection at https://www.caiso.com/generation-
transmission/generation/generator-interconnection.

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C. 
Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter 
Generation 
 
1. 
Co-located Interconnection Studies 
 
The Commission stated in the Order that the CAISO’s tariff does not 
contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and consistency the rates, 
terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving 
co-located load.86 The Commission included, “the scope of the analyses CAISO 
performs as part of its existing study process to evaluate the impacts of co-
location arrangements, which may need to account for any potential dynamic 
impacts of co-located load and any potential impacts of requests to modify an 
existing generating facility’s interconnection service level to serve co-located load 
on transmission system reliability.”87 The Commission noted that in one of its 
recent orders on co-located load in the PJM Interconnection (PJM), it found that it 
was necessary to clarify that interconnection customers seeking to use new 
generating facilities to serve co-located load may: (1) request interconnection 
service at a level below the generating facility’s maximum facility output; (2) use 
existing procedures to accelerate interconnection requests that satisfy certain 
tariff criteria; and (3) request provisional interconnection service and surplus 
interconnection service.88 The Commission additionally noted that 
interconnection customers should have a means of knowing the appropriate 
mechanism for setting forth the terms and conditions of co-location 
arrangements. The Commission also expressed concern that “without an Eligible 
Customer designated to take transmission service on behalf of a co-located load, 
there is no mechanism for CAISO to address situations in which a co-located 
load withdraws energy from the transmission system.”89 
 
 
86  
Order to Show Cause at P 93. The Order to Show Cause did not require, and the CAISO 
does not believe it is necessary, that the CAISO create formal tariff definitions for co-located load 
or behind-the-meter generation. Both terms already have plain meanings, and behind-the-meter 
is already used frequently throughout the CAISO tariff, including for different configurations based 
on whether the meter is a CAISO meter or a retail end-user meter. Thus, providing a definition 
may have inadvertent consequences to the extent it differs in any meaningful respect from the 
use of these terms currently. Likewise, the CAISO, PTOs, and developers have not experienced 
controversy in determining co-location or what constitutes a single site under FERC precedent 
and State law. The CAISO is thus concerned that trying to create formal definitions at this time 
may result in false positives or negatives that impair rather than aid development. The CAISO 
may revisit this issue if controversies arise, or may provide clarifications in its business practice 
manuals. 
87  
Id. at P 96. 
88  
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 231-235 (2025) (PJM Co-
Location Order). PJM’s compliance filing proposing revisions in response to these directives was 
accepted in part on April 16, 2026. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2026).  
89  
Order to Show Cause at P 96.

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Drawing on its track record for co-located generating technologies, the 
CAISO proposes to clarify how co-located large loads and generation may 
interconnect to and operate within the CAISO controlled grid.90 Co-location 
frequently can result in significant operational flexibility, avoided infrastructure, 
and reliability benefits. At the same time, physical proximity between load and 
generation does not guarantee reduced transmission requirements or resource 
adequacy obligations: The actual benefits depend on the operating 
characteristics of both resources, their ability to operate independently, and their 
behavior during contingencies. The CAISO and PTOs thus must draw on their 
significant experience with co-located and behind-the-meter configurations to 
help large load developers maximize efficiencies for them and for ratepayers. 
 
The CAISO proposes to clarify in its tariff co-location arrangements that 
would not require a CAISO resource interconnection request and could be 
accommodated through applicable PTO or State-jurisdictional retail 
interconnection tariffs,91 such as Rule 21.92 These will include large loads with 
back-up generation only to be used during outages or islanding, and large loads 
with non-exporting behind-the-meter generation.93 The CAISO notes that both 
categories will require sufficient control technologies to ensure they do not impact 
the transmission grid.94   
 
The CAISO proposes that new or existing large loads seeking to co-locate 
with new generation that may export energy to the transmission grid95 will require 
a CAISO interconnection study under the CAISO’s Resource Interconnection 
 
90  
Proposed Sections 25.1, 25.1.1, 25.5.1, 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; Proposed Sections 
2.4.4 and 6.7.2.9 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff. 
91  
The CAISO reiterates that the PTOs will continue to govern and study all load 
interconnection requests pursuant to their tariffs. The CAISO, likewise, will continue to govern 
and study wholesale generation interconnection requests. 
92  
See, e.g., CPUC’s Electric Rule 21: Generating Facility Interconnections, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Rule21/. Other local regulatory authorities and utilities have established 
similar interconnection procedures for back-up, non-injecting, and net metering configurations. 
93  
Proposed Sections 25.1 and 25.1.1 of the CAISO tariff. The sequencing likewise will not 
impact whether a CAISO interconnection study is required. 
94  
The CAISO notes that the CAISO’s proposal is fundamentally different than MISO’s Zero 
Injection Generation Resource, at issue in Docket No. ER26-3552. The CAISO’s proposed tariff 
language merely reflects the status quo in California and western States, long in practice between 
local regulatory authorities and CAISO. The CAISO already has thousands of megawatts of 
generation allowed to interconnect without CAISO study because there is no impact to the CAISO 
controlled grid, including generation co-located with large loads on the transmission system. More 
critically, the CAISO requirements only bypass a CAISO interconnection study where there is 
truly no impact, rather than a netting construct that could ignore short-circuit duty and other 
reliability impacts. 
95  
Frequently, constantly, or even rarely, such as in the event the Large Load is offline.

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Standards, Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.96 This means that such resource 
interconnection requests will be screened and compete for capacity in the next 
cluster study based on the CAISO’s scoring criteria.97 However, all scoring, 
financial requirements, and study results will be based on the requested capacity 
figures the developer provides, so the developer may significantly limit the 
generation potentially to be exported based on how much generation will serve 
the large load.98 The CAISO tariff will require it to work with the PTOs to produce 
study results that reflect the combined impact of the co-located large load and 
generation, as requested by the developer. This is a simple extension of current 
rules that allow interconnection customers to be studied for a specific 
interconnection capacity even if their generating capacity is higher. 
Interconnection requests with co-located large loads may avail themselves of all 
rights under the Resource Interconnection Standards, including surplus 
interconnection service, grid enhancing technologies, phasing, etc. Rather than 
add “and Large Load” throughout the CAISO generator interconnection 
procedures and agreements, the CAISO proposes general provisions enabling 
large load studies to be considered in every step of the interconnection process, 
and that all study results will account for the combined operation of the 
generating units and large loads.99 Interconnection customers for generating 
units and co-located large loads will be subject to all applicable commercial 
readiness and GIA deposit requirements.100 Because their costs generally result 
from network upgrade and interconnection facility costs, which will be based on 
the combined facility configuration, all required deposits will be fair and equitable 
under Order No. 2023.  
 
Because it may be difficult to predict every possible issue with future load 
studies conducted by the PTO and generator studies conducted by the CAISO, 
the CAISO proposes to include general conflict provisions stating that (1) for any 
conflict between the CAISO tariff and the PTO tariff pertaining to the 
interconnection of the generating unit, the CAISO tariff will control; and (2) for 
any conflict between the CAISO tariff and the PTO tariff pertaining to the 
 
96  
Proposed Sections 25.1, 25.1.1, 25.5.1, 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; Proposed Sections 
2.4.4 and 6.7.2.9 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff. 
97  
As Energy Only or Deliverable. Energy Only interconnection customers not seeking 
reimbursement for network upgrades are not screened and proceed directly to the cluster study. 
98  
This is already the status quo per Section 3.1 and Attachment 1 (4.h) of Appendix KK to 
the CAISO tariff. The CAISO always has allowed interconnection customers to request to be 
studied for less interconnection service capacity and/or deliverability than generating capacity, 
and all scoring is calculated on the requested interconnection service capacity or requested 
deliverability, as applicable.  
99  
Proposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; proposed Sections 2.4.4 and 3.1 of 
Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff. 
100  
Proposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff.

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interconnection of the large load, the PTO tariff will control.101 This provision will 
provide transparency to developers and may help resolve future issues should 
they arise.  
 
The CAISO notes that despite the ubiquity of co-located resources in 
California, the CAISO has not received any interconnection requests for co-
located load with CAISO-participating generation. This is in part because the 
CAISO is in a different situation than other regions that needed to impose bring-
your-own generation requirements to address capacity market issues. Because 
the CAISO does not have a bring-your-own generation requirement, developers 
have been less interested in co-locating load with participating generation. 
Additionally, to the extent large loads have brought generation to serve onsite 
load, they have elected to do so through tariffs for net energy metering, obviating 
the need for a CAISO interconnection request. However, developers may want to 
co-locate load with participating generation in the future. Stakeholders expressed 
that in California, adding load to existing wholesale generators may be an ideal 
path to cost savings and utilizing plants that are dispatched infrequently or 
approaching retirement. As such, the CAISO’s tariff revisions document 
developers’ ability to add load to existing generator sites, and that they may 
maintain all interconnection rights so long as they continue to comply with the 
CAISO tariff obligations.102 Specifically, the CAISO proposes to clarify that the 
addition of a co-located load or large load will not necessarily affect the qualifying 
capacity, net qualifying capacity, deliverability status, or eligibility to provide 
energy, ancillary services, or resource adequacy capacity of a generating unit. 
Any effect of adding a co-located load will be determined under the otherwise 
applicable CAISO tariff provisions for those rights, modification results, and local 
regulatory authority requirements.103 
 
In addition to the information required in the CAISO resource 
interconnection request process, and the large load operational requirements 
discussed in Section III.A.4, the CAISO may require the following operational 
information for co-located resources, if applicable: 
 
• Expected presence of co-located load;  
• Range of energy consumption characteristics of the load; 
• Minimum and maximum generator operating capabilities; 
• Generator operating characteristics when the load is at its minimum level; 
• Market participation status, if any; and  
 
101  
Proposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff and proposed Section 2.4.4 of Appendix KK 
to the CAISO tariff. 
102  
Proposed Sections 25.5.1 of the CAISO tariff.  
103  
The CAISO believes this is an important clarification because local regulatory authorities 
generally set resource adequacy capacity and emissions rules, among others.

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• Any load services requested when the generator is off-line.104 
 
For co-located large loads and wholesale energy storage, the CAISO 
notes that the storage and large loads will need to be separate operationally, and 
all study results will reflect the same.105 Energy storage resources are fully 
dispatchable and have separate wholesale meters and settlement. Their energy 
cannot be commingled with the large load such that the large load could take 
power effectively at a wholesale rate. The large load can otherwise net its 
withdrawals against behind-the-meter/non-participating generation and 
storage.106 
 
The CAISO also proposes to require co-located load and exporting 
generation studies to begin the cluster study process with the large load 
assumptions. The CAISO also proposes to allow interconnection customers to 
request to modify or remove large loads during the study process, and for the 
PTOs and the CAISO to evaluate whether the requested change is a material 
modification. (The removal or modification to the large load would be under the 
PTO tariff.) In other words, after the commencement of the cluster study, the 
interconnection customer may request to remove the large load as a 
modification, and the CAISO and PTOs will evaluate whether the requested 
change can be accommodated. Likewise, interconnection customers already in 
the queue can request to add large loads as modifications, subject to PTO and 
CAISO evaluation, including through downsizing requests as necessary. The 
CAISO and PTO will assess whether either change would require complete re-
studies and could not be accommodated during the study process, or if the 
requested modifications are material. This is not to say that the CAISO proposes 
to prohibit the addition of large loads to existing generation or in-progress 
interconnection requests; only that the interconnection customer would need to 
do so through the PTO tariff, and the generation interconnection study results 
may not be able to reflect the combined configuration if changed substantially 
well after studies commence (similar to any other modification request).  
 
If an online CAISO generator seeks to add a large load to its site, the 
developer would submit the large load interconnection request to the PTO 
pursuant to its tariff. When ready to reflect the large load, the interconnection 
customer could request a post-commercial operation date (COD) modification107 
or use the Master File change process as needed to assess and capture 
 
104  
Proposed Section 25.7.1 of the CAISO tariff. 
105  
Proposed Section 25.7.5 of the CAISO tariff.  
106  
In other words, the CAISO does not propose any change to the status quo for separating 
wholesale generation/storage and retail load or net energy metering generation/storage. 
107  
Section 25.5 of the CAISO tariff.

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changes currently allowed under these processes.108 The CAISO, PTO, and 
interconnection customer could likewise amend the generator interconnection 
agreement to reflect the large load and any configuration changes. 
 
The CAISO notes that both loads and generation associated with co-
located loads can be eligible for resource adequacy or demand response 
programs pursuant to current program rules.109 Therefore, the CAISO does not 
propose changes to the eligibility criteria for participation in any of these 
programs. 
 
2. 
Cost Allocation for Co-located Loads 
 
In the Order, the Commission stated that the CAISO tariff does not appear 
to include a mechanism to charge large loads, and co-located loads in particular, 
for ancillary services commensurate with their use of such services, particularly if 
such customers do not withdraw energy from the transmission system.110 
Specifically, the Commission noted that co-located loads may unjustly benefit 
from regulation and black start services.111 
 
The CAISO agrees that assessing ancillary service costs on a net $/MWh 
basis to LSEs’ measured demand could enable a large load co-located with 
behind-the-meter generation to avoid an appropriate share of its costs for 
regulation and black start services.112 Unlike some other ISO/RTOs, however, 
the CAISO already has separate, specific rates to assess regulation113 and black 
start services.114 The issue thus becomes how to appropriately meter and assess 
those rates onto co-located large loads. The CAISO proposes to address this 
issue by requiring the PTOs to sub-meter each co-located large load 
 
108  
See CAISO Master File at https://www.caiso.com/systems-applications/portals-
applications/master-file.  
109  
Section 40 of the CAISO tariff establishes rules about eligible capacity and uses criteria 
provided by the CPUC and other Local Regulatory Authorities determine what projects are 
resource adequacy eligible. 
110  
Order to Show Cause at PP 98-99 (“As noted in the PJM Co-Location Order, this 
introduces the risk that costs may be allocated entirely to other transmission customers and 
passed through to residential customers, among others”).  
111  
Id. 
112  
Likewise, if the rate were assessed on a net meter basis to co-located load and 
participating generation, the result would be the same. 
113  
Section 11.10.2.1 of the CAISO tariff. 
114  
Section 11.4.2 of the CAISO tariff. The PTOs assess the costs of black start services 
through their PTO tariffs.

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independent of any onsite generation.115 Scheduling coordinators for the load-
serving entities serving those loads will then be required to report those meter 
values separately for the relevant CAISO charge codes. Going forward, the rates’ 
calculations will include all separately submitted gross volumes for the large 
loads. Each large load with co-located generation will pay on a gross load basis 
for regulation and black start services.116 This solution not only results in just and 
reasonable cost allocation, it is also relatively simple to implement because the 
CAISO and PTOs will not be required to calculate and assess new rates, nor will 
the CAISO need to create new settlement charge codes.  
 
3. 
Transmission Access Charges 
 
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO tariff may 
be unjust and unreasonable because it allows load with behind-the-meter 
generation to net its generation against its load for purposes of calculating 
Regional Access Charges.117 The Commission explained its thinking based on 
the PJM co-location proceeding:  
 
In the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission found that PJM’s 
BTMG rules, which allowed load-serving entities that provide 
service to loads with qualifying BTMG to reduce their costs by 
netting output from BTMG in the calculation of their peak demand 
for the purpose of determining NITS charges, were unjust and 
unreasonable. The Commission concluded that PJM’s BTMG rules 
were no longer consistent with cost causation principles because 
large loads configured in a BTMG arrangement with significant 
generation will raise cost shifting concerns compared to loads 
pursuing smaller amounts of netting. The Commission also found 
that such rules could lead to reliability and resource adequacy risks 
because PJM is obligated to serve transmission customers using 
BTMG but does not consider such customers in transmission and 
resource adequacy planning.118 
 
The Commission then noted that it is “similarly concerned that CAISO’s Tariff 
allows Eligible Customers that provide service to loads with BTMG to reduce 
 
115  
Proposed Section 11.36 of the CAISO tariff.  
116  
Pursuant to the CAISO tariff, the CAISO assesses reliability services costs—the 
settlement charge for black start costs—to the PTOs, who then allocate those costs to their 
customers. The CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions thus create specific sub-allocations earmarked 
for large loads, based on their gross load. 
117  
Order to Show Cause at P 102. 
118  
Id.

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their network service charges because the definition of gross load,119 which is 
used to calculate the Regional Access Charge, excludes load of a retail customer 
served by its own onsite generating unit or energy storage device.” The 
Commission directed the CAISO to explain whether the tariff remains just and 
reasonable even though it allows netting of behind-the-meter generation from 
gross load for purposes of determining Regional Access Charges for loads with 
behind-the-meter generation, or to propose tariff revisions. The Commission also 
stated that the CAISO may explain why the CAISO believes it remains just and 
reasonable for network customers that fall below a new megawatt materiality 
threshold for the amount of load at a particular electrical location to net using 
behind-the-meter generation.120 
 
The CAISO believes that its current transmission access charge structure 
is just and reasonable. Respectfully, the concerns underlying the Commission’s 
findings in the PJM proceeding do not translate to the CAISO. The CAISO and 
PJM have very different forward capacity, resource adequacy, and transmission 
service constructs. Moreover, behind-the-meter generation is far more abundant 
in California, so the CAISO and California policymakers have considered this 
issue more extensively than other regions. For example, in 2020, the 
Commission approved the CAISO’s proposal to amend its definition of Gross 
Load—the billing determinant for transmission access charges—to include load 
served by excess behind-the-meter production, i.e., behind-the-meter energy that 
exceeds the onsite load. The CAISO amended this policy to ensure uniform 
settlement practices, and to ensure load-serving entities were allocated the 
correct costs of their use of the transmission system, which includes use by 
excess behind-the-meter generation. The CAISO did not propose to assess 
transmission access charges based on gross load figures that included load 
served onsite by its own behind-the-meter generation. Neither the CAISO nor 
stakeholders in 2020 believed such loads use the transmission grid in proportion 
to those load figures. To the contrary, a benefit of rooftop solar, onsite storage, 
and other behind-the-meter generation is to reduce the use of the grid and the 
generation delivered across it. The CAISO does not believe this rationale has 
 
119  
Appendix A to the CAISO tariff defines Gross Load as “Demand (adjusted for distribution 
losses) of End-Use Customer Loads directly connected to the transmission facilities or directly 
connected to the Distribution System of a Utility Distribution Company or MSS Operator located in 
a PTO Service Territory, or End Use Customer Loads directly connected to the Distribution 
System or transmission facilities of an EDAM Transmission Service Provider in an EDAM Entity 
Balancing Authority Area. Gross Load includes Load served by Excess Behind the Meter 
Production. Excess Behind the Meter Production shall not be netted against End-Use Customer 
Load in determining Gross Load.” The definition also provides a list of certain loads excluded, 
including “Load of an individual retail customer served by its own onsite Generating Unit or 
energy storage device, or as authorized by Section 218 of the California Public Utilities Code;” 
and “Onsite Load served by a qualifying small power production facility or qualifying cogeneration 
facility, as those terms are defined in the FERC's regulations implementing Section 201 of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.” 
120  
Order to Show Cause at P 102.

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changed in light of large loads. Although a customer with behind-the-meter 
generation may still depend on transmission capacity and reliability services if its 
generation is unavailable, the CAISO and LSEs reflect those costs through the 
reliability services charges described above, and through stand-by service rates 
assessed by the LSEs. Assessing transmission access charges without reflecting 
behind-the-meter generation also could lessen the incentives to avoid using and 
building out the transmission grid in the first place.  
 
Perhaps more critically, the CAISO’s transmission access charges are 
fundamentally different from the PJM transmission charges that concerned the 
Commission. PJM calculates and assesses its transmission charges based on 
certain peak demand figures. A large load with behind-the-meter generation 
could mask all of its transmission usage simply by producing generation equal to 
its demand during that peak period. In contrast, the CAISO assesses its 
transmission access charges 24/7/365 to each utility based on its gross load, 
which consists of total end-user demand accounting for losses and excess 
behind-the-meter production. As such, the CAISO will allocate costs to each 
large load with behind-the-meter generation to the extent the large load uses the 
transmission system, as reflected by its metered load. In other words, any energy 
withdrawal by the large load will be reflected in the gross load. The LSE can then 
easily pass down the costs of that use in the retail bill, just as the millions of 
Western residents with rooftop solar or battery storage are billed today. Thus, the 
CAISO does not believe that changes to its tariff are needed to address concerns 
raised by the Commission in the Order. 
 
D. 
Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers 
Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads 
 
In the Order, the Commission preliminarily found that the CAISO tariff may 
be unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services 
that reflect eligible customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible 
large loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system 
under certain conditions, suggesting that “firm use” is essentially the only type of 
transmission service available in the CAISO. The Commission encouraged new 
transmission services be made available to reflect the operational reality that 
large loads may use the transmission system to differing extents and certain 
large loads are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under 
certain conditions.121 At the same time, the Commission stated, “In the 
alternative, CAISO may explain whether, given that CAISO does not offer the 
transmission services required by Order No. 888, CAISO’s existing transmission 
service framework addresses the concerns described herein, or explain what 
specific changes to its existing transmission service framework would effectively 
provide the same range of transmission service options for flexible large loads as 
 
121  
Id. at P 104.

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in the PJM Co-Location Order.”122 The Commission then explained that the 
customer “must have necessary control technologies and/or protection systems, 
which may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to 
its approved level,” which are typical elements of interconnection service.123 
 
The CAISO proposes to create a new flexible interconnection service 
option that will enable large loads and co-located loads to limit their energy 
withdrawals or injections until their network upgrades are placed into service. The 
CAISO believes this will provide large load developers with the option to 
interconnect to the transmission system quickly through enforceable physical and 
operational controls. The PTOs will define and implement this interconnection 
service offering, and the CAISO will ensure that any flexibility provides greater 
reliability to the system. The CAISO does not propose to create new 
“transmission services” or more responsibilities around eligible customers, which 
would require redesigning transmission and interconnection service entirely. The 
CAISO does not believe such a redesign is warranted, and the Commission 
expressly invites the CAISO to explain alternative service frameworks that may 
enable similar flexibility.124 
 
The CAISO proposes to create a new “Flexible Interim Load 
Interconnection” (FILI) service that will enable faster interconnections while 
mitigating transmission constraints and will be implemented in close coordination 
with the PTOs.125 The proposed FILI offering will enable large loads to 
interconnect flexibly and receive service up to a certain level based on grid 
conditions and constraints until network upgrades are complete, at which time 
the large load will switch over to receiving firm service. This will likely be a 
bespoke option for each large load based on its point of interconnection and the 
constraints it faces, and will be developed through a contractual agreement with 
the PTO. For example, some FILIs may require limited curtailability for a limited 
time because there are few, less probable contingencies. Others may require 
more because of transmission constraints that require network upgrades with 
longer timelines. The FILI option provides flexibility to the PTOs, CAISO, and 
 
122  
Id. at P 103. 
123  
Id. Moreover, in real time, LSEs can schedule demand as needed, including for 
customers limiting their use of the transmission system. With the operational data and process 
described in Section III.A.4, the CAISO can accommodate flexible loads without creating new 
separate classes of transmission service. This will also enable the PTOs to provide bespoke 
interconnection configurations for large loads, saving ratepayers from the costs of network 
upgrades that conform to specific “transmission services.” The CAISO believes this course of 
action is consistent with developers’ desires to interconnect quickly and affordably.  
124  
Id. at P 101. 
125  
The CAISO clarifies that this interconnection service offering is not intended to address 
supply constraints, which the CAISO does not have at this time, as explained in the CAISO’s 30-
day informational report on resource sufficiency.

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developers to customize solutions. For this reason, the CAISO declines to 
propose any kind of temporal or capacity cap on this interconnection service 
offering. 
 
FILI may include a number of tools or measures identified by the PTO with 
the CAISO’s concurrence. They could include, for example, Remedial Action 
Schemes (RAS), enforceable operating requirements, or managing to a preset 
schedule.126 The PTO may request automated schemes, such as a RAS, for FILI 
that are limited by the transmission overload under N-1-1, with the CAISO and 
Reliability Coordinator (RC) concurrence; or the PTO will perform its own load 
curtailment for FILI that is limited by transmission overload under N-1-1 after the 
first N-1 contingency occurs.  
 
Prior to the energization of the large load, the CAISO, PTO, and large load 
or its authorized agent will negotiate and execute an agreement describing the 
circumstances in which the large load receiving FILI may be temporarily curtailed 
and the mechanism used to perform the curtailment. The CAISO will work closely 
with the PTO and large load developer to ensure the compliance obligations for 
each party adhere to all operating limits and promote reliability. At a minimum, 
the agreement will specify: 
 
a) The circumstances, contingencies, or operating conditions in which 
the large load would be curtailed 
b) The mechanism used to perform the curtailment 
c) The entity responsible for performing the curtailment 
d) The notification method, response time, duration, restoration, 
testing, and verification requirements 
e) The interim operating limits both in and out of curtailable events, 
and  
f) The network upgrades or interconnection facilities required to 
conclude the curtailability requirements. 
 
The CAISO will post these agreements on the CAISO website. The CAISO base 
case, full network model, and operating procedures will account for such large 
loads as applicable. This will ensure transparency over FILI arrangements, 
enabling developers and market participants to understand the offering and any 
potential impact. Before energization of large loads, the CAISO will work with the 
large load developers and PTOs to test any FILI tools for safety and reliability, 
just as the CAISO and PTOs do the same for generator interconnections today. 
 
 
126  
The CAISO and PTOs have had success with preset schedules with energy storage 
resources that elect to forgo upgrades and thus may not charge during peak conditions (e.g., 
summer afternoons).

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The CAISO’s proposed FILI framework fulfills the Commission’s central 
objective of making meaningful service options available to large loads whose 
willingness and ability to limit withdrawals permit earlier, reliable access to the 
transmission system, without importing three distinct transmission service 
products into the CAISO’s unique market structure. The Order expressly allows 
the CAISO to explain how changes within its existing framework can provide 
comparable flexibility, rather than requiring it to replicate the service 
classifications contemplated for PJM. FILI translates that flexibility into 
enforceable interconnection terms: a large load may energize before completion 
of required network upgrades, but only within operating limits supported by 
system conditions and subject to specified curtailment triggers, control 
mechanisms, response times, and verification requirements. Agreements 
executed before energization identify those obligations and the facilities 
necessary to conclude interim service, while incorporation into the CAISO’s 
models and operating procedures makes the customer’s flexibility operationally 
usable rather than merely aspirational. Public posting of those agreements also 
provides transparency into the conditions governing access. Although FILI is an 
interim arrangement rather than a substitute for every feature of the three 
contemplated services, it addresses the immediate barrier posed by transmission 
construction timelines while preserving reliability and applicable cost-
responsibility requirements. The relevant distinction is therefore not the number 
or label of service offerings, but whether the framework enables customers to 
obtain earlier service commensurate with their actual, enforceable use of the 
grid—the result FILI is designed to achieve. 
 
 
As described in Section III.F, below, the CAISO plans to develop a 
permanent version of FILI in 2027. This would allow large loads to forgo some 
identified network upgrades altogether if the large loads were curtailable. The 
CAISO recognizes that permanent load flexibility can have significant value even 
in a system with adequate aggregate generating capacity. Although the CAISO 
believes its tariff is just and reasonable without a permanent option at this time, 
the CAISO is committed to exploring the permanent option. The prioritization of 
FILI is consistent with stakeholders’ comments, especially from the large load 
development community.  
 
E. 
Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate 
Large Load and Co-Located Load 
 
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO tariff 
appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not contain provisions 
allowing an interconnection customer to seek the generator interconnection 
service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving either: (1) an 
electrically proximate large load; or (2) a co-located load, as defined in the Order, 
that has a high peak load (i.e., large co-located loads that are 50 MW or

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greater).127 The Commission defined an “electrically proximate large load” as a 
large load “sufficiently electrically close to the interconnection customer’s 
requested point of interconnection, such that the impact on the transmission 
system of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with the 
exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the 
same as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is 
located no more than two substations from the generating facility).”128 
 
The CAISO has committed to examining electrically proximate co-location 
in an upcoming stakeholder initiative to determine whether it may have future 
value for the CAISO and developers. Stakeholders, especially data center 
developers, agreed during the CAISO’s stakeholder process in response to the 
Order that electrically proximate co-location is not a near-term priority. The 
CAISO thus believes its tariff is just and reasonable at this time without 
provisions allowing an interconnection customer to “co-locate” or otherwise be 
studied with an electrically proximate large load.  
 
The Commission’s contemplated treatment of electrically proximate 
generation and large load addresses a potential benefit of studying their 
combined transmission-system effects, but the need for a separate service 
pathway must be evaluated against the CAISO’s existing framework. Unlike an 
Eastern framework that conditions a large load’s energization on the 
development of corresponding generation, the CAISO does not require a large 
load customer to bring its own generation or pair its interconnection request with 
a particular generating facility. Supply adequacy remains the responsibility of the 
LSE under applicable resource adequacy and regulatory requirements, while the 
load’s ability to interconnect depends on the applicable studies, available 
transmission capability, necessary facilities, and operating requirements. 
Accordingly, to the extent an electrically proximate pathway is intended to enable 
a customer to satisfy a generation-matching condition or obtain an exception 
from such a condition, it solves a problem the CAISO’s framework does not 
impose. The CAISO’s near-term reforms instead target the barriers its customers 
actually face, including transmission construction timelines, coordinated studies, 
and enforceable operating limits that can permit earlier energization.  
 
That distinction does not mean electrically proximate generation and load 
can never produce transmission benefits. The Order’s premise—that sufficiently 
close generation and load may have combined effects resembling a co-located 
arrangement—presents a legitimate study question. It does not, however, 
establish that electrical proximity alone eliminates the need to evaluate 
intervening facilities, the consequences of a generator outage or a change in 
load, or the obligations necessary to make any assumed offset dependable. Nor 
 
127  
Order to Show Cause at P 113. 
128  
Id. at P 112.

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does the absence of a customer-specific generation requirement, standing alone, 
resolve the Commission’s concern about recognizing combined system impacts. 
The CAISO therefore distinguishes between considering those impacts and 
creating an immediate, separate interconnection pathway for paired projects. Its 
proposed sequencing allows the CAISO and stakeholders to address the 
additional study and operating questions associated with electrically proximate 
arrangements without delaying reforms applicable to stand-alone loads and co-
located configurations.  
 
The stakeholder process supports that sequencing rather than a 
categorical rejection of electrically proximate arrangements. As the CAISO 
explained in its October 22, 2026 Board memorandum, stakeholder feedback led 
it to prioritize the more common stand-alone and co-located load and generator 
interconnections in this proposal and filing, with electrically proximate 
arrangements to follow once the co-location process is underway. The 
appropriate conclusion is therefore not that stakeholders oppose innovation or 
that developers could derive no benefit from a future pathway, but that the 
CAISO identified more immediate priorities for this filing. Preserving electrically 
proximate arrangements for subsequent policy development permits further 
consideration of their potential benefits and necessary safeguards while 
advancing the interconnection, reliability, customer-protection, and flexible 
interim service reforms that can be implemented now. 
 
F.  
Future Issues 
 
The CAISO remains committed to working with stakeholders, PTOs, and 
State energy agencies, to support the reliable integration of large loads. Building 
on the reforms in this initiative, the CAISO has identified several areas for 
continued stakeholder engagement, including operational and technical 
requirements, market participation, flexible interconnection, electrically proximate 
loads, cost allocation, and implementation of recent State legislation. 
 
First, the CAISO will continue coordinating with California’s principal 
energy agencies, the CPUC and CEC, as well as local regulatory authorities and 
other stakeholders, to address statutory requirements arising from recently 
enacted large load legislation.129 As the large load landscape continues to 
evolve, the CAISO recognizes the need to review existing processes and 
develop additional tools to support reliable integration. This includes exploring a 
risk-mitigation framework under which local regulatory authorities, load-serving 
entities, utility distribution companies, metered subsystems, the PTOs, and the 
CAISO could curtail large loads under tight grid conditions before a reliability 
event. 130 The CAISO expects to explore this framework through a stakeholder 
 
129  
See Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal at pg. 8, included as Attachment C. 
130  
Id.

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The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese 
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process beginning in early 2027.131 Unlike other markets that have developed 
curtailment requirements the Commission has rejected as improper conditions of 
retail service,132 the CAISO currently plans to develop curtailment tools the LSE 
and local regulatory authority can use pursuant to their jurisdiction.  
 
Second, the CAISO is committed to continuing to work with NERC and 
WECC on new reliability requirements for computational loads and other large 
loads. The CAISO and PTOs will ensure that their tariffs do not conflict or unduly 
overlap with similar reliability standards. All parties must work to ensure 
compliance maintains reliability without being unduly burdensome. This work will 
complement the CAISO’s ongoing engagement with the PTOs and the LLTRWG.  
 
Third, the CAISO will continue engaging stakeholders on opportunities for 
large load market participation, including participation through demand response, 
price responsive load, and other market mechanisms. This work will continue in 
the CAISO’s ongoing Demand and Distributed Energy Market Integration 
(DDEMI) initiative throughout 2027, including EWG efforts on coordination 
framework.133 Similarly, while the CAISO is committed to respecting FERC’s 
jurisdictional considerations, the CAISO understands that distribution-connected 
and non-PTO connected loads can impact the transmission system. Although the 
CAISO already considers transmission network upgrades driven by these loads 
through the transmission planning process, the CAISO may consider through 
DDEMI whether additional measures are appropriate when these loads affect the 
transmission system. As additional large loads, including loads co-located with 
generation, interconnect to the system, additional resource adequacy or reliability 
issues may also emerge. Any necessary modifications to resource adequacy 
requirements would be considered through future resource adequacy policy 
initiatives at the CAISO and in coordination with local regulatory authorities.134  
 
Fourth, the CAISO will further explore flexible load interconnection – 
permanent (FLIP) through a stakeholder initiative that is expected to commence 
in 2027.135 If developed and implemented, FLIP would enable large loads to 
 
131   
See 2027-2029 ISO Draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap at 
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Infrastructure-
Policy-Roadmap-Oct-8%202026.xlsx.  
132  
PJM Interconnection, 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 77 et seq. (2026). 
133  
See 2027-2029 California ISO Market Policy Initiatives Roadmap at 
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Market-Policy-
Roadmap-Sep-24-2026.xlsx.  
134  
See Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal at pp.54-55. 
135  
See 2027-2029 ISO Draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap at 
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Infrastructure-
Policy-Roadmap-Oct-8%202026.xlsx.

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The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese 
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interconnect and avoid the need to fund completion of transmission network 
upgrades that would be required for firm load service by accepting terms of 
flexible interconnection service in perpetuity. As explained above, large load 
developers and stakeholders broadly desired the CAISO to prioritize FILI, and 
develop FLIP in 2027.   
 
Finally, stakeholders also stressed the need for the CAISO to prioritize the 
more common stand-alone and co-located load and generator interconnections 
in the near-term; however, the CAISO is committed to exploring provisions for 
interconnection customers to serve electrically proximate loads in a future 
stakeholder initiative. The CAISO has included a stakeholder initiative to address 
these items on its draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap and expects to begin 
policy development in early 2027.136  
 
These commitments should further demonstrate to the Commission that 
the CAISO will continue to innovate interconnection and market efficiencies for 
large loads without the need for a Section 206 proceeding. 
 
IV. 
Briefing Questions 
 
The CAISO responds to the Order’s briefing questions as follows: 
 
P 123:137 How CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners, in responding 
to the order to show cause, should protect existing commercial arrangements 
including: (1) what would be a reasonable implementation period to ensure 
minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements; and (2) how to 
allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are 
nearing completion as of the date such tariff provisions are filed with the 
Commission. 
 
The CAISO and PTOs have designed their tariff revisions to apply to 
future large load interconnection requests, thus protecting existing commercial 
arrangements. The CAISO and PTOs have not proposed imposing any of the 
new large load requirements on operational loads or loads that completed 
interconnection requests before the proposed effective date of these tariff 
revisions. As such, the CAISO and PTOs can implement their tariff revisions 
 
136  
Id. 
137  
“We note that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with transmission 
owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take interconnection and/or 
transmission service from, the transmission system and may be at varying stages of that process. 
We appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that process. We also 
understand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large 
loads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to 
interconnecting to the transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.” Order to 
Show Cause at P 123.

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expeditiously without disrupting existing commercial arrangements. Future large 
load developers will have sufficient notice of these new rules while operational 
and in-flight loads can proceed without disruption. 
 
P 124:138 What, if any, potential impacts on regional and local transmission 
planning would arise from the introduction of the new transmission services 
discussed herein? For example, when planning for load growth, how would 
transmission providers and planners account for flexible large loads’ potential 
preference to take the new transmission services, including potential 
uncertainties around the type, location, and quantity of such expected loads? 
 
The CAISO and PTOs do not believe that flexible large loads will create 
significant new challenges for regional and local transmission planning for two 
reasons. First, flexibility is a tool, not a hindrance: flexible loads create more 
opportunities for lower-cost, bespoke planning solutions. For FILI specifically, the 
service is interim and tied to identified network upgrades, and the CAISO will 
reflect FILI loads and applicable operating limits in its models and operating 
procedures.” Second, the CAISO and local regulators are accustomed to 
planning for flexible, non-traditional loads, including batteries, electric vehicle 
charging stations, and homes with behind-the-meter solar and storage systems. 
Flexible large loads will join this mélange, but as a contribution rather than a 
challenge. The CAISO and PTO planning departments are also highly 
accustomed to planning the grid around flexible resources, namely generating 
facilities. This is especially true in the CAISO, where over 17,000 MW of energy 
storage resources have interconnected in the past few years.  
 
P 125:139 We direct respondents to include information regarding potential 
structures for agreements between the transmission owner/provider and an 
Eligible Customer to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifts among 
transmission customers related to network upgrade costs required for large 
loads. Further, please include information on what an appropriate minimum level 
of cost recovery and financial security from an Eligible Customer would be under 
any such agreements. 
 
The CAISO responds to this issue in Section III.B, above.  
 
 
138  
“Today’s order proposes, as part of a potential replacement rate, to establish new 
transmission services that recognize flexible large loads’ ability and willingness to limit their use of 
the transmission system under certain conditions. As we assess this proposal, we also consider 
how these new transmission services might affect other parts of CAISO’s Tariff and/or 
processes.” Order to Show Cause at P 124. 
139  
“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable without the inclusion of cost shifting protections. We find that there may be a 
variety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts associated with 
network upgrades triggered by large loads.” Order to Show Cause at P 125.

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P 126:140 To the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of 
providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads 
warrant requirements beyond those contemplated here [for ATTs], we seek 
further briefing. 
 
The CAISO’s stakeholder process supported the CAISO’s proposed tariff 
revisions memorializing its consideration of ATTs in transmission planning and 
interconnection procedures. The CAISO has a long, proven track record of 
considering ATTs and non-transmission solutions, as discussed in Section 
III.A.3, above. 
 
P 127:141 (a) To what extent would CAISO allow an interconnection customer’s 
generating facility serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located 
load to participate in CAISO’s energy and ancillary services market, and if CAISO 
were to allow them to participate, what restrictions or mitigation would CAISO 
apply? 
 
The CAISO has not proposed excluding any loads or co-located resources 
from using any participation model or providing any service for which they can 
meet the existing tariff requirements. Loads large and small and co-located 
generators already participate in the CAISO markets today and provide every 
service, including capacity and ancillary services. Here again, the CAISO has a 
proven track record of innovation to enable non-conventional resources to 
access the CAISO markets.  
 
P 127: (b) To the extent that CAISO plans for the electrically proximate large load 
or large co-located load associated with an interconnection customer’s 
 
140  
“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of 
alternative transmission technologies. The order directs CAISO to explain whether the Tariff 
remains just and reasonable without provisions that (1) require the evaluation of alternative 
transmission technologies in studies for the provision of transmission service, using models that 
are capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account for advanced 
transmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request from the Eligible 
Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load; and (2) if traditional network 
upgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study 
report to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load of a 
sufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e., 
would not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would 
not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request.” 
Order to Show Cause at P 126. 
141  
“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and 
unreasonable because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection customer 
serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to seek generator 
interconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving such loads.” Order to 
Show Cause at P 127.

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The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese 
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generating facility for resource adequacy purposes, would CAISO account for the 
generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located 
load in the resource adequacy construct?  If applicable, would CAISO allow the 
generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located 
load to participate in CAISO’s capacity market?  If so, would CAISO accredit 
these generating facilities using the same method as other CAISO generating 
facilities? 
 
Nothing in the current CAISO tariff or the CAISO’s proposed tariff 
revisions would make co-located generating facilities ineligible to provide 
resource adequacy, nor affect their qualifying capacity. So long as the generating 
facility continues to meet all portfolio, capacity, and must-offer obligations, and 
respond to all CAISO dispatches, the CAISO does not have cause to remove or 
reduce their resource adequacy value.  
 
As the CAISO explained in its 30-day informational report and in Section 
II.B.1, the CAISO does not administer a centralized forward capacity market. The 
CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, establishes resource adequacy 
requirements for CPUC jurisdictional load serving entities. CPUC-jurisdictional 
load serving entities represent the vast majority of the load in the CAISO’s 
service territory. Other local regulatory authorities within California, like municipal 
utilities, establish these requirements for load serving entities under their 
authority. The CAISO only sets default resource adequacy requirements if a local 
regulatory authority elects not to establish their own. Moreover, the CPUC 
establishes resource accreditation methodologies and counting rules used to 
determine the qualifying capacity of resource types participating in the resource 
adequacy program. As such, the CPUC and local regulatory authorities will 
evaluate whether co-located or other loads affect generating facilities’ ability to 
provide resource adequacy capacity.  
 
V. 
Order to Show Cause 
 
The Commission should conclude the Order to Show Cause proceeding. 
Only a small minority of comments in the Commission’s ANOPR proceeding 
referenced the CAISO and the West, and fewer, if any, argued that the status 
quo was unjust and unreasonable. As the CAISO describes above, a significant 
portion of the Commission’s findings in the Order to Show Cause are based on 
issues specific to other markets. Although no one in the West would argue that 
the work is done, the CAISO and PTO filings demonstrate they will continue to 
proactively evolve to meet the demands of large loads. The CAISO and 
stakeholders are committed to the principles the Commission established in the 
Order, and will continue to bring frequent, rapid enhancements to the 
Commission for approval without the need for a Section 206 proceeding.

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VI. 
Effective Date, Comment Period, Request for Waiver 
 
With the exception of the two sections described below, the CAISO 
requests that the Commission accept the tariff revisions contained in this filing 
effective February 16, 2027 (i.e., 92 days after the date of this filing).142 Although 
the CAISO is ready to implement its tariff revisions as soon as approved, the 
CAISO is proposing a 92-day notice period to recognize that comments and 
Commission review are largely occurring over the holiday season. Similarly, the 
CAISO requests the Commission establish a 30-day deadline for comments on 
the CAISO’s filing so stakeholders have additional time for the Thanksgiving 
holiday. 
 
The CAISO requests that the Commission accept the tariff revisions in 
Sections 25.7.3 and 25.7.3.1 (scheduling coordinator requirements) effective 
November 1, 2027, and the tariff revisions in Section 11.36 (settlements) 
effective April 30, 2028. The CAISO respectfully requests waiver of the 
Commission’s 120-day notice requirement to permit the requested November 1, 
2027 effective date.143 Good cause exists to grant the requested waiver. The 
tariff revisions will require software development, simulation, and scheduling 
coordinator training. The CAISO’s proposed effective dates align with their 
annual software releases for scheduling coordinator software in the Fall and 
settlements software in the Spring. Importantly, the effective dates for these 
technology changes should have little or no negative impact because the CAISO 
software will be available before the new large loads subject to those 
requirements will finish studies and construction.  
 
 
142  
February 14, 2027 is a weekend, and February 15, 2027 is a federal holiday, hence 92. 
The CAISO may have other proceedings revising some of the sections in the instant filing. If 
necessary, the CAISO will reconcile any overlapping revisions after Commission review.  
143  
Specifically, pursuant to section 35.11 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 
35.11, the CAISO respectfully requests waiver of the notice requirement in section 35.3(a)(1) of 
the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 35.3(a)(1), to allow the tariff revisions to go into effect 
more than 120 days after submittal of this filing.

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VII. 
Communications 
 
Pursuant to Rule 203(b)(3) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and 
Procedure,144 the CAISO requests that all correspondence, pleadings, and other 
communications regarding this filing should be directed to the following: 
 
 
William H. Weaver 
  Assistant General Counsel  
California Independent System 
Operator Corporation  
250 Outcropping Way 
Folsom, CA 95630  
Tel: (916) 608-1225 
Fax: (916) 608-7296 
bweaver@caiso.com 
VIII. 
Service 
 
The CAISO has served copies of this filing on the CPUC, the CEC, and all 
parties with scheduling coordinator agreements under the CAISO tariff. In 
addition, the CAISO has posted a copy of the filing on the CAISO website. 
 
IX. 
Contents of Filing 
 
In addition to this transmittal letter, this filing includes the following 
attachments: 
 
Attachment A 
Clean CAISO tariff sheets incorporating this tariff 
amendment 
 
Attachment B  
Red-lined document showing the revisions in this tariff 
amendment 
 
Attachment C 
Final Proposal 
 
Attachment D 
Technical Working Group Proposal 
 
Attachment E 
Board Memorandum 
 
144  
18 C.F.R. § 385.203(b)(3).

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X. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the CAISO respectfully requests that the 
Commission accept the CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions and conclude the 
Order to Show Cause proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
/s/ William H. Weaver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roger E. Collanton 
  General Counsel 
William H. Weaver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Assistant General Counsel 
 
California Independent System  
 
Operator Corporation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel for the California Independent 
System Operator Corporation