ER27-506-000 · 2026-11-16 · California Independent System Operator Corporation
CAISO files large-load tariff revisions under section 205 in response to the show cause order
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www.caiso.com │ 250 Outcropping Way, Folsom, CA 95630 │ 916.351.4400
California Independent System Operator Corporation
November 16, 2026
The Honorable Debbie-Anne A. Reese
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426
Re:
California Independent System Operator Corporation
Docket No. ER27- ___-000
Large Loads Tariff Amendment
Response to Order to Show Cause
Dear Secretary Reese:
The California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO)
submits this filing to (1) enhance its large load interconnection procedures
through a tariff amendment, and (2) address the issues the Commission raises in
its Order to Show Cause (Order).1 Taken together, the CAISO and Participating
Transmission Owner (PTO) tariff revisions supply the tariff-level clarity, customer
protections, and operational tools the Order seeks. The result is a
comprehensive near-term response to the Order that can accelerate viable large
load projects without compromising reliability, affordability, or open access.
I.
Executive Summary
California and the West have an established framework for integrating
new load growth, including for data centers and other large loads. Through
coordinated resource planning, long-term procurement of clean and reliable
generation, and an unprecedented expansion of the transmission system, the
CAISO and its PTOs are working to ensure that new demand can be served
without compromising reliability or affordability. This work entails close, careful
coordination with California’s principal energy agencies, the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the California Energy Commission (CEC), and
local regulators across the West. It also recognizes that generation and
1
The CAISO submits this filing pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16
U.S.C. § 824d, and Part 35 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 35. Capitalized terms
not otherwise defined herein have the meanings set forth in appendix A to the CAISO tariff, and
references to specific tariff sections and appendices are references to sections and appendices in
the existing CAISO tariff unless otherwise specified.
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transmission are complementary investments: securing adequate generating
resources is only valuable if those resources can be delivered where and when
they are needed. By planning both in tandem over longer time horizons,
California’s framework supports continued investment in innovation,
electrification, and advanced computing infrastructure while maintaining a
reliable, resilient, and increasingly carbon-free electric grid for all customers.
The CAISO and PTOs have complementary and clearly defined
responsibilities within this framework. The PTOs lead customer interconnection
and the development, engineering, construction, and maintenance of the
transmission facilities needed to reliably serve new and expanding customers.
For more than a century, that work has enabled California’s growth, supporting
everything from Silicon Valley and the State’s agricultural and industrial base to
its ports, cities, and emerging centers of technological innovation. The CAISO
builds on that foundation through independent, systemwide transmission
planning, coordination of interconnection and grid-development activities, and
reliability oversight, evaluating individual projects and load additions in the
context of the broader needs of California and the Western interconnected
system.
The Commission’s Order asks whether the CAISO tariff remains just and
reasonable as unprecedented large load growth tests utility tariffs nationwide.
The CAISO’s proposed reforms answer the Commission’s concerns through a
framework tailored to the CAISO’s distinctive market design and the existing
division of responsibility between the CAISO and its PTOs. The CAISO’s
proposals constitute a major step toward enabling the timely development and
interconnection of data centers and other new large loads. The concepts
proposed rest on a foundation of highly integrated planning and coordination
among the CAISO, PTOs, State energy agencies, and local regulatory
authorities, and provide a framework upon which the PTOs will layer their own
processes to serve new large loads while upholding and reinforcing the CAISO’s
commitment to reliability. The proposed reforms strengthen accountability and
protect existing customers. They improve transparency, operational visibility,
technical standards, cost responsibility, and protection against speculative
development.
First, the CAISO and PTO tariff revisions create streamlined paths for
large loads to interconnect to the transmission system while preserving the
PTOs’ lead role in connecting and serving load. Standardized application
information, deposits, milestones, study coordination, and service agreements
will make the process more transparent and predictable. A large load threshold
and enhanced data requirements will give the CAISO and PTOs earlier visibility
into a project’s size, timing, operating profile, and potential system effects.
Coordinated studies, technical standards, telemetry, modeling, ride-through,
ramping, power-quality, and other operating requirements will allow the CAISO to
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identify and mitigate reliability impacts before service begins and to operate the
grid reliably after the load comes online.
Second, the PTOs will implement just and reasonable deposit, security,
reimbursement, and cost-recovery provisions in their own tariffs. Milestone and
readiness requirements will reduce the risk that speculative projects drive
premature investment, and expanded reporting will provide greater transparency
into large load requests, study status, projected demand, required upgrades, and
cost responsibility. Together, these measures align costs with beneficiaries and
cost causers and reduce the risk that abandoned, delayed, or underutilized
projects leave other transmission customers paying for facilities built principally to
serve a new large load.
Third, the CAISO’s tariff revisions close any gaps presented by co-located
and behind-the-meter arrangements. The CAISO clarifies their treatment and
requires generator interconnection customers to disclose plans to serve co-
located load, enabling the CAISO to coordinate its generator studies with the
PTOs’ load-interconnection review. The framework distinguishes service to load
from generator interconnection service, preserves applicable transmission
charges and reliability obligations, and allocates upgrade costs based on the
facilities and service actually required. These provisions give load and generation
developers significant flexibility regardless of their planned configuration. The
CAISO also has clarified how developers can submit new interconnection
requests or modify existing load or generation sites.
Fourth, the CAISO proposes new service options for flexible large loads
that can reduce consumption when transmission capability is unavailable. The
CAISO’s Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) can permit earlier
energization while network upgrades are pending, enabling the PTOs to provide
bespoke solutions to large loads based on their configurations and constraints.
Eligibility, study, metering, communications, dispatch, and compliance
requirements ensure that flexibility is real and operationally dependable rather
than assumed. FILI provides a near-term, prioritized solution for large load
developers, with additional work planned on permanent flexibility and other
emerging configurations.
Collectively, these tariff revisions will ensure the CAISO tariff remains just
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential in the face of the
challenges the Commission identified in the Order associated with providing the
transmission service needed to serve the ongoing influx of large loads while
maintaining reliability and affordability.
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II.
Background
A.
Large Loads
The CAISO’s work on large loads has unfolded against a rapidly evolving
policy landscape. The CAISO’s initial focus was to address the most immediate
operational challenges that could impact reliability. As the stakeholder initiative
progressed, the priorities and expectations of federal and State regulators for
large load interconnections continued to develop. Through it all, the CAISO has
sought to remain responsive to that evolving direction. The CAISO adjusted the
scope and sequencing of its stakeholder process accordingly, while continuing to
provide stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to shape the proposals presented
in this filing.
In 2025, the CAISO began regular engagement with the PTOs and formed
a Large Load Technical Requirements Working Group (LLTRWG) to explore
possible technical standards to ensure reliable operations as new large loads
interconnect to the CAISO system. The CAISO’s Issue Paper, posted in January
2026, described current roles, considerations, and processes for large loads,
including transmission and resource planning, transmission service offerings,
cost allocation and responsibility, technical requirements and standards,
operational requirements, and related issues.2 The CAISO has continued to
monitor and engage in State and federal regulatory discussions regarding large
loads and explored central issues and procedural steps that require additional
transparency or new products. On June 15, 2026, the CAISO issued a Large
Loads Technical Requirements Straw Proposal on behalf of the LLTRWG in
order to stay ahead of any potential operational concerns that large loads may
present. As NERC’s work on large loads ramped up, the LLTRWG focused on
responding to NERC alerts and inquiries to help share eventual reliability
standards.
On June 18, 2026, the CAISO and PTOs received the Order to Show
Cause with the other ISO/RTOs.3 The CAISO immediately re-scoped its large
load stakeholder initiative to work with stakeholders to address each issue in the
Order. The CAISO’s work included weekly coordination meetings with all of its
PTOs, and continuous discussions with local regulators and stakeholders.
Several major large load developers participated actively in the CAISO’s
stakeholder process, including Google, Microsoft, Tesla, and the California Large
Energy Consumers Association. The CAISO received written comments on its
proposal to address the Order from the following parties: American Clean Power-
2
See CAISO Large Loads Issue Paper at https://www.caiso.com/documents/issue-paper-
large-load-consideration-jan-20-2026.pdf.
3
Order Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 195 FERC ¶
61,214 (2026) (Order to Show Cause).
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California, AltaGas, Antora Energy, Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group,
California Community Choice Association, the California Department of Water
Resources – State Water Project, the California Large Energy Consumers
Association, the CPUC, the Public Advocates Office of the CPUC, the California
Solar and Storage Association, Constellation, Google, GridLiance West, IGNIS
Energy USA, Independent Energy Producers Association, KritiGrid, Lotus
Infrastructure Partners, LS Power Grid California and DesertLink, Microsoft,
NextEra Energy Resources, Northern California Power Agency, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, Pattern Energy, Persistence Analytics, Power Applications
and Research Systems, San Diego Gas and Electric, the Six Cities,4 Solar
Energy Industries Association, Southern California Edison, State Water
Contractors, SunZia Transmission, Tesla, Trimark Associates, Valley Electric
Association, Viridon California, and Voltus. These parties and more also
participated on the CAISO’s public stakeholder calls and tariff development
process.5 Stakeholders overwhelmingly support the CAISO’s final proposal as
approved by the CAISO Board of Governors.6
Independent of this proceeding, the CAISO’s work with stakeholders and
regulators continues, and with cause for optimism. As described in the CAISO’s
30-day informational report on resource sufficiency to serve large loads,7 current
State planning forecasts and procurement trajectories indicate that California can
accommodate the large load growth reflected in the adopted demand forecast,
provided planned resource additions, procurement and transmission
development continue to materialize. As of January 2026, the CEC forecasts that
data center load in the CAISO-managed grid will increase by 1.8 GW by 2030
and 4.7 GW by 2035.8 The CAISO also is aware that utilities are receiving an
increasing number of large load interconnection and service applications, and is
committed to staying ahead of the curve, with the timely serving of new energy
demand reliably and affordably. To date, California’s integrated resource
planning efforts have resulted in more than 37 GW of nameplate new generation
4
The cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, California are
CAISO PTOs and metered subsystems (MSS).
5
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/StakeholderInitiatives/Large-loads.
6
https://www.caiso.com/about/governance-committees.
7
See Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency at
https://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-
loads-el26-71.pdf.
8
California Energy Demand 2025 Hourly Forecast – CAISO – Planning Scenario:
https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=268127&DocumentContentId=105135.
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and storage capacity coming online to serve CAISO load since 2020.9 The close
coordination between the CAISO, State agencies, and local regulatory authorities
on demand forecasts and resource planning provides a pathway for proactive
transmission planning that anticipates emerging large load growth by aligning
that growth with commensurate resource and infrastructure development to serve
new loads. This will enable the CAISO to accommodate growth reliably and
affordably.
The CAISO and PTOs coordinated closely throughout the development of
their respective proposals. Consistent with their distinct tariff responsibilities and
governance processes, each entity developed and submitted its own tariff
revisions. The CAISO’s proposals are designed to complement the PTOs’ filings
while preserving the existing allocation of responsibilities.
B.
Key CAISO Differences
1.
Capacity Requirements
The CAISO’s approach to large loads differs from approaches advanced
in other ISO/RTO regions because the CAISO does not condition large load
interconnection on a requirement to “bring your own generation.” Rather than
requiring each new large load to develop or procure a matching increment of
dedicated generation, California addresses supply adequacy through coordinated
long term demand forecasting, integrated resource planning, resource
procurement, and transmission planning. These processes are designed to
anticipate new demand and develop the resources and delivery infrastructure
needed to serve it. Continued generation and storage additions are expected to
support forecast load growth, subject to timely procurement and project
development. As such, the CAISO currently can accommodate large loads
without making each customer’s energization and transmission service
contingent on completion of a separate generation project. At the same time, the
CAISO recognizes that resource sufficiency depends on the realization of
planned additions, and large loads may develop faster than forecast or
procurement processes anticipate. For this reason, the CAISO continually works
with the California energy agencies on forecasting, procurement, and planning.10
The CAISO will continue assessing whether new loads create incremental
reliability risks; however, at this time, a bring-your-own generation requirement is
not a condition for interconnection or transmission service.
9
See CPUC Resource Tracking Data Reports at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-
topics/electrical-energy/summer-2021-reliability/tracking-energy-development/cpuc-resource-
tracking-data-reports.
10
The CAISO describes its resource adequacy framework and current load and supply
forecasts in the 30-day Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency.
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This distinction can remove an important barrier to timely service: a large
load customer need not independently secure new generating capacity or satisfy
a separate CAISO forward-capacity-market requirement as a condition of
interconnection. The CAISO has no centralized forward capacity market; instead,
serving load remains subject to the resource adequacy obligations applicable to
its load-serving entity (LSE) and the requirements of the relevant local regulatory
authority. The absence of a customer-specific generation requirement therefore
does not eliminate advance capacity procurement obligations or guarantee
immediate service at every location. Large loads must still complete applicable
interconnection studies, satisfy technical and operating requirements, and fund or
await required facilities and network upgrades. The resulting framework
facilitates access to the shared grid without requiring a one-for-one pairing of
each new load with new generation, while preserving the planning, procurement,
and cost-responsibility safeguards necessary to protect reliability and existing
customers. This framework has enabled the construction of many data centers,
including those supporting Silicon Valley, for several years.
This distinction also explains why the CAISO does not propose to replicate
generation-linked mechanisms developed or proposed in other ISO/RTO regions.
Where a large load’s access to service depends on identifying sufficient
incremental generation, special arrangements may be needed to pair the load
with a generating project, coordinate their development schedules, or condition
the load’s operation on the availability of designated supply. Those arrangements
address a constraint that the CAISO’s framework does not impose: a large load
customer need not sponsor a corresponding generation project to obtain
interconnection. Adopting mechanisms whose principal purpose is to satisfy or
provide an exception to that requirement would therefore add complexity without
removing a comparable barrier to service in the CAISO. The relevant question is
not whether another region has adopted a particular innovation, but whether the
condition that makes that innovation necessary exists under the CAISO’s market
and regulatory framework.
The CAISO’s proposed reforms in the instant filing instead focus on the
constraints that actually govern a large load’s ability to interconnect and operate
reliably: available transmission capability, timely completion of necessary
upgrades, adequate visibility into load characteristics, enforceable operating
requirements, and appropriate cost responsibility. A flexible interim
interconnection arrangement, for example, can address a transmission
bottleneck by allowing earlier energization subject to operating limits while
upgrades are completed; it need not also function as a bridge until the
customer’s dedicated generation enters service. This does not eliminate the
serving LSE’s resource adequacy obligations or the need to plan and procure
sufficient supply. It means that those obligations remain within the existing
planning and procurement framework, rather than becoming a separate,
customer-specific generation-matching condition layered onto the load
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interconnection process. As explained in detail in the CAISO’s Informational
Report on Resource Sufficiency, the CAISO will continue to assess reliability and
capacity needs presented by large load growth with stakeholders, PTOs, LSEs,
and State energy agencies.
2.
Eligible Customers and Order No. 888
Similarly, the CAISO’s framework for providing transmission access differs
from the traditional Order No. 888 model. First, the CAISO does not use the
“Eligible Customer” construct in any significant way. The very few references to
Eligible Customer in the CAISO tariff are merely catch-alls to prescribe that all
market participants use a scheduling coordinator to interact with the markets.11
Second, the CAISO does not offer specific transmission services. As the
Commission stated in the Order to Show Cause:
Unlike other regions, CAISO does not offer traditional Order No.
888 network and point-to-point transmission services, offers no
firm, long-term transmission reservations of capacity, and does not
provide a formal application process for transmission service.
Instead, CAISO offers a single “daily” transmission service that is
available to all Eligible Customers on a day-to-day basis. All energy
that is transmitted under CAISO’s Tariff that is not associated with
historical rights or certain wheeling transactions is treated as “new
firm use,” and those accessing the CAISO-controlled transmission
system cannot reserve transmission capacity beyond the day-
ahead time frame.12
In other words, transmission service is assumed in the sales of energy and
ancillary services. Stakeholders agreed with the suggestions in the Commission’s
Order that large loads do not warrant reforming how the CAISO complies with
Order No. 888, which has remained unchanged for 30 years. As such, the
CAISO’s compliance focuses on achieving the Order’s goals without redesigning
transmission service or creating a centralized capacity market for the first time in
the CAISO. The CAISO’s reforms thus provide interconnection services to enable
large loads to interconnect to the transmission system expeditiously, and without
jeopardizing reliability or just and reasonable rates.
11
See, e.g., Sections 2.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.2.1, 4.5.4.6.1 of the CAISO tariff.
12
Order to Show Cause at P 19.
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3.
Allocation of Responsibilities
The Commission’s Order does not require the CAISO and its PTOs to
reallocate their existing responsibilities for interconnecting and serving load.13
The Commission expressly stated it recognizes that the PTOs are responsible for
conducting load interconnection studies, the Commission “appreciate[s] that this
role may stem from how CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners
allocated rights and responsibilities in the governing documents establishing
CAISO,” and that the Commission “do[es] not seek to alter that allocation of
rights and responsibilities.”14 Rather than requiring a reallocation of responsibility
between the CAISO and PTO tariffs, the Order identifies a need for greater clarity
and consistency in the applicable tariffs, including a clear identification of the
entity responsible for studying service to large loads. The distinction is important:
addressing potential gaps in the governing procedures does not require
transferring the load interconnection study function from the PTOs to the CAISO.
Stakeholders’ preference was for the existing framework to remain in place, with
the PTOs administering load interconnection requests and performing the
associated studies under their tariffs, coordinated with the CAISO’s transmission
planning, generator interconnection, and system reliability responsibilities. The
necessary reforms can make those complementary roles explicit and improve
coordination without centralizing all interconnection functions in the CAISO tariff.
Although the PTOs will conduct load interconnection studies under their
tariffs, the CAISO will play a pivotal role as the balancing authority and planning
coordinator for the CAISO area in reviewing those studies. Because each PTO
studies requests on its own system, the CAISO is uniquely positioned to evaluate
study results in the context of the integrated grid, including the transmission
facilities of other PTOs, pending generation, and the CAISO’s approved
transmission plans. In its role, the CAISO will review PTO load interconnection
studies to confirm that study assumptions, load characteristics, and results are
consistent with the CAISO’s planning models and long-term plans. Most
importantly, the CAISO will identify any PTO-proposed solution that could create
reliability risk, whether because it relies on an operating measure that cannot be
dependably implemented, it shifts or exacerbates constraints elsewhere on the
system, or it is inconsistent with the CAISO’s planning and operational needs.
The same distinction applies to cost responsibility. Preserving the existing
allocation of functions allows the PTOs’ tariffs to continue to set forth the
13
See, e.g., Order to Show Cause at PP 37, 40, 51, 86. The CAISO also recognizes that
the Order implicates various types of PTOs, including non-load-serving PTOs and approved
project sponsors that could be impacted by large load interconnection requests but are not LSEs
and do not have retail interconnection tariffs. The CAISO expects the PTOs to work together to
clarify and develop complementary roles and responsibilities in their respective tariffs regarding
requests for interconnections to non-load-serving PTO facilities.
14
Id. at P 51.
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applicable rules for assigning and recovering the costs of facilities needed to
interconnect and serve large loads. The CAISO, meanwhile, retains independent
responsibility for evaluating systemwide reliability, transmission planning, and
operational consequences. The CAISO, PTOs, and stakeholders believe this is
the prudent approach because many of the PTOs have a direct relationship with
their retail ratepayers and the regulators of those ultimate rates, including the
CPUC. Likewise, it is the PTOs that will construct and own the network upgrades
if required for the large load interconnection. As such, the CAISO does not
propose to issue a new “top-down” cost allocation solution through its own tariff.
The CAISO believes that the PTOs may develop their own proposals to address
any cost shifting concerns raised in the Order, and that the current transmission
revenue requirement and credit mechanisms in the transmission access charges
can accommodate those proposals.
The PTOs worked in good faith to establish consistent cost allocation rules
in their tariffs; however, there is little case law or Commission precedent to guide
what constitutes just and reasonable rates for large loads specifically. Such
precedent will likely come from these responses to the Order to Show Cause,
offering greater regulatory certainty in the future. If the Commission requires
additional tariff provisions or greater uniformity, the CAISO is prepared to work
with the PTOs and stakeholders to develop an appropriate response consistent
with the existing allocation of responsibilities.
4.
Non-jurisdictional Transmission Owners
The Order was directed to the CAISO and all its PTOs; however, the Order
stated that if a non-public utility wished to be removed from the proceeding, the
Commission would rescind the Order against them. In such a case, the
Commission “expected CAISO to respond to this order regarding the non-public
utility’s CAISO tariff provisions on file with the Commission.”15 Based on this
direction, the CAISO’s non-public utilities requested the Commission rescind the
Order, which the Commission granted.16 Importantly, these PTOs explained that
their exits from the proceeding were not simply a legal issue, but that these PTOs
were generally unlikely to receive large load interconnection requests, and as
such, did not require tariff revisions. Morongo Transmission, for example,
explained that it is a non-load-serving PTO, and has no end users. The Six Cities
similarly explained that their facilities and transmission entitlements in the CAISO
generally represent shares of jointly-owned facilities with other transmission
15
Order to Show Cause at P 2 n. 9.
16
Specifically, the Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside,
California (Six Cities); and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Morongo
Transmission—wholly owned by the Morongo Band of Mission Indians, a federally recognized
American Indian Tribe exercising jurisdiction over the Morongo Indian Reservation—also filed for
rescission on August 12, 2026.
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owners. WAPA likewise explained only a portion of its Path 15 line, between two
PG&E substations, is under the CAISO’s operational control.
The CAISO thus believes that its tariff revisions, combined with the
anticipated tariff revisions of the other PTOs in this proceeding, satisfy the Order.
Together, they will cover the transmission lines and substations in the CAISO
where large loads will interconnect to the transmission system.
III.
Tariff Revisions and Order to Show Cause
Although the CAISO believes the tariff revisions in this filing do not
substantially affect Order Nos. 888, 1000, 2003, 792, 845, 2023, or 1920 policies,
the CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions meet both the just and reasonable standard
and the independent entity standard. The tariff revisions address issues unique
to the CAISO, and were generally designed to work without significant conflict
with the CAISO’s tariff provisions modeled on the Commission’s pro forma Open
Access Transmission Tariff and Large Generator Interconnection Procedures.
The proposed tariff revisions build upon the CAISO tariff with independent entity
variations previously accepted by the Commission.
A.
Transmission Service to Eligible Customers on Behalf of Large
Loads
1.
Definition and Applicability
The Commission noted in the Order that the CAISO and PTO tariffs lack a
definition of large load as a new category of load.17 The Commission directed the
CAISO and PTOs to create an appropriate definition, including a load size and
interconnection voltage threshold, based on the characteristics of CAISO’s
transmission system. The Commission suggested that a potentially reasonable
definition would be Southwest Power Pool’s (SPP) definition of “a new
commercial or industrial customer, located at a single site behind one or more
points of interconnection, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater,
interconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV,
and is not part of a co-location arrangement.”18
The CAISO proposes to define a Large Load as “An End User located at a
single site behind one or more points of interconnection to the CAISO Controlled
Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”19 The CAISO believes this
17
Order to Show Cause at P 58.
18
Id. at P 57.
19
Proposed Appendix A to the CAISO tariff. The CAISO tariff defines an End User as “A
consumer of electric power who consumes such power to satisfy a Load directly connected to the
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definition satisfies the Order’s intent, creates a clear and easy-to-understand
class of loads in the CAISO, and avoids infringing on State jurisdiction. Although
the words in the CAISO’s proposed definition are different than the Commission’s
proposed definition, the CAISO believes those differences are valuable, as
explained below. The CAISO also notes that its proposed definition is similar to
the proposed definition the Commission recently approved in the PJM
Interconnection.20
The CAISO proposes not to include a description of the types of load (i.e.,
commercial or industrial customer) in its definition of Large Load. Unless there is
a relevant operational difference between the types of loads, the CAISO believes
that specifying type is unnecessary. The CAISO also wants to avoid a definition
that results in false positives, false negatives, or disputes about what constitutes
“commercial” or “industrial.”21 In the future, type-based terms may be necessary
for different reliability rules, especially as NERC finalizes its standards for
computational loads. But the CAISO has elected not to specify any type at this
time.
Similar to generator interconnections, the CAISO proposes to continue to
adhere to FERC and California regulations on what constitutes a “site,” and thus
does not propose defining “site” in its definition. The CAISO believes the large
load definition will adequately apply to large loads comprised of distinct loads
even if they have separate retail meters. Operationally, such loads would still
have the same impact on the CAISO transmission system. Moreover, the
prevalence of behind-the-meter and hybrid configurations in the CAISO has led
the CPUC and local regulators to address multi-meter and multi-unit sites. The
CAISO also does not believe that the CAISO tariff is the proper vehicle to define
a site. In the event of a unique configuration, Commission precedent and local
regulations are more than sufficient in the large load context.22 Further, under its
CAISO Controlled Grid, a Distribution System, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the
Day-Ahead Market only, the transmission system of an EDAM Transmission Service Provider
who does not resell the power, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the Real-Time
Market only, the transmission system of an EIM Transmission Service Provider and who does not
resell the power.” The CAISO tariff defines the CAISO Controlled Grid as “The system of
transmission lines and associated facilities of the Participating TOs that have been placed under
the CAISO’s Operational Control.”
The CAISO purposely did not capitalize point of interconnection because its tariff
definition is designed for generating facilities, whereas the point of interconnection for a large load
will be determined by the retail interconnection agreement consistent with local regulatory
authority rules. As with many aspects of this definition, the CAISO’s intent is to remain flexible for
this new set of rules so as to avoid false positives and false negatives.
20
PJM Interconnection, 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 16 (2026).
21
Nor does the CAISO want to compound the issue by formally defining those terms.
22
Id.
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current rules as planning coordinator and balancing authority, the CAISO will
continue to study impacts to the transmission system of any large load that
connects to the distribution system or load that falls below the 50 MW peak load
threshold but connects to the transmission system. The CAISO will similarly
continue to work with NERC and other regulators to address smaller and
distributed loads in the future.
The CAISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also omits a specific
voltage level for the interconnection. The CAISO does not believe this is
necessary where the definition specifies the interconnection is to the “CAISO
Controlled Grid,” a term that already requires evaluation under all Commission
tests for transmission vs. distribution, including voltage. The CAISO’s proposed
definition thus establishes that the large load is transmission-connected,
obviating the need to specify a voltage that could conflict with the existing
transmission registration. Although distribution-grid voltages likely make
interconnection difficult for large loads, the CAISO recognizes that it could be
possible for 50 MW loads to interconnect to the distribution grid. Nevertheless,
the CAISO is focused on transmission-connected large loads at this time
because they are the subject of FERC’s Order, and because the transmission
grid represents the likely interconnection point for the vast majority of large loads.
The CAISO recognizes, however, that the Order represents the frontier of
Commission jurisdiction, and there is little precedent to better understand how a
large load definition and accompanying rules will operate consistent with the
Federal Power Act. The CAISO has created its definition recognizing that it does
not have a centralized capacity market for all loads, and that the Commission has
stressed avoiding infringement on the States’ jurisdiction over retail service and
distribution.
The CAISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also does not include
FERC’s proposal that the definition specify that the large load “is not part of a co-
location arrangement.” The CAISO does not believe it is necessary to exclude
large loads participating in co-location arrangements from the definition of large
loads. Although such loads will be subject to different tariff provisions than
standalone large loads, they would still constitute large loads.
Finally, the CAISO does not propose to include the term “new” in its Large
Load definition because that term also would require specification. Instead, the
CAISO proposes to include in the definition and the tariff a general provision
stating that the CAISO will not consider any load a large load subject to the
CAISO tariff where the load is operational or has a complete request with the
PTO before the CAISO tariff revisions’ effective date of February 16, 2027.23 This
23
Proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO has requested a later effective
date for two sets of technology-related changes, but this should not impact studies. See Section
VI, below.
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provision will avoid retroactive ratemaking on existing loads, and ensure the
CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions do not affect existing commercial
arrangements. The CAISO also proposes to include a provision stating that if a
grandfathered load increases or modifies its load pursuant to a PTO tariff after
the effective date, the load would become a large load and subject to those tariff
requirements. This approach is similar to those proposed by other ISO/RTOs for
large loads, and previous generator interconnection rule changes approved by
the Commission.24 It ensures that existing loads are grandfathered as they are,
but without license to evolve without operating under the same rules as other
large loads. The CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions also recognize that the PTOs
are the first and primary referees of which loads will be “large loads.” The PTOs
will receive the initial energization requests from new loads or modification
requests from existing loads, and have far more experience with load
interconnection requests than the CAISO. As such, the CAISO purposely defers
to their tariffs as the proper place to establish criteria for any grandfathered loads
to become large loads consistent with the filed rate doctrine.
Although the CAISO proposes to create a tariff class for large loads, the
CAISO does not propose to create any new market participation models for large
loads at this time.25 Rather, the CAISO proposes to enable large loads to
participate (1) simply as typical end users, represented by an LSE, or (2) through
any existing CAISO participation model, including, for example, proxy demand
resources, reliability demand response resources, participating loads, or non-
generator resources.26 Large loads participating in the CAISO markets would
then be eligible for all rights and subject to all obligations of the CAISO tariff
under those participation models. For example, a large load that desires to
participate as a reliability demand response resource could simply adhere to the
tariff provisions for reliability demand response resources, just as any other end
user.27 Large loads may participate alone or in permissible aggregations,
including with co-located generating units.28 Likewise, the CAISO proposes to
include tariff provisions stating that large loads are eligible to provide, without
limitation, demand response energy, curtailable demand, resource adequacy
capacity, and ancillary services consistent with their participation model and
24
See, e.g., Section 25.4.2 of the CAISO tariff (applying asynchronous generating facility
technical requirements “to the extent the Generating Facility makes modifications that replace its
Generating Unit(s) or any inverter(s)”).
25
As explained below, the CAISO believes it has several existing market participation
models large loads can use, and plans to explore new, tailored models in stakeholder initiatives in
2027.
26
Proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff.
27
Section 4.13 of the CAISO tariff. (The large load would still also be required to comply
with all tariff provisions regarding large loads.)
28
Id.
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subject to the requirements of the CAISO tariff.29 Instead of trying to create a
bespoke model for large loads, the CAISO’s proposed framework enables
developers to choose what model will work best for them based on their
configuration and business model. Any large load that elects to participate in the
CAISO markets can do so on day one through existing participation models.30
2.
Large Load Interconnection Study Procedures
The Order highlighted a lack of clarity and consistency regarding the study
of the provision of transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large
loads interconnecting to the transmission system.31 Further, the Commission
noted that, while it does not seek to alter the allocation of rights and
responsibilities between the CAISO and PTO tariffs, the CAISO and PTO tariffs
may not clearly specify which entity will be responsible for studying the provision
of transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large loads.32 The
Order suggested that additional study considerations may be necessary to
address the unique operational and reliability challenges presented to the
transmission system by providing transmission service to eligible customers on
behalf of large loads.33 The Commission noted that clear and consistent study
processes may be necessary to fully capture the transmission system impacts of
providing such transmission service, which could result in significant operational
risks for the transmission system,34 and suggested that tariff provisions may
prevent disputes over a variety of issues, e.g., study timelines and delays, how
the transmission service needed on behalf of the large load is studied, what
types of network upgrades are considered, and how required network upgrades
to provide the requested transmission service are determined.35 Finally, the
Commission suggested that the CAISO and PTO tariffs may fail to deter
speculative or duplicative requests for transmission service by eligible customers
on behalf of large loads.36
29
Proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff.
30
In fact, any load can do the same today, hence the CAISO’s inclusion of “Large Loads
and Loads” in proposed Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO included such language to
avoid the implication that only large loads could avail themselves of such rights, even though
loads participate significantly in the CAISO markets today.
31
Order to Show Cause at P 51.
32
Id. at P 51.
33
Id. at P 52.
34
Id. at P 53.
35
Id. at P 54.
36
Id. at P 55.
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As explained in the Order37 and Section II.B.3, above, the PTOs receive
and perform the load interconnection studies today. The CAISO and PTOs do not
propose to change this division of responsibility: The PTOs will therefore respond
to the Order’s findings in their PTO filings. The CAISO expects the PTOs to
develop consistent study procedures to be completed within 60 to 90 days, as
required by the Commission. The CAISO also expects the PTOs to address
network upgrade considerations and deterring speculative requests. For clarity,
the CAISO proposes tariff revisions noting that end users, including large loads,
interconnect to the CAISO controlled grid pursuant to PTO and retail tariffs.38 The
CAISO also proposes tariff revisions stating that the CAISO will coordinate with
the PTOs and any affected systems to account for large load interconnections to
the CAISO in all interconnection studies.39 Consistent with the CAISO’s
interconnection procedures and the PTO tariffs, the CAISO and PTOs will identify
network upgrades and interconnection facilities best reflecting the combined
topology of generating facility and large load interconnections.40
The PTOs will thus conduct load interconnection studies under their tariffs,
and the CAISO will review those studies. As planning coordinator and balancing
authority,41 the CAISO will review PTO load interconnection studies to confirm
that study assumptions, load characteristics, and results are consistent with the
CAISO’s planning models and long-term plans.42 Most importantly, the CAISO
will identify any PTO-proposed solution that could create reliability risk, whether
because it relies on an operating measure that cannot be dependably
implemented, it shifts or exacerbates constraints elsewhere on the system, or it is
inconsistent with the CAISO’s planning and operational needs. The CAISO will
conduct this process on a monthly basis to ensure the CAISO’s review does not
affect the PTOs’ obligations to complete their studies within 90 days.43 Where the
CAISO identifies a risk, it will work with the PTO to develop an alternative, such
as a different network upgrade, an alternative transmission technology, or
37
Id. at P 51.
38
Proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO tariff also notes that end users do
so consistent with local regulatory authority requirements.
39
Id.
40
Id. This provision is included for general compliance. Specific co-located load and
generating facility interconnection study obligations are discussed in Section III.C, below.
41
The CAISO also maintains the base cases, transmission plans, and generator
interconnection queues.
42
Proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff. To avoid the implication that the CAISO
reviews transmission upgrades for large loads only, the CAISO has included “Loads and Large
Loads” in this provision. This is consistent with the CAISO’s status quo planning coordinator
responsibilities to review all transmission upgrades.
43
Id.
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modified operating limits, so that the large load can interconnect without
compromising reliability. This review complements, rather than replaces, the
PTOs’ lead role in studying and serving load, and ensures that solutions
developed at the local level are reliable and coordinated with the broader system.
The CAISO also proposes to memorialize in the tariff that the CAISO’s
transmission planning process will consider large load growth and any
transmission upgrades planned as transmission solutions for public policies
selected for consideration under Order No. 1000 processes.44
The CAISO also proposes to implement new data requirements for large
load interconnection requests and associated cost data. The CAISO discusses
these proposals in Section III.B.2, below.
3.
Large Load Application Process
The Order suggested that the CAISO and PTOs lack clear and consistent
provisions establishing the application process and study procedures that will be
used when the CAISO and/or the PTOs evaluate the provision of transmission
service on behalf of large loads, including an application process, application fee
and readiness requirements, and information and data requirements.45 The
Order also suggested that the CAISO and PTO tariffs lack appropriate study
provisions to recognize the unique operational characteristics of large loads that
are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals under certain conditions to
lessen or avoid the need for network upgrades.46 In addition, the Commission
noted that accurate models using Electromagnetic Transient (EMT) studies may
help to ensure that transmission service needed on behalf of large loads can be
provided without compromising reliability and suggests clarity and consistency in
the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies (ATTs) as potential
solutions to accommodate an eligible customer’s request for transmission service
on behalf of a large load.47 To the extent that traditional network upgrades are
selected over ATTs, the Commission recommended demonstration of why ATTs
were not selected.48 The Commission directed the CAISO and PTOs to explain
whether their tariffs sufficiently address identification of Direct Assignment
Facilities and Network Upgrades (as the Order defines) necessary to reliably
44
Again, this already occurs where the transmission planning process identifies reliability-
based transmission solutions and policy-driven transmission solutions, but pursuant to the intent
of the Order, the CAISO is highlighting it for large loads to increase transparency. As the CAISO
detailed in its 30-day informational report on resource sufficiency, the CAISO, CEC, and CPUC all
break out large loads specifically in forecasts and planning scenarios.
45
Order to Show Cause at P 58.
46
Id. at P 59.
47
Id. (Also known as Grid Enhancing Technologies or GETs).
48
Id. at PP 60-61.
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provide transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of large loads;
include provisions for a 60-to 90-day timeline to study the unique operational
characteristics of large loads; and include a study deadline to assess large
loads.49
The CAISO reiterates that the existing load interconnection process is
conducted by the PTOs. For this reason, the CAISO proposes enhanced and
ongoing coordination with the PTOs on the load and resource interconnection
processes and expects the PTOs to align their load application processes with
the CAISO’s resource interconnection process to ensure the level of visibility
necessary for the CAISO to plan for new large loads and maintain reliability once
they are interconnected. The CAISO proposes including general provisions
explaining this coordination, as discussed in Section III.A.2, above. The CAISO
also notes that existing load and generator interconnection study procedures
already include ample processes to detect potential impacts on affected systems
and multiple affected PTOs, and those processes will apply to large loads.50 The
CAISO expects that the PTOs will address the other interconnection process
issues in their respective filings.
The CAISO understands that transmission providers must consider ATTs
at all times. The CAISO currently evaluates ATTs in its transmission planning
process and generator interconnection process. The CAISO’s evaluation
includes static synchronous compensators, static VAR compensators, advanced
power flow control devices, transmission switching, synchronous condensers,
voltage source converters, advanced conductors, and tower lifting. Further, the
CAISO is expanding its economic consideration of dynamic line ratings to
mitigate congestion. As a transmission provider, the CAISO must include in the
generator interconnection cluster study report an explanation of the results of the
evaluation of the enumerated ATTs for feasibility, cost, and time savings as an
alternative to a traditional network upgrade. Therefore, the CAISO supports and
has broadly adopted the practice of duly considering and assigning ATTs to meet
identified system needs, including when triggered by new loads interconnecting
to the CAISO grid. The CAISO also documents consideration of such
technologies in its annual Transmission Plan. This has been the practice in
CAISO for several years and was recently memorialized in the CAISO’s tariff in
compliance with FERC Order Nos. 2023 and 1920 (pending FERC approval).51
To respond to the Order and the large load interconnection context specifically,
the CAISO proposes to clarify these considerations through consistent language
in the CAISO tariff, which the CAISO expects the PTOs will similarly include in
49
Id. at P 62.
50
See proposed Section 25.7 of the CAISO tariff; Section 3.7 of Appendix KK to the CAISO
tariff.
51
See, e.g., Section 6.2 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.
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their tariffs.52 The CAISO will continue to set out the alternatives that were
considered in the selection of all preferred transmission solutions, whether ATTs
or other more conventional solutions, to the reasonable depth necessary given
the nature of the transmission need. This approach has worked well in the
generator interconnection study process, enabling the consideration and use of
ATTs without slowing down studies.
With regard to the Commission’s ATTs-related modeling concerns, the
CAISO coordinates annually with the transmission owners during the
transmission planning process on the feasibility of ATTs, particularly evaluating
the application of advanced conductors and flow control devices. The CAISO
also expects that both the CAISO and the PTOs will be advancing their EMT-
related studies, and expects that the PTO tariffs will address the timely provision
of EMT models in the large load application process.
4.
Operational Requirements
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO and PTO
tariffs appear to be unjust and unreasonable because they lack provisions
addressing ongoing operational requirements for eligible customers taking
transmission service on behalf of large loads.53 The Commission enumerated
specific examples, including the lack of provisions governing hourly forecasts,
telemetry data, and equipment to enable the CAISO to monitor large loads.54 The
Commission also suggested the CAISO should impose requirements to remotely
disconnect large loads when necessary to maintain reliability; ramp rate or ride-
through requirements; and control technologies and/or protection systems that
may be necessary to limit withdrawals from the transmission system.55
The CAISO agrees that the operational requirements the Commission
identifies in the Order are necessary. The CAISO has been exploring these
issues through discussions with PTO representatives in the LLTRWG, CPUC
workshops, an industry Expert Working Group (EWG), and through engagement
with NERC. The LLTRWG was established by the CAISO and utilities
interconnecting large loads to develop consistent technical requirements for the
reliable interconnection and operation of large data center loads connected to the
CAISO controlled grid. The EWG was likewise formed to gain collaborative
feedback from diverse industry representatives focused on developing a
52
Proposed Sections 24.1 and 24.3.1 of the CAISO tariff. For co-located generating units
and large loads, the CAISO and PTOs are already obligated to evaluate ATTs/GETs by Section
6.2 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.
53
Order to Show Cause at P 63.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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coordination framework and functional model that advances opportunities in
Transmission and Distribution coordination, including large loads, while
maintaining current roles and responsibilities. As detailed at length in the
LLTRWG proposal, the LLTRWG developed its operational requirements after
broadly surveying operational requirements developed by other utilities with large
loads.56 This process ensures that the CAISO’s operational requirements will be
consistent with national requirements, and thus easier and less expensive to
implement for developers. The CAISO also put its proposed operational
requirements to stakeholders in the general large load initiative, where
stakeholders supported the proposals.
To maintain reliability, the CAISO proposes several new requirements
regarding large loads. Because many large loads may not be directly subject to
the CAISO tariff,57 the CAISO’s proposed requirements place the onus of
responsibility on the PTOs and LSEs.
Prior to the interconnection of any large load to the CAISO controlled grid,
the CAISO proposes to require the PTO to provide the CAISO with the following
information for the large load: Load type, variable or flat load designation,
expected hourly operating profile, points of interconnection and withdrawal, MW
capacity, minimum and maximum operating levels, expected CAISO market
participation model (if any), curtailment and ramping capabilities, and behind-the-
meter generation capacity and characteristics (if any).58 This will provide the
CAISO with the necessary information to assess any operational impact before
energization. The CAISO also proposes to require the PTO to ensure the large
load has continuous dynamic disturbance recording data and storage on the
high-side of the main power transformer or common point of connection to
determine the following electrical quantities for the large load: (1) Phase-to-
neutral voltage for each phase, (2) each phase current and the residual or neutral
current, (3) real power and reactive power flows expressed on a three-phase
basis corresponding to all circuits where current measurements are required; and
(4) frequency.59 This requirement will ensure adequate reliability data for each
large load. The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to ensure it can
56
Included as Attachment D to this filing, and available at
https://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-
loads-el26-71.pdf.
57
In other words, many large loads may interconnect subject to a PTO tariff alone. As such,
the CAISO may not always have contractual privity to subject large loads to its requirements or
enforce reliability provisions. As such, the CAISO’s compliance obligations are directed toward
the PTOs and LSEs already subject (or unavoidably subject) to the CAISO tariff. They can then
enforce the CAISO tariff requirements through their tariffs, agreements, or procedures.
58
Proposed Section 25.7.1 of the CAISO tariff.
59
Id.
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disconnect or otherwise isolate the large load in the event of a contingency,
imminent, or actual system emergency, to maintain system reliability.60
The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to impose ride-through
requirements for large loads to remain electrically connected during certain
frequency61 and voltage disturbances.62 Similar to generating facility
requirements,63 these rules provide the severity and length of disturbance in
which a large load may or may not trip. All requirements were based on the work
by NERC, regional entities, and utilities facing large load disturbances.64 The
CAISO also has included a general tariff provision stating that a load shedding
program or remedial action scheme directed or required by the CAISO or PTO
takes precedence over these ride-through requirements.65 This provision avoids
any ambiguity over potentially conflicting ride-through/trip directions.
The CAISO also proposes to require each PTO to impose ramp-rate
limitations in active power consumption during normal operation, start-up,
shutdown, and restoration processes.66 The average active power ramp rate,
measured at the point of interconnection over a rolling ten (10)-minute interval,
should not exceed twenty (20) megawatts per minute (MW/min), applying to both
increases and decreases in active power consumption. This ramp-rate limitation
does not apply to the immediate post-disturbance recovery of active power
consumption following a system fault or voltage disturbance. The PTO also will
require each large load to restore its active power consumption following a
system fault or voltage disturbance to at least 90 percent of its pre-disturbance
active power consumption within three seconds after the post-fault voltage at the
point of interconnection recovers to at least 0.90 pu.67 Additionally, the CAISO
has included a general requirement that after a disturbance or other reliability
event involving a large load, the large load, any associated interconnection
customer, scheduling coordinator, and PTO must comply with any CAISO,
regional entity (i.e., WECC), or Reliability Coordinator data request related to the
event.68 This is already the case today, but the CAISO believes a specific tariff
60
Id.
61
Proposed Section 25.7.1.1 of the CAISO tariff.
62
Proposed Section 25.7.1.2 of the CAISO tariff.
63
Attachment H to Appendix LL to the CAISO tariff.
64
See Attachment D to this filing.
65
This would include programs or remedial action schemes designed to facilitate FILI as
well.
66
Proposed Section 25.7.1.4 of the CAISO tariff.
67
Proposed Section 25.7.1.3 of the CAISO tariff.
68
Proposed Section 25.7.4 of the CAISO tariff.
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provision for large loads provides greater transparency. This transparency will
ensure parties involved in a reliability event continue to provide data to help
understand the event and prevent future issues.
The CAISO’s remaining operational requirements apply to the scheduling
coordinator representing the large load’s demand. For each large load, the
scheduling coordinator must provide the CAISO:
1. Daily and hourly forecast data otherwise required for the CAISO demand
forecast;
2. Any real-time, material deviations from provided forecasts, including
changes resulting from energization activities, material operational
changes, curtailments, outages, derates, operating limits, operating
envelopes, or co-located generation impacts that materially affect
expected demand;
3. The forecasts are expected to reflect the resource’s anticipated operating
capability, including planned outages or derates that materially affect the
large load’s expected consumption or operating capability; and
4. Operational status and real-time consumption in accordance with the
CAISO’s standards for direct telemetry and consistent with CAISO
telemetry requirements.69
These data requirements will ensure the CAISO has day-ahead and real-time
information sufficient to manage reliability risks from large load demand swings.
For those not participating through a market model, demand forecasting and
settlement will remain at the LSE level, and the CAISO will have specific data
inputs to understand the behavior of those large loads that could impact
reliability.
Based on stakeholder feedback, the CAISO believes most large loads will
elect not to participate directly in the CAISO markets, and will simply be
represented by their LSE like conventional loads today. Nevertheless, the CAISO
proposes to include tariff language stating that large loads may elect to
participate in the CAISO markets directly, including as stand-alone loads or in
aggregation with other resources.70 Large loads also may elect to participate as
their own LSE, a non-generator resource, or a participating load, if they qualify
for those models under CAISO tariff and local regulatory authority
69
Proposed Section 25.7.3 of the CAISO tariff. The CAISO notes that its telemetry
requirements are tailored to coordinate with local regulatory authority standards and nationally
available telemetry technologies.
70
Proposed Section 25.7.3.1 of the CAISO tariff.
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requirements.71 Such large loads could then elect to comply with the CAISO tariff
operational requirements and participate in the CAISO markets through their own
scheduling coordinator in lieu of their LSE scheduling coordinator. However, the
CAISO has included a qualification that any such direct participation must be
consistent with local regulatory authority requirements.72
Additionally, the CAISO proposes to include a qualification that the
applicable LSE, utility distribution company, MSS operator, large load, and
scheduling coordinator may satisfy the operational requirements through
coordinated arrangements that clearly assign each CAISO tariff obligation and
avoid duplicative submissions.73 The applicable arrangement must identify the
scheduling coordinator responsible for submitting bids, scheduled demand, meter
data, forecasts, and real-time operational updates for the large load. The CAISO
also must verify the arrangement will comply with the tariff before its use. This
provision recognizes that these are novel operational requirements, and
developers have varying needs based on their configuration and location. It is in
everyone’s interest for the CAISO to provide flexibility to enable large loads and
their counterparts to identify the best compliance practices. As such, the CAISO
believes this tariff provision will provide significant value without sacrificing
reliability.
5.
Large Load Service Agreements
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO and PTO
tariffs lack pro forma provisions in a transmission service agreement, or other
applicable agreement, to memorialize the technical and operational terms the
Order describes.74
The PTOs will propose consistent pro forma agreements to memorialize
the technical and operational terms the Order describes. At this time, the CAISO
and stakeholders do not believe the CAISO should always be a signatory to a
three-party agreement for large load interconnections, especially where the large
71
In other words, this provision would not operate to make a large load an LSE or
participating load unless the large load meets the tariff definition and requirements for those
entities. This provision is intended to encompass rare cases where certain loads participate
directly in the CAISO markets. The CAISO also notes that although a large load also could
participate in a demand response program, it would still require an LSE to account for its general
demand (in addition to demand response provider managing the demand response participation).
72
For example, the CAISO tariff requires the State or local regulatory authority to allow any
end user to be an LSE or a Participating Load. See “Load Serving Entity,” Appendix A to the
CAISO tariff; Appendix B.4 of the CAISO tariff.
73
Proposed Section 25.7.3 of the CAISO tariff.
74
Order to Show Cause at P 64.
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load is not taking FILI service or participating in the CAISO markets.75 The large
load developer and PTO can negotiate the terms of construction and cost rules,
while the CAISO would not require any rights or obligations. Rather, such
arrangements will be effectuated through a two-party interconnection agreement
between the PTO and the large load developer, as performed today.76 For a
large load requesting FILI service, the PTO will need the CAISO to help
memorialize and agree to the operational procedures necessary to provide that
service through new service agreements or having the CAISO co-sign the PTO’s
interconnection agreement.
For co-located large loads with exporting generation, likewise, the CAISO
will need to be a party to a pro forma agreement that bridges the pro forma Large
Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) with the pro forma large load
interconnection agreement or negotiate a non-conforming LGIA to account for
certain details of the co-located large load interconnection on an individual basis.
The developer also will need to execute a CAISO pro forma Participating
Generator Agreement for the generator, but not a Participating Load Agreement
for the large load.77
B.
Cost Shifting Risk among Transmission Customers
1.
Cost Allocation Rules and Agreements
In the Order, the Commission laid out key objectives regarding cost
allocation of infrastructure needs attributable to eligible customers taking
transmission service on behalf of large loads: improved transparency regarding
the assignment of network upgrades and their associated costs; and
development of a pro forma cost recovery agreement between the CAISO, the
relevant PTO, and the eligible customer taking transmission service on behalf of
large loads. The Commission stated that improved transparency would provide
important information to State public utility commissions and other State
regulators, enabling them to identify which transmission costs are caused by
which transmission customers to appropriately sub-allocate costs at the retail
level. According to the Commission, a pro forma cost recovery agreement would
ensure that eligible customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for the
costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of network
upgrades.
75
For example, the CAISO likely will not have any roles or responsibilities for the financing
and construction of simple network upgrades needed for large loads receiving firm
interconnection service.
76
The CAISO describes the elements required for a three-party agreement for FILI in
Section III.D, below.
77
Unless it will participate as a Participating Load, in which case it would. See Proposed
Section 4.19 of the CAISO tariff.
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The CAISO shares the objectives of the Order to prevent cost shifting
among transmission customers and to ensure that large loads equitably bear risk
and responsibility for costs incurred to interconnect, including the cost of network
upgrades attributed to the large loads. The CAISO understands the importance
of maintaining affordability while addressing large load integration. The CAISO
expects that in addressing cost shifting concerns, the PTOs will address the
collateral issues regarding financial security, revenue stability, and adequate exit
provisions for large loads. As explained in Section II.B.3, above, the CAISO
believes it is prudent for cost allocation rules to be set forth in the PTO tariffs
rather than the CAISO tariff. The PTOs will continue to manage large load
interconnections through their tariffs. Many of the PTOs also have a direct
relationship with their retail ratepayers and the regulators of those ultimate rates,
including the CPUC. Additionally, it is the PTOs that will construct and own the
network upgrades if required for the large load interconnection. As such, the
CAISO does not propose to issue a new “top-down” cost allocation solution
through its own tariff. The CAISO believes that the PTOs may develop their own
proposals to address any cost shifting, and that the current transmission revenue
requirement and credit mechanisms in the transmission access charges can
accommodate those proposals.78 The CAISO proposes some metering and
settlement changes in Section III.C.2 to account for co-located large loads and
generation.
2.
Data Transparency
In the Order, the Commission highlighted the need for “the provision of
data on CAISO’s website in a single location, and in an easily accessible format
that is searchable and allows users to filter the data, on transmission service
provided to eligible customers on behalf of large loads, for network upgrades
evaluated in the local transmission planning process that are needed to
accommodate transmission service to eligible customers on behalf of those large
loads, and the costs for those network upgrades.”79
The CAISO agrees that cost data should be transparent and can be
provided on the CAISO website in a searchable format. This is important both to
aid large load developers in making efficient siting decisions as well as to provide
information critical for State regulators to ensure fair cost allocation at the retail
level. For large load developers, the CAISO notes that for the interconnection
study process, the CAISO already provides each PTO’s per unit cost guide for all
78
The CAISO notes that the orders to show cause represent largely novel issues: There is
little case law to guide what constitutes just and reasonable rates for large loads specifically.
Such precedent will likely come from these responses to the Orders to Show Cause, offering
greater guidance for future enhancements.
79
Order to Show Cause at P 46.
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network upgrade cost components.80 These guides are updated and shared with
stakeholders annually based on the latest industry cost estimates. As such, the
CAISO believes its tariff provides detailed, transparent, up-to-date cost
information on potential costs for transmission network upgrades.
For State regulators and stakeholders, per the Commission’s direction,81
the CAISO also proposes to clarify in the transmission planning process where
network upgrades were needed to accommodate both general load growth and
large load interconnection specifically. Large load growth has already been
incorporated into the CEC, CPUC, and CAISO forecasting and planning
processes, as detailed in the CAISO’s informational report on resource
sufficiency already submitted to the Commission.82 The CAISO also proposes to
publicly post:83
1. Aggregate amounts of proposed large load additions in the CAISO
operating area, including the aggregate amounts in each transmission
pricing zone;
2. Planned network upgrades needed to accommodate eligible customers
taking transmission service on behalf of large loads, identified by type of
equipment and network upgrade (e.g., new substation, reconductoring, a
new high-voltage transmission line) for each transmission service request;
and
3. Cost estimates for each planned network upgrade identified as needed for
large loads, as described in (2).84
The CAISO proposes to memorialize these transparency requirements in its
tariff. The CAISO also has encouraged the PTOs to memorialize tariff
requirements to adopt large load queue spreadsheets as they do for wholesale
generator interconnection customers. The CAISO likewise proposes to include in
its generator interconnection queue report whether the interconnection customer
proposes to include a large load, and its capacity.85
80
See CAISO current cost guides at https://www.caiso.com/library/current-cost-guides.
81
Order to Show Cause at PP 70-72.
82
See CAISO Informational Report on resource sufficiency at
https://www.caiso.com/documents/jul-20-2026-informational-report-large-loads-and-co-located-
loads-el26-71.pdf.
83
Proposed Sections 24.3.1 and 24.19.1 of the CAISO tariff, and proposed Section 3.6 of
Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.
84
Order to Show Cause at P 75.
85
See CAISO Generator interconnection at https://www.caiso.com/generation-
transmission/generation/generator-interconnection.
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C.
Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind the Meter
Generation
1.
Co-located Interconnection Studies
The Commission stated in the Order that the CAISO’s tariff does not
contain provisions addressing with sufficient clarity and consistency the rates,
terms, and conditions of service that apply to interconnection customers serving
co-located load.86 The Commission included, “the scope of the analyses CAISO
performs as part of its existing study process to evaluate the impacts of co-
location arrangements, which may need to account for any potential dynamic
impacts of co-located load and any potential impacts of requests to modify an
existing generating facility’s interconnection service level to serve co-located load
on transmission system reliability.”87 The Commission noted that in one of its
recent orders on co-located load in the PJM Interconnection (PJM), it found that it
was necessary to clarify that interconnection customers seeking to use new
generating facilities to serve co-located load may: (1) request interconnection
service at a level below the generating facility’s maximum facility output; (2) use
existing procedures to accelerate interconnection requests that satisfy certain
tariff criteria; and (3) request provisional interconnection service and surplus
interconnection service.88 The Commission additionally noted that
interconnection customers should have a means of knowing the appropriate
mechanism for setting forth the terms and conditions of co-location
arrangements. The Commission also expressed concern that “without an Eligible
Customer designated to take transmission service on behalf of a co-located load,
there is no mechanism for CAISO to address situations in which a co-located
load withdraws energy from the transmission system.”89
86
Order to Show Cause at P 93. The Order to Show Cause did not require, and the CAISO
does not believe it is necessary, that the CAISO create formal tariff definitions for co-located load
or behind-the-meter generation. Both terms already have plain meanings, and behind-the-meter
is already used frequently throughout the CAISO tariff, including for different configurations based
on whether the meter is a CAISO meter or a retail end-user meter. Thus, providing a definition
may have inadvertent consequences to the extent it differs in any meaningful respect from the
use of these terms currently. Likewise, the CAISO, PTOs, and developers have not experienced
controversy in determining co-location or what constitutes a single site under FERC precedent
and State law. The CAISO is thus concerned that trying to create formal definitions at this time
may result in false positives or negatives that impair rather than aid development. The CAISO
may revisit this issue if controversies arise, or may provide clarifications in its business practice
manuals.
87
Id. at P 96.
88
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 231-235 (2025) (PJM Co-
Location Order). PJM’s compliance filing proposing revisions in response to these directives was
accepted in part on April 16, 2026. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2026).
89
Order to Show Cause at P 96.
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Drawing on its track record for co-located generating technologies, the
CAISO proposes to clarify how co-located large loads and generation may
interconnect to and operate within the CAISO controlled grid.90 Co-location
frequently can result in significant operational flexibility, avoided infrastructure,
and reliability benefits. At the same time, physical proximity between load and
generation does not guarantee reduced transmission requirements or resource
adequacy obligations: The actual benefits depend on the operating
characteristics of both resources, their ability to operate independently, and their
behavior during contingencies. The CAISO and PTOs thus must draw on their
significant experience with co-located and behind-the-meter configurations to
help large load developers maximize efficiencies for them and for ratepayers.
The CAISO proposes to clarify in its tariff co-location arrangements that
would not require a CAISO resource interconnection request and could be
accommodated through applicable PTO or State-jurisdictional retail
interconnection tariffs,91 such as Rule 21.92 These will include large loads with
back-up generation only to be used during outages or islanding, and large loads
with non-exporting behind-the-meter generation.93 The CAISO notes that both
categories will require sufficient control technologies to ensure they do not impact
the transmission grid.94
The CAISO proposes that new or existing large loads seeking to co-locate
with new generation that may export energy to the transmission grid95 will require
a CAISO interconnection study under the CAISO’s Resource Interconnection
90
Proposed Sections 25.1, 25.1.1, 25.5.1, 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; Proposed Sections
2.4.4 and 6.7.2.9 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.
91
The CAISO reiterates that the PTOs will continue to govern and study all load
interconnection requests pursuant to their tariffs. The CAISO, likewise, will continue to govern
and study wholesale generation interconnection requests.
92
See, e.g., CPUC’s Electric Rule 21: Generating Facility Interconnections,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Rule21/. Other local regulatory authorities and utilities have established
similar interconnection procedures for back-up, non-injecting, and net metering configurations.
93
Proposed Sections 25.1 and 25.1.1 of the CAISO tariff. The sequencing likewise will not
impact whether a CAISO interconnection study is required.
94
The CAISO notes that the CAISO’s proposal is fundamentally different than MISO’s Zero
Injection Generation Resource, at issue in Docket No. ER26-3552. The CAISO’s proposed tariff
language merely reflects the status quo in California and western States, long in practice between
local regulatory authorities and CAISO. The CAISO already has thousands of megawatts of
generation allowed to interconnect without CAISO study because there is no impact to the CAISO
controlled grid, including generation co-located with large loads on the transmission system. More
critically, the CAISO requirements only bypass a CAISO interconnection study where there is
truly no impact, rather than a netting construct that could ignore short-circuit duty and other
reliability impacts.
95
Frequently, constantly, or even rarely, such as in the event the Large Load is offline.
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Standards, Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.96 This means that such resource
interconnection requests will be screened and compete for capacity in the next
cluster study based on the CAISO’s scoring criteria.97 However, all scoring,
financial requirements, and study results will be based on the requested capacity
figures the developer provides, so the developer may significantly limit the
generation potentially to be exported based on how much generation will serve
the large load.98 The CAISO tariff will require it to work with the PTOs to produce
study results that reflect the combined impact of the co-located large load and
generation, as requested by the developer. This is a simple extension of current
rules that allow interconnection customers to be studied for a specific
interconnection capacity even if their generating capacity is higher.
Interconnection requests with co-located large loads may avail themselves of all
rights under the Resource Interconnection Standards, including surplus
interconnection service, grid enhancing technologies, phasing, etc. Rather than
add “and Large Load” throughout the CAISO generator interconnection
procedures and agreements, the CAISO proposes general provisions enabling
large load studies to be considered in every step of the interconnection process,
and that all study results will account for the combined operation of the
generating units and large loads.99 Interconnection customers for generating
units and co-located large loads will be subject to all applicable commercial
readiness and GIA deposit requirements.100 Because their costs generally result
from network upgrade and interconnection facility costs, which will be based on
the combined facility configuration, all required deposits will be fair and equitable
under Order No. 2023.
Because it may be difficult to predict every possible issue with future load
studies conducted by the PTO and generator studies conducted by the CAISO,
the CAISO proposes to include general conflict provisions stating that (1) for any
conflict between the CAISO tariff and the PTO tariff pertaining to the
interconnection of the generating unit, the CAISO tariff will control; and (2) for
any conflict between the CAISO tariff and the PTO tariff pertaining to the
96
Proposed Sections 25.1, 25.1.1, 25.5.1, 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; Proposed Sections
2.4.4 and 6.7.2.9 of Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.
97
As Energy Only or Deliverable. Energy Only interconnection customers not seeking
reimbursement for network upgrades are not screened and proceed directly to the cluster study.
98
This is already the status quo per Section 3.1 and Attachment 1 (4.h) of Appendix KK to
the CAISO tariff. The CAISO always has allowed interconnection customers to request to be
studied for less interconnection service capacity and/or deliverability than generating capacity,
and all scoring is calculated on the requested interconnection service capacity or requested
deliverability, as applicable.
99
Proposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff; proposed Sections 2.4.4 and 3.1 of
Appendix KK to the CAISO tariff.
100
Proposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff.
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interconnection of the large load, the PTO tariff will control.101 This provision will
provide transparency to developers and may help resolve future issues should
they arise.
The CAISO notes that despite the ubiquity of co-located resources in
California, the CAISO has not received any interconnection requests for co-
located load with CAISO-participating generation. This is in part because the
CAISO is in a different situation than other regions that needed to impose bring-
your-own generation requirements to address capacity market issues. Because
the CAISO does not have a bring-your-own generation requirement, developers
have been less interested in co-locating load with participating generation.
Additionally, to the extent large loads have brought generation to serve onsite
load, they have elected to do so through tariffs for net energy metering, obviating
the need for a CAISO interconnection request. However, developers may want to
co-locate load with participating generation in the future. Stakeholders expressed
that in California, adding load to existing wholesale generators may be an ideal
path to cost savings and utilizing plants that are dispatched infrequently or
approaching retirement. As such, the CAISO’s tariff revisions document
developers’ ability to add load to existing generator sites, and that they may
maintain all interconnection rights so long as they continue to comply with the
CAISO tariff obligations.102 Specifically, the CAISO proposes to clarify that the
addition of a co-located load or large load will not necessarily affect the qualifying
capacity, net qualifying capacity, deliverability status, or eligibility to provide
energy, ancillary services, or resource adequacy capacity of a generating unit.
Any effect of adding a co-located load will be determined under the otherwise
applicable CAISO tariff provisions for those rights, modification results, and local
regulatory authority requirements.103
In addition to the information required in the CAISO resource
interconnection request process, and the large load operational requirements
discussed in Section III.A.4, the CAISO may require the following operational
information for co-located resources, if applicable:
• Expected presence of co-located load;
• Range of energy consumption characteristics of the load;
• Minimum and maximum generator operating capabilities;
• Generator operating characteristics when the load is at its minimum level;
• Market participation status, if any; and
101
Proposed Section 25.7.6 of the CAISO tariff and proposed Section 2.4.4 of Appendix KK
to the CAISO tariff.
102
Proposed Sections 25.5.1 of the CAISO tariff.
103
The CAISO believes this is an important clarification because local regulatory authorities
generally set resource adequacy capacity and emissions rules, among others.
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• Any load services requested when the generator is off-line.104
For co-located large loads and wholesale energy storage, the CAISO
notes that the storage and large loads will need to be separate operationally, and
all study results will reflect the same.105 Energy storage resources are fully
dispatchable and have separate wholesale meters and settlement. Their energy
cannot be commingled with the large load such that the large load could take
power effectively at a wholesale rate. The large load can otherwise net its
withdrawals against behind-the-meter/non-participating generation and
storage.106
The CAISO also proposes to require co-located load and exporting
generation studies to begin the cluster study process with the large load
assumptions. The CAISO also proposes to allow interconnection customers to
request to modify or remove large loads during the study process, and for the
PTOs and the CAISO to evaluate whether the requested change is a material
modification. (The removal or modification to the large load would be under the
PTO tariff.) In other words, after the commencement of the cluster study, the
interconnection customer may request to remove the large load as a
modification, and the CAISO and PTOs will evaluate whether the requested
change can be accommodated. Likewise, interconnection customers already in
the queue can request to add large loads as modifications, subject to PTO and
CAISO evaluation, including through downsizing requests as necessary. The
CAISO and PTO will assess whether either change would require complete re-
studies and could not be accommodated during the study process, or if the
requested modifications are material. This is not to say that the CAISO proposes
to prohibit the addition of large loads to existing generation or in-progress
interconnection requests; only that the interconnection customer would need to
do so through the PTO tariff, and the generation interconnection study results
may not be able to reflect the combined configuration if changed substantially
well after studies commence (similar to any other modification request).
If an online CAISO generator seeks to add a large load to its site, the
developer would submit the large load interconnection request to the PTO
pursuant to its tariff. When ready to reflect the large load, the interconnection
customer could request a post-commercial operation date (COD) modification107
or use the Master File change process as needed to assess and capture
104
Proposed Section 25.7.1 of the CAISO tariff.
105
Proposed Section 25.7.5 of the CAISO tariff.
106
In other words, the CAISO does not propose any change to the status quo for separating
wholesale generation/storage and retail load or net energy metering generation/storage.
107
Section 25.5 of the CAISO tariff.
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changes currently allowed under these processes.108 The CAISO, PTO, and
interconnection customer could likewise amend the generator interconnection
agreement to reflect the large load and any configuration changes.
The CAISO notes that both loads and generation associated with co-
located loads can be eligible for resource adequacy or demand response
programs pursuant to current program rules.109 Therefore, the CAISO does not
propose changes to the eligibility criteria for participation in any of these
programs.
2.
Cost Allocation for Co-located Loads
In the Order, the Commission stated that the CAISO tariff does not appear
to include a mechanism to charge large loads, and co-located loads in particular,
for ancillary services commensurate with their use of such services, particularly if
such customers do not withdraw energy from the transmission system.110
Specifically, the Commission noted that co-located loads may unjustly benefit
from regulation and black start services.111
The CAISO agrees that assessing ancillary service costs on a net $/MWh
basis to LSEs’ measured demand could enable a large load co-located with
behind-the-meter generation to avoid an appropriate share of its costs for
regulation and black start services.112 Unlike some other ISO/RTOs, however,
the CAISO already has separate, specific rates to assess regulation113 and black
start services.114 The issue thus becomes how to appropriately meter and assess
those rates onto co-located large loads. The CAISO proposes to address this
issue by requiring the PTOs to sub-meter each co-located large load
108
See CAISO Master File at https://www.caiso.com/systems-applications/portals-
applications/master-file.
109
Section 40 of the CAISO tariff establishes rules about eligible capacity and uses criteria
provided by the CPUC and other Local Regulatory Authorities determine what projects are
resource adequacy eligible.
110
Order to Show Cause at PP 98-99 (“As noted in the PJM Co-Location Order, this
introduces the risk that costs may be allocated entirely to other transmission customers and
passed through to residential customers, among others”).
111
Id.
112
Likewise, if the rate were assessed on a net meter basis to co-located load and
participating generation, the result would be the same.
113
Section 11.10.2.1 of the CAISO tariff.
114
Section 11.4.2 of the CAISO tariff. The PTOs assess the costs of black start services
through their PTO tariffs.
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independent of any onsite generation.115 Scheduling coordinators for the load-
serving entities serving those loads will then be required to report those meter
values separately for the relevant CAISO charge codes. Going forward, the rates’
calculations will include all separately submitted gross volumes for the large
loads. Each large load with co-located generation will pay on a gross load basis
for regulation and black start services.116 This solution not only results in just and
reasonable cost allocation, it is also relatively simple to implement because the
CAISO and PTOs will not be required to calculate and assess new rates, nor will
the CAISO need to create new settlement charge codes.
3.
Transmission Access Charges
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO tariff may
be unjust and unreasonable because it allows load with behind-the-meter
generation to net its generation against its load for purposes of calculating
Regional Access Charges.117 The Commission explained its thinking based on
the PJM co-location proceeding:
In the PJM Co-Location Order, the Commission found that PJM’s
BTMG rules, which allowed load-serving entities that provide
service to loads with qualifying BTMG to reduce their costs by
netting output from BTMG in the calculation of their peak demand
for the purpose of determining NITS charges, were unjust and
unreasonable. The Commission concluded that PJM’s BTMG rules
were no longer consistent with cost causation principles because
large loads configured in a BTMG arrangement with significant
generation will raise cost shifting concerns compared to loads
pursuing smaller amounts of netting. The Commission also found
that such rules could lead to reliability and resource adequacy risks
because PJM is obligated to serve transmission customers using
BTMG but does not consider such customers in transmission and
resource adequacy planning.118
The Commission then noted that it is “similarly concerned that CAISO’s Tariff
allows Eligible Customers that provide service to loads with BTMG to reduce
115
Proposed Section 11.36 of the CAISO tariff.
116
Pursuant to the CAISO tariff, the CAISO assesses reliability services costs—the
settlement charge for black start costs—to the PTOs, who then allocate those costs to their
customers. The CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions thus create specific sub-allocations earmarked
for large loads, based on their gross load.
117
Order to Show Cause at P 102.
118
Id.
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their network service charges because the definition of gross load,119 which is
used to calculate the Regional Access Charge, excludes load of a retail customer
served by its own onsite generating unit or energy storage device.” The
Commission directed the CAISO to explain whether the tariff remains just and
reasonable even though it allows netting of behind-the-meter generation from
gross load for purposes of determining Regional Access Charges for loads with
behind-the-meter generation, or to propose tariff revisions. The Commission also
stated that the CAISO may explain why the CAISO believes it remains just and
reasonable for network customers that fall below a new megawatt materiality
threshold for the amount of load at a particular electrical location to net using
behind-the-meter generation.120
The CAISO believes that its current transmission access charge structure
is just and reasonable. Respectfully, the concerns underlying the Commission’s
findings in the PJM proceeding do not translate to the CAISO. The CAISO and
PJM have very different forward capacity, resource adequacy, and transmission
service constructs. Moreover, behind-the-meter generation is far more abundant
in California, so the CAISO and California policymakers have considered this
issue more extensively than other regions. For example, in 2020, the
Commission approved the CAISO’s proposal to amend its definition of Gross
Load—the billing determinant for transmission access charges—to include load
served by excess behind-the-meter production, i.e., behind-the-meter energy that
exceeds the onsite load. The CAISO amended this policy to ensure uniform
settlement practices, and to ensure load-serving entities were allocated the
correct costs of their use of the transmission system, which includes use by
excess behind-the-meter generation. The CAISO did not propose to assess
transmission access charges based on gross load figures that included load
served onsite by its own behind-the-meter generation. Neither the CAISO nor
stakeholders in 2020 believed such loads use the transmission grid in proportion
to those load figures. To the contrary, a benefit of rooftop solar, onsite storage,
and other behind-the-meter generation is to reduce the use of the grid and the
generation delivered across it. The CAISO does not believe this rationale has
119
Appendix A to the CAISO tariff defines Gross Load as “Demand (adjusted for distribution
losses) of End-Use Customer Loads directly connected to the transmission facilities or directly
connected to the Distribution System of a Utility Distribution Company or MSS Operator located in
a PTO Service Territory, or End Use Customer Loads directly connected to the Distribution
System or transmission facilities of an EDAM Transmission Service Provider in an EDAM Entity
Balancing Authority Area. Gross Load includes Load served by Excess Behind the Meter
Production. Excess Behind the Meter Production shall not be netted against End-Use Customer
Load in determining Gross Load.” The definition also provides a list of certain loads excluded,
including “Load of an individual retail customer served by its own onsite Generating Unit or
energy storage device, or as authorized by Section 218 of the California Public Utilities Code;”
and “Onsite Load served by a qualifying small power production facility or qualifying cogeneration
facility, as those terms are defined in the FERC's regulations implementing Section 201 of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.”
120
Order to Show Cause at P 102.
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changed in light of large loads. Although a customer with behind-the-meter
generation may still depend on transmission capacity and reliability services if its
generation is unavailable, the CAISO and LSEs reflect those costs through the
reliability services charges described above, and through stand-by service rates
assessed by the LSEs. Assessing transmission access charges without reflecting
behind-the-meter generation also could lessen the incentives to avoid using and
building out the transmission grid in the first place.
Perhaps more critically, the CAISO’s transmission access charges are
fundamentally different from the PJM transmission charges that concerned the
Commission. PJM calculates and assesses its transmission charges based on
certain peak demand figures. A large load with behind-the-meter generation
could mask all of its transmission usage simply by producing generation equal to
its demand during that peak period. In contrast, the CAISO assesses its
transmission access charges 24/7/365 to each utility based on its gross load,
which consists of total end-user demand accounting for losses and excess
behind-the-meter production. As such, the CAISO will allocate costs to each
large load with behind-the-meter generation to the extent the large load uses the
transmission system, as reflected by its metered load. In other words, any energy
withdrawal by the large load will be reflected in the gross load. The LSE can then
easily pass down the costs of that use in the retail bill, just as the millions of
Western residents with rooftop solar or battery storage are billed today. Thus, the
CAISO does not believe that changes to its tariff are needed to address concerns
raised by the Commission in the Order.
D.
Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers
Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads
In the Order, the Commission preliminarily found that the CAISO tariff may
be unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services
that reflect eligible customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible
large loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system
under certain conditions, suggesting that “firm use” is essentially the only type of
transmission service available in the CAISO. The Commission encouraged new
transmission services be made available to reflect the operational reality that
large loads may use the transmission system to differing extents and certain
large loads are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under
certain conditions.121 At the same time, the Commission stated, “In the
alternative, CAISO may explain whether, given that CAISO does not offer the
transmission services required by Order No. 888, CAISO’s existing transmission
service framework addresses the concerns described herein, or explain what
specific changes to its existing transmission service framework would effectively
provide the same range of transmission service options for flexible large loads as
121
Id. at P 104.
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in the PJM Co-Location Order.”122 The Commission then explained that the
customer “must have necessary control technologies and/or protection systems,
which may include a special protection scheme, to limit its energy withdrawals to
its approved level,” which are typical elements of interconnection service.123
The CAISO proposes to create a new flexible interconnection service
option that will enable large loads and co-located loads to limit their energy
withdrawals or injections until their network upgrades are placed into service. The
CAISO believes this will provide large load developers with the option to
interconnect to the transmission system quickly through enforceable physical and
operational controls. The PTOs will define and implement this interconnection
service offering, and the CAISO will ensure that any flexibility provides greater
reliability to the system. The CAISO does not propose to create new
“transmission services” or more responsibilities around eligible customers, which
would require redesigning transmission and interconnection service entirely. The
CAISO does not believe such a redesign is warranted, and the Commission
expressly invites the CAISO to explain alternative service frameworks that may
enable similar flexibility.124
The CAISO proposes to create a new “Flexible Interim Load
Interconnection” (FILI) service that will enable faster interconnections while
mitigating transmission constraints and will be implemented in close coordination
with the PTOs.125 The proposed FILI offering will enable large loads to
interconnect flexibly and receive service up to a certain level based on grid
conditions and constraints until network upgrades are complete, at which time
the large load will switch over to receiving firm service. This will likely be a
bespoke option for each large load based on its point of interconnection and the
constraints it faces, and will be developed through a contractual agreement with
the PTO. For example, some FILIs may require limited curtailability for a limited
time because there are few, less probable contingencies. Others may require
more because of transmission constraints that require network upgrades with
longer timelines. The FILI option provides flexibility to the PTOs, CAISO, and
122
Id. at P 103.
123
Id. Moreover, in real time, LSEs can schedule demand as needed, including for
customers limiting their use of the transmission system. With the operational data and process
described in Section III.A.4, the CAISO can accommodate flexible loads without creating new
separate classes of transmission service. This will also enable the PTOs to provide bespoke
interconnection configurations for large loads, saving ratepayers from the costs of network
upgrades that conform to specific “transmission services.” The CAISO believes this course of
action is consistent with developers’ desires to interconnect quickly and affordably.
124
Id. at P 101.
125
The CAISO clarifies that this interconnection service offering is not intended to address
supply constraints, which the CAISO does not have at this time, as explained in the CAISO’s 30-
day informational report on resource sufficiency.
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developers to customize solutions. For this reason, the CAISO declines to
propose any kind of temporal or capacity cap on this interconnection service
offering.
FILI may include a number of tools or measures identified by the PTO with
the CAISO’s concurrence. They could include, for example, Remedial Action
Schemes (RAS), enforceable operating requirements, or managing to a preset
schedule.126 The PTO may request automated schemes, such as a RAS, for FILI
that are limited by the transmission overload under N-1-1, with the CAISO and
Reliability Coordinator (RC) concurrence; or the PTO will perform its own load
curtailment for FILI that is limited by transmission overload under N-1-1 after the
first N-1 contingency occurs.
Prior to the energization of the large load, the CAISO, PTO, and large load
or its authorized agent will negotiate and execute an agreement describing the
circumstances in which the large load receiving FILI may be temporarily curtailed
and the mechanism used to perform the curtailment. The CAISO will work closely
with the PTO and large load developer to ensure the compliance obligations for
each party adhere to all operating limits and promote reliability. At a minimum,
the agreement will specify:
a) The circumstances, contingencies, or operating conditions in which
the large load would be curtailed
b) The mechanism used to perform the curtailment
c) The entity responsible for performing the curtailment
d) The notification method, response time, duration, restoration,
testing, and verification requirements
e) The interim operating limits both in and out of curtailable events,
and
f) The network upgrades or interconnection facilities required to
conclude the curtailability requirements.
The CAISO will post these agreements on the CAISO website. The CAISO base
case, full network model, and operating procedures will account for such large
loads as applicable. This will ensure transparency over FILI arrangements,
enabling developers and market participants to understand the offering and any
potential impact. Before energization of large loads, the CAISO will work with the
large load developers and PTOs to test any FILI tools for safety and reliability,
just as the CAISO and PTOs do the same for generator interconnections today.
126
The CAISO and PTOs have had success with preset schedules with energy storage
resources that elect to forgo upgrades and thus may not charge during peak conditions (e.g.,
summer afternoons).
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The CAISO’s proposed FILI framework fulfills the Commission’s central
objective of making meaningful service options available to large loads whose
willingness and ability to limit withdrawals permit earlier, reliable access to the
transmission system, without importing three distinct transmission service
products into the CAISO’s unique market structure. The Order expressly allows
the CAISO to explain how changes within its existing framework can provide
comparable flexibility, rather than requiring it to replicate the service
classifications contemplated for PJM. FILI translates that flexibility into
enforceable interconnection terms: a large load may energize before completion
of required network upgrades, but only within operating limits supported by
system conditions and subject to specified curtailment triggers, control
mechanisms, response times, and verification requirements. Agreements
executed before energization identify those obligations and the facilities
necessary to conclude interim service, while incorporation into the CAISO’s
models and operating procedures makes the customer’s flexibility operationally
usable rather than merely aspirational. Public posting of those agreements also
provides transparency into the conditions governing access. Although FILI is an
interim arrangement rather than a substitute for every feature of the three
contemplated services, it addresses the immediate barrier posed by transmission
construction timelines while preserving reliability and applicable cost-
responsibility requirements. The relevant distinction is therefore not the number
or label of service offerings, but whether the framework enables customers to
obtain earlier service commensurate with their actual, enforceable use of the
grid—the result FILI is designed to achieve.
As described in Section III.F, below, the CAISO plans to develop a
permanent version of FILI in 2027. This would allow large loads to forgo some
identified network upgrades altogether if the large loads were curtailable. The
CAISO recognizes that permanent load flexibility can have significant value even
in a system with adequate aggregate generating capacity. Although the CAISO
believes its tariff is just and reasonable without a permanent option at this time,
the CAISO is committed to exploring the permanent option. The prioritization of
FILI is consistent with stakeholders’ comments, especially from the large load
development community.
E.
Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate
Large Load and Co-Located Load
The Commission preliminarily found in the Order that the CAISO tariff
appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not contain provisions
allowing an interconnection customer to seek the generator interconnection
service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving either: (1) an
electrically proximate large load; or (2) a co-located load, as defined in the Order,
that has a high peak load (i.e., large co-located loads that are 50 MW or
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greater).127 The Commission defined an “electrically proximate large load” as a
large load “sufficiently electrically close to the interconnection customer’s
requested point of interconnection, such that the impact on the transmission
system of the combination of the generating facility and the load, with the
exception of the transmission facilities between the two, will be effectively the
same as if they were located at the same substation (e.g., large load that is
located no more than two substations from the generating facility).”128
The CAISO has committed to examining electrically proximate co-location
in an upcoming stakeholder initiative to determine whether it may have future
value for the CAISO and developers. Stakeholders, especially data center
developers, agreed during the CAISO’s stakeholder process in response to the
Order that electrically proximate co-location is not a near-term priority. The
CAISO thus believes its tariff is just and reasonable at this time without
provisions allowing an interconnection customer to “co-locate” or otherwise be
studied with an electrically proximate large load.
The Commission’s contemplated treatment of electrically proximate
generation and large load addresses a potential benefit of studying their
combined transmission-system effects, but the need for a separate service
pathway must be evaluated against the CAISO’s existing framework. Unlike an
Eastern framework that conditions a large load’s energization on the
development of corresponding generation, the CAISO does not require a large
load customer to bring its own generation or pair its interconnection request with
a particular generating facility. Supply adequacy remains the responsibility of the
LSE under applicable resource adequacy and regulatory requirements, while the
load’s ability to interconnect depends on the applicable studies, available
transmission capability, necessary facilities, and operating requirements.
Accordingly, to the extent an electrically proximate pathway is intended to enable
a customer to satisfy a generation-matching condition or obtain an exception
from such a condition, it solves a problem the CAISO’s framework does not
impose. The CAISO’s near-term reforms instead target the barriers its customers
actually face, including transmission construction timelines, coordinated studies,
and enforceable operating limits that can permit earlier energization.
That distinction does not mean electrically proximate generation and load
can never produce transmission benefits. The Order’s premise—that sufficiently
close generation and load may have combined effects resembling a co-located
arrangement—presents a legitimate study question. It does not, however,
establish that electrical proximity alone eliminates the need to evaluate
intervening facilities, the consequences of a generator outage or a change in
load, or the obligations necessary to make any assumed offset dependable. Nor
127
Order to Show Cause at P 113.
128
Id. at P 112.
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does the absence of a customer-specific generation requirement, standing alone,
resolve the Commission’s concern about recognizing combined system impacts.
The CAISO therefore distinguishes between considering those impacts and
creating an immediate, separate interconnection pathway for paired projects. Its
proposed sequencing allows the CAISO and stakeholders to address the
additional study and operating questions associated with electrically proximate
arrangements without delaying reforms applicable to stand-alone loads and co-
located configurations.
The stakeholder process supports that sequencing rather than a
categorical rejection of electrically proximate arrangements. As the CAISO
explained in its October 22, 2026 Board memorandum, stakeholder feedback led
it to prioritize the more common stand-alone and co-located load and generator
interconnections in this proposal and filing, with electrically proximate
arrangements to follow once the co-location process is underway. The
appropriate conclusion is therefore not that stakeholders oppose innovation or
that developers could derive no benefit from a future pathway, but that the
CAISO identified more immediate priorities for this filing. Preserving electrically
proximate arrangements for subsequent policy development permits further
consideration of their potential benefits and necessary safeguards while
advancing the interconnection, reliability, customer-protection, and flexible
interim service reforms that can be implemented now.
F.
Future Issues
The CAISO remains committed to working with stakeholders, PTOs, and
State energy agencies, to support the reliable integration of large loads. Building
on the reforms in this initiative, the CAISO has identified several areas for
continued stakeholder engagement, including operational and technical
requirements, market participation, flexible interconnection, electrically proximate
loads, cost allocation, and implementation of recent State legislation.
First, the CAISO will continue coordinating with California’s principal
energy agencies, the CPUC and CEC, as well as local regulatory authorities and
other stakeholders, to address statutory requirements arising from recently
enacted large load legislation.129 As the large load landscape continues to
evolve, the CAISO recognizes the need to review existing processes and
develop additional tools to support reliable integration. This includes exploring a
risk-mitigation framework under which local regulatory authorities, load-serving
entities, utility distribution companies, metered subsystems, the PTOs, and the
CAISO could curtail large loads under tight grid conditions before a reliability
event. 130 The CAISO expects to explore this framework through a stakeholder
129
See Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal at pg. 8, included as Attachment C.
130
Id.
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process beginning in early 2027.131 Unlike other markets that have developed
curtailment requirements the Commission has rejected as improper conditions of
retail service,132 the CAISO currently plans to develop curtailment tools the LSE
and local regulatory authority can use pursuant to their jurisdiction.
Second, the CAISO is committed to continuing to work with NERC and
WECC on new reliability requirements for computational loads and other large
loads. The CAISO and PTOs will ensure that their tariffs do not conflict or unduly
overlap with similar reliability standards. All parties must work to ensure
compliance maintains reliability without being unduly burdensome. This work will
complement the CAISO’s ongoing engagement with the PTOs and the LLTRWG.
Third, the CAISO will continue engaging stakeholders on opportunities for
large load market participation, including participation through demand response,
price responsive load, and other market mechanisms. This work will continue in
the CAISO’s ongoing Demand and Distributed Energy Market Integration
(DDEMI) initiative throughout 2027, including EWG efforts on coordination
framework.133 Similarly, while the CAISO is committed to respecting FERC’s
jurisdictional considerations, the CAISO understands that distribution-connected
and non-PTO connected loads can impact the transmission system. Although the
CAISO already considers transmission network upgrades driven by these loads
through the transmission planning process, the CAISO may consider through
DDEMI whether additional measures are appropriate when these loads affect the
transmission system. As additional large loads, including loads co-located with
generation, interconnect to the system, additional resource adequacy or reliability
issues may also emerge. Any necessary modifications to resource adequacy
requirements would be considered through future resource adequacy policy
initiatives at the CAISO and in coordination with local regulatory authorities.134
Fourth, the CAISO will further explore flexible load interconnection –
permanent (FLIP) through a stakeholder initiative that is expected to commence
in 2027.135 If developed and implemented, FLIP would enable large loads to
131
See 2027-2029 ISO Draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap at
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Infrastructure-
Policy-Roadmap-Oct-8%202026.xlsx.
132
PJM Interconnection, 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 at P 77 et seq. (2026).
133
See 2027-2029 California ISO Market Policy Initiatives Roadmap at
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Market-Policy-
Roadmap-Sep-24-2026.xlsx.
134
See Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal at pp.54-55.
135
See 2027-2029 ISO Draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap at
https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/2027-2029-ISO-Draft-Infrastructure-
Policy-Roadmap-Oct-8%202026.xlsx.
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interconnect and avoid the need to fund completion of transmission network
upgrades that would be required for firm load service by accepting terms of
flexible interconnection service in perpetuity. As explained above, large load
developers and stakeholders broadly desired the CAISO to prioritize FILI, and
develop FLIP in 2027.
Finally, stakeholders also stressed the need for the CAISO to prioritize the
more common stand-alone and co-located load and generator interconnections
in the near-term; however, the CAISO is committed to exploring provisions for
interconnection customers to serve electrically proximate loads in a future
stakeholder initiative. The CAISO has included a stakeholder initiative to address
these items on its draft Infrastructure Policy Roadmap and expects to begin
policy development in early 2027.136
These commitments should further demonstrate to the Commission that
the CAISO will continue to innovate interconnection and market efficiencies for
large loads without the need for a Section 206 proceeding.
IV.
Briefing Questions
The CAISO responds to the Order’s briefing questions as follows:
P 123:137 How CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners, in responding
to the order to show cause, should protect existing commercial arrangements
including: (1) what would be a reasonable implementation period to ensure
minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements; and (2) how to
allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are
nearing completion as of the date such tariff provisions are filed with the
Commission.
The CAISO and PTOs have designed their tariff revisions to apply to
future large load interconnection requests, thus protecting existing commercial
arrangements. The CAISO and PTOs have not proposed imposing any of the
new large load requirements on operational loads or loads that completed
interconnection requests before the proposed effective date of these tariff
revisions. As such, the CAISO and PTOs can implement their tariff revisions
136
Id.
137
“We note that large loads, including data centers, are actively working with transmission
owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take interconnection and/or
transmission service from, the transmission system and may be at varying stages of that process.
We appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that process. We also
understand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large
loads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to
interconnecting to the transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.” Order to
Show Cause at P 123.
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expeditiously without disrupting existing commercial arrangements. Future large
load developers will have sufficient notice of these new rules while operational
and in-flight loads can proceed without disruption.
P 124:138 What, if any, potential impacts on regional and local transmission
planning would arise from the introduction of the new transmission services
discussed herein? For example, when planning for load growth, how would
transmission providers and planners account for flexible large loads’ potential
preference to take the new transmission services, including potential
uncertainties around the type, location, and quantity of such expected loads?
The CAISO and PTOs do not believe that flexible large loads will create
significant new challenges for regional and local transmission planning for two
reasons. First, flexibility is a tool, not a hindrance: flexible loads create more
opportunities for lower-cost, bespoke planning solutions. For FILI specifically, the
service is interim and tied to identified network upgrades, and the CAISO will
reflect FILI loads and applicable operating limits in its models and operating
procedures.” Second, the CAISO and local regulators are accustomed to
planning for flexible, non-traditional loads, including batteries, electric vehicle
charging stations, and homes with behind-the-meter solar and storage systems.
Flexible large loads will join this mélange, but as a contribution rather than a
challenge. The CAISO and PTO planning departments are also highly
accustomed to planning the grid around flexible resources, namely generating
facilities. This is especially true in the CAISO, where over 17,000 MW of energy
storage resources have interconnected in the past few years.
P 125:139 We direct respondents to include information regarding potential
structures for agreements between the transmission owner/provider and an
Eligible Customer to prevent unjust and unreasonable cost shifts among
transmission customers related to network upgrade costs required for large
loads. Further, please include information on what an appropriate minimum level
of cost recovery and financial security from an Eligible Customer would be under
any such agreements.
The CAISO responds to this issue in Section III.B, above.
138
“Today’s order proposes, as part of a potential replacement rate, to establish new
transmission services that recognize flexible large loads’ ability and willingness to limit their use of
the transmission system under certain conditions. As we assess this proposal, we also consider
how these new transmission services might affect other parts of CAISO’s Tariff and/or
processes.” Order to Show Cause at P 124.
139
“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and
unreasonable without the inclusion of cost shifting protections. We find that there may be a
variety of possible approaches to protect customers from significant cost shifts associated with
network upgrades triggered by large loads.” Order to Show Cause at P 125.
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P 126:140 To the extent stakeholders believe that specific characteristics of
providing transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads
warrant requirements beyond those contemplated here [for ATTs], we seek
further briefing.
The CAISO’s stakeholder process supported the CAISO’s proposed tariff
revisions memorializing its consideration of ATTs in transmission planning and
interconnection procedures. The CAISO has a long, proven track record of
considering ATTs and non-transmission solutions, as discussed in Section
III.A.3, above.
P 127:141 (a) To what extent would CAISO allow an interconnection customer’s
generating facility serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located
load to participate in CAISO’s energy and ancillary services market, and if CAISO
were to allow them to participate, what restrictions or mitigation would CAISO
apply?
The CAISO has not proposed excluding any loads or co-located resources
from using any participation model or providing any service for which they can
meet the existing tariff requirements. Loads large and small and co-located
generators already participate in the CAISO markets today and provide every
service, including capacity and ancillary services. Here again, the CAISO has a
proven track record of innovation to enable non-conventional resources to
access the CAISO markets.
P 127: (b) To the extent that CAISO plans for the electrically proximate large load
or large co-located load associated with an interconnection customer’s
140
“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and
unreasonable because it lacks clear and consistent provisions requiring the evaluation of
alternative transmission technologies. The order directs CAISO to explain whether the Tariff
remains just and reasonable without provisions that (1) require the evaluation of alternative
transmission technologies in studies for the provision of transmission service, using models that
are capable of evaluating the transmission system to accurately account for advanced
transmission technologies, in all instances, without the need for a request from the Eligible
Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load; and (2) if traditional network
upgrades are selected instead of alternative transmission technologies, inclusion in the study
report to the Eligible Customer seeking transmission service on behalf of large load of a
sufficiently clear demonstration of why alternative transmission technologies are not feasible (i.e.,
would not resolve reliability violations identified or meet the relevant planning criteria) or would
not result in lower costs or a faster timeline for accommodating the transmission service request.”
Order to Show Cause at P 126.
141
“Today’s order preliminarily finds that CAISO’s Tariff appears to be unjust and
unreasonable because it does not contain provisions allowing an interconnection customer
serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located load to seek generator
interconnection service(s) that reflects the operational dynamics of serving such loads.” Order to
Show Cause at P 127.
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generating facility for resource adequacy purposes, would CAISO account for the
generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located
load in the resource adequacy construct? If applicable, would CAISO allow the
generating facilities serving electrically proximate large load or large co-located
load to participate in CAISO’s capacity market? If so, would CAISO accredit
these generating facilities using the same method as other CAISO generating
facilities?
Nothing in the current CAISO tariff or the CAISO’s proposed tariff
revisions would make co-located generating facilities ineligible to provide
resource adequacy, nor affect their qualifying capacity. So long as the generating
facility continues to meet all portfolio, capacity, and must-offer obligations, and
respond to all CAISO dispatches, the CAISO does not have cause to remove or
reduce their resource adequacy value.
As the CAISO explained in its 30-day informational report and in Section
II.B.1, the CAISO does not administer a centralized forward capacity market. The
CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, establishes resource adequacy
requirements for CPUC jurisdictional load serving entities. CPUC-jurisdictional
load serving entities represent the vast majority of the load in the CAISO’s
service territory. Other local regulatory authorities within California, like municipal
utilities, establish these requirements for load serving entities under their
authority. The CAISO only sets default resource adequacy requirements if a local
regulatory authority elects not to establish their own. Moreover, the CPUC
establishes resource accreditation methodologies and counting rules used to
determine the qualifying capacity of resource types participating in the resource
adequacy program. As such, the CPUC and local regulatory authorities will
evaluate whether co-located or other loads affect generating facilities’ ability to
provide resource adequacy capacity.
V.
Order to Show Cause
The Commission should conclude the Order to Show Cause proceeding.
Only a small minority of comments in the Commission’s ANOPR proceeding
referenced the CAISO and the West, and fewer, if any, argued that the status
quo was unjust and unreasonable. As the CAISO describes above, a significant
portion of the Commission’s findings in the Order to Show Cause are based on
issues specific to other markets. Although no one in the West would argue that
the work is done, the CAISO and PTO filings demonstrate they will continue to
proactively evolve to meet the demands of large loads. The CAISO and
stakeholders are committed to the principles the Commission established in the
Order, and will continue to bring frequent, rapid enhancements to the
Commission for approval without the need for a Section 206 proceeding.
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VI.
Effective Date, Comment Period, Request for Waiver
With the exception of the two sections described below, the CAISO
requests that the Commission accept the tariff revisions contained in this filing
effective February 16, 2027 (i.e., 92 days after the date of this filing).142 Although
the CAISO is ready to implement its tariff revisions as soon as approved, the
CAISO is proposing a 92-day notice period to recognize that comments and
Commission review are largely occurring over the holiday season. Similarly, the
CAISO requests the Commission establish a 30-day deadline for comments on
the CAISO’s filing so stakeholders have additional time for the Thanksgiving
holiday.
The CAISO requests that the Commission accept the tariff revisions in
Sections 25.7.3 and 25.7.3.1 (scheduling coordinator requirements) effective
November 1, 2027, and the tariff revisions in Section 11.36 (settlements)
effective April 30, 2028. The CAISO respectfully requests waiver of the
Commission’s 120-day notice requirement to permit the requested November 1,
2027 effective date.143 Good cause exists to grant the requested waiver. The
tariff revisions will require software development, simulation, and scheduling
coordinator training. The CAISO’s proposed effective dates align with their
annual software releases for scheduling coordinator software in the Fall and
settlements software in the Spring. Importantly, the effective dates for these
technology changes should have little or no negative impact because the CAISO
software will be available before the new large loads subject to those
requirements will finish studies and construction.
142
February 14, 2027 is a weekend, and February 15, 2027 is a federal holiday, hence 92.
The CAISO may have other proceedings revising some of the sections in the instant filing. If
necessary, the CAISO will reconcile any overlapping revisions after Commission review.
143
Specifically, pursuant to section 35.11 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. §
35.11, the CAISO respectfully requests waiver of the notice requirement in section 35.3(a)(1) of
the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 35.3(a)(1), to allow the tariff revisions to go into effect
more than 120 days after submittal of this filing.
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VII.
Communications
Pursuant to Rule 203(b)(3) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure,144 the CAISO requests that all correspondence, pleadings, and other
communications regarding this filing should be directed to the following:
William H. Weaver
Assistant General Counsel
California Independent System
Operator Corporation
250 Outcropping Way
Folsom, CA 95630
Tel: (916) 608-1225
Fax: (916) 608-7296
bweaver@caiso.com
VIII.
Service
The CAISO has served copies of this filing on the CPUC, the CEC, and all
parties with scheduling coordinator agreements under the CAISO tariff. In
addition, the CAISO has posted a copy of the filing on the CAISO website.
IX.
Contents of Filing
In addition to this transmittal letter, this filing includes the following
attachments:
Attachment A
Clean CAISO tariff sheets incorporating this tariff
amendment
Attachment B
Red-lined document showing the revisions in this tariff
amendment
Attachment C
Final Proposal
Attachment D
Technical Working Group Proposal
Attachment E
Board Memorandum
144
18 C.F.R. § 385.203(b)(3).
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X.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the CAISO respectfully requests that the
Commission accept the CAISO’s proposed tariff revisions and conclude the
Order to Show Cause proceeding.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ William H. Weaver
Roger E. Collanton
General Counsel
William H. Weaver
Assistant General Counsel
California Independent System
Operator Corporation
Counsel for the California Independent
System Operator Corporation