ER27-25-000 · 2026-11-12 · Citizens Utility Board of Michigan and five other consumer advocates
Six MISO-state consumer advocates answer in support of the Organization of MISO States
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Midcontinent Independent System
Operator, Inc.
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)
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)
Docket No. ER27-25-000
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND ANSWER OF MISO CONSUMER
ADVOCATES
Pursuant to the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission or FERC), the Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin, the Citizens
Utility Board of Minnesota, the Citizens Utility Board of Michigan, the Illinois Attorney
General’s Office, the Iowa Office of Consumer Advocates, and the Minnesota Department of
Commerce (collectively, the MISO Consumer Advocates) respectfully submit this Motion for
Leave to Answer and Answer in support of the comments filed by the Organization of MISO
States, Inc. (OMS) concerning the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO)
proposed Large Load Addition Resource Study (LARS) process.1
I.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER
Although the Commission’s rules do not require it to accept answers to protests or
answers, the Commission has discretion to do so, and regularly does when the information
provided in the proposed answer will assist the Commission in its decision-making process.2
Good cause exists for the Commission to accept this Answer because it will “clarify the
issues in dispute” and will help the Commission “achieve a more complete and accurate record”
1 Notice of Intervention and Comments of the Organization of MISO States, Inc. at 1-3, Midcontinent Indep. Sys.
Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER27-25-000 (filed Oct. 23, 2026) (OMS Comments).
2 See, e.g., Nev. Power Co., 190 FERC ¶ 61,096 at P 11 (2025) (“Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of
Practice and Procedure . . . prohibits an answer to a protest or an answer unless otherwise ordered by the decisional
authority. We accept the answers filed in this proceeding because they have provided information that assisted us in
our decision-making process.”) (citing 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2)); Great Basin Transmission, LLC, 190 FERC ¶
61,110 at P 26 (2025) (“We accept Great Basin’s answer because it has provided information that assisted us in our
decision-making process.”)
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in this proceeding.3 Further, consideration of this Answer will not delay Commission action.4
The MISO Consumer Advocates thus request that the Commission accept this Answer and
consider their comments below.
II.
INTRODUCTION
The MISO Consumer Advocates represent residential and other ratepaying customers that
ultimately bear substantial portions of the costs of the generation and transmission systems
serving the MISO region. From that perspective, the Consumer Advocates agree with OMS that
coordinated study of sufficiently mature, electrically proximate Large Loads and associated
generation may provide meaningful efficiencies if appropriately designed.5
MISO has proposed safeguards intended to limit speculative projects and forecasted
demand, including application deposits, generator milestones, site-control requirements, binding
arrangements between associated generation and load, service deadlines, and continuing
responsibility for certain assigned Network Upgrade costs following withdrawal. Those
provisions should be required by FERC and adopted by MISO.6
But they do not resolve the central ratepayer risk raised by OMS: transmission
investments caused by a Large Load may ultimately be recovered from customers that neither
caused the investment nor receive commensurate benefits from it.
MISO’s own filing confirms that risk. MISO explains that certain constraints identified
through LARS may become Baseline Reliability Projects (BRPs) or Other Projects through the
MISO Transmission Expansion Plan (MTEP). The costs attributable to one Transmission
3 Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 93 FERC ¶ 61,017, at 61,036 (2000)
(accepting an answer that was “helpful in the development of the record”).
4 Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 FERC ¶ 61,198, at P 5 n.3 (2012) (finding good cause to accept an unauthorized
answer where it “[did] not delay the proceeding, may assist the Commission in understanding the issues raised, and
will ensure a complete record.”) (citations omitted).
5 OMS Comments at 3-5.
6 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Large Load Addition Resource Study Process, Transmittal Letter at 8-10,
16, 25, 34-36, Docket No. ER27-25-000 (filed Oct. 2, 2026) (MISO Transmittal).
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Customer seeking service on behalf of a single large load could then be allocated under existing
Tariff rules, likely to the broader load in the transmission pricing zone where the upgrade is
required. MISO expressly describes that result as a “cost shift” consistent with its existing
processes.7
That explanation reinforces rather than resolves the concern of the MISO Consumer
Advocates and OMS. The Commission instituted the related show-cause proceeding because it
preliminarily found that MISO’s existing Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable insofar as it
does not adequately protect transmission customers against cost shifts resulting from Large Load
integration. Compliance with an existing cost-allocation process therefore does not establish that
the resulting allocation is just and reasonable when a discrete but extraordinary Large Load such
as a data center has caused or materially accelerated the underlying investment.8
The Commission should condition acceptance of LARS on protections that preserve cost
causation, prevent construction of a project before the associated cost-recovery framework is
approved, require an actual electrically-proximate relationship between associated generation
and load, and provide appropriate review when material changes undermine the assumptions
supporting identified transmission investments. These conditions are necessary to prevent
stranded investment and to enable the States and consumer representatives to have the
information necessary to adopt rates that reflect cost causation.
III.
LARS SHOULD PRESERVE COST CAUSATION THROUGH
SUBSEQUENT PLANNING AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESSES
OMS appropriately recommends that costs caused by Large Load integration remain
attributable to the responsible Large Load regardless of whether the resulting transmission
7 MISO Transmittal at 12-14 (quotation at 13).
8 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at ¶¶ 66-83, 43-53 (2026) (Show Cause Order).
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solution subsequently proceeds through MTEP, Expedited Project Review, generator
interconnection, or another planning process.9
MISO’s proposed methodology demonstrates why that protection is necessary. Mitigation
to address violations observed only in the generation study generally would be assigned to the
Interconnection Customer as a Generator Interconnection Project. By contrast, mitigation to
address violations found in the transmission study, including common violations found in both
the load and generation studies, may become BRPs or Other Projects. That classification may
materially affect who ultimately pays for the investment.10
For ratepayer-protection purposes, the inquiry should begin with cost causation, not the
planning label subsequently assigned to the facility. If a LARS Associated Load causes or
materially accelerates the need for a transmission investment, or the investment would not be
made “but for” the Large Load, classification of that investment as a BRP, Other Project, or
another MTEP project should not erase the causal relationship or allow the costs to be assigned
to customers who did not cause and do not benefit from the investment.
The Commission should therefore require MISO to identify and preserve that relationship
throughout the planning process. Where a LARS participant causes or materially accelerates an
investment, the attributable costs should remain the responsibility of that participant except to the
extent MISO demonstrates that broader allocation is independently justified by identifiable
benefits to other customers. A key inquiry is whether the investment would have been made
“but for” the Large Load’s need.
This does not mean every facility identified in connection with LARS must automatically
be directly assigned to a Large Load. A project may address preexisting system needs or provide
9 OMS Comments at 5-7.
10 MISO Transmittal at 12, 31-32.
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substantial regional or local benefits. But broader allocation should follow from demonstrated
cost causation and benefits, not merely from a later change in project classification.11
IV.
LARS SHOULD NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL BEFORE THE
ASSOCIATED COST-RECOVERY PROTECTIONS ARE APPROVED
MISO acknowledges that the LARS process ultimately will require a pro forma cost-
shifting agreement and additional transmission-service provisions for Large Loads. Those
provisions, however, were not included in the LARS filing and remain under development for
submission in a separate proceeding. MISO nevertheless maintains that LARS can be
implemented without awaiting Commission consideration of those protections.12
The MISO Consumer Advocates respectfully disagree. The cost-recovery agreement is
not an incidental administrative component of LARS. It is the mechanism intended to protect
customers against one of the principal risks created by accelerated Large Load integration:
construction of transmission facilities in reliance on projected demand that is delayed, reduced,
or never materializes, and to provide supplemental payments when Network Upgrades needed
for a large load create cost shift to other customers.
The Show Cause Order preliminarily found that MISO’s Tariff may be deficient because
it lacks an adequate pro forma cost-recovery agreement addressing transmission investments
associated with Large Loads. The Commission specifically contemplated financial commitments
and credit support sufficient to reduce the risk that other transmission customers would be left
paying for those investments.13
The Commission should not approve the mechanism that accelerates transmission
investment decisions before it can evaluate the mechanism intended to protect customers from
the resulting financial exposure. Implementation of LARS should therefore be conditioned upon
11 See Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at ¶¶ 79-80, 51-52.
12 MISO Transmittal at 14, 19-20.
13 Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at ¶¶ 78-83, 49-53.
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Commission acceptance of an enforceable Large Load cost-recovery and financial-security
framework applicable to LARS participants, as well as mandatory operational rules including
voltage ride-through standards and power-swing mitigation requirements tailored to high-density
data center and large loads.
V.
MISO’S READINESS AND WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS DO NOT
RESOLVE THE COST-CAUSATION ISSUE
MISO’s proposed readiness and withdrawal provisions are meaningful. Among other
measures, MISO proposes a $250,000 nonrefundable application deposit, a $30,000/MW
generator milestone, 100 percent site control, binding generation-load arrangements, service
deadlines, financial-security requirements, and continuing responsibility for certain Network
Upgrade costs following withdrawal or termination.14
These provisions reduce the risk presented by speculative or insufficiently mature
projects. They do not, however, determine which costs should be assigned to a LARS participant
in the first instance.
Financial assurance and cost causation perform different functions. Financial assurance
helps ensure that an entity can satisfy costs properly assigned to it. Cost-causation rules
determine what costs should be assigned to that entity. If a Large Load-driven constraint is
classified for broader recovery before the financial security is utilized, even complete
enforcement of the financial security withdrawal provisions will not prevent the underlying cost
shift.
LARS requires both meaningful financial assurance and rules that preserve responsibility
for costs caused or materially accelerated by participating projects.
14 MISO Transmittal at 8-10, 15-17, 25, 33-36, 41-44.
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VI.
SAME-LRZ MEMBERSHIP DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE
ELECTRICAL PROXIMITY NECESSARY FOR SPECIALIZED
TREATMENT
OMS also correctly questions MISO’s use of LRZ boundaries to establish proximity
between a LARS Associated Load and associated generation. Facilities within one LRZ may
remain geographically and electrically remote from one another.15
MISO explains that the LRZ standard aligns with its resource-adequacy construct, avoids
capacity import and export limitations between LRZs, accommodates large or landlocked loads,
and allows multiple generation points of interconnection to support one load. Those
considerations may help determine whether generation contributes to resource adequacy within
an LRZ. They do not necessarily establish electrical proximity.16
The Show Cause Order described an “electrically proximate large load” in functional
transmission-system terms. The relevant question is whether the load is sufficiently close to the
generator’s requested point of interconnection that their combined transmission-system impact,
apart from the connecting facilities, is effectively the same as if they were located at the same
substation. The Commission identified a Large Load located no more than two substations from
the generator as one example.17
The MISO Consumer Advocates do not recommend converting that example into an
inflexible geographic rule. MISO may reasonably develop an approach suited to its transmission
system. But the standard should remain electrical, rather than merely geographic or
administrative.
MISO should be required to demonstrate through the LARS study that associated
generation materially offsets the Large Load at the relevant transmission constraints and that the
pair meets explicit quantitative engineering criteria—such as a maximum electrical
15 OMS Comments at 8.
16 MISO Transmittal at 10-11, 20-22, 28-29.
17 Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,212 at P 112, 67.
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distance/impedance threshold or a maximum physical distance of no more than two substations--
necessary to justify coordinated and expedited treatment. Same-LRZ membership should not be
considered “proximity” and should not alone establish eligibility.
VII.
MATERIAL CHANGES SHOULD TRIGGER REVIEW OF
CONTINUING NEED AND COST RESPONSIBILITY
MISO proposes that there will be no LARS restudy when an Associated Load withdraws.
The MISO Consumer Advocates recognize that routine comprehensive restudies could
undermine the speed and predictability LARS is intended to provide.18
But categorical elimination of restudy presents the opposite risk. MISO proposes to
evaluate the cumulative effects of participating projects and allow subsequent studies to rely on
transmission facilities identified in earlier LARS studies. Withdrawal, material downsizing, or
failure of a participating load or generator may therefore change the need for, scope of, timing
of, or beneficiaries of an identified transmission investment. Large load projects that require
hundreds of megawatts of power can materially affect the need for transmission investment and
changes in those projects should be readily incorporated into transmission planning.
The Commission need not require automatic repetition of the entire LARS study. It
should instead require a materiality review following a withdrawal, material downsizing, or other
significant change. MISO should determine and document whether the change:
1. eliminates or materially reduces the need for an identified upgrade;
2. changes its appropriate scope or timing;
3. alters the projects responsible for the underlying constraint; or
4. materially affects the proper allocation of costs.
Where the change is material, MISO should perform a targeted restudy sufficient to
confirm the continuing need, appropriate scope, and cost responsibility for the affected facilities.
18 MISO Transmittal at 16, 38, 48.
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VIII. TRANSPARENCY AND PERIODIC REVIEW ARE NECESSARY TO
PROTECT RATEPAYERS
The MISO Consumer Advocates support OMS’s recommendations concerning public
reporting and a five-year sunset.19
Transparency should permit regulators and consumer advocates to trace a LARS-driven
transmission investment from the initial study through MTEP approval, reclassification,
construction, final cost determination, allocation, and recovery. Without that traceability,
stakeholders may be unable to determine whether a facility originally driven by a LARS
participant later appears under a different project designation or rate treatment. Transparency
and traceability are thus required to ensure proper cost allocation to protect existing customers.
MISO should therefore assign a persistent identifier or use an equivalent mechanism to
preserve the connection between a LARS project and the facilities it causes or materially
accelerates.
A five-year sunset and formal review are also appropriate because MISO proposes LARS
as a permanent process from its inception.20
Before continuing LARS, MISO should report at least:
• LARS applications, completed projects, and withdrawals;
• forecast and actual Large Load additions;
• transmission investments identified through LARS;
• initial and subsequent project classifications;
• estimated and final costs;
• amounts recovered from LARS participants and other customers;
• withdrawal-related materiality reviews and restudies; and
• measurable effects on MISO’s ordinary generator interconnection process.
If LARS produces the efficiencies MISO anticipates while protecting existing customers,
continuation should be supportable by that evidence. If it does not, customers should not be
locked into a permanent process adopted before its effects are known.
19 OMS Comments at 8-10.
20 MISO Transmittal at 11.
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IX.
CONCLUSION
The MISO Consumer Advocates support OMS’s central position. Coordinated study of
mature Large Loads and genuinely associated, electrically proximate generation may provide
meaningful benefits. MISO has also proposed valuable project-readiness and financial-
commitment requirements that should remain part of any LARS framework the Commission
accepts.
But MISO’s filing confirms that LARS can produce cost shifts under existing Tariff
mechanisms, proposes implementation before the associated cost-recovery agreement is before
the Commission, relies on an LRZ construct that does not necessarily demonstrate electrical
proximity, and categorically eliminates restudies following load withdrawal.
The Commission should condition acceptance and implementation of LARS upon:
1. assignment of cost responsibility where a LARS participant causes or materially
accelerates a transmission investment;
2. prior Commission acceptance of an enforceable Large Load cost-recovery and financial-
security framework including technical power-quality operational rules;
3. an engineering-based demonstration of electrical proximity bounded by quantitative
impedance or substation distance criteria;
4. materiality review and targeted restudy following material project changes;
5. transparent tracking of LARS-driven investments through planning and cost recovery; and
6. a five-year sunset followed by a public, data-driven review.
These conditions would preserve the potential benefits of coordinated study while
adhering to a basic consumer-protection principle: customers should not bear transmission costs
or development risks merely because an expedited process causes those costs to move into a
category subject to broader recovery.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John Liskey
John Liskey
General Counsel
Citizens Utility Board of Michigan
921 N. Washington Ave
Lansing, MI 48906
(517) 913-5105
John.liskey@cubofmichigan.org
For the Citizens Utility Board of Michigan
/s/ Anthony A. Alvarez
Anthony A. Alvarez
Utilities Regulation Engineer 2
Iowa Attorney General
Office of the Consumer Advocate
1375 East Court Avenue
Des Moines, IA 50319
Anthony.Alvarez@oca.iowa.gov
/s/ Jennifer C. Easler
Jennifer C. Easler
Attorney
Iowa Attorney General
Office of the Consumer Advocate
1375 East Court Avenue
Des Moines, IA 50319
jennifer.easler@oca.iowa.gov
For the Iowa Office of the Consumer Advocate
/s/ Corey Singletary
Corey Singletary
Director, Regulatory Affairs
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
625 N. Segoe Rd., Suite 101
Madison, WI 53705
singletary@cubwi.org
/s/ Daniel Narvey
Daniel Narvey
General Counsel
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
625 N. Segoe Rd., Suite 101
Madison, WI 53705
narvey@cubwi.org
For the Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
/s/ Brandon Crawford
Brandon Crawford
Regulatory Advocate
Citizens Utility Board of Minnesota
332 Minnesota St., Suite W1360
Saint Paul, MN 55101
brandonc@cubminnesota.org
/s/ Samuel C. Lukens
Samuel C. Lukens
Assistant Attorney General
Public Utilities Bureau
Office of the Illinois Attorney General
115 South LaSalle Street, 25th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60603
samuel.lukens@ilag.gov
For the Citizens Utility Board of Minnesota
For the Office of the Illinois Attorney General
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/s/ Sydnie Lieb
Sydnie Lieb
Assistant Commissioner of Regulatory
Affairs, Energy Resources Division
Minnesota Department of Commerce
85 7th Place East, Suite 280
Saint Paul, MN 55101
Sydnie.Lieb@state.mn.us
For the Minnesota Department of Commerce
Dated: November 11, 2026
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated
on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding.
Dated at this 11th day of November 2026
/s/ Daniel Narvey
Daniel Narvey
General Counsel
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
625 N. Segoe Rd., Suite 101
Madison, WI 53705
narvey@cubwi.org